The Constitution, which inumerates the exclusive purposes for which the militia may be called into the service of the United States, affords no warrant for the use of the militia by the General Government, except to suppress insurrection, to repel invasions, or to execute the laws of the Union, and hence the Presi- Clause 16. Power over the militia. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; CASE NOTES Scope and operation of clause. - "Congress is thus expressly vested with the power to provide for governing such part only of the militia of the several States, as, having been called forth to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, or to repel invasions, is employed in the service of the United States." (Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114, May 6, 1895.) "It is admitted on the one side, that so long as militia are acting under the military jurisdiction of the state to which they belong, the powers of legislation over them are concurrent in the general and state government. Congress has power to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining them; and this power being unlimited, except in the two particulars of officering and training them, according to the discipline to be prescribed by congress, it may be exercised to any extent that may be deemed necessary by congress. But as state militia, the power of the state governments to legislate on the same subjects, having existed prior to the formation of the constitution, and not having been prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the states, subordinate nevertheless to the paramount law of the general government, operating upon the same subject. On the other side, it is conceded, that after a detachment of the militia have been called forth, and have entered into the service of the United States, the authority of the general government over such detachment is exclusive. This is also obvious. Over the national militia, the state governments never had, or could have jurisdiction. None such is conferred by the constitution of the United States; consequently, none such can exist.". (Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 16-17, Feb. Term, 1820. See also: Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, Jan. 4, 1886; United States ex rel. Gillett v. Dern, 74 F.2d 485, 487, Dec. 3, 1934.) Congress is empowered to fix the period when a portion of the militia, called forth by the President, shall enter the service of the United States and change their character from State to National Congress may provide for the punishment by court-martial of a militiaman who refuses or neglects to obey the order of the President calling forth the militia. "This flows from the power bestowed upon the general government to call them forth; and, consequently, to punish disobedience to a legal order; and by no means proves, that the call of the president places the detachment in the service of the United States." (Houston v. Moore, supra, at 18. See also Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, Jan. Term, 1827.) "But congress have no power and never had to subject a militia man not in the military or naval service of the United States ✶✶✶ to a trial by a court-martial for any crime, especially one that is capitol or infamous. This is plain enough upon the face of the constitution, and it is supported by the opinion of Judge Story. (Ex parte Henderson, 11 Fed. Cas. 1067, 1076, No. 6, 349, May 24, 1878.) The militia power reserved to the States by the militia clause, while separate and distinct in its field, and while serving to diminish occasion for exercising the army power, is subject to be restricted in, or even deprived of, its area of operation through the army power, according to the extent to which Congress, in its discretion, finds necessity for calling the latter into play. (Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, Jan. 7, 1918. See also Cox v. Wood, Commandant Camp Funston, 247 U.S. 3, May 6, 1918.) Clause 17. Power of exclusive legislation over places ceded or purchased.7 To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And EDITORIAL NOTE The Criminal Code, act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, secs. 272-289, 35 Stat. 1142-1145, as amended, defines and provides for the punishment of offenses which may be "committed within or on any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building.", that the legislature of a State might exercise within the State; and may vest and distribute the judicial authority in and among courts and magistrates, and regulate judicial proceedings before them, as it may think fit, so long as it does not contravene any provision of the Constitution of the United States," (Capital Traction Company v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 5, Apr. 11, 1899. See also: Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 424-426. Feb. Term, 1821, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 619, Jan. Term, 1838; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223, Jan. Term, 1845; Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300, Jan. 16, 1893; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 56, Apr. 11, 1898; Keller et al., as Public Utilities Comm. of District of Columbia v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U, S. 428, 442443, Apr. 9, 1923; Neild v. District of Columbia, 110 F.2d 246, 249-251, Jan. 15, 1940; 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 114, 115, Apr. 24, 1855.) II. EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENTAL JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES. Acquisition