of a right protected by the state are fundamentally the same terms.' Likewise, he rejects as "contrary to the very nature of criminal law" the theory existent in French juristic thought since Dumoulin that a foreigner agrees to submit to the penal laws of a state which he enters. No less condemnatory are his conclusions on the idealistic conception of the universalists:

"This idea, moreover, can only find justification in the notion of natural rights or law. But the existence of natural rights . . . is disproved by the facts. Criminal law and morals may be in accord, but are clearly distinct."

Piracy alone, because of the nature of the crime, should be punished universally.

M. Travers repudiates the current objections to the theory of the application of criminal law by reason of the nationality of the injured party, but regards such procedure justifiable only in three cases: First, when the victim is on foreign territory in other than' a private capacity; second, for infractions against the surety or credit of the state; third, when there is no criminal law at the place of the infraction, either for the reason that the place cannot be determined or that it forms part of an uncivilized country.

The principle of 'personnalité' has its roots in the law as far back as the ancient Greeks and was the basis of the doctrine of statutes formulated by Accursius, Bartolus, and the post-glossators of medieval Italy. Now the author rejects this conception and especially opposes the assimilation of criminal law to the lois d'état et de capacité,' but his argument amounts to a mere definition of terms. Three exceptions are admitted: Where the provisions of a statute by its very nature follow the person of the national; where the law of the place of the infraction renounces jurisdiction; where the place of infraction has no sovereign or its penal laws rest on principles differing from those of civilized nations.

That the state of refuge should have jurisdiction in default of cognizance of the crime by the lex loci delicti or the lex loci domicilii is all important.

"First of all, the example of the delinquent unpunished and tranquilly enjoying his profit tends to encourage criminality. In the second place, the possibility of taking refuge in a country with a certainty of immunity .. is bound to bring on the territory of a too hospitable state an agglomeration of vagabonds necessarily disturbing to the social order."

It is not essential that the act be classed as criminal by the lex loci delicti. Such an unusual jurisdiction would appear to involve startling complications. Could Hop Sing, citizen of the United States, be sentenced by a Chinese court while on a temporary return to China for having in Chicago anathematized the spirit of his greatgrandfather?

M. Travers finds in the systems of Dudley Field, Fiore, Wheaton, and the Institute of International Law as formulated by resolutions of September 7, 1883, the common fault of insufficient

repression. Field's code is of course founded on the traditional Anglo-American principle of territoriality. "The weak points of this conception are glaring," asserts the writer. ". to condition prosecution of crime committed abroad on the presence of the accused within the territory is to defeat repression." Sentence by default should be possible in cases touching the security or credit of the state. The reviewer at least can appreciate the writer's surprise that murder and rape are more lightly dealt with by the state of refuge than theft.

All attempts such as that of Meili to classify various systems M. Travers opposes as purely arbitrary. Austria, Italy, Norway, and Russia, Meili assigns to the category of universal; the United States and England to that of territorial; while France, Switzerland, and Germany are of a mixed character combining both the former with elements of the conceptions of personality, active and passive. From a detailed examination of these and other legislations, the writer concludes:

“(1)

Criminal law can not be called territorial. "(2) Neither can it be classed as personal.

"(3) The principles of classification should be deduced not from the application of a single and exclusive idea, but from the number and range of the guiding rules admitted."

For those interested in the administration of our criminal law this author's treatment of the theory of territoriality will be read with great profit for the remarkable candor of his criticism of some of the basic conceptions of Anglo-American criminal law: "The American authors do nothing but reaffirm the doctrine of Chief Justice Marshall: 'It is admitted that the legislation of every state is territorial, that beyond its territory it can only reach its subjects or citizens.'" M. Travers deems the epithet 'territorial' vicious because of its multifarious interpretations:

"That law is territorial either which is only applied to acts accomplished on the territory or which without regard to the place of infraction, seizes every delinquent because of the mere fact of his passing the frontier, or that which has force and permits action only in the territory."

Three appendices are devoted to the theories of complicity and indivisibility, to literary, artistic, and industrial property, and to the effect of the annexation of territories and changes of nationalities. For reference purposes, the analytical index with its hierarchy of divisions, sections, chapters, subsections and subchapters could be improved by the adoption of the typographical devices of the American printer which give proper emphasis to the various elements of such an outline.

This work is essentially a study of comparative law for a determination of the state of evolution attained by the principal systems. The student would therefore do well to devote some prior attention to historical material. It is not a far cry from the shibboleth of the eighteenth century French publicists-l'interêt de l'état-to the

theories of M. Travers. For its constructive thesis, however, there is no doubt of the immense value of the work. It is an exhaustive treatise, scholarly as well as practical. Upon its completion in four or more volumes, this distinguished author will have erected a monument in this branch of the law. In America, where the administration of criminal justice is increasingly a challenge to our whole form of government, we may well ponder over these words:

"No matter how perfect the conception of international penal law, the value of practical results depends in a large measure on the degree of development attained by the internal criminal law."

Chicago.

HARRY LEROY JONES.

CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By James Brown Scott. St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1922. Pp. xxxvi + 1196.

The first edition of Scott's cases on International Law was published in 1902 and for many years it was the outstanding case book on this subject. In the twenty years that have elapsed since its publication, many changes have been effected in various rules of law, particularly those relating to war and the rights and duties of neutrals in time of war. There may be some who disagree, but certainly most students of the subject will concede the correctness of the author's statement:

"International law seems to have stood fairly well the strain of war. It is no doubt true that the belligerent practices of nations have not squared with their peaceful professions. Nevertheless the law of nations emerges from the World War as a system with foundations unimpaired, although the structure bears outward marks of violence and unsightly scars, which only time can cover."

