which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. * * * And unless this rule be considered as meaning that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. (United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-408, May 3, 1909. See also: United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401, June 5, 1916; United States v. Mackenzie et al., 30 Fed. Cas. 1160, No. 18, 313.)

"Equally clear is it, generally speaking, that where a statute contains provisions which are constitutional and others which are not, effect may be given to the legal provisions by separating them from the illegal. But this applies only to a case where the provisions are separable and not dependent one upon the other, and does not support the contention that that which is indivisible may be divided. Moreover, even in a case where legal provisions may be severed from those which are illegal, in order to save the rule applies only where it is plain that Congress would have enacted the legislation with the unconstitutional provisions eliminated." (Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 501, Jan. 6, 1908. See also: United States v. Reese et al., 92 U.S. 214, 220-221, Oct. Term, 1875; Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99, Oct. Term, 1879; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83-84, Oct. Term, 1880; Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 289290, Mar. 10, 1924.)

"The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty, to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. All the court does, or can do, is to announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having done that, its duty ends.". (United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63, Jan. 6, 1936.)

II. LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.

In general. "Every constitutional act of Congress is passed by the will of the people of the United States, expressed through their representatives, on the subject-matter of the enactment; and when so passed it becomes the supreme law of the land, and operates by its own force on the subjectatter, in whatever state or territory it may happen to be. The proposition, therefore, that such a law cannot operate upon the subject-matter of its enactment, without the express consent of the people of the new state where it may happen to be, contains its own refutation, and requires no farther examination." (Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 224-225, Jan. Term, 1845.)

Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance of it, are declared by the Constitution itself to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every State are bound thereby, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. Whenever, therefore, any conflict arises between the enactments of the two sovereignties, or in the enfornemen of their asserted authorities, those of the National government must have supremacy until the validity of the different enactments and authorities can be finally determined by the tribunals of the United States. This temporary supremacy until judicial decision by the National tribunals, and the ultimate determination of the conflict by such decision, are essential to the preservation of order and peace, and the avoidance of forcible collision between the two governments." (Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406-407, Dec. Term. 1871.)

Conflicting laws. "The Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land. Art. 6, par. 2. A law of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution suspends or overrides all State statutes with which it is in conflict. (Pensacola Telegraph Company v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 96 U.S. 1, 8-9, Oct. Term, 1877. See also: Gibbons v. Orden, 9 Wheat. 1, 209-211, Feb. Term, 1824; Sinnot et al. v. Davenport et al., 22 How. 227. 242-243, Dec. Term, 1859.)

A statute of a State, although enacted in pursuance of a reserved power of the State, "ds not to be regarded as inconsistent with an act of Congress passed in the execution of a clear power under the Constitution, unless the repugnance or conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot be reconciled or stand together." (Missouri, Kansas &Texas Railway v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 623, Mar. 14, 1898.)

Applicability of laws of the United States. "When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another, as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegience, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries, are not enployed by him, nor are they engaged in national pur. suits. Consequently, there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it." (The Exchange v. MoFadon, 7 Cr. 116, 144, Feb. Term, 1812. See also: United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 525, Oot. Term, 1875; Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 11-12, Jan. 10, 1887.)

"But in all respects different. is the situation of a public armed ship. She constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects. He has many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place, without affecting his power and dignity. The implied license, therefore, under which such vessel enters a friendly port, may reasonably be

construed, and it seems to the court, ought to be construed, as containing an exemption from the jur isdiction of the sovereign, within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality." (The Exchange v. Meladon, supra, at 144. See also: Berizsi Brothers Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 570-574, June 7, 1928; The Maibo, 252 F. 627, 629, July 8, 1918; Compania Espanola v. The Navomar, Joy U.S. 68, Jan. 31, 1938.)

"No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of pations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights. It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in all, by the consent of all, can be divested only by conBent; and this trade, in which all have participated, must remain lawful to those who cannot be induced to relinquish it. As no nation can preBoribe a rule for others, none can make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose governments have not forbidden it. If it be consistent with the law of nations, it cannot in Itself be piracy. It can be made so only by statute and the obligation of the statute cannot transcend the legislative power of the state which may enact it." (The Antelope, 10 heat. 66, 122, Feb. Term, 1825.)

"Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea. That law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the usages of navigation or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it has become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial world. Many of the usages which prevail, and which have the force of law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of some single state, which were at first of limited effect, but which when generally accepted became of universal obligation." (The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 187, Dec. Term, 1871.)