of governmental jurisdiction by the constitutional method. The term "exclusive legislation", as used in Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, providing in part that, "The Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district *** and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings", means "exclusive jurisdiction". (United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336, 387, Feb. 21, 1818; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 278, May 24, 1909; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, June 2, 1930; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141, Dec. 6, 1937; United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, 648, No. 14,867, Nov. Term, 1819; United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 F. 753, 755, Nov. 14, 1921.) The term "other needful buildings", as used in the provision of the Constitution quoted above, embraces whatever structures are found to be necessary in the performance of the functions of the Federal Government. (James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra, at 143.) Included are the following: locks and dams for the improvement of navigation (James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra; and United States v. Tucker, 122 F. 518, May 5, 1903.); steamship piers (United States v. City of Hoboken, N. J., 29 F.2d 932, Aug. 10, 1928.); post offices (Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, Mar. 2, 1908; and United States v. Andem, 158 F. 996, Jan. 17, 1908.); court houses (State v. Mack, 47 P. 763, Feb. 4, 1897.); penitentiaries (Steele v. Halligan, 229 F. 1011, Feb. 7, 1916.); hospitals (Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, Feb. 18, 1929.); custom houses (Sharon v. Hill, 24 F. 726, Aug. 5. 1885.); soldier's homes (State v. Willett, 97 S. W. 299, Nov. 3, 1906.); Indian training schools (United States v. Wurtzbarger, supra.); and air stations (38 Op. Atty. Gen. 185, Jan. 30, 1935.) Lands acquired by cession from the State of Kentucky, at a time when there was in force a state statute consenting to acquisitions of land by purchase, were "purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State." (United States v. Tucker, supra.) The "consent of the legislature of the State "is legally effective even though not given until after the purchase by the United States. (Ex parte Hebard, 11 Fed. Cas. 1010, No. 6, 312, 1877; United States v. Tucker, supra; Steel v. Halligan, supra; 13 Op.Atty. Gen. 411; Apr. 15, 1871. Compare: St. Louis San Francisco R. Co. v. Satterfield, 27 F.2d 586, 588, June 21, 1928. See sec. 1838, R.S.) No particular phraseology is required to express the "consent of the legislature of the State." (39 Op. Atty. Gen. 99, Aug. 25, 1937.) A body of the character known as a constitutional convention of a State is not "the legislature of the State" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. (12 Op. Atty. Gen. 428, June 15, 1868.) The reservation, by a State, of the right to serve criminal or civil process upon persons found within a federal area is not incompatible with the acquisition and exercise of exclusive jurisdiction by the Federal Government. (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, May 4, 1885; United States v. Travers, 28 Fed. Cas. 204, No. 16,537, Oct. 1814; United States v. Cornell, supra; United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 781 No. 14,930, Oct. Term, 1829; Steele v. Halligan, supra; People v. Hillman, 159 N. E. 400, Nov. 22, 1927; Manlove v. Mc Dermott, 162 A. 278, May 26, 1932; 7 Op.Atty. Gen. 628, Feb. 11, 1856; 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 263, Dec. 9, 1858; 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 617, Apr. 16, 1903. See also: File MM/A17-8(400205), Feb. 20, 1940, C.M.O. 1-1940, pp. 102-103; and File JAG:JAL: amp, Nov. 25, 1943, C.M.O. 4-1943, p. 37.) "The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the States that civil and criminal process of the State courts may be served in the places purchased is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them; but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice." (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, supra, at 533.) "Of course it is competent for the State in relinquishing its sovereignty and ceding it to the United States to reserve the right to serve civil and criminal process. But in this case no such reservation has been made by the State of Georgia, and the granting of power to the United States is absolute and exclusive of all State authority whatsoever." (23 Op. Atty. Gen. 254, 259, Sept. 26, 1900.) Even though a federal area has been acquired for one of the enumerated purposes with the unqualified consent of a State, the Federal Government may refuse to exercise exclusive jurisdiction and may decline to accept such jurisdiction, in which case the area will remain subject to the jurisdiction of the State. (Silas Mason Company v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, Dec. 6, 1937. Accord: Atkinson v. State Tax Comm'n, 303 U.S. 20, Jan. 31, 1938.) In consenting to a purchase of lands by the Federal Government for one of the enumerated purposes, a State may reserve to itself such jurisdiction over the lands purchased as is not inconsistent with the Government's use of the lands. (James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra.) Acquisition of governmental jurisdiction by the cession method. The United States may acquire exclusive jurisdiction over a federal area situated within the exterior boundaries of a State by the cession method. The authority of a State to cede any portion of its jurisdiction to the United States does not have its basis in Art. I, sec. 