example, in Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, this Court took pains in its construction of a treaty, relating to the power of an alien to dispose of property in this country, not to invalidate the provisions of state law governing such dispositions. Frequently the obligation of a treaty will be dependent on state law.*** But state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of a treaty or of an international compact or agreement. *** Then the power of a State to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which runs counter to the public law of the forum *** must give way before the superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or international compact or agreement. (United States v. Pink, 315 U. S 203, 230-231, Feb. 2, 1942.)

Time at which treaty comes into force.- "It is undoubtedly true, as a principle of international law, that, as respects the rights of either government under it, a treaty is considered as concluded and binding from the date of its signature. In this regard the exchange of ratifications has a retroactive effect, confirming the treaty from its date. But a different rule prevails where the treaty operates on individual rights. The principle of relation does not apply to rights of this character, which were vested before the treaty was ratified. In so far as it affects them, it is not considered as concluded until there is an exchange of ratifi***. cations, The reason of the rule is apparent. In this country, a treaty is something more than a contract, for the Federal 'Constitution declares it to be the law of the land. if so, before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it, must agree to it. But the Senate are not required to adopt or reject it as a whole, but may modify or amend it, as was done with the treaty under consideration. As the individual citizen, on whose rights of property it operates, has no means of knowing anything of it while before the Senate, it would be wrong in principle to hold him bound by it, as the law of the land, until it was ratified and proclaimed. And to construe the law, so as to make the ratification of the treaty relate back to the signing, thereby divesting a title already vested, would be manifestly unjust, and cannot be sanctioned." (Haver v. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32, 34-35, Dec. Term, 1869. The first sentence of the quotation set forth above is probably not in accordance with existing international law.)

State continuity. - "The reigning sovereign represents the national sovereignty, and that sovereignty is continuous and perpetual, residing in the proper successors of the sovereign for the time being. Napoleon was the owner of the Euryale, not as an individual, but as sovereign of France. *** On his deposition the sovereignty does not change, but merely the person or persons in whom it resides. The foreign state is the true and real owner of its public vessels of war. The reigning Emperor, or National Assembly, or other actual person or party in power, is but the agent and representative of the national sovereignty. A change in such representative works no change in the national sovereignty or its rights. The next successor recognized by our government is competent to carry on a suit already commenced and receive the fruits of it. A deed to or treaty with a sovereign as such inures to his successors in the government of the country. If a substitution of names is necessary or proper it is a formal matter, and can be made by the court under its general power to preserve due symmetry in its forms of proceeding." (The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164, 168, Dec. Term, 1870.)

Effect of war on treaties. "The effect of war upon the existing treaties of belligerents is one of the unsettled problems of the law. The older writers sometimes said that treaties ended¶ipso facto when war came. 3 Phillimore Int. L. 794. The writers of our own time reject these sweeping statements. 2 Oppenheim, Int. L. sec. 99: Hall, Int. L. 398, 401; Fiore, Int. L. (borchard's Transl.)845. International law to-day does not preserve treaties or annul them, regardless of the effects produced. It deals with problems pragmatically, preserving or annulling as the necessities of war exact. It establishes standards, but it does not fetter itself with rules. When it attempts to do more, it finds that there is neither unanimity of opinion nor uniformity of practice. The whole question remains as yet unsettled.' Oppenheim, supra. This does not mean, of course, that there are not some classes of treaties about which there is general agreement. Treaties of alliance fall. Treaties of boundary or cession, 'dispositive or 'transitory conventions, survive. Hall, Int. L. pp. 398, 401; 2 Westlake, Int. L. II, 34; Oppenheim, supra. So, of course, do treaties which regulate the conduct of hostilities. Hall, supra; 5 Moore, Dig. Int. L. 372; Society for Propagation of The Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 494. " Techt v. Hughes, 128 N. E. 185, 191, June 8, 1920.)