"No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high seas, or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such countries may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law, and keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive. *** They go further, at times, and declare that they will punish any one, subject or not, who shall do certain things, if they can catch him, as in the case of pirates on the high seas. In cases immediately affecting national interests they may go further still and may make, and, if they get the chance, execute similar threats as to acts done within another recognized jurisdiction. An illustration from our statutes is found with regard to criminal correspondence with foreign governments. *** And the notion that English statutes bind British subjects everywhere has found expression in modern times and has had some startling applications. ✶✶✶ But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." (American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-356, Apr. 26, 1909.)

"Law is a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts. But the word commonly is confined to such prophecies or threats when addressed to persons living within the power of the courts. A threat that depends upon the choice of the party affected to bring himself within that power hardly would be called law in the ordinary sense. We do not speak of blockade running by neutrals as unlawful. And the usages of speech correspond to the limit of the attempts of the lawmaker, except in extraordinary cases. It is true that domestic corporations remain always within the power of the domestic law, but in the present case, at least, there is no ground for distinguishing between cor porations and men. (American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra, at 356-357.)

"But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents. Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the Government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are such that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense." (United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98, Nov. 13, 1922. Compare: Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-438, Feb. 15, 1932.)

"It is true that the criminal jurisdiction of the United States is in general based on the territorial principle, and criminal statutes of the United States are not by implication given an extra-territorial effect. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98; compare Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421. But that principle has never been thought to be applicable to a merchant vessel which, for purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the sovereignty whose flag it flies to punish crimes committed upon it, is deemed to be a part of the territory of that sovereignty, and not to lose that character when in navigable waters within the territorial limits of another sovereignty." (United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155156, Apr. 10, 1933.)

"In the absence of any controlling treaty provision, and any assertion of jurisdiction by the territorial sovereign, it is the duty of the courts of the United States to apply to offenses committed by its citizens on vessels flying its flag, its own statutes, interpreted in the light of recognized principles of international law." (United States v. Flores, supra, at 159.)

"International law is a part of our law and as such is the law of all States of the Uniớn * but it is a part of our law for the application of its own principles, and these are concerned with international rights and duties and not with domestic rights and duties. * * * For aside from the question of the extent of control which the United States may exert in the interest of self-protection over waters near its borders, although beyond its territorial limits, the United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. With respect to such an exercise of authority there is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the citizen in relation to his own government. *** Thus, a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no express declaration to that effect." (Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-74, Apr. 28, 1941.)

Territorial jurisdiction of the United States."The authority of a nation, within its own territory, is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel, within the range of its cannon, by a foreign force, is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. Upon this principle, the right of a belligerent to search a neutral vessel on the high seas, for contraband of war, is universally admitted, because the belligerent has a right to prevent the injury done to himself, by the assistance intended for his enemy: ** Any

attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right, is an injury to itself, which it may prevent, and it has the right to use the means necessary for its prevention. These means do not appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain the same, at all times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their exercise. If they are such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will be submitted to.

"In different seas, and on different coasts, a wider and more contracted range, in which to exercise the vigilance of the government, will be assented to. Thus, in the channel, where a very great part of the commerce to and from all the north of Europe, passes through a very narrow sea, the seizure of vessels, on suspicion of attempting an illicit trade, must necessarily be restricted to very narrow limits; but on the coast of South America, seldom frequented by vessels, but for the purpose of illicit trade, the vigilance of the government may be extended somewhat farther; and foreign nations submit to such regulations as are reasonable in themselves, and are really necessary to secure that monopoly of colonial commerce, which is claimed by all nations holding distance possessions." (Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cr. 187, 234-235, Feb. Term, 1804. See also The Ann, 1 Fed. Cas. 926, No. 397, May Term, 1812; The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 367, 370, Feb. Term, 1824.)

The arrest of the ship Grange within the capes of the Delaware was a seizure within the territory of the United States. (1 Op. Atty. Gen. 32, May 14, 1793.)

"Considering therefore the importance of the question, the configuration of Chesapeake bay, the fact that its headlands are well marked, and but twelve miles apart, that it and its tributaries are wholly within our own territory, that the boundary lines of adjacent States encompass it; that from the earliest history of the country it has been claimed to be territorial waters, and that the claim has never been questioned; that it cannot become the pathway from one nation to another, and remembering the doctrines of the recognized authorities upon international law, as well as the holdings of the English courts as to the British channel and Conception bay, and bearing in mind the matter of the brig Grange and the position taken by the government as to Delaware bay, we are forced to the conclusion that Chesapeake bay must be held to be wholly within the territorial jurisdiction and authority of the government of the United States, and no part of the 'high seas' within the meaning of the term as used in section 5 of the act of. June 5, 1872 ** * *.n. (Stetson v. United States, 32 Albany Law Journal 484, 487 (1885).)

"We think it must be regarded as established that, as between nations, the minimum limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tidewaters is a marine league from its coast; that bays wholly within its territories not exceeding two marine leagues in width at the mouth are within this limit is, of course, subject to the common right of navigation; and all governments, for the purpose of self-protection in time of war or for the prevention of frauds on its revenue, exercise an authority beyond this limit.". (Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258, Mar. 16, 1891.)

