Acts of Postmasters General-How far Conclusive. had the undoubted power to re examine the subject, for the purpose of testing the accuracy of any complaint or suspicion of unfairness or illegality, and of verifying the truth of any material fact which entered into the contract, so also must his successor have the same power. The right to make this investigation belongs to the office, and not to the individual who may chance to fill it. And whenever the incumbent for the time being shall come to the knowledge, either by means of his personal investigations, or by information communicated to him by others, or in any other way, that any contract of the department is liable to any such objection, it is his duty to take such proper measures as circumstances may require, to protect the interest of the government in the premises. If the money has been paid, the proper remedy will be a suit in the appro priate tribunal: if the contract be yet unsatisfied, and the money unpaid, it would be idle and improper to make payment, for the mere purpose of enabling the government to maintain a suit to recover back the money. The simple and more appropriate course will be to stop short with the contract, and to refuse to make any further payment thereon. It is obvious that the remarks before made, as to the caution which should attend such a step, even when taken by the very person who entered into the contract, will also apply in this place, and with greatly increased force. But, in regard to the right, and, under certain circumstances, the duty of taking it, I cannot entertain a doubt. The constitution declares that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." Whether the public moneys at the disposal of the Postmaster General are technically in the treasury or not, the spirit of this povision applies to them, and ought to be faithfully observed in their expenditure. In contemplation of law, every such expenditure must be considered as ordered by the head of the department at the time when it is made. It is true that the pressure of business must necessarily prevent a special examination in respect to each particular payment on each particular contract; yet, as the Postmaster General is exclusively intrusted with the care and application of the moneys of the department, the law presumes that he does so far examine Acts of Postmasters General-How far Conclusive. and decide in respect to each disbursement as to make himself legally responsible therefor. And, accordingly, his accounts. are to be rendered to the Auditor, and to be settled by that officer and the Comptroller, "as other public accounts." (General Post Office law of 1825, sec. 1.) To hold that an agent, whose powers are thus circumscribed, and whose appropriation of the public moneys is thus to be made the subject of account, can be authorized to pay over those moneys to a party whom he conscientiously believes to have no lawful claim to them, would not only be repugnant to the spirit of the constitution and of law, but to the first principles of reason and justice. It can make no difference, in morals or in law, that an order is to be found in the records of the department directing the payment to be made. If the officer is satisfied that there was no legal authority to make such order, or that it was obtained by fraud, or was made under erroneous impressions as to material facts, he is bound, by the very nature of his trust, to do what he can to correct the procedure, and to protect his constituents from any further mischief by means of it. The first and most obvious step is, to desist from applying the public moneys to a purpose which, if it be regarded by him in the light above mentioned, he must also see and feel is unauthorized by law. The foregoing principles, as it appears to me, grow out of the general relation of principal and agent, as it exists under our constitution and laws, in this particular department. It only remains, before I apply them to the present case, that I should vindicate or distinguish them from the objections contained in the arguments on behalf of the contractors, transmitted to me with your communications. It is contended that, as the Postmaster General is authorized to make contracts for carrying the mail, and also to decide whether additional services are necessary, and to agree on the compensation to be made for them, he has jurisdiction over the subjects; and that his decision, though erroneous, must be binding on the government and on his successor in office. In support of this position, several adjudged cases are referred to, in which the distinction between erroneous and void judgments has been recognised; and in which the courts, acting on that distinction, have held that the decisions of tribu Acts of Postmasters General-How far Conclusive. nals, and of officers having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of such decisions, although admitted or supposed to be erroneous, were yet, for many purposes, held to be valid and conclusive. And in order to bring the present case within the principle of those decisions, we are reminded that it is the doctrine. of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the understanding and practice of all the departments of the government, to consider the contracts, decisions, and proceedings of the head of a department conclusive upon the particular department, unless material errors or new and important facts have been subsequently discovered; and also conclusive as against the government, except when impeached in a court of justice, on the ground of fraud or mistake. To support this latter suggestion, the cases of the United States vs. Jones, (8 Peters, 375,) United States vs. Macdaniel, (7 Peters, 1,) United States vs. Fillebrown, (7 Peters, 28,) and United States vs. Randolph (9 Peters, 12,) the arguments of the Attorney General in several of those cases, and the official opinions of that officer and of the Secretary of War, in cases presented for