"The effect of war upon treats is a subject in respect of which there are widely divergent opinions. The doctrine sometimes asserted, especially by the older writers, that war ipso facto annuls treaties of every kind between the warring nations, is repudiated by the great weight of modern authority; and the view now commonly accepted is that 'whether the stipulations of a treaty are annulled by war depends, upon their intrinsic character." 5 Moore's Digest of International Law,, § 779, p. 383. But as to precisely what treaties fall and what survive, under this designation, there is lack of accord. The authorities, as well as the practice of nations, present a great contrariety of views. The law of the subject is still in the making, and, in attempting to formulate principles at all approaching generality, courts must proceed with a good deal of caution. But there seems to be fairly common agreement that, at least, the following treaty obligations remain in force: stipulations in respect of what shall be done in a state of war; treaties of cession, boundary, and the like; provisions giving the right to citizens or subjects of one of the high contracting powers to continue to hold and transmit land in the territory of the other; and, generally, provisions which represent completed acts. On the other hand, treaties of amity, of alliance, and the like, having a political character, the object of which is to promote relations of harmony between nation and nation,' are generally regarded as belonging to the class of treaty stipulations that are absolutely annulled by war. (Karnuth v. United States, 279 U. S. 231, 236-237, Apr. 8, 1929.)

IV. FREEDOM OF FEDERAL INSTRUMENTALITIES FROM INTERFERENCE.

In general. "There are within the territorial limits of each State two governments, restricted in their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each has its separate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each has its own tribunals for their enforcement. Neither government can intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference

therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other. The two governments in each State stand in their respective spheres of action in the same independent relation to each other, except in one particular, that they would if their authority embraced different territories. That particular consists in the supremacy of the authority of the United States when any conflict arises between the two governments. The Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance of it, are declared by the Constitution itself to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every State are bound thereby, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. (Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406-407, Dec. Term, 1871.)

"Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to preserve its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the other. How their respective laws shall be enacted; how they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what officers; and how much discretion, or whether any at all shall be vested in their officers, are matters subject to their own control, and in the regulation of which neither can interfere with the other." (Tarble's Case, supra, at 407-408.)

"Now, among the powers assigned to the National government, is the power 'to raise and support armies,' and the power 'to provide for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.' The execution of these powers falls within the line of its duties; and its control over the subject is. plenary and exclusive. It can determine, without question from any State authority, how the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at which the soldier shall be received, and the period for which he shall be taken, the compensation he shall be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned. And it can provide the rules for the government and regulations of the forces after they are raised, define what should constitute military offenses, and prescribe their punishment. No interference with the execution of this power of the National government in the formation, organization, and government of its armies by any State officials could be permitted without greatly impairing the efficiency, if it did not utterly destroy, this branch of the public service.

It is manifest that the powers of the National government could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all times, if its acts could be interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another sovereignty." (Tarble's Case, supra, at 408-409.)

"The United States is a government with authority extending over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon the States and upon the people of the States. While it is limited in the number of its powers, so far as its sovereignty extends it is supreme. No State government can exclude it from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, obstruct its authorized officers against its will, or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance of any subject, which that instrument has committed to it." (Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263, Oct. Term, 1879. See also In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 62, Apr. 14, 1890.)

"Where

lands are acquired in any other way by the United States within the limits of a State than by purchase with her consent, they will hold the lands subject to this qualification: that if upon them forts, arsenals, or other public, buildings are erected for the uses of the general government, such buildings, with their appurtenances, as instrumentalities for the execution of its powers, will be free from any such interference and jurisdiction of a State as would destroy or impair their effective use for the purposes designed. Such is the law with reference to all instrumentalities created by the general government. Their exemption from State control is essential to the independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of their delegated powers. But, when not used as such instrumentalities, the legislative power of the State over the places acquired will be as full and complete as over any other places within her limits.". (Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 539, May 4, 1885. See also Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 545, May 4, 1885.)

