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3 Dall., p. 17; Ex Parte Milburn, 9 Peters, p. 704; Ex Parte Dorr, 3 Howard, p. 103. President cannot suspend unless Act of Congress authorizes it.-Ex Parte Merryman, 9 Am. L. R., p. 524; s. c., 24 L. R., p. 78; Ex Parte Benedict, 4 West L. Mo., p. 449; McCall vs. McDowell, 1 Pacific Law Mag., p. 360; see Ex Parte McQuillon, 3 West L. Mo., p. 440; s. c., 9 Pitt's L. J., p. 27. Only when public safety requires it.-Ex Parte Keeler, Hamp., p. 306. The right is above the sphere of ordinary legislation.-U. S. vs. Williamson, 4 Am. L. R., p. 5. Under Act of 1863, one arrested, if not indicted at next term of Circuit or District Court, entitled to discharge.-Ex Parte Mulligan, 4 Wall., p. 3. Congress may indemnify officers disregarding writ under suspension of.-McCall vs. McDowell, supra; see Ex Parte Blum, 2 Spr., p. 73; Fagan, id.. p. 93; see Act March 3, 1863.
EXPORT DUTY.-Tonnage duty is not prohibited from being imposed on foreign vessels.-Aguire vs. Maxwell, 3 Bl. C. C., p. 140.
EX POST FACTO LAWS.-The prohibition in the Federal Constitution of ex post facto laws extends to penal statutes only, and not to cases affecting only the civil rights of individuals.-Calder et ux. vs. Bull et ux., 3 Dall., p. 386. A resolution or law of a State Court setting aside a decree of a Court and granting a new trial to be had before the same Court, is not void under the Constitution as an ex post facto law.-Id. The words and intent of the ex post facto prohibition embraces: 1. Every law that makes an action done before the framing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action; 2. Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; 3. Every law that changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; 4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives Jess or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.-Id. A law merely divesting antecedent vested rights of property, where there is no contract, is not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States. A retrospective law is within the constitutional powers of the States. Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad vs. Nesbit et al., 10 Howard, p. 395.
1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, Limitation or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; powers of coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.
2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.
3. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.See note to Preamble, ante. Tonnage duty.—See Agure vs. Maxwell, in note to Sec. 9, ante; is not inhibited to the States. The prohibition of the Constitution embraces all contracts between a State and individuals, or corporations, or between the States themselves, or between individuals.-Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wh., p. 1; Bridge Proprietors vs. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall., p. 117. A compact between two States is such contract, the obligation whereof is protected by the Constitution when the consent of Congress thereto is given.-Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wh., p. 1; Spooner vs. McConnell, 1 McL., p. 338. A grant of lands by a State is such contract, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by a subsequent law.-Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cr., p. 87; Tenett vs. Taylor, 9 id., p. 43; Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, id., p. 292; McGee vs. Mathis, 4 Wall., p. 143. The repeal of a law which is a contract cannot take away vested rights.-See last above cases; and The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall., p. 51; Thompson vs. Holton,
6 McL., p. 386. See same cases as to how a State may contract so as to preclude itself from impairing the obligations thereof, by subsequent acts; and Van Hoffman vs. City of Quincy, 4 Wall., p. 535. A State Legislature may by contract surrender the right of taxation as to the property of a corporation, and may not afterwards impair such contract.-State Bank of Ohio vs. Knoop, 16 H., p. 369; Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. vs. Debolt, id., p. 416; Dodge vs. Woolsey, 18 H., p. 331; s. c., McL., p. 142; and several other cases. In the State of California the State Constitution requires that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State," and "all property in this State shall be taxed according to its value," which renders these decisions inapplicable to this State. A State insolvent law discharging both the debtor and his future acquisitions as respects subsequent debts is not unconstitutional so far as contracted with citizens of the same State.-Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wh., p. 213; Baldwin vs. Hale, 1 Wall., p. 223. But a discharge under such a law does not bar the rights of citizens of other States.Idem; Boyle vs. Zacharis, 6 Pet., p. 348; s. c., id., P. 635; Suydam vs. Broadnax, 14 Pet., p. 67; Cook vs. Moffatt, 5 H., p. 295; Gilman vs. Lockwood, 4 Wall., p. 409. Unless they make themselves parties and receive a dividend of the estate.-Idem; and Clay vs. Smith, 3 Pet., p. 411. It does not change the rule if the note was given and payable in the same State, if payer resides in another.-Idem. Though retrospective such law does not impair the obligations of contracts.Adam vs. Storey, 1 Pa., p. 79. Taking property of a corporation chartered by the Legislature for public use does not impair the obligation of contract.-West Riv. Bridge Co. vs. Dix, 6 H., p. 507; R. F. and P. R. R. Co. vs. Louisa. R. R. Co., 13 H., p. 71.
