not but encourage him to yield to his baser inclinations, and inflict the injury. As it was obviously adapted to produce this result. it is to be presumed that this was one of the inducements which made him desire its execution. The law does not countenance such agreements. 'Any contract between the parties having for its object the dissolution of the marriage contract, or facilitating that result, . . . is void as contra bonos mores.'

Our attention has not been called to any authority prescribing a different rule than that laid down in the cases above cited. The only suggestion we have received from appellant, offering any reason why the doctrine enunciated in these cases should not be followed, is that in the present action the contract was made prior to marriage, while those considered in the authorities above cited were made subsequent to marriage. We can see no good reason why any such distinction should be made. If contracts of this nature tend to facilitate the dissolution of the marriage relation, then they should not be sanctioned by the courts, irrespective of the time of their execution. If by such an agreement "the husband is left free to inflict upon his wife the most grievous marital wrongs, such as would compel her to obtain a divorce, and at the same time he could rest secure that the payment of the amount stipulated in the contract will satisfy all her claims against him of a pecuniary nature," would the situation of the parties be any different if the agreement had been made prior rather than subsequent to marriage? Would such a provision be any less a menace to the marriage relation, if made prior rather than subsequent to its consummation? If the existence of such an agreement would "encourage the husband to yield to his baser inclinations to commit marital offenses against his wife," is there any good reason to believe that his conduct would be less reprehensible from the mere fact that the instrument, by which he had sought thus to protect himself, was an antenuptial rather than a postnuptial agreement? We believe that all these questions should be answered in the negative, and that contracts like the one involved in the present action are a menace to the marriage relation and should not be tolerated, and this irrespective of the time when the same might have been executed in reference to the time of the marriage. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the con

tract in this action is absolutely void, and its existence furnished no ground that would preclude the court from making the order appealed from.

We are further of the opinion that no good reason appears why the order appealed from should be disturbed by this court. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in making the same.

The order appealed from is hereby affirmed.

Conrey, P. J., concurred.

Mr. Justice Houser, deeming himself disqualified, took no part in the above decision.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on July 5, 1923.

[Crim. No. 984. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-May 9, 1923.]

In the Matter of the Proceeding for the Disbarment of M. O. GRAVES, Attorney and Counselor at Law.

[1] SUPERSEDEAS-SUSPENSION FROM PRACTICE OF LAW-APPEAL.-A writ of supersedeas will not issue to stay a judgment of suspension from the practice of law pending appeal from such judgment.

[2] ID. SELF-EXECUTING JUDGMENTS.

Supersedeas will not issue where the judgment does not command or permit any acts to be done, or where it is not of a nature to be actively and affirmatively enforced by execution or otherwise.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Supersedeas to stay a judgment of suspension from the practice of law. Writ denied.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

M. O. Graves, in pro. per., and Wheaton A. Gray for Petitioner.

Frank C. Collier for Respondent.

FINLAYSON, P. J.-This is an application for a supersedeas. By a judgment of the superior court for Los Angeles County, made January 22, 1923, petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year. From that judgment he has taken an appeal to this court, and now asks for a supersedeas to stay the judgment of suspension pending his appeal.

[1] This is not a case for the issuance of supersedeas. The judgment of suspension acts directly against petitioner without the necessity for process or proceedings of any kind for its enforcement. (Tyler v. Presley, 72 Cal. 290 [13 Pac. 856].) It is true that the power to issue the writ of supersedeas is inherent in an appellate court, but it will only be issued to restrain proceedings upon the judgment from which the appeal has been taken. Its effect is merely to stay proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment. It does not reverse, suspend, supersede, or impair the force of the judgment itself. That remains in all respects the same. [2] The general rule, therefore, is that supersedeas will not issue where the judgment does not command or permit any act to be done, or where it is not of a nature to be actively and affirmatively enforced by execution or otherwise. (Dulin v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 98 Cal. 304 [33 Pac. 123]; Tyler v. Presley, supra; Hoppe v. Hoppe, 99 Cal. 536 [34 Pac. 222]; Taylor v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 23 [185 Pac. 994]; Wood v. Board of Commrs., 50 Cal. App. 594 [195 Pac. 739].) Here the judgment of suspension is self-executing. There is no further action to be taken thereon by the court below, and consequently nothing upon which the supersedeas can act.

