the property by evil designs, the court said: "Findings upon these aspects of the litigation were not necessary in view of the judgment that there had been a valid delivery of the deeds to the plaintiffs in escrow and that defendant then had full knowledge of that transaction. The determination of the last-named issues controlled the judgment. This court will not reverse a judgment because of failure to make findings which would not necessitate a different judgment, even if they were made and entered in the appellant's favor. (Citing cases.)" And see also, Fritz v. Mills, 170 Cal. 449 [150 Pac. 375]; National Bank of San Mateo v. Whitney, 40 Cal. App. 276 [180 Pac. 845]; Berry v. Crowell, 55 Cal. App. 534 [203 Pac. 835]. Appellant's objections to certain other findings by the court, which ordinarily might be of some moment, also lose their importance because of the fact that they, too, revolve around and are necessarily controlled by the main issue as to whether or not any contract was ever made between the Irrigation District and the Laguna Company. The judge of the trial court refused to admit in evidence a certain exhibit offered by intervener for the purpose of showing what had been done by it under its contract with the United States government, in order that the fact might be established that the cancellation of the contract could have been resisted with likelihood of success. But assuming as true all that was claimed would be shown by the exhibit, as well as its possible result on the question of cancellation of the contract by the United States government in view of the decision by the court as to the nonexistence of any contract between the Irrigation District and the Laguna Company, such evidence would be immaterial. [5] Another point urged by appellant relates to the fact that over the objection of intervener the court, under the provision of section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Stats. 1917, p. 58), permitted certain officers and directors of the defendant Irrigation District to be ex amined by the plaintiffs as under cross-examination. The most that can be said against even the cross-examination of one's own witness is that he is thereby permitted to answer leading questions, and it is well understood that answers to leading questions do not deserve, nor are they accorded, the same credence as is given to answers to questions not in that category. It is purely a matter of the weight of such testimony, and the objection to such questions relates more to the weight of the evidence to be received, rather than to its admissibility. If, under the pleadings in this case and the admissions and stipulation of counsel representing respectively the plaintiffs and defendant Irrigation District, the examination of the officers of the Irrigation District as under cross-examination amounted to nothing more than asking leading questions of such officers, the rule is well settled that such a course may be pursued, dependent upon the discretion of the court. That such discretion was carefully exercised is manifest by an inspection of the record. herein. Assuming, without deciding, that in the circumstances of this case the plaintiffs did not have the right, under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to examine the officers and the directors of the defendant Irrigation District as under cross-examination, still the course pursued by the trial court resulted in no prejudice to the intervener company. There appears to have been no miscarriage of justice. The judgment is affirmed. Conrey, P. J., and Curtis, J., concurred. A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on July 23, 1923. [Civ. No. 2618. Third Appellate District.-May 24, 1923.] WILLIAM H. BOSSEN, Respondent, v. F. E. BEAN, Appellant. - Where the record [1] APPEAL-ABSENCE OF PLEADINGS DISMISSAL, on appeal does not contain a copy of the pleadings upon which the findings of the trial court were made and the judgment entered, the appellate court is not furnished with a transcript, and under rule 2 of the supreme court it is proper to dismiss the appeal. [2] PLEADING-WAIVER OF ERROR.-Error of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer or in striking out portions of a first amended answer is waived by the filing of a second amended answer and going to trial upon the issue raised thereby. [3] APPEAL-JUDGMENT-ROLL-NOTICE OF MOTION TO STRIKE OUT. — A notice of motion to strike out is not part of the judgment-roll and it cannot be considered on appeal in the absence of a bill of exceptions. [4] ID. BURDEN OF SHOWING ERROR INCOMPLETE RECord. It is incumbent upon the appellant to show prejudicial error to justify a reversal of the judgment, and the appellate court cannot say that the trial court erred in sustaining a demurrer to defendant's first amended answer where the second amended answer is not contained in the record on appeal. