of April 22, 1793, adopted the policy of nonintervention and neutrality.

Am. State Papers, For. Rel. I. 708-709, 147, 140. See supra, § 821.

(3) SPAIN AND HER COLONIES.

$900.

In the contest between Spain and her colonies, in which the latter achieved their independence, the United States adhered to the policy of neutrality and nonintervention. See supra, §§ 28-36; infra,

$930-936, 1320.

(4) GREEK INDEPENDENCE.

§ 901.

"The war of the Greeks for independence early attracted attention in this country. Mr. Dwight, of Massachusetts, on the 24th of December, 1822, presented to the House a memorial in their favor. The sentiment of the House was against meddling with the subject, and the memorial was ordered to lie on the table.

"Early in the next session (December 8, 1823), Mr. Webster submitted to the House a resolution that provision ought to be made by law for defraying the expense incident to the appointment of an agent or commissioner to Greece, whenever the President shall deem it expedient to make such appointment. On the 19th of the same month the House requested the President to lay before it any information he might have received, and which he might deem it improper to communicate, respecting the condition and future prospects of the Greeks. "On the 29th a memorial was presented from citizens of New York, requesting the recognition of the independence of Greece. On the 31st the President transmitted the desired information to Congress. On the 2d of January, 1824, Mr. Poinsett laid before the House a resolution of the general assembly of South Carolina that that State would hail with pleasure the recognition by the American government of the independence of Greece. On the 5th Webster presented a memorial from citizens of Boston. The debate upon Webster's resolution began upon the 19th of January and continued until the 26th. It took a wide range, developed great diversity of sentiment, and produced no result.

"The sympathy for the Greeks continued to manifest itself. On the 2d of January, 1827, Edward Livingston moved to instruct the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill appropriating $50,000 for provisions for their relief. The bill was negatived on the 27th. Private relief was given, and in his annual message to Congress in the H. Doc. 551-vol 6- -3

following December the President transmitted to Congress correspondence respecting it with Capo d'Istrias and with the president and secretary of the Greek national assembly.

It

"The first and only treaty with Greece was concluded in London in 1837 between the ministers of the respective powers at that court. was sent to Congress with the President's message of December 4, 1838."

Davis, Notes, Treaty Vol. (1776-1887), 1341; supra, § 41.

For correspondence in relation to the Greeks, in 1823-1824, see Ex. Papers 14, 18 Cong. 1 sess.; Am. State Papers, For Rel. V. 251, 252.

(5) HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION.

§ 902.

As to the efforts made to induce the United States to depart from the policy of nonintervention in the Hungarian revolution of 1848, see supra, § 72; infra, § 905.

(6) CHILE-PERUVIAN WAR.

§ 903.

With reference to an inquiry as to the attitude of the United States in case a proposal should be received from Germany and Great Britain to act with them in a mediation between Chile and Peru in the war in South America, in the interest of the protection of commerce, Mr. Evarts said: "While as keenly alive as the governments of Germany or Great Britain can be to the dangers arising to commerce from the existence of so deplorable a war between kindred peoples, as well as to the greater prospective danger that the Argentine Republic and other South American States may yet be involved in the quarrel, and while it has been from the commencement of the struggle and is now ready to assist in the restoration of peace between the belligerents, whenever its good offices may be usefully proffered, yet this government does not look with favor upon any premature effort, nor any effort in combination with other neutral powers, which would carry the impression of dictation or coercion in disparagement of belligerent rights. Inquiry having been made of this government, through Her Britannic Majesty's minister at this capital, in the same sense as that addressed to you through Mr. Bucher, an identical answer was returned to Sir Edward Thornton. You will, of course, carefully note and report any tendencies you may observe toward further action by Germany in the direction of South American intervention, either with or without the cooperation of other powers."

Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. White, min. to Germany, No. 22, July 19, 1879, MS. Inst. Germany, XVI. 486.

In 1879 Mr. S. Newton Pettis, American minister to Bolivia, paid a visit to Lima and to Santiago in the interest of peace between the parties to the war then existing in South America. His mission was avowedly undertaken without the knowledge or direction of his government, and seems to have been limited to the endeavor to make each of the three governments concerned privately acquainted with the others' views with regard to a settlement of differences, especially by arbitration if a direct settlement should be unattainable. "Unauthorized and even rash," said the Department of State, " as Mr. Pettis' experiment might appear, the United States could not but rejoice at the result should the knowledge thus gained by the belligerents of each other's views conduce to an eventual settlement." The United States was "not, however, disposed to dictate a peace, or to take any steps looking to arbitration or intervention in disparagement of belligerent rights, or even to urge the conditions under which it may be reached. Its good offices have not been officially tendered, but if sought, on a practical basis of arbitration submitted by the several parties to the struggle, the President would not hesitate to use them in the interest of peace. The Department dismisses, as unbased rumor of a hostile press, the statement in some of the Chilean journals that you have indicated a purpose on the part of this government to end the war by intervention or by arbitration on terms proposed by itself.”

Mr. Hunter, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Pettis, min. to Bolivia, No. 26, Oct. 1, 1879, MS. Inst. Bolivia, I. 262.

See, also, Mr. Evarts, Sec. of State, to Mr. Pettis, No. 25, Sept. 19, 1879, id. 261.