The application is denied.

Works, J., concurred.

CRAIG, J., Concurring.-I concur. During the argument counsel for petitioner insisted that, although supersedeas may not issue to suspend the operation of a self-executing judgment, it should issue in this case because a contempt proceeding might be instituted should he practice law during the pendency of this appeal. A contempt proceeding would be independent from, although of course an outgrowth of, the disbarment case. The possibility of such a

proceeding does not make the judgment of suspension any less self-exccuting, nor does it create a ground for the issuance of a supersedeas. (Wolf v. Gall, 174 Cal. 140 [162 Pac. 115].)

[Civ. No. 4169. Second Appellate District, Division One.-May 9, 1923.]

JAMES F. BRYSON et al., Respondents, v. ISAAC H. BRYSON et al., Appellants.

[1] CORPORATIONS QUALIFICATION OF DIRECTOR STOCKHOLDER.-A director of a corporation, at least as between him and the corporation, must be a stockkholder therein.

INTENT EVIDENCE

[2] ID.-OWNERSHIP TRANSFER DISQUALIFICATION AS DIRECTOR.-A certificate of stock is only evidence of ownership; and an officer and director of a corporation, who owns only one qualifying share of stock, may transfer the same without having the certificate in his possession, and his act in issuing a new certificate to the transferee indicates, both as an individual owner and as an officer of the corporation, that a transfer was intended, and by such transfer he divests himself of all title to the stock and renders himself ineligible to be a director, notwithstanding the original certificate in his name is not surrendered to the corporation and canceled.

[3] ID.-DELIVERY OF STOCK TO TRUSTEE-ELECTIONS-VIOLATION OF TRUST.-Where all the stock of a corporation is delivered to a trustee and the trust agreement provides that the stock shall be voted "as a unit at all stockholders' meetings" of the corporation "that are held during the existence of the trust for the election of directors of said corporation for the persons in office as directors at the time such meeting or meetings are held," the election by the trustee of a director who is not at the time a director of the corporation is an act not in conformity with the terms of the trust and is outside the authority of the trustee.

[4] TRUSTS REDUCTION TO WRITING PRIOR DECLARATIONS. The declarations of the trustor to his trustee in relation of the trust, made before the trust has been accepted, are to be deemed as a part of the declaration of trust, but when a declaration of trust is made in writing, all previous declarations by the same trustor are merged therein.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Bertin A. Weyl, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

John F. Keogh, C. C. Mishler, E. W. Sargent, E. J. Vaughn and G. B. Colby for Appellants.

Newby & Palmer and O. L. Anderson for Respondents.

HOUSER, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in an action brought under section 315 of the Civil Code to declare illegal and void the election of Isaac H. Bryson and Joseph S. Bryson as directors of the Bryson Estate Company.

Considering the fact that Joseph S. Bryson is one of the plaintiffs in the action and is a respondent herein, the appeal need be considered only with reference to the election of Isaac H. Bryson.

In the month of May, 1907, the Bryson Estate Company was organized as a corporation with a capital stock of $600,000, divided into 60,000 shares of the par value of ten dollars per share. One share each was subscribed by and issued to Isaac H. Bryson and six other persons, and those seven persons composed the board of directors for the first year of the life of the corporation. By-laws for the corporation were adopted which, among other things, provided that directors of the corporation should be elected by ballot at the annual meeting of the stockholders, and that they were to serve for one year and until their successors were elected. The by-laws also provided that shares of stock of the corporation might be transferred by the holder thereof by indorsement of the certificate of stock, but that no transfer should be valid until the certificate was surrendered and acknowledgment of such transfer entered on the books of the corporation.

Contemporaneously with the organization of the Bryson Estate Company, John Bryson, Sr., and Evaline Bryson, his wife, being the owners of a piece of property known as the Bryson Block, located in the city of Los Angeles, executed a declaration of trust wherein they agreed to grant to the Bryson Estate Company the real property upon which the Bryson Block was located. Among other things, the