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XIV. And thus, indeed, Adam was in covenant with God, as a man, created after the image of God, and furnished with sufficient abilities to preserve that image. But there is another relation, in which he was considered as the head and representatire of mankind, both federal and natural. So that God said to Adam, as once to the Israelites, Deut. xxix. 14, 15. “ neither with you only do I make this covenant, and this oath ; but also with him that is not here with us this day.” The whole history of the first man proves, that he is not to be looked upon as an individual person, but that the whole huisan nature is considered as in him. For it was not said to our first parents only, encrease and multiply; by virtue of which word, the propagation of mankind is still continued : nor is it true of Adam only; it is not good that the man should be alone : nor does that conjugal law, therefore shali a man leave his father and his mother, and they shall be one flesh, concern him alone : which Christ still urges, Matt. fix. 5.: nor did the penalty, threatened by God upon Adam's sinning, thou shalt surely die, affect him alone, but, death passed upon all men, according to the Apostle's observation, Rom. v. 12. All which loudly proclaim, that Adam was here considered as the head of mankind.
XV. This also appears from that beautiful opposition of the first and second Adam, which Paul pursues at large, Roma V. 15, &c. For, as the second Adam does, in the Covenant of Grace, represent all the elect, in such a manner that they are accounted to have done and suffered themselves, what he did and suffered, in their name and stead: so likewise the first Adam was the representative of all that were to descend from him.
XVI. And that God was righteous in this constitution, is by no means to be disputed. Nor does it become us to ens tertain doubts about the right of God, nor enquire too curicusly into it; much less to measure it by the standard of any right established amongst us despicable mortals, when the matter of fact is évident and undisputed. We are always to speak in vindication of God; " that thou mightest bę justified when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest." Psal. li. 4. He must, surely, be utterly unacquainted with the majesty of the Supreme Being, with his most pure and unspotted holiness, which in every respect is 'most consistent with itseif, who presumes to scan his actions, and call his equity to account. A freedom this, no earthly father would bear in a son, no king in a subject, nor master in a servant. And do we, mean worms of the earth, take upon as to use
such freedom with the judge of the whole universe! As often as our murmuring flesh dares to repine and cry out, the ways of the Lord are not equal; so often let us oppose thereto, are not thy ways unequal? Ez, xviii. 25.
XVII. However, it generally holds that we more calmly acquiesce in the determinations of God, when we understand the reasons of them. Let us therefore see, whether here also we cannot demonstrate the equity of the divine right. For what if we should consider the matter thus? "If Adam had, in his own, and in our name, stood to the conditions of the covenant; if, after a course of probation, he had been confirmed in happiness, and we, his posterity, in him, if, fully satisfied with the delights of animal life, we had, together with him, been translated to the joys of heaven ; none certainly would then repine, that he was included in the head of mankind: every one would have commended both the wisdom and goodness of God: not the least suspicion of injustice would have arisen on account of God's putting the first man into a state of probation in the room of all, and not every individual for himself. How should that, which in this event, would have been deemed just, be unjust on a contrary event? For, neither is the justice nor injustice of actions to be judged of by the event.
XVIII. Besides, what mortal how can flatter himself, that, placed in the same circumstances with Adam, he would have better consulted his own interest? Adam was neither with. out wisdom, nor holiness, nor a desire after true happiness, nor an aversion to the miseries denounced by God against the sinner ; nor in fine, without any of those things, by which he might expect to keep upon his guard against all sin: and yet he suffered himself to be drawn aside by the craft of a flattering seducer. And dost thou, iniquitous censurer of the ways of the Lord, presume, thou wouldst have better used thy free will? Nay, on the contrary, all thy actions cry aloyd, that thou approvest, that thou art highly pleased with, and always takest example from that deed of thy first parent, about which thou so unjustly complainest. For, when thou transgressest the commands of God, when thou settest less by the will of the Supreme Being than by thy lusts, when thou preferest earthly to heavenly things, present to future, when, by thine own choice, thou seekest after happiness, but not that which is true; and, instead of taking the right way, goest into by-, 'paths; is not that the very same as if thou didst so often eat
of the forbidden tree? Why then dost thou presume to blame God for taking a compendious way, including all in one ; well knowing that the case of each in particular, when put to the test, would have proved the same.
CHA P. III.
Of the Law, or Condition, of the Covenant of Worksa I. LITHERTO we have treated of the Contracting Parties:
let us now take a view of the condition prescribed by this covenant. Where first we are to consider the Law of the Covenant, then the Observance of that law. The law of the covenant is twofold. ist, The law of nature, implanted in Adam at his creation. 2dly, The symbolical law, concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
II. The law of nature is the rule of good and evil, inscribed by God on man's conscience, even at his creation, and therefore binding upon hiin by divine authority. That such a law was connate with, and as it were implanted in the man, appears from the reliques, which, like the ruins of some noble building, are still extant in every man ; namely, from those common notions, by which the Heathens themselves distinguished right from wrong, and by which “ they were a law to themselves, which shews the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness," Rom. ii. 14, 15. From which we gather, that all these things were complete in man, when newly formed after the image of God.