"It is true that the silence of Congress, when it has authority to speak, may sometimes give rise to an implication as to the Congressional purpose. The nature and extent of that implication depend upon the nature of the Congressional power and the effect of its exercise. But there is little scope for the application of this doctrine to the tax immunity of governmental instrumentalities. The constitutional immunity of either government from taxation by the other, where Congress is silent, has its source in an implied restriction upon the powers of the taxing government. So far as the implication rests upon the purpose to avoid interference with the functions of the taxed government or the imposition upon it of the economic burden of the tax, it is plain that there is no basis for implying a purpose of Congress to exempt the federal government or its agencies from tax burdens which are unsubstantial or which courts are unable to discern Silence of Congress implies immunity no more than does the silence of the Constitution. It follows that when exemption from state taxation is claimed on the ground that the federal government is burdened by the tax, and Congress has disclosed no intention with respect to the claimed immunity, it is in order to consider the nature and effect of the alleged burden, and if it appears that there is no ground for implying a constitutional immunity, there is equally a want of any ground for assuming any purpose on the part of Congress to create an immunity." (Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479-480, Mar. 27, 1939.)

"Since the United States is a government of delegated powers, none of which may be exercised throughout the Nation by any one state, it is necessary for uniformity that the laws of the United States ve dominant over those of any state. Such dominancy is required also to avoid a breakdown of administration through possible conflicts arising from inconsistent requirements. The supremacy clause of the Constitution states this essential principle. Article VI. A corollary to this principle is that the activities of the Federal Government are free

from regulation by an [sic] state. No other adjustment of competing enactments or legal principles is possible. (Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445, June 1, 1943.)

"The purpose of the supremacy clause was to avoid the introduction of disparities, confusions

and conflicts which would follow if the Government's general authority were subject to local controls. The validity and construction of contracts through which the United States is exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present questions of federal law not controlled by the law of any State. *** Federal statutes may declare liens in favor of the Government and establish their priority over subsequent purchasers or lienors irrespective of state recording acts.", (United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 183, May 1, 1944.)

Enforcement of tax laws. "If the states may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent-rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the states. (McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 432, Feb. Term, 1819.)

"The people of the United States constitute one nation. They have a government in which all of them are deeply interested. This government has necessarily a capitol established by law, where its principal operations are conducted. *** That government has a right to call to this point any or all of its citizens to aid in its service, as members of the Congress, of the courts, of the executive departments, and to fill all its other offices; and this right cannot be made to depend upon the pleasure of a State over whose territory they must pass to reach the point where these services must be rendered. The government, also has its offices of secondary importance in all other parts of the country. On the seacoasts and on the rivers it has its ports of entry. In the interior it has its land offices, its revenue offices, and its subtreasuries. In all these it demands the services of its citizens, and is entitled to bring them to those points from all quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in a State to obstruct this right that would not enable it to defeat the purposes for which the government was established. " (Crandall v. State of Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44, Dec. Term, 1867.)

"If this right to declare and prosecute wars] is dependent in any sense, however limited, upon the pleasure of a State, the government itself may be overthrown by an obstruction to its exercise. Much the largest part of the transportation of troops during the late rebellion was by railroads, and largely through States whose people were hostile to the Union. If the tax levied by Nevada on railroad passengers had been the law of Tennessee, enlarged to meet the wishes of her people, the treasury of the United States could not have paid the tax necessary to enable its armies to pass through her territory.' (Crandall v. State of Nevada, supra, at 44.)

"Unquestionably the taxing power of the States is very comprehensive and pervading, but it is not without limits. State Tax laws cannot restrain the action of the national government, nor can they abridge the operation of any law which Congress may constitutionally pass. They may extend to every object of value within the sovereignty of the State, but they cannot reach the administration of justice in the Federal courts, nor the collection of the

public revenue, nor interfere with any constitutional regulation of commerce. (Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 605, Dec. Term, 1867.)

