cast upon the defendants by the presumption in question as amounting to more than a demand upon them, in sustaining the burden, to introduce such evidence only as would create a reasonable doubt of their guilt of the offense charged. The court explicitly instructed the jury that the burden of proving the guilt of the defendants was upon the people and that "every essential fact, or every essential to a conviction, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty"; that upon the plea entered by the defendants of not guilty to the indictment, the presumption of innocence arose and that said presumption "accompanies the defendants throughout the trial, and goes with you in your retirement to the jury-room to deliberate upon your verdict. It will avail to acquit the defendants unless it be overcome by sufficient proof of guilt. You must examine the evidence by the light of that presumption, and unless, upon examining it, you find it sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of innocence, to remove it and, moreover, to satisfy you of the defendants' guilt beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, they would be entitled to an acquittal at your hands." Again, in another part of the charge, the court further instructed the jury that "the law presumes every man to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt and this presumption attaches at every stage of the case, and to every fact essential to a conviction." These instructions certainly were sufficient to convey to the mind of any intelligent man or woman that the prima facie presumption arising upon a proof of certain facts in connection with the transaction culminating in the execution of the alleged conspiracy does not have the effect of attaching to the defendants any further burden than that of creating by the introduction of testimony in rebuttal of the presumption a reasonable doubt of their guilt.

The court's action in giving and refusing to give other instructions is criticised. It is not necessary to give these assignments special attention herein for the reason that the court's charge covered every important principle pertinent to the case. Every principle embraced in the instructions proposed by the defendants but rejected by the court was covered by the court's charge. The criticism of certain other given instructions than the one embracing a statement

of certain provisions of the Alien Land Law and above considered, we find, upon a careful examination thereof, is without merit.

[12] 3. The court allowed the district attorney to introduce before the trial jury certain alleged statements made by the defendant Cockrill before the grand jury relating to the transaction herein involved. This testimony was limited in its effect to the defendant Cockrill. Counsel for the defendants stated that they had no objection to offer to the introduction of any portions of the statement made by Cockrill before the grand jury which involved the facts of said transaction. It transpired, however, that the alleged "statement" consisted entirely of a discussion between the district. attorney, his assistant, Cockrill, and some of the grand jurors as to the meaning of the several provisions of the Alien Land Law. To these matters counsel for the defendants vigorously objected. But the court, while stating that they involved mere matters of argument as to the meaning of the law, permitted them to go into the record and before the jury, saying that they were only argumentative and so were innocuous in their effect upon the rights of the defendants and were so intermingled with certain facts testified to by Cockrill before the grand jury which the people were entitled to introduce before the trial jury that they could not be segregated from the facts without much waste of time and great inconvenience. We have given this assignment serious consideration and thus have not been able to persuade ourselves that the introduction of those matters before the jury exercised any baleful effect upon the rights of the accused. Of course, those matters should not have been permitted to be introduced into the case and should have been stricken from the record, but the opinions expressed by Cockrill, the district attorney, his assistant and some of the jurors as to the meaning of the provisions of the Alien Land Law corresponded in a measure with the statement of the law by the court in its charge to the jury. Besides, the record shows that counsel on both sides, in their arguments before the jury, read and gave their respective interpretations of the provisions of said law applicable to the case. There was no expression by either the district attorney, his assistant or any of the grand jurors contained in the alleged statement of Cockrill before the grand jury upon

the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendants. Moreover, Cockrill, when asked by the district attorney or his assistant or any grand juror a question calling for his opinion as to the meaning of certain provisions of the law, invariably answered and gave his conception of the meaning of said provisions. While these are our views with respect to the admission of the matters referred to in evidence, we are not prepared to deny that there is some force in a suggestion made by the court, when ruling upon the question of the admissibility of Cockrill's testimony before the grand jury, that the discussion of the provisions of the Alien Land Law by the parties named before the grand jury and thus securing the opinion of Cockrill regarding certain provisions thereof might have been construed to disclose his real state of mind with regard to the transaction-that is to say, it may well be regarded as tending to reveal in a measure his real intentions relative to that matter. In that view the discussion between Cockrill and others before the grand jury as to the meaning of certain provisions of the law would be admissible in evidence at the trial as against him.

