Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

had any intention of acquiring any such territory. (Mr. Vignaud's No. 672, Nov. 26, 1884; Mr. Morton's No. 734, March 19, 1885. See, also, Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. McLane, min. to France, No. 414, Dec. 21, 1888, MS. Inst. France, XXI. 616.) With reference to a rumor that Great Britain intended to seize the island of Tortuga, a copy of some of the foregoing correspondence was sent to the American minister at London, with instructions, if he should discover that any such step was in contemplation, promptly to remonstrate, in suitable terms, against the consummation of any measure on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, which would violate the well known principles of the Monroe doctrine." (Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Phelps, min. to England, No. 546, Feb. 24, 1887, MS. Inst. Gr. Br. XXVIII. 272, enclosing copies of Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Morton, No. 698, Feb. 28, 1885; same to same, No. 700, March 2, 1885; Mr. Morton to Mr. Bayard, April 2, 1885; Mr. Thompson, min. to Hayti, to Mr. Bayard, Jan. 25, 1887.

With reference to rumors in Hayti in regard to efforts of the French diplomatic agent to induce his Government in certain contingencies to declare a protectorate over or even to annex that country, the Department of State of the United States, while discrediting the rumors, said:

"That Government [the French] is perfectly aware of the wellsettled policy of the United States which would lead us to oppose any attempt on the part of a European government to extend its influence in any portion of America. In view of events which are currently reported to be taking place in France at this time arising out of the pecuniary embarrassments of the Panama Canal Company, and of the possibility of the French Government being asked to undertake the construction of that work as a national measure, it may be well for you, without referring especially to affairs in Panama, to take this opportunity also to call the attention of the minister of foreign affairs in somewhat explicit language to the consistent attitude maintained by the United States in regard to this subject. The wish of the United States has always been that the independent countries to the south of us should be left free to develop their own resources in such manner as they might deem most advisable for their own interests free from foreign dictation or interference of any kind. The United States has no interest other than that of the well being and prosperity of its neighbors. It has never attempted colonization, but it has consistently maintained that no part of America is to be considered as a subject for future colonization of any European power. The views of this Government in this regard have heretofore been fully explained to the Government of France, not only on the occasion above referred to, when some acquisition by it of Haytian territory was reported to be in contemplation, but also on the occasion of the expedition to Mexico,

H. Doc. 551-vol 6-28

undertaken upwards of 25 years ago, and at the time of the commencement of work by the French company upon the Panama Canal." Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. McLane, min. to France, No. 414, Dec. 21, 1888, MS. Inst. France, XXI. 616.

IX. SPECIAL APPLICATIONS OF MONROE DOCTRINE.

1. ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.

$944.

Replying to an inquiry of the Argentine Republic as to the scope of the declarations contained in President Monroe's message of December 22, 1823, against European interference in American affairs, Mr. Clay said that, when the declaration was made, "apprehensions were entertained of designs on the part of the allied powers of Europe to interfere in behalf of Spain to reduce again to subjection those parts of the continent of America which had thrown off the Spanish yoke." The declaration was made by the President as the head of the executive government, and, although there was every reason to believe that the policy which it announced was in conformity with the opinion both of the nation and of Congress, "the declaration must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand." Should the case ever occur of such European interference as the message supposed, and it became necessary to decide whether the country would or would not engage in war, Congress alone would by the Constitution be competent to decide that question, although there could be little doubt that the sentiment of the message would be still that of the people and the Government of the United States.

As to the war raging between the Argentine Republic and the Emperor of Brazil, Mr. Clay said that it could not be conceived "as presenting a state of things bearing the remotest analogy to the case which President Monroe's message deprecates. It is," continued Mr. Clay, "a war strictly American in its origin and its object. It is a war in which the allies of Europe have taken no part. Even if Portugal and the Brazils had remained united, and the war had been carried on by their joint arms against the Argentine Republic, that would have been far from presenting the case which the message contemplated."

Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Forbes, chargé d'affaires to Buenos Ayres,
No. 6, Jan. 3, 1828, MS. Inst. U. States Ministers, XII. 49.

As to the difficulty between France and the Argentine Confederation in
1838, see memorandum, Oct. 27, 1838, MS. Inst. Special Missions,
I. 167.

"As the resumption of actual occupation of the Falkland Islands by Great Britain in 1833 took place under a claim of title which had been previously asserted and maintained by that Government, it is not seen that the Monroe doctrine, which has been invoked on the part of the Argentine Republic, has any application to the case. By the terms in which that principle of international conduct was announced, it was expressly excluded from retroactive operation.

"If the circumstances had been different, and the acts of the British Government had been in violation of that doctrine, this Government could never regard its failure to assert it as creating any liability to another power for injuries it may have sustained in consequence of the omission."

Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, to Mr. Quesada, March 18, 1886, MS. Notes to
Argentine Republic, VI. 256.

For further information in relation to the incident here referred to, see
supra, I. 298, § 89; Mr. Baylies, chargé d'affaires, to the Buenos
Ayrean Government, July 10, 1832, 20 Br. & For. State Papers, 338,
based on Mr. Livingston, Sec. of State, to Mr. Baylies, Jan. 26, 1832,
MS. Inst. Am. States, XIV. 235.

