And to correct the irregularity and extravagance of this passion, let us but reflect how airy and unsubstantial a pleasure the highest gratifi. cations of it afford; how many cruel mortifica, tions it exposes us to, by awakening the envy of others to what meanness it often makes us submit; how frequently it loseth its end by pursuing it with too much ardour; and how much more solid pleasure the approbation of con science will yield, than the acclamations of igno. rant and mistaken men, who judging by externals only, cannot know our true character; and whose commendations a wise man would rather despise than court. "Examine but the size of people's sense, and the condition of their un. derstandings, and you will never be fond of popularity, nor afraid of censure: nor solic itous what judgment they may form of you, who know not how to judge rightly of them selves."*

CHAPTER XIII.

What kind of knowledge we are already furnished with, and what degree of esteem we set upon it.

XII. A MAN can never rightly know himself, unless he examines into his knowledge of other things.

*Examine the minds of men, and you will see what judges you should fear, even such, as are judges of themselves. Marcus Antoninus.

We must consider then the knowledge we have; and whether we do not set too high a price upon it, and too great a value upon ourselves on the account of it; of what real use it is to us, and what effect it has upon us; whether it does not make us too stiff, unsociable, and assuming; testy and supercilious, and ready to despise others for their supposed ignorance. If so, our knowledge, be it what it will, does us more harm than good. We were better without it; ignorance itself would not render us so ridiculous. Such a temper, with all our knowledge shows that we know not ourselves.

"A man is certainly proud of that knowledge he despises others for the want of."

How common is it for some men to be fond of appearing to know more than they do, and of seeming to be thought men of knowledge? To which end they exhaust their fund almost in all companies, to outshine the rest. So that in two or three conversations they are drawn dry, and you see to the bottom of them much sooner than you could at first imagine. And even that torrent of learning, which they pour out upon you at first so unmercifully, rather confounds than satisfies you; their visible aim is not to inform your judgment, but display their own; you have many things to query and except against, but their loquacity gives you no room; and their good sense, set off to so much advantage, strikes a modest man dumb: if you insist upon your right to examine, they retreat, either in confusion or equivocation; and, like the scuttle fish, throw

a large quantity of ink behind may not see where to pursue. ble flows is obvious enough. would soon correct it.

them, that you Whence this foi. Self knowledge

But, as some ignorantly affect to be more knowing, so others vainly affect to be more ignorant than they are; who, to show they have greater insight and penetration than other men, insist upon the absolute uncertainty of science; will dispute even first principles; grant nothing as certain, and so run into downright Pyrrhonism; the too common effect of abstracted debates excessively refined.*

Every one is apt to set the greatest value upon that kind of knowledge, in which he imagines he himself most excels; and to undervalue all other in comparison of it. There wants some certain rule then, by which every man's knowledge is to be tried, and the value of it estimated. And let it be this. "That is the best and most valuable kind of knowledge, that is most subservient to the best ends; i. e. which tends to make a man wiser and better, or more agreeable, and useful both to himself and oth For knowledge is but a means that relates to some end. And as all means are to be

ers."

* Socrates' saying, "that he knew nothing, except that he knew nothing," savoured of an affected humility. But they that followed went further; and particularly Arcesilas "said there was nothing which could be known; not even that which Socrates professed to know." And thus the absurdity grew to a size that was monstrous. For to know that one knows nothing is a contradiction. And not to know that he knows even that, is not to know but that he may know something. Relig. of Nat. delin. page 40

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judged of by the excellency of the end, and their expediency to produce it; so that must be the best knowledge that hath the most direct tendency to promote the best ends: viz. a man's own true happiness, and that of others; in which the glory of GoD, the ultimate end, is ever necessarily comprised.

Now, if we were to judge of the several kinds of science by this rule, we should find, 1. Some of them to be very hurtful and pernicious; as tending to pervert the true end of knowledge; to ruin a man's own happiness, and make him more injurious to society. Such is the knowl. edge of vice, the various temptations to it, and the secret ways of practising it; especially the arts of dissimulation, fraud, and dishonesty. 2. Others will be found unprofitable and useless. As those parts of knowledge, which, though they may take up much time and pains to ac. quire, yet answer no valuable purpose; and serve only for amusement, and the entertainment of the imagination. For instance, an acquaint. ance with plays, novels, games, and modes, in which a man may be very critical and expert, and yet not a whit the wiser or more useful man. 3. Other kinds of knowledge are good only relatively, or conditionally, and may be more useful to one than to another; viz. a skill in a man's particular occupation or calling, on which his credit, livelihood, or usefulness in the world depends. And as this kind of knowledge is valuable in proportion to its end, so it ought to be cultivated with a diligence

and esteem answerable to that. Lastly, other kinds of knowledge are good, absolutely and universally; viz. the knowledge of GoD and ourselves. The nature of our final happiness and the way to it. This is equally necessary to all. And how thankful should we be, that we, who live under the light of the gospel, and enjoy that light in its perfection and purity, have so many happy means and opportunities of attaining this most useful and necessary kind of knowledge.

A man can never understand himself then, till he makes a right estimate of his knowledge; till he examines what kind of knowledge he values himself most upon, and most diligently cultivates; how high a value he sets upon it; what good it does him; what effect it hath upon him; what he is the better for it; what end it answers now; or what it is likely to answer hereafter.

There is nothing in which a man's self ignorance discovers itself more, than in the esteem he hath for his understanding, or for himself on the account of it. It is a trite and true observation, that empty things make the most sound. Men of the least knowledge are most apt to make a show of it; and to value themselves upon it; which is very visible in forward, confident youth, raw, conceited academics, and those who, uneducated in their childhood, betake themselves in later life to reading, without taste or judgment, only as an accomplishment, and to make a show of scholarship; who have just learning enough