Until the time limit has expired, the presumption is that they intend to return; after that time it is presumed that they do not intend to return, and it becomes necessary, in order that they may continue to have this Government's protection, to show affirmatively, in accordance with the regulations of the State Department made in pursuance of the act, that it is their bona fide intention to return to the United States to live. Obviously, therefore, the essential thing under the act is the intention to return to and reside in the United States. The highest proof of such an intention is the actual return and residence of such a person, amounting as it does to a demonstration. It is not to be held, therefore, that the act would apply to a case of this kind unless the language used or the circumstances attending its passage compel such a conclusion. The title, language, and history of the act, however, support the views just stated as to its construction. As above stated, the act is entitled "An act in reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad," and it appears that it was passed at the instance of the Department of State. In reporting the bill to the House, the Committee on Foreign Affairs said (H. Rept. No. 6431, 59th Cong., 2d sess.): This bill follows in its general lines the recommendations of the Department of State. * Perhaps the most important provision of the bill is desired by the State Department to guard against complications in which this country has often been involved. All desire that the flag of this country should protect an American citizen to the fullest extent. But none of us desire that some foreigner who does not intend to cast his lot permanently with us should endeavor to avail himself of the flag as a fraudulent protection. Many foreigners come here, become naturalized, and then return to their own countries or migrate to other parts of the world without any intention of returning to this country. They have not become citi zens in good faith, but they seek to avail themselves of the protection of our citizenship in avoiding responsibility to which they may be subjected in other parts of the world. This is not right. The citizenship of the United States should not be sought or possessed for commercial or dishonest ends. To guard against this evil, this bill provides that a naturalized citizen who leaves this country and dwells elsewhere continuously for five years shall be presumed to have abandoned his citizenship. This presumption can be overcome, but such a provision as this would be of great assistance to the Department of State, would avoid possibilities of international complications, and will prevent those who are not entitled to its protection from dishonestly hiding under the American flag. As further showing the purpose of the act, the remarks of Mr. Perkins, who reported the bill from the committee and had charge of it in the House, are pertinent. In the course of debate it was said (Congressional Record, vol. 41, pt. 2, p. 1466): Mr. BENNET of New York. Mr. Speaker, I entirely agree with the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Bonynge] as to section 3 [2]. I think it is too broad. In addition to the consideration that he urged upon the House, there is also the consideration of property rights and of property rights inhering in American born citizens who might take through these foreign-born naturalized citizens. This bill will apply to a man who has now been abroad four years and eleven months, and if he remain abroad the other month he would be forced, under this statute, to become no longer a citizen of the United States, but a citizen of the country where he was. Mr. PERKINS. Allow me to correct the gentleman. That certainly is not the result of the statute at all. Mr. BENNET of New York. Why not? Mr. PERKINS. The statute provides that having remained there five years continuously, there shall be a presumption which, unless he satisfies the officers of the State Department, their consuls, or ministers to the contrary, would authorize the State Department to refuse to extend him protection. It can not affect any other rights, which, of course, he can present in court. No presumption is conclusive on a court. It is a mere presumption, but the presumption would protect the State Department. That is the object of the bill and the result of the bill and the only result of it. The fact that the act only authorizes the submission of proof for the purpose of overcoming the presumption as to noncitizenship raised thereby to diplomatic and consular officers of the United States, who necessarily reside abroad, and makes no provision in respect to naturalized citizens coming within the purview of the act who return to the United States, is a further evidence that Congress did not intend the act to apply to a case of this kind. To hold that it did would produce the absurdity of a naturalized citizen seeking to reenter the United States being held to have ceased to be such, and possibly denied admission, because he had failed to make proof before the proper diplomatic or consular officer abroad of his intention to return to the United States. As above shown, the presumption as to noncitizenship raised by the act is created for the purpose of relieving the State Department of protecting naturalized citizens abroad when the conditions are apparently such as to indicate that they have no bona fide intention to return to and reside in the United States. When a citizen returns to the United States the necessity for such protection no longer exists, and it is fair to assume that with the cessation of the necessity the presumption created by the act also ceases. In my opinion, therefore, under the facts stated, Jebran Gossin has not lost his citizenship, and his wife, Nazara Gossin, upon the assumption above stated that she herself might be lawfully naturalized, is also to be deemed a citizen. