INSTRUCTIONS. See Alien Land Law, 5, 10; Contracts, 21; Criminal Law, 10, 12, 13, 22-24, 27, 28, 38, 42, 57-60, 75, 77, 8284; Wills, 16, 18-20. INSURANCE. See Fire Insurance. INTENT. See Agency, 2; Criminal Law, 15; Deeds, 1, 2; Wills, 2-4, 27. INTENTION. See Wills, 6, 21. INTEREST. 1. SALE OF GOODS -DEFERRED PAYMENTS CONTRACTS. The contract for the sale to defendant of certain labels manufactured by plaintiff, which was entered into prior to November 5, 1918, having bound defendant to pay plaintiff the amount due upon delivery as specified therein within a stated time after delivery had been made, under section 1917 of the Civil Code interest began to run upon the deferred payments, at the rate of seven per cent per annum, from the date such payments became due.-Western Lithograph Co. v. Vanomar Producers, 644. 2. TERMINATION OF LIABILITY TENDER EXCESSIVE DEMANDS.-The only way in which the defendant could have avoided or terminated his liability to pay interest under such agreement would have been to have made a tender of payment of the whole amount of the principal and interest due up to the date of such tender, and he was not excused from making such tender by the mere fact that plaintiff was demanding a much larger sum than was actually due, basing such demand upon an alleged subsequent agreement which the court found to be without consideration and void.-Id. See Criminal Law, 62; Sales, 10; Wills, 33. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 1. UNLAWFUL POSSESSION - VOID MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE. A city ordinance making it unlawful to have intoxicating liquor in one's possession, and prescribing a greater penalty for such offense than that prescribed by the state law, is void.-Olivieri v. Police Court of Bakersfield, 91. JURISDICTION -PRO 2. SUFFICIENT COMPLAINT UNDER STATE LAW HIBITION. A writ of prohibition will not issue to restrain a police court from proceeding with the trial of a defendant charged with unlawfully having intoxicating liquor in his possession, contrary to the provisions of a specified municipal ordinance, which is void, where the complaint in the action, although purporting to state an offense under the ordinance, does in fact state an offense under INTOXICATING LIQUORS (Continued). the state law and over which such police court has jurisdiction.— Id. 3. VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE - - DEFECTIVE COMPLAINT HABEAS CORPUS.-Where the complaint in a prosecution before a justice's court for a violation of a municipal liquor ordinance does not wholly fail to state a cause of action, but at most is merely defective, in that it does not specifically allege that the intoxicating liquor was sold for beverage purposes, such defect might be remedied by demurrer or by motion in arrest of judgment; but where such objection is not raised in the justice's court, or in the superior court on appeal from the judgment of conviction, and such judgment is affirmed, the defendant is not entitled to her release upon habeas corpus.-In re Hayward, 177. INTOXICATION. See Criminal Law, 1, 3, 4, 21, 23. ISSUES. See Broker's Commissions, 20; Sales, 10. JUDGMENTS. 1. OFFSET-OWNERSHIP-EFFECT OF EX PARTE ORDERS.-Where the judgment debtors in an action instituted in Los Angeles County acquire, by assignment, a judgment against the judgment creditor in an action instituted in the city and county of San Francisco, and the superior court of the latter county, by an ex parte order, directs that the property of the judgment debtor in the local action, to wit, the judgment in his favor in Los Angeles County, be applied to the payment of the local judgment "and that the amount so applied be and the same hereby is credited upon said judgment" rendered in his favor in Los Angeles County, that order is not conclusive upon the assignees of the judgment rendered in Los Angeles County, but merely affects the interest in said judgment remaining in their assignor.-Murphy v. Davids, 63. 2. OWNERSHIP APPEAL PRESUMPTION. Said judgment debtors, relying upon such ex parte order, having applied to the superior court of Los Angeles County for an order compelling the entry of satisfaction of the judgment entered against them by that court, and the assignees of that judgment having intervened and set up their title thereto, and said court having denied the motion of the judgment debtors, it must be assumed on appeal from the order denying the motion that said court found the facts alleged by the interveners to be true and that the judgment creditor had no interest in said judgment which could be applied in satisfaction of the judgment against him in the city and county of San Francisco. Id. -- 3. FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE VACATION OF DEFAULT-ABSENCE D FRAUD RELIANCE UPON PROMISE OF MORTGAGEE · - PLEADING-IN JUDGMENTS (Continued). SUFFICIENT COMPLAINT.-In an action by a mortgagor to set aside a default judgment rendered against him in an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage brought by assignees, who took the assignment of the mortgage for a valuable consideration and without notice that it was executed for the mere purpose of furnishing credit to the mortgagee, the complaint fails to state & cause of action where no fraud is alleged against defendants and the relief is sought on the sole ground that the mortgagee failed to keep his promise with the mortgagor to discharge the mortgage and save the mortgagor harmless.-Fisher v. George, 399. 4. ACTION TO FORECLOSE MORTGAGE - DEATH OF DEFENDANT AFTER OPINION RENDERED-AUTHORITY TO RENDER JUDGMENT.-Where an action against a husband and wife to foreclose certain mortgages is submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, in which it is stipulated that judgment may be entered against the husband for certain specified sums and that if the mortgages are found to be valid the usual decree of foreclosure may be entered, no findings are required; and the trial court is authorized to render judgment in such action after the death of the husband where, prior to such death, it had rendered its opinion and directed judgment in plaintiff's favor.