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, but in the general principle that the States and the United States may deal with each other in any way that they deem best to carry out the purposes of the Constitution. The cession method of acquiring exclusive jurisdiction may be employed irrespective of the method of acquisition of ownership employed by the United States. (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, May 4, 1885; Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, Dec. 5, 1892; Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, Mar. 2, 1908; Standard Oil Co. v. ifornia, 291 U.S. 242, Feb. 5, 1934; Colling v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, My 31, 1938; Bozon v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, Jan. 30, 1939.) Inasmuch as the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction by the cession method must be initiated by a cession of such jurisdiction by the States, ft follows, in accordance with the principles of law applicable to grants, that the grant may be accepted or declined. Acceptance may be presumed in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, but there is no constitutional principle which compels acceptance by the United States of an exclusive jurisdiction contrary to its own conception of its interests. (Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 207, Dec. 6, 1937; Atkinson v. State Tax Comm'n, 303 U.S. 20, 23-25, Jan. 31, 1938.) When a State codes jurisdiction over a federal area to the United States, it may reserve to itself any jurisdiction power, and may attach to its cession any conditions, not inconsistent with the power of the United States to control the area for the purpose for which jurisdiction was ceded. (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, supra; Benson v. United States, supra; United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138, Apr. 14, 1930; Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., supra; 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 216, May 28, 1935; 38 Op. Atty. Gen. 341, 345, Oct. 18, 1935.) Jurisdiction, exclusive or partial, over a fedoral area may be acquired by the cession method if the area is to be reserved for a constitutional use, whether or not such use is enumerated in Art. I, sec. 8, clause 17, of the Constitution, (Collins v. Yosemita Park & Curry Co., supra.) Reservation of governmental jurisdiction upon admission of a State. "The land constituting the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation was part of the territory acquired in 1803 by cession from France, and, until the formation of the State of Kansas, and her admission into the Union, the United States possessed the rights of a proprietor, and had political dominion and sovereignty over it. For many years before that admission it had been reserved from sale by the proper authorities of the United States for military purposes, and occupied by them as a military post. The jurisdiction of the United States over it during this time was necessarily paramount. But in 1861 Kansas was admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States, that is, with the same rights of political dominion and sovereignty, subject like them only to the Constitution of the United States. Congress might undoubtedly, upon such admission, have stipulated for retention of the political authority, dominion and legislative power of the United States over the Reservation, so long as it should be used for military purposes by the government; that is, it could have excepted the place from the jurisdiction of Kansas, as one needed for the uses of the general government. But from some cause, inadvertence perhaps, or over-confidence that a recession of such jurisdiction could be had whenever desired, no such stipulation or exception was made. The United States, therefore, retained, after the admission of the State, only the rights of an ordinary proprietor; except as an instrument for the execution of the powers of the general government, that part of the tract, which was actually used for a fort or military post, was beyond such control of the State, by taxation or otherwise, as would defeat its use for those purposes." (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526-527, May 4, 1885. See also: Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 329, Dec. 5, 1892; United States v. Stahl, 27 Fed. Cas. 1288, 1289, No. 16,373, May Term, 1368; Ex parte Hebard, 11 Fed. Cas. 1010-1011, No. 6, 312, 1877; United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86, 88-89, Mar. 5, 1888; United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899, 900, Sept. 23, 1905; In re Annexation of Reno qúartermaster Depot Military Reservation to Independent School Dist. No. 34, Canadian County, 69 P.2d 659, June 15, 1937.) Federal areas subject to governmental jurisdiction of the States. If the enabling act providing for the admission of a new State into the Union does not reserve to the United States exclusive, concurrent or partial jurisdiction over the Governmentowned lands situated within the boundaries of the State, governmental jurisdiction in respect to such lands passes to the State, subject to the qualification that the State may not exert its power in such manner as to interfere with the use of the lands for federal purposes. (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Com pany v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, May 4, 1885; United States v. Stahl, 