"The deplorable condition of Peru, the disorganization of its government, and the absence of precise and trustworthy information as to the state of affairs now existing in that unhappy country, render it impossible to give you instructions as full and definite as I would desire.

“Judging from the most recent dispatches from our ministers, you will probably find on the part of the Chilean authorities in possession of Peru a willingness to facilitate the establishment of the provisional government which has been attempted by Señor Calderon. If so, you will do all you properly can to encourage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable conditions and limitations with which this concession may be accompanied. It is vitally important to Peru that she be allowed to resume the functions of a native and orderly government, both for the purposes of internal administration and the negotiation of peace. To obtain this end it would be far better to accept conditions which may be hard and unwelcome than by demanding too much to force the continuance of the military control of Chile. It is

hoped that you will be able, in your necessary association with the Chilean authorities, to impress upon them that the more liberal and considerate their policy, the surer it will be to obtain a lasting and satisfactory settlement. The Peruvians can not but be aware of the sympathy and interest of the people and government of the United States, and will, I feel confident, be prepared to give to your representations the consideration to which the friendly anxiety of this government entitles them.

"The United States can not refuse to recognize the rights which the Chilean government has acquired by the successes of the war, and it may be that a cession of territory will be the necessary price to be paid for peace. It would seem to be injudicious for Peru to declare that under no circumstances could the loss of territory be accepted as the result of negotiation. The great objects of the provisional authorities of Peru would seem to be to secure the establishment of a constitutional government, and next to succeed in the opening of negotiations for peace without the declaration of preliminary conditions as an ultimatum on either side. It will be difficult, perhaps, to obtain this from Chile; but as the Chilean government has distinctly repudiated the idea that this was a war of conquest, the government of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity to make propositions of indemnity and guarantee before submitting to a cession of territory. As far as the influence of the United States will go in Chile, it will be exerted to induce the Chilean government to consent that the question of the cession of territory should be the subject of negotiation and not the condition precedent upon which alone negotiations shall commence. If you aid the government of Peru in securing such a result, you will have rendered the service which seems most pressing. Whether it is in the power of the Peruvian government to make any arrangements at home or abroad, singly or with the assistance of friendly powers, which will furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the required guarantee, you will be better able to advise me after you have reached your post.

"As you are aware, more than one proposition has been submitted to the consideration of this government looking to a friendly intervention by which Peru might be enabled to meet the conditions which would probably be imposed. Circumstances do not seem at present opportune for such action; but if, upon full knowledge of the condition of Peru, you can inform this government that Peru can devise and carry into practical effect a plan by which all the reasonable conditions of Chile can be met without sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian territory, the government of the United States would be willing to offer its good offices toward the execution of such a project.

"As a strictly confidential communication, I inclose you a copy of instructions sent this day to the United States minister at Santiago.

You will thus be advised of the position which this government assumes toward all the parties to this deplorable conflict. It is the desire of the United States to act in a spirit of the sincerest friendship to the three republics, and to use its influences solely in the interest of an honorable and lasting peace."

Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Hurlbut, min. to Peru, No. 2, June 15, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 914; War in South America, 500.

For the communication to the American minister at Santiago, see Mr. Blaine, Sec. of State, to Mr. Kilpatrick, min. to Chile, No. 2, June 15, 1881, For. Rel. 1881, 131; War in South America, 157.

In an instruction of November 22, 1881, Mr. Blaine, referring to Mr. Hurlbut's reports of his proceedings, expressed regret that a construction had been put upon the latter's language and conduct indicating a policy of active intervention on the part of the United States beyond the scope of his instructions. Mr. Hurlbut had stated, in a memorandum to Admiral Lynch, that the United States would “regard with disfavor" the annexation by Chile of Peruvian territory by right of conquest. "You were,” said Mr. Blaine, “distinctly informed that this government could not refuse to recognize that such annexation might become a necessary condition in a final treaty of peace;" and the main purpose of Mr. Hurlbut's effort was expected to be "not so much a protest against any possible annexation, as an attempt by friendly but unofficial communications with the Chilean authorities (with whom you were daily associated), to induce them to support the policy of giving to Peru, without the imposition of harsh and absolute conditions precedent, the opportunity to show that the rights and interests of Chile could be satisfied without such annexation." Mr. Blaine also criticised some of the language used by Mr. Hurlbut in a letter to Señor Garcia, the secretary of General Piérolalanguage which might seem to imply that the United States had recognized the government of Calderon instead of that of General Piérola, because of the former's resolution not to cede Peruvian territory. "No such motive," said Mr. Blaine, " has ever been declared by this government. The government of Calderon was recognized because we believed it to the interest of both Chile and Peru that some respectable authority should be established which could restore internal order, and initiate responsible negotiations for peace. We desired that the Peruvian government should have a fair opportunity to obtain the best terms it could, and hoped that it would be able to satisfy the just demands of Chile without the painful sacrifice of the national territory. But we did not make, and never intended to make, any special result of the peace negotiations the basis of our recognition of the Calderon government." Mr. Blaine also expressed his dissatisfaction with Mr. Hurlbut's action in sending a telegram to the American minister at Buenos Ayres suggesting that a