Property of the United States is exempt from caxation under the authority of a State. (Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, Mar. 1, 1886; United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, Feb. 23, 1903; Irwin v. Wright, County Treasurer, 258 U. S. 219, Mar. 20, 1922; United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, May 1, 1944; United States v. City of Milwaukee, 100 F. 828, Feb. 1, 1893; United States v. City of Hoboken, N. I., 29 F.2d 932, Aug. 10, 1928; United States v. City of Buffalo, 54 F.2d 471, Dec. 7, 1931, cert. den., 285 U. S. 550; City of Springfield v. United States, 99 F.2d 860, Nov. 12, 1938; United States v. Power County, Idaho, 21 F. Supp. 684, Dec. 14, 1937; People ex rel. McCrea v. United States, 34 Am. Rep. 155, Sept. Term, 1879; Concessions Co. v. Morris, 186 P. 655, Dec. 15, 1919. See also: McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall. 23, 27, Dec. Term, 1876; Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496, 504, Mar. 3, 1890.)

The fact that realty of the United States is utilized by private persons for business purposes pending its disposition by the United States does not have the effect of making it subject to the tax laws of a State. (City of Springfield v. United States, supra.)

"It is familiar law that a State has no power to tax the property of the United States within its limits. This exemption of their property from state taxation--and by state taxation we mean any taxation by authority of the State, whether it be strictly for state purposes or for mere local and special objects--is founded upon that principle which inheres in every independent government, that it must be free from any such interference of another government as may tend to destroy its powers or impair their efficiency. If the property of the United States could be subjected to taxation by the State, the object and extent of the taxation would be subject to the State's discretion. It might extend to buildings and other property essential to the discharge of the ordinary business of the national government, and in the enforcement of the tax those buildings might be taken from the possession and use of the United States." (Wisconsin Central Railroad Company v. Price County, supra, at 504.)

"The theory that property of a federal agency is immune from state taxation, regardless of the amount or nature of the tax, is only applicable to cases where the property is held in that capacity. *** Property of an individual, although used in the performance of a federal duty, and even though essential to such performance, is not exempt from state taxation because of the use made of it. As on the one hand it cannot be taxed because put to a federal use, so, on the other hand, it is not exempt from taxes whose incidence depends upon other factors. In short, the federal use cannot be taxed, but the property is taxable." (Tirrell v. Johnston, 171 A. 641, 653, Mar. 6, 1934, aff., 293 U.S. 533, Dec. 17, 1934.)

A state law creating liens for taxes subsequently assessed in due course upon real property and making them effective as against subsequent purchasers does not contravene the Constitution of the United States. The United States, although protected with respect to proceedings against it without its consent, stands, so far as the existence of

་

Juch liens is concerned, in no different position from that of any other purchaser of lands who take conveyances on and after the specified tax date. (United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274, May 26, 1941.)

A State may not impose a tax upon automobiles purchased by the United States, for the use of the President, under appropriations made by Congress. The chauffeurs operating said machines may not be taxed by a State for the privilege of performing the duties pertaining to their employment. (28 Op. Atty. Gen. 604, Feb. 10, 1911. See also 23 Comp. Dec. 386, Jan. 10, 1917.)

The requirement of a .State that a Federal motor vehicle operated within the States shall have a license tag for which the Government is required to pay a fee, amounts to a tax on an instrumentality of the United States and is unauthorized, ́ notwithstanding the contention that the license tag is furnished at actual cost and as a means of identification. (1 Comp. Gen. 150, Sept. 20, 1921. See also 4 Comp. Gen. 412, Oct. 25, 1924.)

In view of the fundamental question of FederalState authority involved, the judicial interpretations with regard to the taxing and police powers of a State in its relation to the Federal Government and those engaged in its lawful and proper functions within a State, and the absence of a determination by proper judicial authority of the liability of the United States for parking fees imposed by municipal ordinance or state law, appropriated moneys may not be considered available for the procurement of "service cards" for the parking of Goverment vehicles in a metered zone, notwithstanding the charge for such cards is nominal and the fee is to cover the cost of inspection, installation, operation, control, etc., of the parking area and meters. (18 Comp. Gen. 151, Aug. 11, 1938.)