"It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a marine league, or three geographic miles. " (Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 101, 122, Apr. 30, 1923. Accord: United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121, Aug. 28, 1935. See also: The La Ninfa, 75 F. 513, June 29, 1896; Murray v. Hildreth, 61 F.2d 483, Oct. 28, 1932; Ocean Industries v. Superior Court of California in and for Santa Cruz County, 252 P. 722, Jan. 11, 1927; People v. Stralla, 96 P.2d 941, Nov. 20, 1939.)

Construction of statutes.- "The primary rule of statutory construction is. to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Whenever that is apparent it dominates and interprets the language used." (Rodgers v. United States, 185 U. S. 83, 86, Apr. 7, 1902. See also: Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 380, Oct. Term, 1874; 29 Op. Atty. Gen. 488, 492, July 1, 1912; 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 333, 335, Aug. 29, 1939.)

"The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. " (United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96, Feb. 18, 1820. See also: Caminetti v. United States, 242, U.S. 470, 485, Jan. 15, 1917; United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U. S. 210, 217, Jan. 5, 1920; Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 514, 519, Apr. 9, 1923; Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 269, 253-254, Jan. 2, 1929; United States v. Missouri Pacific R. R. Cos; 278 U. S. 269, 277-278, Jan. 2, 1929; Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13, 18-19, July 21, 1902; United States v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 F. 321, 324, Nov. 25, 1907.)

"It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers. This has often been asserted, and the reports are full of cases illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act. (Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, Feb. 29, 1892. See also Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 59-60, Nov. 24, 1930.)

"Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the legislature is the title of the act. We do not mean that it may be used to add to or take from the body of the statute, *** but it may help to interpret its meaning." (Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, supra, at 462.)

"Again, another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body." (Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, supra, at 463.)

* *

"Although debates may not be used as a means for interpreting a statute that rule in the nature of things is not violated by resorting to debates as a means of ascertaining the environment at the time of the enactment of a particular law, that is, the history of the period when it was adopted." (Standard Oil Company of New Jersey et al. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50, May 15, 1911. See also: Federal Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 650, May 25, .1931; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625, May 27, 1935; Ex parte Farley, 40 F. 66, 69, Oct. 14, 1889.)

"By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well established that the debates in Congress expressive of the views and motives of individual members are not a safe guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the law-making body. *** But reports of committees of House or Senate stand upon a more solid footing, and may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute is obscure. *** And this has been extended to include explanatory statements in the nature of a supplemental report made by the committee member in charge of a bill in course of passage. (Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering et al., 254 U.S. 443, 474-475, Jan. 3, 1921. See also Wright v. Vinton Branch Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 463-464, Mar. 29, 1937.)

"It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. Primarily this intent is ascertained by giving the words their natural significance, but if this leads to an unreasonable result plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, we must examine the matter further. We may then look to the reason of the enactment and inquire into its antecedent history and give it effect in accordance with its design and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal

meaning in order that the purpose may not fail.". (Takap Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194, Nov. 13, 1922.)

"It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. If Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when we come to interpret a statute. " (Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48, Nov. 19, 1928. also 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 285, 288, May 5, 1939.)

See

"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.**. United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 U.S. 534, 543-544, May 27, 1940. See also: United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562, May 27, 1940; Harrison v. Northern Trust Co. et al., Executors, 317 U.S. 476, 479, Jan. 11, 1943; 40 Op. Atty. Gen., No. 1, Jan. 3, 1941.)

"The maxim expressio unius est excluso alterius is an aid to construction, not a rule of law. It can never override clear and contrary evidences of Congressional intent.". (Neuberger v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 72, 88, Nov. 12, 1940. See also Securities and Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corporation et al., 320 U.C. 344, 350, Nov. 22, 1943.) '

"The correct rule of interpretation is, that if divers statutes relate to the same thing, they ought all to be taken into consideration in construing any of them, and it is an established rule of law, that all acts in pari materia are to be taken together, as if they were one law. *** If a thing contained in a subsequent statute be within the reason of a former statute, it shall be taken to be within the meaning of that statute; *** and if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, what meaning the legislature attached to the words of the former statute, they will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute. 11. (United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564, Jan. Term, 1845. See also Greenleaf v. Goodrich, 101 U. S. 278, 281, Oct. Term, 1879; United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64-65, Nov. 12, 1940; 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 30, 35, July 28, 1908.)

"As a general rule, where the legislation dealing with a particular subject consists of a system of related general provisions indicative of a settled policy, new enactments of a fragmentary nature on that subject are to be taken as intended to fit into the existing system and to be carried