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"' not for that we would be unclothed ;" as if written, as Frobenius prints it, irudn, tho' Beza here greatly differs. 2dly, Others observe, it may be explained, with whom, i. e. wbo sinning, all have sinned. For ini in a similiar construction denotes a time, in which something was done. Thus we say in Greek, in imal Husspøxbow tõro gázous, when I was a boy this happened, and igà xwè in the dog.days; and the Apostle Heb. ix. 15. và Th Feqah ? doa thun, under the first testament. And then the meaning would be, that upon Adam's sinning, all are judged to have sinned. 3dly, Augustine, and most of the Orthodox have explain, ed it, in whom. Which Erasmus in vain opposes, saying, that iri when signifying upon, or, in, is joined to the genitive case ; as ir ©** kas iri ons zápas ;also when denoting time,as ir, raíompos 'Oxlaßis. In all this he is strangely mistaken. For, not to say any thing now of time, it is certain, that it when joined to the dative denotes in: as Mat. xiv. 8. évi sívaxs, in a charger ; and in this very context of Paul, verse 14. Sri Ratopoiw perly in the similitude. And which is more, Tò ég á, cannot sometimes be otherwise explained, than by in wbich, [on in whom] :as Mat. ii. 4, ip üė **poc a plomes refixolo, wherein the sick of the palsy lay, and Luke, v. 25, åpas ip ū xalepilo took up that whereon he lay. Nor is it taken in this light, in the sacred writings only, but he might learn from Budæus, Commentar. lingf. Græc. p. 506, that Aristotle used this phraseology in the same sense, im is pern dýnu, iri bez7épart de do pipay sawásil, on the one the female, on the other the male broods. However, we reckon none of those explanations to be imperti. nent as they are almost to the same purpose ; yet, we give the preference to the last, because most emphatical and very applicable to the Apostle's scope ; it is a bad way of interpreting scripture to represent it as declaring what is the least thing intended. For, the words are to be taken in their full import, where there is nothing in the context to hinder it.
XXXIII. Grotius really prevaricates, when he thus comments on the passage before us. It is a common metonomy in the Hebrew, to use the word sin, instead of punishment ; and to sin, instead of to undergo punishment, whence extending this figure, they are said, by a metalepsis, run to sin, who suffer any evil, even though they are innocent, as Gen. xxxi. 36. and Job vi. 24. Where xun is rendered by dvor poor box to be unhappy, 'EQ a here denotes through whom, as it with the dative is taken, Luke v. $, Acts, iii. 36. i Cor, viii. ii. Heb. ix. 17. Chrysostom on this place says, On his fall, they who did not eat of the tree, dre from him all become mortal. · XXXIV. This illustrious person seems to have wrote with, out attention, as the whole is very impertinent. Ist, Though wę allow, that sin does sometimes metonomically denote the punishment of sin, yet, we deny it to be usual in Scripture, that he who undergoes punishment, even while innocent, may be said to sin. Grotius says, it is frequent, but he neither does nor can prove it by any one example, which is certainly bold and rash. Crellius confuting his book on the satisfaction of Christ, brings in the saying of Bathsheba to David, 1 Kings i. 21. I and my son Solomon shall be counted offenders ; that is, says he, we shall be treated as offenders, or, be ruined. But a sinner, or even sin and to sin are different things. The former is said of Christ, 2 Cor. v. 21: but not the latter on any account. Moreover, to be a sinner, does not signify, in the passage alleged, to undergo punishment, without any regard to a fault or demerit, but to be guilty of aiming at the kingdom, and of high treason, and as such to be punished. The testimonies advanced by Grotius are so foreign, that they seem not to have been examined by that great man. For, neither in the Hebrew do we find XUn to sin, nor in the Greek version, dvarpaytv ; nor do the circumstances admit, that what is there said of sin, or mistake, can be explained of punishment. It is necessary therefore to suppose, that either Grotius had something else in his view, or that here is a typographical error. 2dly, Though we should grant, which yet we do not in the least, that to sin sometimes denotes to undergo punishment, yet it cannot signify this here; because, the Apostle in this place immediately distinguishes between death, as the punishment, and sin, as the meritorous cause, and death by sin. And by this interpretation of Grotius, the Apostle's discourse, which we have already shewn is solid, would be an insipid tau. tology. For, where is the sense to say, “ So death passed upon all, through whom all die.” 3dly, Grotius, discovers but little judgement in his attempt to prove, that fpüs ignifies through wbom: certainly, Luke. v. 5. iri Tū påpe ce 76 o8, does not signify through thy word, but at thy word, or as Beza translates, at thy command. And Hebr. ix. 17. izi vexpois does not siguify through the dead, but when dead, and rather denotes a circumstance of time, Acts iii. 16 is alleged with a little more judgment; and 1 Cor. viii. 11, not improperly. But it might be ina sisted, that is" ixón işi signifies, it is owing to me, that the meaning shall be,“ to whom it was owing that all sinned.” Which interpretation is not altogether to be rojected. Thus the sholiast. ip* sAdope, òi' ór. And if there was nothing else couched under this, I would easily grant Grotius this explanation of that phrase. ology. 4thly, It cannot be explained consistent with divine justice, how without a crime death should have passed upon Adam's posterity. Prosper reasoned solidly and elegantly against Coll, lator, c. xx.“ Unless, perhaps, it can be said, that the punishment, and not the guilt passed on the posterity of Adam, but to say this is in every respect false ; for it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God; as if he would, contrary to his own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. The guilt therefore is evident where the punishment is so, and a partaking in punishment shews a partaking in guilt ; that human misery is not the appointment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge." If therefore thro’Adam all are obnoxious to punishment, all too must have sinned in Adam. 5thly, Chrysostom also is here improperly brought in, as if from Adam he derived only the punishment of death, without partaking in the guilt ; for the homily from which the words are quoted begins thus : “ When the Jew shall say, How is the world saved by the obedience of one, namely, Christ? you may reply, How was the world condemned by one disobedient A. dam? Where it is to be observed, ist, That he supposes the miseries of mankind to proceed from God as a judge, who cannot justly condemn but for sin. 2dly, That he compares the condemnation of the world by Adam's disobedience, with its salvation by Christ's obedience. But this last is imputed to believers, and deemed to be theirs, and therefore Adam's sin is in like manner imputed to all. As also Gregory of Nazianzen, quoted by Vossius, Hist. Pelag. lib. ii. P. i. p. 163. said, that Adam's guilt was his. “ Alas! my weakness," says he, “ for I derive my weakness from the first parent."
