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such that the Board of Equalization of one county was required to commence its session after the time when the Auditor is required to deliver the duplicate asses ment roll to the Tax Collector. We must decline to accede to the request. After having given the Revenue Acts a thorough investigation no one will need any suggestions from us urging their revision.

** The defendant's counsel present two questions of great moment. They relate to double taxation, and the constitutionality of the Revenue Laws. It is apparent that the question, whether the assessment against the defendant, of the sum of money loaned, under the existing circumstancs, amounts to double taxation, does not legitimately arise upon the facts of the case. While the defendant held the money, which he afterwards loaned to Lick, he was taxable for that sum, and when he passed the money to Lick upon making the loan, and took Lick's obligation to pay the same, secured by a deed of trust or other adequate security, he certainly did not divest himself of so much property. He possessed the same amount of property that he held before the loan was made. Its form only was changed. And so in all cases of loans. The lender owns the debt, and the debt is property, its value depending on the sufficiency of the security, if there be security, and the ability of the borrower to pay the debt. The holder of the debt is taxable upon the value of the debt. If the property of the borrower is assessed at its full value, without any deduction for what he owes, whether its payment is secured by any lien or charge upon his property or not, perhaps he may complain of undue or double taxation; and it seems that there is no difference, in this respect, whether the lender holds only the promise of the borrower, wbich may be enforced against his property by proper legal proceedings, or has a lien upon his real or personal property by judgment or the levy of an execution, or whether he has a specific lien by virtue of a mortgage, pledge, deed of trust, etc. But it is useless for us to express an opinion upon these questions so far as they relate to the borrower, for it would be a mere obiter dictum, The lender has no legal cause to complain that the borrower suffers the wrong of double taxation, or of being taxed for more than the value of his property after deducting the liens, charges, or incumbrances thereon. A decision in this case of questions of that character would not have the force of authority.

“Another question, and one of much greater importance under our present revenue system, does arise in this case.

The defendant objects to the tax on the ground that the Legislature having, in defiance of constitutional requirements, imposed the burden of taxation upon a portion only of the property in the State, and expressly relieved a large portion from taxation, the law is neither equal nor uniform in its operation, does not tax 'all the property in the State,' and is therefore void.' The section of the Constitution referred to is Sec. 13 of Article XI, and is as follows:

"TAXATION SHALL BE EQUAL AND UNIFORM THROUGHOUT THE STATE.-All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law; but Assessors and Collectors of town, county, and State taxes shall be elected by the qualified electors of the district, county, or town in which the property taxed for State, county, or town purposes is situated.' The first clause of the section was considered by this Court in The People vs. Naglee, 1 Cal., p. 252, which was an action instituted to test the constitutionality of the law of this State, requiring foreigners to pay a license fee for the privilege of working the gold mines upon the public lands in this State. It was there held that this clause, when taken in connection with the clause following it, must be construed as limited to direct taxes upon property; and it was considered that the statute in question was unaffected by that clause of the Constitution-for the statute did not levy or assess a tax upon property, but required a certain license fee to be paid by those of the specified class, who should pursue the designated business.

“The same question was presented in People vs. Coleman, 4 Cal., p. 46. Two actions were brought, the one to recover the penalties imposed by the Revenue Act of 1853 on auctioneers for selling property without license, and the other to recover penalties imposed by the same Act on persons selling goods consigned for sale from without the State; and both cases were considered together. The authority of People vs. Naglee was recognized, and it was held, that the first clause of the section applied to taxes upon property, and not upon trades, professions, or occupations, such taxes being in the nature of license taxes. This may be accepted as the correct construction of that clause; or rather, without expressing any opinion as to its applicability to taxes imposed upon persons, whether as poll taxes or license taxes, we accept as correct the construction, that the clause does apply to taxes upon

property. The Court, after disposing of the first clause of the section, proceeded to construe the second, and the conclusion reached was, that the clause did not limit or restrict the power of the Legislature so as to prevent it from exempting from taxation such property as in its discretion it might think proper.

“This point was directly presented in High vs. Shoemaker, 22 Cal., p. 363, and it was held 'that the omission to tax a portion of the land in the State does not Tender the Revenue Act of 1857 void.' The decision was based upon the authority of The People vs. Coleman, and the reasoning in that case, without entering anew upon an analysis or construction of the section. There are no other cases in this Court bearing directly upon this question; and as the latter case, High vs. Shoemaker, rests entirely upon the case of People vs. Coleman, and the reasons upon which it is placed, we will proceed to the examination of that case, and will give our construction of that section of the Constitution.