No constitutional immunity of the United States from state taxation prevents a State from applying its sales tax laws to a purchase of building materials by a contractor who buys them for his own use, and uses them in performing a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction contract for the United States, although the contract provided that the contractor should be reimbursed by the Government for the, cost of the materials. The legal incidence of the tax is not on the United States, and, under the special circumstances in the case, the contractor is not acting as agent for the United States. The fact that the economic burden of the tax is passed on to the United States does not make it a tax upon the United States. (Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, Nov. 10, 1941. Compare: Curry v. United States, 314 U. S. 14, Nov. 10, 1941.)

post exchanges as now operated are arms of the Government deemed by it essential for the performance of governmental functions. They are integral parts of the War Department, share in fulfilling the duties entrusted to it, and partake of whatever immunities it may have under the Constitution and federal statutes." (Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485, June 1, 1942. Accord: Query v. United States, 121 F.2d 631, June 27, 1941; 39 Op.Atty. Gen. 316, Aug. 5, 1939. See also, letter from Acting Secretary of the Treasury to Secretary of the Navy, dated Oct. 28, 1942, relative to Ship's Service activities and Marine Corps post exchanges.)

Sales made to officers' messes on board naval vessels are transactions with Government instrumentalities, the operations of which cannot be taxed

by a State. (File EG5/L14-1 (350705), Aug. 1, 1935, C.M.O. 8-1935, p. 11. See also File JJ56 (5) /L113(370301), Apr. 16, 1937, C.M.O. 6-1937, p. 11.)

An open account claim of a creditor of the United States, representing a balance claimed to be due under a contract for the construction of airports for the use of the Army, is not a credit instrumentality of the United States and not constitutionally immune from non-discriminatory property taxation by a State. (Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, Dec. 4, 1944.)

A rural mail carrier, who utilizes his own automobile for the carriage of the mails and who is allowed a fixed amount per mile by the Government on account of the utilization of said automobile, is liable for a so-called "gasoline road toll" imposed by a State for the use of state highways. (Tirrell v. Johnston, supra, at 653.)

Where a corporation entered into a contract with the Federal Government for the construction of levees, in aid of navigation of the Mississippi River, in the performance of which gasoline was used to supply power for machinery, and a State imposed an excise tax of five cents per gallon in respect of gasoline so used by a lump sum contractor purchasing gasoline for his own account, such excise tax was not invalid as a tax on a means or instrumentality of the Federal Government, its effect, if any, upon that Government being consequential and remote. (Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466, Mar. 5, 1934.)

An independent contractor,, engaged under his contract with the Government in the construction of locks and dams for the improvement of navigation, is not an instrumentality of the Government. (James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, Dec. 6, 1937.)

"So much of the burden of a non-discriminatory general tax upon the incomes of employees of a government, state or national, as may be passed on economically to that government, through the effect of the tax on the price level of labor or materials, is but the normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two governments, each possessing the taxing power. The burden, so far as it can be said to exist or to affect the government in any indirect or incidental way, is one which the Constitution presupposes, and hence it cannot rightly be deemed to be within an implied restriction upon the taxing power of the national and state governments which the Constitution has expressly granted to one and has confirmed to the other. The immunity is not one to be implied from the Constitution, because if allowed it would impose to an inadmissible extent a restriction on the taxing power which the Constitution has reserved to the state governments. (Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487, Mar. 27, 1939. See also Tax Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 515, Mar. 27, 1939.)

Note: The greater part of the law relating to the subject of intergovernmental tax immunity is embodied in current legislation, regulations, and decisions thereunder. This body of law is constantly undergoing change. Moreover, the Office of the Judge Advocate General engages in negotiations, with state and local tax officials, which frequently lead to special arrangements in particular cases.7

Enforcement of police regulations. In making provision for feeding the inmates of a soldier's home, in accordance with the legislation of Congress in that respect, and under the direction of the board of managers, the governor of the home is engaged in the internal administration of a Federal institution, and the legislature of the State within whose borders the home is situated has no constitutional power to interfere with the management which is provided for it by Congress, nor with the provisions made by Congress for furnishing food to the inmates. The police power of the State does not enable it to prohibit or regulate the furnishing of any article of food (such as oleomargarine) approved by the officials of the home. (Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, Feb. 27, 1899.)

