AN ACT To revise and consolidate the statutes of the United States, in force on the first day of Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Words importing singular number, plural number, masculine gender, etc. In determining the meaning of the revised statutes, or of any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February twenty-fifth, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things; words importing the plural number may include the singular; words importing the masculine gender may be applied to females; the words "insane person" and "lunatic" shall Include every idiot, non compos, lunatic, and insane person; the word "person" may extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations, and the reference to any officer shali include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of such office, unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense; and a requirement of an "oath" shall be deemed complied with by making affirmation in judicial form. Sec. 2. CASE NOTES General rule.- "And the general rule is that 'words importing the singular number may extend and be applied to several persons or things; words importing the plural number may include the singular,' as provided in the first section of the Revised Statutes. (United States v. Oregon and California Railroad Company, 164 U.S. 526, 541, Dec. 14, 1896.) Meaning and scope of the term "person".- "The meaning and scope of the term 'person as used in a statute depends upon the intention of the legislature in using it, and this intention is to be ascertained by considering the entire context of the law and the circumstances which attended its enactment." (19 Comp. Gen. 227, 228, Aug. 18, 1939.) County" as including parish, etc.7 The word "county" includes a parish, or any other equivalent subdivision of a State or Territory of the United States. EDITORIAL NOTES This section is embodied in the U.3. Code as se. 2 of title 1. This section was derived from an act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, sec. 9, 14 Stat. 101, 110. Sec. 3. Vessel" `as including all means of water transportation. The word "vessel" includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. being used therefor but only as a floating dry dock, permanently moored, is not a vessel within the meaning of the admiralty law. (Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625, Jan. 10, 1887. See also Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 F. 763, Jan. 13, 1915.) Incompleted structures. "In common usage the words 'boat' and 'vessel' are understood to describe structures so far completed as to be capable of being used as a means of transportation on water." (R. R. Ricou & Sons Co. v. Bairbanks, Morse & Co., 11 F.2d 103, 104, Jan. 19, 1926.) Aircraft. "A hydroaeroplane, while afloat upon waters capable of navigation, is subject to the admiralty, because location and function stamp it as a means of water transportation. Such a plane is, indeed, two things--a seaplane and an aeroplane. To the extent that it is the latter, it is not a vessel, for the medium through which it travels is the air. *** To the extent that it is the former, it is a vessel, for the medium through which it travels is the water. If a seaplane, incapable of flight, breaks its moorings and causes injury to man or ship, there will be a remedy against the offending res. If, moving upon the water, it becomes disabled, and is rescued on the high seas by a ship, it will be subject to a lien for salvage. We think the jurisdiction of the admiralty is not less where the structure found afloat is seaplane and aeroplane combined. It is true that the primary function is then movement in the air, and that the func tion of movement in the water is auxiliary and secondary. That is, indeed, a reason why the jurisdiction of the admiralty should be excluded when the activities proper to the primary function are the occasion of the mischief. It is no reason for the exclusion of jurisdiction when the mischief is traceable to the function that is auxiliary and secondary. Collision does not cease to be collision and a peril of the sea because the structure is amphibious. We cannot even say that the chance that the peril will be encountered is so remote as to be negligible. The records of the Navy Department show that there have been times, in transatlantic flights, when planes, abandoning the air, moved for days upon the water. The cause might be lack of fuel or other disability. Even in the absence of such causes, there must always, for at least some space, be movement upon the water before there is ascent into the air. Jurisdiction cannot vary as the distance is short or longer. That would require us to say that the plane, by keeping to the water, could transform itself into a vessel, but would leave us helpless to define the point at which transformation would be suffered. From such embarrassments of definition there is but one avenue of escape. It is found in the conclusion that the plane is a vessel, and hence within the jurisdiction of the admiralty, when it is in the fulfilment of its function as a traveler through water, and has put aside its functions and capacities as a traveler through air.". (Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corporation et al., 133 N. E. 371, 372. Nov. 22, 1921.) Sec. 4. "Vehicle" as including all means of land transportation. The word "vehicle" includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land. EDITORIAL NOTES This section is embodied in the U.S. Code as sec. 4 of title 1 This section was derived from the first section of an act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178. Sec. 5. Company" and "association" as including successors and assigns The word "company" or "association," when used in reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words "successors and assigns of such company or association,” in like manner as if these last-named words, or words of similar import, were expressed. вес EDITORIAL NOTES This section is embodied in the U.S. Code as 5 