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND LABOR. GEO. W. WICKERSHAM, COMMERCIAL CONVENTION BETWEEN DENMARK AND FRANCE. File No. 23807. No. 273.] Chargé Wallace to the Secretary of State. AMERICAN LEGATION, Copenhagen, February 23, 1910. SIR: I have the honor to inclose, as of interest to the department, two copies, with translation in duplicate, of a supplementary agreement, signed on February 9, 1910, by the Danish minister for foreign affairs and the French minister in Copenhagen, to the convention of commerce and navigation signed in Paris, February 9, 1842. I beg to draw the department's attention to Article II of the convention, inasmuch as the Rigsdag has now under consideration a complete revision of the existing laws governing the rights of commercial travelers in Denmark. I have, etc., WM. K. WALLACE. [Inclosure-Translation.] The undersigned, Erik Julius Christian de Scavenius, minister for foreign affairs of His Majesty the King of Denmark, and Charles Prosper Maurice Horric de Beaucaire, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Copenhagen, duly authorized for the purpose, have agreed upon the following supplementary articles to the convention of commerce and navigation signed in Paris the 9th of February, 1842. ARTICLE I. Danish subjects in France and French citizens in Denmark in the exercise of their civil rights as well as in the pursuit of their trades and industrial or commercial professions, shall enjoy the same rights, privileges, liberties, favors, immunities, and exemptions which have been or will be granted to their own nationals and shall not be subjected to other forms of taxation or impost than those which are or may be levied on their own nationals. ARTICLE II. The amount to be paid for letters patent in Denmark by the commercial travelers of firms established in France shall not exceed the amount paid by commercial travelers of nations most favored in this respect. The commercial travelers of firms established in Denmark shall be subject in France to an equivalent impost. ARTICLE III. The foregoing articles will have the same force and value as if they were an integral part of the above-mentioned convention of the 9th of February, 1842, they shall apply to the same geographical areas, and shall cease to be effective simultaneously with termination of the said convention, in case this should be renounced. ARTICLE IV. These articles, executed in duplicate, shall come into force one month after their signature. ERIK SCAVENIUS. COPENHAGEN, February 9, 1910. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. EXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Signed at Santo Domingo June 19, 1909. Ratification advised by the Senate, with amendment, July 26, 1909. Ratified by the President April 29, 1910. Ratified by the Dominican Republic July 11, 1910. Ratifications exchanged at Santo Domingo August 2, 1910. Proclaimed August 26, 1910. BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. · A PROCLAMATION. Whereas a convention between the United States of America and the Dominican Republic providing for the mutual extradition of fugitives from justice was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Santo Domingo, on the nineteenth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and nine, the original of which convention, being in the English and Spanish languages is, as amended by the Senate of the United States, word for word as follows: The United States of America and the Dominican Republic, having judged it expedient, with a view to the better administration of justice and to the prevention of crimes within their respective territories and jurisdictions, that persons convicted of or charged with the crimes hereinafter specified, and being fugitives from justice, should, under certain circumstances, be reciprocally delivered up, have resolved to conclude a convention for that purpose, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States of America, Fenton R. McCreery, minister resident and consul general of the United States of America, and the President of the Dominican Republic, Don Emilio Tejera Bonetti, acting secretary of state for foreign affairs of the Dominican Republic, who, after reciprocal communication of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles, to wit: ARTICLE I. It is agreed that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Dominican Republic shall, upon mutual requisition duly made as herein provided, deliver up to justice any person who may be charged with, or may have been convicted of any of the crimes specified in article two of this convention committed within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties while said person was actually within such jurisdiction when the crime was committed, and who shall seek an asylum or shall be found within the territories of the other, provided that such surrender shall take place only upon such evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offence had been there committed. ARTICLE II. Persons shall be delivered up, according to the provisions of this convention, who shall have been charged with or convicted of any of the following crimes: 1. Murder, comprehending the crimes designated by the terms of parricide, assassination, manslaughter, when voluntary, poisoning, or infanticide. 