XXXV. But we only understand this of Adam's first sin, We no wise agree with those who absurdly tell us, that Adam's other sins were also imputed to us ; for Paul, when treating on this subject, Rom. v. every where mentions transgresson in the singular number; nay, expressly ver. 18. one transgression, by which guilt passed upon all; and the reason is manifest, for Adam ceased to be a federal head when the covenant was once broken, and whatever sin he was afterwards guilty of, was his own personal sin, and not chargeable on his posterity, unless in so far as God is soinetimes pleased to visit the sins of the fathers on the children. In which Adam has now nothing peculiar above other men. So much for the violation by the covenant of man.
CHA P. IX. : Of the Abrogation of the Covenant of Works on the .
part of God. I. HAVING sufficiently considered the violation of the
covenant by sin; let us now enquire whether, and how far it is made void, or abrogated by God himself. : II. And first, we are very certain, that there are many things in this covenant of immutable and eternal truth, which we reckon up in this order : Ist, The precepts of the covenant, excepting that probatory one, oblige all, and every one to a per. fect performance of duty, in what state soeyer they are. 2dly, Eternal life, promised by the covenant, can be obtained upon no other condition, than that of perfect, and in every respect complete obedience. 3dly, No act of disobedience escapes the vengeance of God, and death is always the panishment of sin. But these maxims do not exclude a surety, who may come under engagements in man's stead, to undergo the penal. ty, and perform the condition. But we shall speak of this afterwards, and now proceed to what has been proposed,
III. It is indeed a most destructive heresy to maintain, that man, sinful and obnoxious to punishment, is not bound to obedience. For by no misconduct of man, can God forfeit his right and supremacy ; but the right and supremacy of God requires, that man, and even every creature be subject in all respects to God, so far as possible. Moreover, the rational creature, such as sinful man is, and does continue to be, can be subject, not only to the natural, but also to the moral providence of God; nor only to his vindictive justice, but also to his legislative authority; and as he can, so he ought to be subject to him, as to the obligation of obedience, because every possible subjection is essential to the creature.
IV. If the sinner who deserves punishment was not subject to the law, he could no longer sin, and therefore by one şin he would set himself free from the danger of farther sinning ; for where no law is binding, there is no transgression, no sin, which John defines to be the transgression of the law, ! John iii. 4. But nothing can be imagined more absurd, than that man by sin has acquired an impeccability,
V. Moreover, according to this hypothesis, all siņners would be equal, and an equal degree of punishment remain for every one; which is contrary, both to sound reason and scrips
ture ture, where the inequality of sins and punishment, is so often inculcated.
VI. There is a plain passage, Gal. v. 3. which confirms, that even by the promulgation of the new gospel covenant, the breakers of the covenant who are without Christ, are not set free from that obligation of the law, which demands perfect obedience, but continue debtors to do the whole law.
VII. Nay, even in a human court, the penal compact is deemed an additional compact, adding to the principal convention, and consequently not abrogating, but accumulating the former obligation. Much less at the bar of God, can the obligation to punishment, arising from the violation of the covenant, abrogate the primary and principal obligation of the law, whereby the covenant was ratified.
VIII. Arminius therefore, (in Epist. Præstantium viro. rum, p. 173.) very basely refuses, that God, when man once fell from the state of innocence, and became obnoxious to punishment, even of right required obedience of man, as if God had forfeited his right by man's obedience. He makes use of these arguments : Ist, Because when man is in a state of sin, he is not in covenant with God; therefore there is no contract between God and man, by which he can require os bedience ; for by what reward, what punishment, can he give sanction to the law, since man, for the disobedience already committed, has forfeited the reward, and is become obnoxious to punishment ? 2dly, As God has, because of sin, deprived man of ability and power to fulfil the law, so by this very thing he has signified, that he will no longer require man to fulfil it, unless he restore his ability, nay he cannot in justice do it. If any shall say, Could therefore the creature be exempted from the right or authority of the Creator, as no longer to be bound to obey him? He answers, Yes, indeed, if the creature be accursed, and the Creator reckon it unworthy to require obedience from it; for it is the highest punishment so to conclude the sinner under sin, as not to require any more obedience from him, that being an evidence of irreconcileable anger, namely in that state. 3dly, The law, itself, to be performed, is such, as it would be unbecoming, it should be performed by a sinner who is out of the favour of God. He is commanded to have God for his God, to love, honour, and adore him, to put his trust in him, to use his name with reverence, &c. is it probable that such an obedience is required of him who is under the curse of God? Thus far Arminius, whose arguments deserve to be carefully exainined.