“In each of the cases considered on that appeal the question related only to a tax upon business-a tax in the nature of a license tax- -and it was so considered by the Court in delivering their opinion. In the case of the sale of consigned goods there were some features that resembled a tax upon property, but the Court treated it as a tax upon the business of the consignees. The first clause of the section, Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State,' was necessarily involved in the discussion, and if that clause should be considered applicable to taxes of that character, the Court would be bound to declare the Act void so far as it levied those taxes. But, as already stated,

was held that the clause applied to taxes upon property only, and consequently it had no application to taxes upon persons, trades, professions, and business.

“The question as to the construction of the section in its application to taxes upon property-as to whether it limited or in any manner restricted the power of the Legislature-was not involved in the case in any manner whatsoever, and all that was said upon that point must, in our opinion, be regarded as obiter dicta. We have this point established by these cases (The People vs. Naglee and The People vs. Coleman), that the clause_Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State '-applies to taxes upon property; and it may be added that we have never heard this proposition doubted by any one. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of this State no provision

identical with that of the section before us was to be found in the Constitution of any other State.

“The Constitution of Missouri provides that all property subject to taxation in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value.' In construing the language of this section, the question at once presents itself as to the word “subject,' whether the property to be taxed was all the property within the State, over which the Government of the State had jurisdiction, or only such property as the Legislature might in its discretion subject to taxation.

“These questions were very elaborately discussed in Crow et al. vs. The State of Missouri, 14 Mo., p. 237, and a majority of the Court were of the opinion that the first was the meaning of the term. This matter is alluded to here merely to say that in the section of our Constitution there is no such word of doubtful import.

“The section relating to taxation in our Constitution was taken, with certain important modifications, from that of Texas. The twenty-seventh section of Article VII of Texas is as follows: Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law, except such property as two thirds of both Houses of the Legislature may think

proper to exempt from taxation. The Legislature shall have power to levy an income tax and to tax all persons pursuing any occupation, trade, or profession; provided, that the term 'occupation shall not be construed to apply to pursuits either agricultural or mechanical.' That section was framed in full view of the principle that the power of the Legislature over the subject of taxation of property is plenary, except as restricted by constitutional limitations. That portion of the section which corresponds with the first portion of the section in our Constitution was not, therefore, intended as a grant of power to the Legislature; nor was it intended as an affirmance of a power recognized and admitted by all as possessed by the Legislature. The language is not expressive of such an idea. It must have been intended as a limitation of power. This becomes manifest, and, we think, indisputable, when that portion of the section is read with the following clause: 'Except such property as two thirds of both Houses of the Legislature may think proper to exempt from taxation.' This clause was inserted for some purpose. It cannot be said that it was added without any object, without design, and merely to round a period. It must have been added because the framers of the instrument understood that without it the previous portion of the section required a property tax to be levied upon all property without exception, and that the clause was necessary in order to enable the Legislature to exempt any description of property from the operation of the general rule of taxation. By a slight change among the members of the sentence, but still retaining the same sense, it will read: 'All property in this State, except such property as two thirds of both Houses of the Legislature may think proper to exempt from taxation, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law.' Read in that manner, it is evident that the section is a limitation upon the power of the Legislature to exempt from taxation any kind or parcel of property, unless exempted in the mode therein described, and that the clause was inserted as a relaxation of the general and imperative rule embodied in the previous words of the section.

"Accepting as a fact that our Constitutional Convention borrowed the first portion of the section relating to taxation from the Constitution of Texas, and seeing that the clause in that Constitution permitting the Legislature to exempt property from taxation, is omitted from our Constitution, the conclusion is inevitable that it was not intended that the Legislature should possess the power to exempt property from taxation, if the previous clauses of that Constitution did, in fact, limit the power of the Legislature in that respecto Suppose, for the purpose of illustration, that the Legislature, in framing the charter of a city, should grant the power of taxation over all property within the municipality, and should insert a section similar to that which we cited from the Constitution of Texas, and should afterwards amend the section, making it similar to that of our Constitution, no one would doubt that the power of exempting property from taxation was conferred upon the municipal government by the original charter, and was denied to it by the amended charter.

“In The People vs. Coleman, the Court, upon reference to the debates of the Constitutional Convention, were of opinion that the clause was adopted 'as a pledge of security to the native inhabitants against imaginary cases of inequality or arbitrary exactions,' and was intended to apply only to lands. The remarks of the members of a Convention are not as sure an

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