[13] It is lastly contended that the evidence is wholly insufficient to support the verdict, particularly as to the defendant Cockrill. We have above given herein the substance of the evidence introduced by the people and directly addressed to the proof of the charge. Laying aside, for the moment, the instruction containing the provision of the act as to the prima facie presumption arising upon the proof of certain facts or the doing of certain acts, it is clear to our minds that the evidence directly presented by the people was such that it would be an unwarranted interference with the province of the jury for a reviewing court to declare that the conclusion arrived at by the jury was not fortified by sufficient proof. In addition to the admitted facts (above referred to) that Akada furnished the money which was paid on the purchase price and that Cockrill took the contract of sale in his name, is the testimony of the Souzas that, prior to the time at which Cockrill appeared in the transaction, Akada undertook to negotiate the purchase of the property for himself. Explicitly did B. C. Souza so testify, and further testified that he (Souza) told Akada at that time that he could not sell the land to an alien Japanese and advised Akada to consult an attorney. It further ap

pears from the testimony of said Souza (and this is not contradicted) that immediately upon the execution of the contract of sale and the payments required thereby being made, Akada himself took possession of the property, although the contract was still in Cockrill's name. And here we may pause to suggest that the jury were well justified in viewing (and we may assume in support of the verdict that they did so view it) the fact of the taking possession of the land by Akada immediately upon the execution of the contract of sale as reflecting the purpose or intent of the defendants. while prosecuting the negotiations for the purchase of the land; that the real intention of the defendants was to purchase the land for Akada and to take it in Cockrill's name as a mere camouflage of such intent. It also appears that no steps had been taken by Cockrill or Akada after the execution of the agreement and Akada took possession of the property to secure the appointment of a guardian for the latter's children. As stated above, Akada, in a conversation with certain parties, after the contract was executed, but prior to the execution of the conveyance of the land according to the terms of the agreement, declared that the money with which certain payments were made on the purchase price belonged to his children, the eldest of whom. was about seven years of age, but could not, or at least did not, make a satisfactory explanation as to where or how they kept the money. He also stated that he was going to live on the land with the boy and "run it." Then there was the testimony of the Souzas that, prior to the execution of the agreement of sale, Cockrill said to them that he had consulted the district attorney of Sonoma County about that particular case, and that that official told him (Cockrill) that it was a valid transaction, and, as seen, the denial of the district attorney that he ever gave any such advice to Cockrill or that the latter ever consulted him about said transaction.

Thus it is clear that there was sufficient evidence introduced by the people, if credited or believed by the jury, as the verdict shows that it was, to warrant a verdict of guilty as to both defendants. It is true that Cockrill's testimony tended to contradict the bad faith or any wrongful motive at the bottom of the transaction which is to be implied from the testimony presented by the people. It is

also true that Cockrill explained, as to the statement of the Souzas that he said to them that he had consulted the district attorney about this particular case, that, when speaking to the Souzas of his interview with said official, he had reference, and so explained to the Souzas, to another and entirely different case. But it was obviously with the jury to accept the stories of the Souzas on all the matters as to which they testified and reject the testimony of Cockrill as to any matters to which he testified. This they evidently did.

But, as we have seen, a prima facie presumption of guilt arose upon the uncontradicted fact that Akada, being an alien, ineligible to become a citizen of the United States, furnished the money with which payments upon the purchase price of the land were made. If there had been no other testimony introduced after the proof or the admission of this fact-if, in other words, the defense had introduced no proof whatever or made no attempt to make a showing in rebuttal of the presumption referred to-it would have been. the duty of the jury under the law to return a verdict of guilty. As we have shown, however, there is plenty of testimony in the record which strengthens and supports the presumption.

We have now given painstaking consideration to the points advanced against the validity of the judgment and the order appealed from and, as must be apparent from the foregoing discussion, have found no just legal reason for disturbing either.

The judgment and the order are, accordingly, affirmed.

Burnett, J., and Finch, P. J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on June 28, 1923.

Seawell, J., having been trial judge, did not participate in denial of hearing in supreme court.