EX POST FACTO.-Under pretense of attaching a condition or making a qualification, States cannot in effect inflict a punishment for an act done not punishable at the time it occurred.-Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall, p. 277. Deprivation or suspension of rights for past conduct is punishment within the meaning of the Constitution.-Ex Parte Garland, id., p. 333. Such Acts of legislation not only ex post facto but are in their nature bills of attainder.-Id. So are Acts requiring test oaths as to past acts.-Id; Ex Parte Baxter, 14 Am. L. Rep., p. 159; Ex Parte Law, 15 id., p. 410; Ex Parte Magruder, id., p. 292. Retrospective Acts neither impairing contracts nor in their nature ex post facto are not within the constitutional prohibi
tion.-Satterlee vs. Matthewson, 2 Pet., p. 280; Watson vs. Mercer, 8 Pet., p. 88; Charles Riv. Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., p. 420; Balt. and Susq. R. R. Co. vs. Nesbit, 10 H., p. 395; Carpenter vs. Penn., 17 H., p. 456; Alber vs. May, 2 Pa., p. 74; Locke vs. New Orleans, 4 Wall, p. 172. Statute may validate
past transactions not impairing vested rights.-Leland vs. Wilkinson, 10 Pet., p. 294; People vs. Brady, 40 Cal., p. 198.
BILLS OF CREDIT.-The Act of Missouri, passed July 27, 1821, for the establishment of loan offices," was unconstitutional and void.-Craig & Moore vs. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters, p. 410; Byrne vs. State of Missouri, 8 Peters, p. 40. To constitute a "bill of credit" within the Constitution, it must be issued by the sovereign power, containing a pledge of its faith, and designed to circulate as money.-Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Peters, p. 313. The Constitution considers the emission of bills of credit and the enactment of tender laws as distinct operations, independent of each other. Both are forbidden. Craig vs. State of Missouri, 4 Peters, p. 410. The bills of a banking corporation, which has corporate property, are not bills of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, although the State which created the bank is the only stockholder, and pledges its faith for the ultimate redemption of the bills.-Darrington vs. The Bank of Alabama, 13 Howard, p. 12. The "legal tender" Acts held to be constitutional, and their use in payment of all indebtedness subsequent to its passage held valid, in Latham vs. U. S., 1 N. & H., p. 149; s. c., 2 N. & H., p. 573.
RIGHTS OF THE STATES.-The power of a Legislature of a State relative to the confirmation of a sale of real estate, is greater than the judicial power. They may sanction past transactions, where vested rights are not disturbed, while the Court can only authorize a title to be made in future.-Leland et al. vs. Wilkinson, 10 Peters, p. 294. A State has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial limits as any foreign nation, when that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States.-Id. No sovereign State is liable to be sued without her consent.-Briscoe et al. vs. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 11 Peters, p. 257. The Legislature of a State cannot annul the judgment or determine
the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States.United States vs. Peters, 5 Cranch, p. 115. Whereever a right grows out of, or is protected by a treaty, it is sanetioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the States, and whoever may have this right, it is protected. Owing vs. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, p. 348. The mere grant of a power to Congress does not imply a prohibition on a State to exercise the same power. Sturges vs. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat., p. 122. The State Governments have no right to tax any of the constitutional means employed by the Government of the Union to exercise its constitutional powers.-McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. p. 316. The State Governments retain the right to make such laws as they may think proper within the ordinary functions of legislation, if not inconsistent with the powers vested exclusively in the Government of the United States and forbidden by the Constitution.-Golden vs. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. R., p. 313. The power conferred upon Congress by the fifth and sixth clauses of the eighth section, first Article of the Constitution, "to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and to provide for punishing counterfeiting coin," etc., does not prevent a State from passing a law to punish the circulation of counterfeit coin of the United States.-Fox vs. The State of Ohio, 5 Howard, p. 410. The prohibitions contained in the amendments to the Constitution were intended to be restrictions upon the Federal Government and not upon the authority of the States.-Id. A bridge held by an incorporated company, under a charter from a State, may be condemned and taken as part of a public road under the laws of that State.West River Bridge Co. vs. Dix et al., 6 Howard, p. 507. The Constitution of the United States cannot be so construed as to take away from the States the right of eminent domain.-Id. A person in custody under a ca. sa. issued under the authority of the Circuit Court of the United States, cannot legally be discharged from imprisonment by a State officer acting under a State insolvent law.-Duncan vs. Darst et al., 1 Howard, p. 301. The shores of navigable waters and the soil under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the States respectively, and the new States have the same rights over this subject as the original States.-Pollard vs. Hagan, 3 Howard, p. 212. Although no State could establish a permanent military government, yet it may use its military power to put down an armed insurrec