their decision, are appealed to by the counsel. But it is due to them to state that this part of their argument was founded on the assumption that the decision to consider the services in question as additional services, and to require them to be performed, was definitively made in June, 1833; the compensation then fixed and ordered to be allowed; the money actually paid, and the allowance entered on the books. to the credit of the company. In all these particulars, the statements and conclusions in your official communications are different from those of the counsel; and as I have felt myself bound to adopt your version of the facts as the correct one, the arguments and the authorities are for the most part inapplicable. Besides, several of the most important cases relate to departments organized on principles and proceeding in a manner very different from those prescribed for the General Post Office. Still, I recognise the general accuracy of the doctrine above stated, and of the decisions and opinions referrred to; and do not intend to lay down any principle which shall conflict with them. It will also be perceived that the arguments referred to me Acts of Postmasters General-How far Conclusive. fully admit that allowances made by the head of a department, which have been actually paid, and which have even gone into accounts settled by the accounting officers of the treasury, may yet be judicially re-examined in cases of fraud, or mistake as to material facts, and the money obtained by means thereof be recovered back by the government. They further admit, either expressly or by necessary intendment, that the head of a department, who has ordered a special allowance, has a right to modify, correct, or withdraw it, at any time before it has been acted on and passed by the accounting officers, and entered on their books. The preceding observations would be sufficient, I think, to dispose of the whole argument founded on the distinction between acts that are void for want of jurisdiction, and those that are only erroneous and voidable for error in the exercise of powers really possessed. But as it appears to me that this principle is only to a very limited extent applicable to the proceedings of the Post Office Department, I shall endeavor to point out what I conceive to be an erroneous use of the dis. tinction referred to, in the remarks of the counsel. To do this with accuracy, the reason and design of the rule must be carefully borne in mind; and we must also take it in connexion with certain other rules, equally well settled, and equally applicable to subjects of this nature. The rule in question relates chiefly, if not exclusively, to the decisions of courts and of officers acting judicially; and is founded on the regard which the law pays to the intrinsic difficulties of the judicial function and to the fallibility of human nature. Knowing the arduousness of many of the duties which devolve on the officer, and his liability to fall into mistake, the law, which never demands impossibilities, merely requires that he should confine himself within his legitimate sphere, and act with integrity and ordinary care. If he has jurisdiction, and only errs in the exercise of it, his acts are not void, but only voidable. The great purposes of the rule are, to shield the tribunal or officer from personal responsibility for mere error of judgment; to protect the ministerial officers by whom the judgments and other acts of judicial tribunals, or officers acting judicially, are to be executed; and to prevent injustice to pur Acts of Postmasters General-How far Conclusive. chasers and other third persons, who have innocently reposed confidence in the validity of the proceedings. So long as the decision was clearly within the jurisdiction of the officer, third persons will be protected, whatever may have been his errors in judgment, or his impurity of motive; and if there be no impurity of motive, the officer himself will also be irresponsible. For all these purposes, it is in many cases necessary that the official proceedings, even though admitted to be erroneous, should yet be deemed valid until duly reversed; and that they should not be reviewed collaterally, nor in any mode or by any authority than such as is appropriate and competent to their reversal. But this rule does not imply that such proceedings are perpetually conclusive and irreversible. On the contrary, it admits that the decision, if erroneous, is liable, in due form of law, to be reversed; but it will not allow even such a decision. to be impeached collaterally. And it is only while it remains unreversed, that it is to be regarded as valid, or that parties and third persons can be protected by it. All acts done after any such decision shall have been regularly reversed, stand on the same ground as if it had never existed, or as if it had been void. from the beginning. Where tribunals or officers undertake to act in matters over which they have no jurisdiction whatever, their proceedings are void from the beginning. And even where they have juris diction over the subject, yet, if they entirely depart in their proceedings from the positive requirements of law, such irregular proceedings are considered absolutely void, and not merely voidable. Irregularities of this nature are not regarded as mere errors of judgment-mere mistakes in ascertaining the rules of law, or in applying them judicially; and, therefore, they are not viewed with the indulgence, nor entitled to the immunities, which are extended to such errors and mistakes. On the contrary, they are looked upon as excesses of jurisdiction. Indeed, so far as the particular acts are concerned, there is a want of jurisdiction to perform them, and they are therefore justly involved in the general consequences of such a defect. After this explanation of the doctrines referred to, it will be easy to show that they do not conflict with either of the general principles on which I rely. VOL. III-2 |