of title 1. This section was derived from an act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, sec. 9, 14 Stat. 241. Sec. 6. Sealing of instruments. In all cases where a seal is necessary by law to any commission, process, or other instrument provided for by the laws of Congress, it shall be lawful to affix the proper seal by making an impression therewith directly on the paper to which such seal is necessary; which shall be as valid as if made on wax or other adhesive substance. EDITORIAL NOTES This section is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 31 of title 1. This section was derived from an act of May 31, 1854, ch. 60, sec. 2, 10 Stat. 297. Sec. 7. Enacting clause. The enacting clause of all acts of Congress hereafter enacted shall be in the following form: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. EDITORIAL NOTES This section is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 21 of title 1. This section was derived from the first section of an act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431. Sec. 8. /Resolving clause. The resolving clause of all joint resolutions shall be in the following form: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. EDITORIAL NOTES This section is embodied in the U. S. Code as sec. 22 of title 1. This section was derived from the first section of an act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71. 16 Stat. 431. Sec. 9. Enacting or resolving words after first section. No enacting or resolving words shall be used in any section of an act or resolution of Congress except in the first. Sec. 11. Title of appropriation acts. The style and title of all acts making appropriations for the support of Government shall be as follows: “An act making appropriations, (here insert the object) for the year ending June thirtieth (here insert the calendar year).' Sec. 12. Effect of repeal of repealing act.] Whenever an act is repealed, which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided. Iaw as it was before the first repeal, "where the On the expiration of a repealing act by its own limitation, the act repealed is revived, this section having no application to such a case. (20 Op. Atty. Gen. 466, Sept. 1, 1892.) This statute "applies to repeals by implication as well as by express language." (Bender v. United States, 93 F.2d 814, 816, Nov. 24, 1937.) Sec. 13. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities. The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. .section must be enforced unless either by express Sec. 13, R. S., was enacted to avoid the effects 7, 1924. See also: United States v. Chambers et Sec. 101. /Oaths to witnesses. The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or a chairman of any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or of a committee of the whole, or of any committee of either House of Congress, is empowered to administer oaths to witnesses in any case under their examination. EDITORIAL NOTES This section was expressly amended and reenacted to read as above by act of June 22, 1938, ch. 594, 52 Stat. 942. This section, as amended, is embodied in the U.S. Code as the first paragraph of sec. 191 of title 2. In its original form, sec. 101, R. S., read as follows: "Sec. 101. The President of the Senate, the speaker of the House of Representatives, or a chairman of a Committee of the Whole, or of any committee of either House of Congress, is empowered to administer oaths to witnesses in any case under their examination.". The above-quoted section was derived from an act of May 3, 1798, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 554, and an act of Feb. 8, 1817, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 345. An act of June 22, 1938, ch. 594, 52 Stat. 942, 943, contains the following provision: "Any member of either House of Congress may administer oaths to witnesses in any matter depending in either House of Congress of which he is a Member, or any committee thereof." CASE NOTE Purpose of secs. 101-104 and 859, R. S. The enactments, embodied in secs. 101-104 and 859, R. S., "show very plainly that Congress intended thereby (a) to recognize the power of either house to institute inquiries and exact evidence touching subjects within its jurisdiction and on which it was disposed to act; (b) to recognize that such inquiries may be conducted through committees; (c) to subject defaulting and contumacious witnesses to indictment and punishment in the courts, and thereby to enable either house to exert the power of inquiry 'more effectually'; and (d) to open the way for obtaining evidence in such an inquiry, which otherwise could not be obtained, by exempting witnesses required to give evidence there in from criminal and penal prosecutions in respect of matters disclosed by their evidence." (McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 168, Jan. 17, 1927. See also In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, Apr. 19, 1897.) Sec. 102. /Refusal of witness to testify. Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more tha $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months. In its original form, sec. 102, R. S., read as follows: "Sec. 102. Every person who, having been sum moned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress, to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less than one hundred dollars, and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." The above-quoted section was derived from the first section of an act of Jan 24, 1857, ch. 19, 11 Stat. 155-156. As to the purpose of sec. 102, R. S., see note under sec. 101, R. S. A House Committee charged with a specific investigation of abuses alleged to have been committed by Captain Elliott of the Navy included the following statement in its report: "But, in the opinion of this committee, it is competent for the Representatives of the people to investigate any abuses alleged to be committed by officers in command of squadrons, and to provide, by law, for [sic] the recurrence of such abuses; and, moreover, to |