-Id. 5. SUBSTITUTION OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OMISSION OF ORDER FROM JUDGMENT-ROLL-RECITAL IN JUDGMENT.-The recital in a judgment that an order substituting a special administrator as defendant in the place of a deceased defendant, without some proof to the contrary, is sufficient to sustain the judgment, even though such order is not contained in the judgment-roll.-Id. See Corporations, 4; Criminal Law, 32; Ejectment, 2; Injunc- JUDICIAL NOTICE. See Evidence, 7. JURIES AND JURORS. See Criminal Law, 76. JURISDICTION. See Criminal Law, 31, 46-48; Intoxicating Liquors, 2; Partition, 1; Place of Trial, 1, 2; Pleading, 2; Supersedeas, 3; Torrens Title Act, 2, 3, 5. JUVENILE COURT ACT. 1. PLEADING-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION COMPLAINING WITNESS NOT WIFE.-An information charging a violation of the juvenile 62 Cal. App.-54 JUVENILE COURT ACT (Continued). court law is not defective because it fails to state that the complaining witness is not the wife of defendant.-People v. Cohen, 521. 2. DELINQUENCY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS - SCOPE OF ACT.-An information charging a violation of the juvenile court law which alleges that at a designated time and place a certain person "was then and there. a female person under the age of 21 years, towit, of the age of 16 years . . . and was then and there in danger of leading an idle, dissolute and immoral life" by reason of the acts in such information alleged, sufficiently shows that said female is within the provisions of subdivision 11 of section 1 of said law. Id. 3. COMPLAINING ... WITNESS AS DELINQUENT PERSON SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION.-The words "delinquent" or "delinquent person" are not found in sections 1 or 21 of the juvenile court law of 1915, and an information charging a violation of that law is not defective because it fails to state that the female therein mentioned was a delinquent person within the purview of that law. Id. 4. VIOLATION OF LAW-AGE-PROOF.-Under the juvenile court law as amended in 1921, it is not necessary to prove that the complaining witness is such a person as is enumerated in any of the subdivisions 1 to 13 of section 1 of said law, it being sufficient to show that she is under the age of twenty-one years.-Id. 5. WHEN GUILT ATTACHES SUCCESS IMMATERIAL. Under the juvenile court law, the guilt of a person attaches whenever he commits any act which causes or manifestly tends to cause a person under the age of twenty-one years to come within the provisions of section 1 thereof, independent of the success of his efforts or its effect upon the minor.-Id. KNOWLEDGE. See Contracts, 16; Criminal Law, 15. LACHES. See Specific Performance, 5. LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF PREMISES LIABILITY TO TENANT-COMMON LAW.-At common law, in the absence of an express contract, there was no duty owing by the landlord to the tenant to make repairs, and consequently no liability was incurred by the landlord to the tenant arising from the defective condition of the leased premises.-Priver v. Young, 405. 2. DAMAGES FOR INJURIES STATUTORY RIGHT. The right of the tenant to any relief in damages as against the landlord on account of injuries sustained by the tenant by reason of the defective LANDLORD AND TENANT (Continued). condition of the leased premises is purely statutory and such right must be measured solely by the provisions of the statute.-Id. -- 3. COLLAPSE OF WALL-BED-INJURY TO TENANT ACTION FOR DAMAGES PLEADING INSUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT. In an action by a tenant against a landlord for damages for personal injuries sustained from the collapse of a wall-bed, a complaint which contains allegations conclusively showing that plaintiff was aware of the unsafe condition of the bed, and which contains no allegation setting forth such attendant circumstances as would relieve plaintiff from the inference of contributory negligence, fails to state a cause of action.-Id. See Leases. LEASES. 1. CANCELLATION SALE OF PREMISES UNDER EXECUTORY CONTRACT -RIGHT OF LESSOR CONSTRUCTION. — Under a provision giv ing the lessor the right to cancel the lease upon giving the lessee sixty days' notice in writing, but providing that such notice of cancellation "shall only be given in the event that the lessor, its successors or assigns, intend to erect a new building on the premises, or shall have disposed of said premises by sale or ground lease," the lessor is entitled to cancel the lease upon the sale of the premises under an executory contract of sale, notwithstanding such contract reserves the title to the premises in the vendor (the lessor) until the full amount of the purchase price shall have been paid.-Glenn v. Ionouye, 259. 2. SUBLETTING OF APARTMENT HOUSE-CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT.— A written contract between the lessee of an apartment house and two others, under which the latter are let into exclusive possession of the apartment house for a fixed term and are to receive and retain the rentals in excess of a certain stipulated sum per month, which sum they are obliged to pay the lessee on a specified day of each month of the term, it being further provided that if they should make "default" in any of their covenants the lessee, at her option, may "re-enter and take possession of said premises in entirety, and remove said second parties therefrom," constitutes an underletting of the premises, notwithstanding the parties thereto style such contract a "Contract for Services."-Frasier v. Witt, 309. 3. AUTHORITY TO INSTALL MANAGER-RIGHT TO SUBLET.-Where a lease of an apartment house contains a provision against subletting or transferring the use or possession of the premises, the granting of permission to install a "manager" does not authorize the lessee to sublet to a tenant the entire premises and transfer the right of exclusive possession.-Id. |