27 Fed. Cas. 1288, No. 16,373, May Term, 1868; Ex parte Hebard, 11 Fed. Cas. 10 10, No. 6,312, 1877; Ex parte Sloan, 22 Fed. Cas. 324, No. 12,944, Sept. 21, 1877; United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86, Mar. 5, 1888; United States v. Tully, 140 F. 899, Sept. 23, 1905; St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Satterfield, 27 F.2d 586, June 21, 1928; 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 33, Apr. 19, 1872. See also: 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 571, Oct. 24, 1855; 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 91, 93-94, Dec. 10, 1906.) If lands are acquired by the United States after the date of admission of the States whose boundaries encompass such lands, and exclusive, concurrent or partial jurisdiction is not acquired by the United States in accordance with Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution or by the cession method, governmental jurisdiction over such lands remains under the State, subject to the qualification that the State may not exert its power in such manner as to interfere with the use of the lands for federal purposes. (Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, Dec. 6, 1937; Atkinson v. State Tax Comm'n, 303 U. S. 20, Jan. 31, 1938; United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, No. 14,867, Nov. Term, 1819; United States v. Penn, 48 F. 669, July, 1880; United States v. San Francisco Bridge Co. 88 F. 891, June 25, 1898; United States v. McGowan, 89 F.2d 201, Mar. 15, 1937. See also: Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Love, supra, at 531; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 404, Mar. 19, 1917; 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 34, 38, May 6. 1861.) The jurisdiction which has been acquired by the United States may be lost by cession of such jurisdiction to a State. (Ohio.v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, Feb. 27, 1899; Renner v. Bennett, 21 Ohio St. 431, Dec. Term, 1871; State v. Board of Com'rs of Grant County, 54 N.E. A09, Oct. 13, 1899.) The jurisdiction which has been acquired by the United States may be lost by the operation of a reverter clause attached to a cession act. (Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, Apr. 13, 1896; Crook, Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 F. 604, Feb. 28, 1893.) The jurisdiction which has been acquired by the United States may be lost by ceasing to use the lands for stipulated purposes. (La Duke v. Melin, 177 N. W. 673, Apr. 2, 1920. See also Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, supra, at 542.) Exercise of the police power in federal areas,Regulations which have their basis in the police pow er of a State may not be enforced in federal areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (Pacific Coast Dairy v. Depart, of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285, Mar. 1, 1943. Accord: Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323, Jan. 8, 1938; In re Ladd, 74 F. 31, May 7, 1896; Farley v. Schermo, 101 N. E. 891, Apr. 22, 1913; and Lynch v. Hammock, 165 S. . 2d 369, Nov. 2, 1942. See also Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, May 13, 1944.) Regulations which have their basis in the police power of a State may not be enforced in federal areas under the concurrent or partial jurisdiction of the United States, if the jurisdiction reserved by the State does not include the right to enforce such regulations. (Collins ▼. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, May 31, 1938. Accord: Crater Lake Nat. Park Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 26 F. Supp. 363, Feb. 20, 1939. See also file JJ 56(5)/ L11-3(360819), Sept. 11, 1936, C. M. O. 9-1936. D. 11.) Regulations which have their basis in the police power of a State may be enforced, as against private parties, in federal areas which are subject to the governmental jurisdiction of a State. (Bacon v. Jalker, 204 U. S. 311, Feb. 4, 1907; Denee v. Ankeny, Executrix, 246 U.S. 208, Mar. 4, 1918; Omaechevarria v. State of Idaho, 246 U. S. 345, Mar. 18, 1918; Lamoreau ▼. Kinney, 41 F.2d 30, May 19, 1930; 36 Op. Atty. Gen. 527, Mar. 8, 1992. See also McKelvey v. United States, 260 U. S. 353, Dec. 4, 1922.) The Federal Government may protect its 'proprietary interests and perform its functions within a federal area without conforming to police regulations which have their basis in the police power of a State. (Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U. S. 276, Feb. 27, 1899; Hunt v. United States 278 U. S. 96, Nov. 19, 1928; Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207, Aug. 30, 1940. See also Anderson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 168 N. W. 196, June 15, 1918.) "The power of a military commandant over a reservation is necessarily extensive and practically exclusive, forbidding entrance and controlling residence as the public interest may demand. The police power of the Government over lands set apart for its purposes, wherever situated, is essentially untrammeled. The extent to which the Government may go in the exercise of this power is measured by the exigencies of the particular case. (Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518, 525, 526). It is an uncontrovertible principle that the Government of the United States may, by means of physical force exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it'. (Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395; In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1; In re Debs, 158 U.S., 564; and see Ohio ▼. Thomas, 173 U. S., 276). The