2. The attempt to commit murder. 3. Rape, abortion, carnal knowledge of children under the age of twelve years. 4. Bigamy. 5. Arson. 6. Willful and unlawful destruction or obstruction of railroads, which endangers human life. 7. Crimes committed at sea: (a) Piracy, as commonly known and defined by the laws of Nations; (b) Wrongfully sinking or destroying a vessel at sea or attempting to do so; (c) Mutiny or conspiracy by two or more members of the crew or other persons on board of a vessel on the high seas, for the purpose of rebelling against the authority of the captain or commander of such vessel, or by fraud or violence taking possession of such vessel; (d) Assault on board ships upon the high seas with intent to do bodily harm. 8. Burglary, defined to be the act of breaking into and entering the house of another in the night time with intent to commit a felony therein; 9. The act of breaking into and entering into the offices of the Government and public authorities, or the offices of banks, banking houses, saving banks, trust companies, insurance companies, or other buildings not dwellings with intent to commit a felony therein. 10. Robbery, defined to be the act of feloniously and forcibly taking from the person of another, goods or money by violence or by putting him in fear. 11. Forgery or the utterance of forged papers. 12. The forgery or falsification of the official acts of the Government or public authority, including courts of justice, or the uttering or fraudulent use of any of the same. 13. The fabrication of counterfeit money, whether coin or paper, counterfeit titles, or coupons of public debt, created by national, State, provincial, territorial, local or municipal Governments, bank notes or other instruments of public credit, counterfeit seals, stamps, dies, and marks of State or public administrations, and the utterence, circulation, or fraudulent use of the above mentioned objects. 14. Embezzlement or criminal malversation committed within the jurisdiction of one or the other party by public officers or depositaries, where the amount embezzled exceeds two hundred dollars. 15. Embezzlement by any person or persons hired, salaried, or employed, to the detriment of their employers or principals, when the crime or offence is punishable by imprisonment or other corporal punishment by the laws of both countries, and where the amount embezzled exceeds two hundred dollars. 16. Kidnapping of minors or adults, defined to be the abduction or detention of a person or persons, in order to exact money from them or their families, or for any other unlawful end. 17. Larceny, defined to be the theft of effects, personal property, or money of the value of twenty-five dollars or more. 18. Obtaining money, valuable securities or other property by false pretenses or receiving any money, valuable securities or other property knowing the same to have been unlawfully obtained, where the amount of money or the value of the property so obtained or received exceeds two hundred dollars. 19. Perjury or subornation of perjury. 20. Fraud or breach of trust by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, director, or officer of any company or corporation, or by anyone in any fiduciary position, where the amount of money or the value of the property misappropriated exceeds $200. 21. Crimes and offenses against the laws of both countries for the suppression of slavery and slave trading. 22. The extradition is also to take place for participation in any of the aforesaid crimes as an accessory before or after the fact, provided such participation be punishable by imprisonment by the laws of both contracting parties. ARTICLE III. The provisions of this convention shall not import claim of extradition for any crime or offense of a political character, nor for acts connected with such crimes or offenses; and no persons surrendered by or to either of the contracting parties in virtue of this convention shall be tried or punished for a political crime or offense. When the offense charged comprises the act either of murder or assassination or of poisoning, either consumated or attempted, the fact that the offense was committed or attempted against the life of the sovereign or head of a foreign State or against the life of any member of his family, shall not be deemed sufficient to sustain that such a crime or offense was of a political character, or was an act connected with crimes or offenses of a political character. ARTICLE IV. No persons shall be tried for any crime or offense other than that for which he was surrendered. ARTICLE V. A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered under the provisions hereof, when, from lapse of time or other lawful cause, according to the laws of the place within the jurisdiction of which the crime was committed, the criminal is exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense for which the surrender is asked. ARTICLE VI. If a fugitive criminal whose surrender may be claimed pursuant to the stipulations hereof, be actually under prosecution, out on bail or in custody, for a crime or offense committed in the country where he |