A law of a State penalizing those who operate motor trucks on highways without having obtained licenses based on examination of competency and payment of a fee, can not constitutionally apply to an employee of the Post Office Department while engaged in driving a Government motor truck over a post road in the performance of his official duty. (Johnson v. State of Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, Nov. 8, 1920. Accord: File NY6/LA23 (270218) J-SG, Apr. 29, 1927, C.M.O. 5-1927, p. 12.)

"It seems to us that the immunity of the instruments of the United States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to a requirement that they desist from performance until they satisfy a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary part of them and pay a fee for permission to go on. Such a requirement does not merely touch the Government servants remotely by a general rule of conduct; it lays hold of them in their specific attempt to obey orders and requires qualifications in addition to those that the Government has pronounced sufficient. It is the duty of the Department to employ persons competent for their work and that duty it must be presumed has been performed." (Johnson v. State of Maryland,

- The United States has power to construct a dam across a navigable river for the purpose of improving navigation and need not first obtain approval of its plans by the State in which the dam is to be located even though this be expressly provided for by a statute of the State. "The United States may perform its functions without conforming to the police regulations of a State. *** If Congress has power to authorize the construction of the dam and reservoir, Secretary of the Interior Wilbur is under no obligation to submit the plans and specifications to the State Engineer for approval." (Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 451-452, May 18, 1931.)

"We may assume also that, in the absence of Congressional consent, there is an implied constitutional immunity of the national government from

state taxation and from state regulation of the performance, by federal officers and agencies, of governmental functions. *** But those who contract to furnish supplies or render services to the government are not such agencies and do not perform governmental functions, *** and the mere fact that non-discriminatory taxation or regulation of the contractor imposes an increased economic burden on the government is no longer regarded as bringing the contractor within any implied immunity of the government from state taxation or regulation." (Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Commission, 318 U.S. '261, 269, Mar. 1, 1943.)

The supremacy clause of the Constitution prevents a city from requiring an agency of the United States to comply with a local building regulation in constructing dwelling units on land situated with the limits of the city. (United States v. City of Chester, 51 F. Supp. 573, July 6, 1943. )

Whenever a structure of any kind is being built by the Navy, for the use of the Navy, all matters of planning, structural and engineering detail and physical lay-out, are the concern of the Navy, i.e., the United States Government, and are not the concern of the operating contractor for he is not operating the plant for himself, but for the Navy, hence the doctrine of Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, June 1, 1943, applies. Any attempt to require or coerce a Navy contractor to conform Navy plans and Navy structures to a local code is an attempt to impose a requirement before or as a part of the execution of a function of the Government, which, as the May> case unequivocally declares, is prohibited by the Federal Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. (File JAG:II:HJD: amp, June 5, 1944, C.M.O. 1-1944, pp. 114-118. See also File JAG:P:CCW: amp, SO-4950, May 20, 1942.)

The

"The public vessels of the government have the right of entering the ports and harbors of the United States without employment of pilots, if the officers in command, under instructions, shall deem it consistent with the safety of their command. employment on board of one familiar with the coast along which a public vessel may be required to cruise, to perform the duties of pilot, has always been deemed prudent and economical. It is not inconsistent with the law; and if the commander can rely on his skill, there is no obligation to employ a local or branch pilot, and consequently there is no lawful charge for pilotage in such cases where the services have not been required and rendered. This exemption extends to all vessels belonging to the United States, and employed in the public service, whether they be armed ships or not." (4 Op. Atty. Gen. 532, 533, Sept. 9, 1846. See also 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 647, Oct. 22, 1879.)

The powder officer for the harbor of Norfolk, Virginia, appointed under an act of Mar. 3, 1880, of that State, had no authority over powder belonging to the Federal Government, and the United States was not liable for any charge for services performed by him under the authority of that law. (25 Op. Atty. Gen. 234, Aug. 18, 1904.)

The health laws of a State do not extend to agencies of the Federal Government; and as battleships belonging to the United States are agencies of the Federal Government, the charges by a health officer of a State for the inspection of such battleships are not a legal claim against the United States. (13 Comp. Dec. 672, Apr. 2, 1907.)

Delivery of men to civil authorities.- "There being no existing law which provides for the case of