military control up to the limit of the military necessities would be paramount (26 Op. Atty. Gen. 91, 92-93, Dec. 10, 1906.) "It is beyond dispute that the United States has the power to exclude the public from the land and works of which it is the proprietor." (United States v. Moody, 164 F. 269, 272, Aug. 10, 1908.) Although the commanding officer of the Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., has not the legal right to compel civilians to submit to search of their persons or vehicles upon suspicion that they are engaged in illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors or other violations of law, he may prevent such individuals entering the reservation if they refuse to submit to search at the time they seek to enter, and he accordingly has the authority to require that all civilians entering the reservation procure passos from post headquarters. If he should incorporate in passes issued to drivers of public vehicles for hire a section by which the holder of the pass would consent to search of his person or vehicle by members of the command authorized by the commanding general to make such search, at any time and without further notice, while the holder of said pass is within the limits of the military reservation at Quantico, said pass to be counter-signed by the holder indicating his agreement to the provisions thereof, this would not confer upon him or his subordinates any additional authority to search a suspected civilian or his vehicle if the individual entering the reservation under such pass subsequently refused to submit to search while on the reservation, but' the commanding general or his subordinates would have authority to eject said individual from the reservation. (File 28787-5:1, Aug. 5, 1925, C. M. O. 8-1925, pp. 7-8% See also: File 28787-54, Oct. 11, 1922, C.M. 0. 10-1922, p. 12; File 7734-1143, Feb. 12, 1926; File JAG:J: JAL: amp, Nov. 4, 1943, C. M. O. 4-1943, p. 116.) Administration of criminal justice in federal areas. The Federal Government has authority to prescribe the rules of criminal law for application within the federal areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and its courts have jurisdiction to try and punish offenders against such rules. (Battle v. United States, 209 U. S. 36, Mar. 2, 1908; United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U. S. 138, Apr. 14, 1930; Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, Jan. 30, 1939; United States v. Travers, 28 Fed. Cas. 204, No. 16, 537, Oct. 1814; United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, No. 14,867, Nov. Term, 1819; Ex parte Tatem, 23 Fed. Cas. 706, No. 13, 759, Jan 16, 1877; Kelly v. United States, 27 F. 616, July 7, 1885; United States v. Meagher, 37 F. 875, Nov. 23, 1888; United States v. Carter, 84 F. 022, Nov. 15, 1897; United States v. Tucker, 122 F. 518, May 5, 1903; United States v. Holt, 168 F. 141, Mar. 4, 1909; United States v. Watkins, 22 F.2d 437, Oct. 18, 1927. See also Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat 264, Feb. Term, 1821.) "Implied power in Congress to pass laws to define and punish offences is also derived from the constitutional grant to Congress to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the land and naval forces, and to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the public service. Like implied authority is also vested in Congress from the power conferred to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, and from the clause empowering Congress to pass all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof." (United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 346, Oct. Term, 1878.) The criminal laws of the States are without force in federal areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and the courts of the States are without jurisdiction to try persons accused of .committing criminal acts therein. (Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72, 1811; State v. Morris, 68 A. 1103, Feb. 24, 1908; People v. Hillman, 159 N. E. 400, Nov. 22, 1927; People v. Mouse, 265 P. 944, Apr. 6, 1928, cert. den., 278 U.S. 614, Oct. 15, 1928; Commonwealth, v. King, 68 S. W.2d 45, Feb. 9, 1934; Baker v. State, 83 S. W. 1122, Dec. 17, 1904; People v. Kraus, 207 N. Y. S. 87, Dec. 5, 1924. See also: In re Ladd, 74 F. 31, May 7, 1896; Ex parte Tatem, supra. The courts of the United States are without jurisdiction to try persons charged with the commission of acts of a criminal nature within federal areas which are subject to the governmental jurisdiction of a State (if such acts are not punishable under criminal laws which apply throughout the United States or under criminal laws which relate to the protection of federal areas). (Adams v. United States, 319 U, S. 312, May 24, 1943; United States v. Hopkins, 26 Fed. Cas. 371, No. 15, 387a, May, 1830; United States v. Bateman, 34 F. 86, Mar. 5, 1888; United States v. Penn, 48 F. 669, July, 1880; In re Kelly, 71 F. 545, Dec. 27, 1895; Pothier v. Rodman, 291 F. 311, June 21, 1923. See also: United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, Oct. 1881; Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, Nov. 30, 1896.) "The sole question was whether this Park was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. There is no question that the United States had the constitutional power to acquire the territory for the purpose of a national park and that it did acquire it. Whether or not the National Government acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the lands within the Park or the State reserved, as it could, jurisdiction over the crimes