Mr. Bayard, in his note of March 18, 1886, supra, quoted from a note of
Mr. Webster, Sec. of State, to Mr. Alvear, Argentine minister, of Dec.
4, 1841, reading as follows:

"The right of the Argentine Government, therefore, to jurisdiction over it
[the territory of the Falkland Islands], being contested by another
power [Great Britain], and upon grounds of claim long antecedent to
the acts of Captain Duncan which General Alvear details, it is con-
ceived that the United States ought not, until the controversy upon
the subject between those two Governments shall be settled, to give a
final answer to General Alvear's note, involving, as that answer must,
under existing circumstances, a departure from that which has hith-
erto been considered as the cardinal policy of this Government."
As to the seizure of the ship Hudson and the schooner Washington by
the British authorities at the Falkland Islands in 1854, see S. Ex.
Doc. 19, 42 Cong. 2 sess.

With reference to a suggestion made in certain quarters that the United States should join Germany and Great Britain in representations to the Argentine Republic in relation to the latter's reported refusal to proceed with the arbitration of the boundary question with Chile, the Department of State observed that the fact that the Queen of Great Britain had already been chosen as arbitrator would appear to stand in the way of joint representations by Great Britain and Germany to the Argentine Republic against the latter's refusal to arbitrate. The Department of State added that it of course did not wish to appear as opposing any suggestion of arbitration “made benevolently and not in the form of intervention, joint or otherwise, inconsistent with the independence of the nation to which it was addressed;" and that the United States had already tendered its

good offices impartially to the Argentine Republic and Chile for the purpose of bringing about the execution of the treaty of arbitration, but had not yet received a reply. The American ambassador in London reported that the British Government held similar views to those expressed by the United States.

Mr. Moore, Act. Sec. of State, to Mr. Hay, ambass. to England, tel., Sept.
1, 1898, MS. Inst. Great Britain, XXXII. 640; Mr. Hay to Mr. Moore,
Sept. 6, 1898, MS. Desp. from Great Britain; Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay,
No. 833, Sept. 7, 1898, MS. Inst. Great Britain, XXXII. 643.

2. BOLIVIA.

§ 945.

"The nations on this continent are placed in a peculiar position. Their interests and independence require that they should establish and maintain an American system of policy for their protection and security entirely distinct from that which has so long prevailed in Europe. To tolerate any interference on the part of European governments with controversies in America and to suffer them to establish new colonies of their own intermingled with our free republics would be to make, to the same extent, a voluntary sacrifice of our independence. These truths ought everywhere throughout the continent of America to be impressed on the public mind."

Mr. Buchanan, Sec. of State, to Mr. Appleton, min. to Bolivia, No. 2,
June 1, 1848, MS. Inst. Bolivia, I. 2.

In the course of this instruction Mr. Buchanan said it was greatly to be
deplored that the instability of the Spanish-American republics, and
in many instances their disregard for private rights, had afforded a
pretext for the unfounded assumption that man is not fit for self-
government. So long, said Mr. Buchanan, as it should be in the
power of successive military chieftains to subvert the governments
of those republics by the sword, their peoples could not expect to
enjoy the blessings of liberty; and anarchy, confusion, and civil war
must be the result. In his intercourse with the Bolivian authorities,
Mr. Appleton was to omit no opportunity of pressing these truths
upon them.
He was also, by his counsel and advice, should an op-
portunity offer, to promote, without attempting to interfere with the
domestic concerns of either republic, the cession by Peru to Bolivia
of the port of Arica, which Bolivia was understood to desire. In
this relation Mr. Buchanan referred to the onerous transit duties
then levied by Peru at Arica on merchandise destined for consump-
tion in Bolivia, and observed that so long as Arica should continue to
be a Peruvian port it would be a perpetual cause of irritation between
the two republics and always endanger their friendly relations with
each other.

[blocks in formation]

By notes of January 28 and April 6, 1825, the chargé d'affaires of Brazil, in behalf of his Government, proposed (1) that the United States should enter into an alliance with Brazil to maintain its independence, if Portugal should be assisted by any foreign power to reestablish her former sway, and (2) that an alliance might be formed to expel the arms of Portugal from any part of the Brazilian territory of which they might happen to take possession. Mr. Clay replied that, while the President adhered to the principles set forth in the message of his predecessor of Dec. 2, 1823, the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil, founded on the independence which the United States was the first to acknowledge, seemed to remove the ground which would be necessary to justify the acceptance of the first proposition; but that, if there should be a renewal of demonstrations on the part of the European allies against the independence of American States, the President would give to that condition of things every consideration which its importance would undoubtedly demand. The prospect of peace also rendered unnecessary such an alliance as was referred to in the second proposition. Such a treaty, however, would be contrary to the policy the United States had pursued, which was "that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its former colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties."

Mr. Clay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Rebello, Brazilian chargé d'affaires, April 13, 1825, MS. Notes to For. Legs. III. 212.

The Earl of Aberdeen, in a note to the Marquis of Barbacena, Jan. 13, 1829, said:

"Undoubtedly the King did advise His Imperial Majesty [of Brazil] to complete the act of abdication of the Kingdom of Portugal, and thus to perform an obligation which H. I. M. himself, as far back as the month of May, 1826, had solemnly contracted before the world. His Majesty further advised the Emperor to send his daughter to Europe, in accordance with the declaration of H. I. M. made at the same period. These measures were well calculated to conciliate and to tranquillize the Portuguese nation, by removing the just suspicions of the people, and convincing them that it was not intended to govern them as a colony of Brazil. It is unfortunate that the measures thus advised, were not carried into execution previous to the arrival of the Infant at Lisbon. . . . But the assurance given to Dom Miguel, and entered upon the protocol of the con

« AnteriorContinuar »