Chapter XII.

Greene Joins Morgan on the Catawba-Adopts the Fabian Policy-Movement of Cornwallis to Cross the Catawba-Affair at McGowan's Ford-Militia Surprised by Tarleton at Tarrant's Tavern-Cornwallis Checked by the Rising of the Yadkin-Contest of Skill and Speed of the Two Armies in a March to the Banks of the Dan.

G

ENERAL GREENE was gladdened by a letter from Morgan, written shortly after his defeat of Tarleton,

and transmitted the news to Washington with his own generous comments. "The victory was complete," writes he, "and the action glorious. The brilliancy and success with which it was fought, does the highest honor to the American arms, and adds splendor to the character of the general and his officers. I must beg leave to recommend them to your Excellency's notice, and doubt not but from your representation, Congress will receive

pleasure from testifying their approbation of their conduct."

Another letter from Morgan, written on the 25th, spoke of the approach of Cornwallis and his forces. "My numbers, "My numbers," writes he, "are at this time too weak to fight them. I intend to move towards Salisbury, to get near the main army. I think it would be advisable to join our forces and fight them before they join Phillips, which they certainly will do if they are not stopped."

Greene had recently received intelligence of the landing of troops at Wilmington, from a British squadron, supposed to be a force under Arnold, destined to push up Cape Fear River, and co-operate with Cornwallis; he had to prepare, therefore, not only to succor Morgan, but to prevent this co-operation. He accordingly detached General Stevens with his Virginia militia (whose term of service was nearly expired) to take charge of Morgan's prisoners, and conduct them to Charlottesville in Virginia. At the same time he wrote to the governors of North Carolinia and Virginia, for all the aid they could furnish; to Steuben, to hasten forward his recruits, and to Shelby, Campbell, and others, to take arms once more, and rival their achievements at King's Mountain.

This done, he left General Huger in com

Greene at Morgan's Camp

209

mand of the division on the Pedee, with orders to hasten on by forced marches to Salisbury, to join the other division: in the meantime he set off on horseback for Morgan's camp, attended merely by a guide, an aide-de-camp, and a sergeant's guard of dragoons. His object was to aid Morgan in assembling militia and checking the enemy until the junction of his forces could be effected. It was a hard ride of upwards of a hundred miles through a rough country. On the last day of January he reached Morgan's camp at Sherrard's Ford, on the east side of the Catawba. The British army lay on the opposite side of the river, but a few miles distant from it, and appeared to be making preparations to force a passage across, as it was subsiding, and would soon be fordable. Greene supposed Cornwallis had in view a junction with Arnold at Cape Fear; he wrote, therefore, to General Huger to hurry on, so that with their united forces they could give his lordship a defeat before he could effect the junction. "I am not without hopes," writes he, "of ruining Lord Cornwallis if he persists in his mad scheme of pushing through the country; and it is my earnest desire to form a junction as early for this purpose as possible. Desire Colonel Lee to force a march to join us. Here is a fine field, and great glory ahead."

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More correct information relieved him from the apprehension of a co-operation of Arnold and Cornwallis. The British troops which landed at Wilmington, were merely a small detachment sent from Charleston to establish a military depot for the use of Cornwallis in his Southern campaign. They had taken possession of Wilmington without opposition.

Greene now changed his plans. He was aware of the ill-provided state of the British army, from the voluntary destruction of their wagons, tents, and baggage. Indeed, when he first heard of this measure, on his arriving at Sherrard's Ford, he had exclaimed, "Then Cornwallis is ours." His plan now was to tempt the enemy continually with the prospect of a battle, but continually to elude one; to harass them by a long pursuit, draw them higher into the country, and gain time for the division advancing under Huger to join him. It was the Fabian policy that he had learnt under Washington, of whom he prided himself on being a disciple.

As the subsiding of the Catawba would enable Cornwallis to cross, Greene ordered Morgan to move off silently with his division, on the evening of the 31st, and to press his march all night, so as to gain a good start in advance, while he (Greene) would remain to bring on

Cornwallis at the Catawba

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the militia, who were employed to check the enemy. These militia, assembled from the neighboring counties, did not exceed five hundred. Two hundred of them were distributed at different fords; the remaining three hundred, forming a corps of mounted riflemen under General Davidson, were to watch the movements of the enemy, and attack him wherever he should make his main attempt to cross. When the enemy should have actually crossed, the different bodies of militia were to make the best of their way to a rendezvous, sixteen miles distant, on the road to Salisbury, where Greene would be waiting to receive them, and conduct their further movements.

While these dispositions were being made by the American commander, Cornwallis was preparing to cross the river. The night of the 31st was chosen for the attempt. To divert the attention of the Americans, he detached Colonels Webster and Tarleton with a part of the army to a public ford called Beattie's Ford, where he supposed Davidson to be stationed. There they were to open a cannonade, and make a feint of forcing a passage. The main attempt, however, was to be made six miles lower down, at McGowan's, a private and unfrequented ford, where little, if any, opposition was anticipated.