there committed, depended upon the terms of the consent or cession given by the legislature of Georgia. *** The federal courts take judicial notice of the Georgia statutes. *** If these statutes did not give to the United States exclusive Jurisdiction over the Park, the indictment did not charge a crime cognizable under the authority of the United States." (Bowen v. Johnston, supra, at 23.) Congress has power to regulate the hours of labor which may be required or permitted on public buildings or works of the United States, and the federal courts have jurisdiction to punish violations of such regulations; though the buildings or works at which committed may be situated on federal lands within the governmental jurisdiction of a State. (United States v. San Francisco Bridge Co., 88 F. 891, June 25, 1898.) Congress has power to punish intentional obstruction to free passage over the public lands within a State, accomplished by acts of violence, and its exercise works no interference with the power of the State to punish the acts of violence as such. (McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, Dec. 4, 1922.) The courts of a State may try a person accused of committing an act of a criminal nature within a federal area subject to the governmental jurisdiction of a State if the act is punishable under the laws of the State. (Gill v. State, 210 S. W. 637, Mar. 22, 1919; Curry v. State, 12 S. W. 2d 796, Nov. 28, 1928.) Administration of civil justice in federal areas, "It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights, continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession public property passes from one government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it .those municipal laws which are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power--and the latter is involved in the former--to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorising cruel and unusual punishments, and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new government upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws affecting the possession, use and transfer of property, and designed to secure good order and peace in the community, and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is general, that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.". (Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company ▼. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546-547, -May 4, 1885. See also: American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542, Jan. Term, 1828; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176, Dec. Term, 1857; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 298, May 27, 1901; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, June 1, 1903; Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 357-358, Apr. 3, 1911; In re Chavez, 149 F. 73, 75, Nov. 5, 1906; Fordham v. Marrero, 273 F. 61, May 12, 1921; 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 59, Sept. 22, 1903.) Upon the transfer from a State to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over an area, the substantive laws relating to the administration of civil justice which are in effect in the State at the time of transfer continue in force in the area as federal laws, save as they may be inappropriate to the changed situation or inconsistent with the national purpose, and save as Congress may have provided otherwise. (Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company v. McGlinn, supra; James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, Adm., 309 U. S. 94, Jan. 29, 1940; Steele v. Halligan, 229 F. 1011, Feb. 7, 1916; 1liams v. Arlington Hotel Co., 22 F.2d 669, Oct. 17, 1927; Danielson v. Donmopray, 57 F.2d 565, Apr. 2, 1932; Coffman v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. of Cincinnati, 24 F. Supp. 581, July 18, 1938; United States v. Resex. Trust Co., 44 F. Supp. 476, Apr. 16, 1942; McCarthy v. R. G. Packard Co., 94 N. Y. S. 203, June 9, 1905, aff., 75 N. E. 1130, Oct. 17, 1905; Hoffman v. Leavenworth Light, Heat & Power Co., 138 P. 632, Feb. 7, 1914; Kaufman v. Hopper, 115 N. E. 470, Feb. 27, 1917; Nor folk & P. B. L. R. Co. v. Parker, 147 S. E. 461, Mar. 21, 1929; State v. Department of Labor and Industries, 10 P.2d 213, Apr. 6, 1932; Craig v. Craig, 56 P.2d 464, Apr. 11, 1936; 'Pound v. Gaulding, 187 So. 468, Mar. 16, 1939.) Laws enacted by a State after the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction over a federal area from the State to the United States are not operative within such area unless adopted by the Federal Government. (Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, Feb. 18, 1929; Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 20 P.2d 591, Mar. 24, 1933, aff., 291 U.S. 315, Feb. 5, 1934; Williams v. Arlington Hotel Co., supra; Kaufman v. Hopper, supra; Willis v. Oscar Daniels Co., 166 N. W. 49.6, Feb. 23, 1918; Allen v. Industrial Accident Commission, 43 P.2d 787, Apr. 18, 1935; Utley v. State Industrial Commission, 55 P.2d 702, Mar. 10, 1936; Pound v. Gaulding, aupra; Martin, Continental Casualty Co. Intervener, v. Clinton Const. Co., 105 P.2d 1029, Oct. 3, 1940.) The repeal by a State, after the transfer of exclusive jurisdiction over a federal area from the State to the United States, of laws in force at the time of the transfer, has no effect within the federal area. (McCarthy v. R. G. Packard Co., supra,) If a defendant has committed a wrong of a transitory character (e.g. a breach of contract or a tortious act) within a federal area under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the plaintiff may |