III. Whatever the conscience of man dictates to be virtuous, or otherwise, it does so in the name of God, whose vicegerent it is, in man and the depositary of his commands. This, if I mistake not, is David's meaning, Psal. xxvii. 8.995 2875, to thee, that is, for thee, in thy stead, my heart says, or my conscience. This conscience therefore was also called a God by the heathen: as in this, Iambic, Bporois áruou ý ovveidneis Osós ; In all men conscience is a God. Plato in Philebus, calls reason a God dwelling in us. And hence we are not to think that the supreme rule in the law of nature is its agreement or disagreement with the rational nature, but that it is the divine wisdom manifested to, or the notion of good and evil engraven by God, on the conscience. It is finely said by the author of the book de Mundo, c. II. “ God is to us a law, tending on all sides to a just equilibrium, requiring no correction, admitting no variation.” With this Cicero agrees,
de Legibus, lib. 2. “ The true and leading law, which is proper both to command and to forbid, is the right reason ci the Supreme Being.
IV. That author appears not to have expressed himself with accuracy, who said, We here call the law, the knowledge of right and wrong, binding to do what is right, and to avoid what is wrong. For law properly is not any knowled e, but the object of knowledge. This law, we say, is naturaily known to man, but it would be absurd to say, knowledge is naturally known. Knowledge is our act, and is indeed to be squared by the rule of the law. The law is a rule prescribed by God for all our actions.
V. That other author is far less accurate, who thus determines : “ Prior to the fall there was properly no law: For then the love of God prevailed, which requires no law. There (as the same author elsewhere explains himself) a state of friendship and love obtained, such as is the natural state of a son with respect to a parent, and which is what nature affects. But when that love is violated, then a precept comes to be super-added : and that love, which before was yoluntary, (as best agreeing with its nature; for that can scarcely be called love, unless voluntary) falls under a precept, and passes into a law, to be enforced then with commination and coercion; which rigour of coercion properly constitutes a law.
VI. But this way of reasoning is far from being the effect of thought and attention. For, ist, it is not the rigour of the enforcement properly, that constitutes a law, but the obligatory virtue of what is injoined, proceeding both from the power of the lawgiver, and from the equity of the thing commanded, which is here founded on the holiness of the divine nature, so far as imitable by man. The Apostle James, ch. i. 25. commends “the perfect law of liberty.” 2dly, Nor is there any absurdi, ty to affirm, that the natural state of a son with respect to a parent, is regulated by laws. It is certain, Plato de Legib. lib. 3. says, that the first mortals practised the customs and laws of their fathers, quoting that sentence of Homer, Fipeisius de sxas Fasłwy every one makes laws for his children. 3dly, Nor, is it repugnant to do a thing by nature, and at the same time by a law. Philo Judæus de Migratione, explaining that celebrated old saying of the philosophers, say, that to live agreeably to nature, is done when the mind follows God, remembering his precepts. Crysippus in like manner, as commended by Laertius lib. 7. on Zeno, says, that person lives agreeably to nature, who does nothing prohibited by the common law, which is right reason. In a sublimer strain al
most than one could well expect from a heathen, is what Hier, ocles says on Pythagoras's golden verses : “ To obey right reason and God, is one and the same thing. For the rational nature being illuminated, readily embraces what the divine law prescribes. A soul which is conformed to God, never dissents from the will of God, but being attentive to the divinity and brightness, with which it is enlightened, does which it does. 4thly, Nor can it be affirmed, that after the breach of love, or, which is the same thing, after the entrance of sin, that then it was the law was superadded; seeing sin itself is avquse the transgression of the law. 5thly, Nor is love rendered less voluntary by the precept. For, the law enjoins love to be every way perfect, and therefore to be most volun, tary, not extorted by the servile fear of the threatening, I John iv. 18. Nor does he give satisfaction, when he says, that what is called love, scarce deserves that name, unless volutary ; he ought to say, is by no means charity, unless voluntary. For love is the most delightful union of our will
with the thing beloved; which cannot be so much as concei. ved, without the plainest contradiction, any other than volun· tary. If therefore, by the superadded law, love is rendered
involuntary and forced, the whole nature of love is destroyed, and a divine law set up, which ruins love. 6thly, In fine, the law of nature itself was not without a threatening, and that of eternal death. I shall conclude in the most accurate words of Crysostom, Homil. 12. to the people of Antioch ; " when God formed man at first, he gave him a natural law. And what then is this natural law? He rectified our conscience, and made us have the knowledge of good and evil, without any other teaching than our own.
VII. It is, moreover, to be observed, that this law of nature is the same in substance with the decalogue ; being what the Apostle calls, tnv sloana Inu oostwnu, a commandment which was ordained to life, Rom. vii. 10. that is, that law by the performance of which, life was formerly obtainable. And indeed, the decalogue contains such precepts,” which if a man do he shall live in them,” Lev. xviii. 5. But those precepts are undoubtedly the law proposed to Adam, upon which the covenant of works was built. Add to this, what the Apostle says, that that law, which still continues to be the rule of our actions, and whose righteousness ought to be fulfilled in us, was made weak through the flesh, that is, through sin, and that it was become impossible for it to bring us to life, Rom. viii. 3. 4. The same law therefore was in force before the entrance of sin, and, if duly observed, had the power of giving life. Besides, God in the second creation inscribes the