This edition, while omitting some fifty cases found in the earlier edition, contains much new material. There is a slight departure from the usual division of the subject: Peace, War and Neutrality. The cases relating to the latter topic are given as part of the subject of War, being inserted just prior to the chapter on Termination of War. There are also several changes in the order of sub-topics and a number of new topics inserted. Of these the most interesting is the subject of Angary. Inasmuch as one of the outstanding examples of the exercise of this right is the action of the American and British governments in seizing the Dutch vessels in 1918, it is somewhat surprising that the author makes no reference to it.

One does not find in this edition certain well-known cases usually included in collections of cases on international law: The Belgenland, The Parlement Belge, Vavasseur v. Krupp, Wildenhans' case and Terlinden v. Ames, and others. There are included, however, many cases arising out of the World War and a fund of

1. [Two additional volumes have appeared since this review was written. The completed work has been crowned by l'Institut de France and there has been awarded to the author the Limantour prize.-Eds.]

material not readily accessible in this form elsewhere. A very good feature of this case book is the inclusion in the appendix of the Declaration of Paris, Declaration of St. Petersburg, the Geneva Convention, The Hague Convention, Declaration of London and Declaration of Washington. This makes the work much more serviceable for class-room purposes.

CHARLES H. WATSON.

FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS. By Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, late Southmayd Professor of Law in Yale University. Edited by Walter Wheeler Cook. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923. Pp. 420.

In this well printed book the colleagues in the Yale law faculty of the late Professor Hohfeld have fulfilled a duty of piety. It is a well deserved and a fitting tribute to the memory of a forceful and independent legal thinker. It was a great loss when Hohfeld was cut down. He was in his best years and the midst of creative work of a kind to which few persons are naturally attracted. For those who did not know Professor Hohfeld in the flesh, these essays permit a better acquaintance in the spirit. They point to two dominant characteristics-insight and thoroughness. No man was less influenced by the idols of the market-place. No man took his work more seriously.

The first two papers on Fundamental Legal Conceptions are already well known. They were first published in 1913 and 1917 respectively, and issued in pamphlet form in 1919 after the author's death. In the first of these essays, the author has formulated tables of legal relations. The one striking feature of these tables is that they include as legal relations the general negation of the claim-duty relation (no claim-no duty) and of the power-liability relation (no power-no liability). This subject has been extensively debated. It is asserted that a non-legal content (i. e., non-constraint) relation is not a legal relation, and that a general negation of a constraint type of legal relation unless and until converted into a constraint type of relation is not a legal relation. This view is energetically combated by those who accept Professor Hohfeld's formulation. It is also asserted as a further capital objection that the term Privilege (the meaning of which has not yet been fixed by those who accept the Hohfeld terminology) is an overlapping term which may include or coincide with No-Duty, No-Duty-Not-To, Power, Liberty, and Privilege (in the sense of special legal advantage). This objection seems to be met by a confession and avoidance. The debate up to this point has run true to form in its futility, so far at least as concerns any evidence of the power of reason to make itself acknowledged or even known.

The essay on the Relations between Equity and Law is informative and valuable. It has also the merit of being more easily read than any other of the technical essays. In this essay Professor

Hohfeld aligns himself against powerful authority, but so far as the reviewer feels any competency to share an opinion on the merits of the controversy, it seems that Professor Hohfeld has clearly made his point that various substantive rules of equity are in conflict with the rules of the law courts.

The discussion of Penman v. Jones, a Pennsylvania coal mine case (1917, 256 Pa. 416, 100 Atl. 1043), under the title Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, is a thorough and competent piece of writing. It illustrates very well in a relatively brief compass the author's method of work-complete analysis of the subject matter and an industrious marshaling of collateral information. Here, too, it seems to us, the author succeeds in making his point and in demonstrating a logical error of judgment due to a confusion of legal relations.

In his critique of the Risdon case the author virtually wrote a book. It runs over a space of one hundred thirty-eight pages and is the principal technical essay in this volume. It deals with an interesting and very important question of corporation law and of foreign rights. In the Risdon case, the defendant, an English subject and resident, was a stockholder of an English joint stock company chartered to deal in mining in the United States and elsewhere. The company was licensed to operate in California and incurred a debt there. By California law, stockholders were personally responsible in proportion to their shares for the debts of the corporation. The company having become insolvent, the defendant was sued in England (Risdon v. Furness 1905, 1 K. B. 304, 1906, 1 K. B. 49). The defendant prevailed.

Professor Hohfeld regarded a corporation merely as an association of natural persons. He says:

"In reality when we say that the so-called legal or juristic person has rights or that it has contracted, we mean nothing more than what must ultimately be explained by describing the capacities, powers, rights, privileges (or liberties), disabilities, duties, and liabilities, etc., of the natural persons concerned, or of some of such persons."

The propositions that Professor Hohfeld suggests to the reader and contends for are: (1) a corporation is a collection of natural persons; (2) a debt contracted in California by the corporation is governed by California law; (3) in the absence of a policy at the forum opposing foreign responsibility, a stockholder is liable for his proportionate share of the associated debt.

The conclusion in part rests on the soundness of the premise that legal relations can only be attributed to that kind of persona which has for its substrate a homo sapiens. We believe the premise is wrong and that even if it should be taken experimentally as correct in any system of law, it would soon be found unworkable. It is commonly, perhaps universally, believed that there is something peculiar about corporate personateness. The fact, however, is quickly demonstrable that the persona of an aggregate of human beings is no more of a fiction than the persona of a single human