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yuba County. Eugene P. McDaniel, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. J. E. Ebert for Respondent. BURNETT, J.-The appeal is from the judgment and purports to be upon the judgment-roll, but the judgmentroll is not complete since it does not contain the second amended answer, one of the pleadings upon which the parties went to trial. Indeed, said answer does not appear in the transcript at all and there has been no suggestion of diminution of the record. The action was brought to recover the possession of a certain number of cattle or their value in case delivery could not be had. The original answer and the first amended answer are printed in the transcript, from which it appears that defendant admitted the ownership of plaintiff, but claimed the right to the possession of the cattle by virtue of the assignment of a chattel mortgage, of a judgment for a certain amount and of a claim for pasturage. Plaintiff demurred to each of said answers on various grounds and also moved to strike out certain portions thereof. The motion was granted and the demurrer in each instance was sustained. Instead of relying upon his first amended answer, appellant chose to file another pleading, and hence this second amended answer and the complaint are the only pleadings that could be considered by this court (Colton Land & Water Co. v. Swartz, 99 Cal. 278 [33 Pac. 878]; Bray v. Lowery, 163 Cal. 256 [124 Pac. 1004]), but, of course, we cannot consider this second amended answer becouse wo do not know its character or contents. [1] Indeed, since the record does not contain a copy of the pleadings upon which the findings were made and the judgment entered it cannot be said that we have been furnished with a transcript, and under rule 2 (176 Pac. vii) and the decisions of the supreme court it would seem proper to dismiss the appeal. (Hart v. Plum, 14 Cal. 148; San Francisco & N. P. R. Co. v. Anderson, 77 Cal. 297 [19 Pac. 517].) [2] Moreover, if there was any error in sustaining the demurrer or in striking out portions of the first amended answer, it was waived by the filing of the second amended answer and going to trial upon the issue raised thereby. (Ganceart v. Henry, 98 Cal. 281 [33 Pac. 92]; Brittan v. Oakland Bk. of Savings, 112 Cal. 1 [44 Pac. 339].) [3] In addition, as to the motion to strike out, it is impossible to determine from the printed record what portions were stricken out, since the notice of motion designated the portions by page and line of the amended answer as filed and not as printed, and there is no bill of exceptions in the case. Besides, the notice of motion is no part of the judgment-roll and we cannot consider it in the absence of a bill of exceptions. (Brown v. Canty, 31 Cal. App. 183 [159 Pac. 1056]; Overton v. Noyes, 177 Cal. 450 [170 Pac. 1110].) [4] It is incumbent, of course, upon appellant to show prejudicial error to justify a reversal of the judgment, and assuming, for the sake of argument, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, we cannot say that it was prejudicial when we are not apprised of the contents of the second amended answer and of the evidence upon which the case was tried. We may add, though, that an examination of said first amended answer and the demurrer thereto convinces us that the trial court was right in the ruling. No motion has been made to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the transcript is imperfect, but, at any rate, since no error has been shown, the judgment must be affirmed and it is so ordered. Finch, P. J., and Hart, J., concurred. [Crim. No. 685. Third Appellate District.-May 24, 1923.] THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD LENNERT, Appellant. [1] CRIMINAL LAW-BURGLARY EVIDENCE-APPEAL. On this appeal from a judgment of conviction of burglary and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, although there was no appearance for appellant in the appellate court and no argument submitted in his behalf, the transcript was examined but no error was found, and the evidence was found amply sufficient to justify the conviction. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Napa County and from an order denying a new trial. Percy S. King, Judge. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. No appearance for Appellant. U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and J. Charles Jones, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent. BURNETT, J.-Appellant was convicted of three separate acts of burglary charged in one information in different counts and he has appealed from the judgment and an order denying his motion for a new trial. [1] There has been no appearance for him in this court nor has any argument been submitted in his behalf. We have, however, carefully examined the transcript and have. found no error therein. The motion for a new trial was made solely upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict, but it was promptly denied by |