it is a matter of common knowledge that responsibility for corporate crimes is not easily shifted or evaded. Until and unless it is demonstrated that the social good demands that corporations be held responsible for crimes, there is no sound reason for so holding them. The mass of confusing dicta must be cleared away before they are enacted into bad laws. Special instances may demand that the legislature impute crimes to corporations, but the general principles of the law of agency, crimes, and corporations will be our safest guides. These principles point to the exemption of corporations from criminal responsibility. ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW Published monthly except July to October, inclusive, by Nathan William MacChesney, President. $3 PER YEAR Frederic B. Crossley, Secretary and Treasurer PRICE OF THIS NUMBER 50 CENTS Subscribers who wish to discontinue their subscriptions at the end of the subscription period should notify the business office of the REVIEW; otherwise it will be assumed that a continuation of the subscription is desired. Ex-Officio, R. ALLAN STEPHENS, Secretary, Illinois State Bar Association To promote free expression of view on the part of contributors, the Editorial Board, collectively, assumes no responsibility for any statement in the columns of the REVIEW. Each article or com munication, including editorial notes, comments on cases, and book reviews, is identified by the name or the initials of the writer. COMMENT ON RECENT CASES FUTURE EQUITABLE INTERESTS SHIFTING USES.-In Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Patterson 308 Ill. 519, 139 N. E. 912, the court in holding that a grantor under a deed in trust had, by the terms of that instrument, the equitable fee in the trust property (real estate) subject to be devested by his death during the trust period (20 years), in which event the property was to go as he should by will appoint and, in default of appointment, to his children, says that the "new estate which would follow (on the death of the grantor within the trust period) would be in derogation of his estate as a shifting use. Such an interest, if validly created by will, would be an executory devise; given by deed would be a future interest governed by the same rules as to its creation and vesting as an executory devise. In either case, the interest arises out of a direction in the instrument creating the trust, whether a will or a deed, that in the event of the happening of the specified contingency-death before the expiration of the trust-the use shall shift; that the interest of the deceased holder of the equitable fee shall cease and that the trustee shall thereafter hold for the benefit of the person or persons specified in the deed of trust to take in such event." The words italicized above might seem to intimate that the future equitable estate in question arose as a "shifting use" under the Statute of Uses (that being the usual meaning of those words: 24 Laws of England pp. 231, 279-80). If so, the language of the court betrays some confusion of ideas. Shifting uses operate, under the "Statute of Uses," to create future legal, not equitable, estates. The effect of the statute was to convert what was prior thereto a purely equitable estate into a legal estate of the same quality 24 Laws of England p. 231; Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) sec. 52-53; Williams "Real Property" (22d ed.) p. 178. It was the necessity of livery of seisin which prevented conveyances of land, to take effect in futuro, and which prevented the creation of future estates in land, except those taking effect as remainders: 24 Laws of England p. 217; Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) sec. 6; Sugden's Gilbert "Uses" pp. 163N, 153N. Except where livery of seisin was required, estates could be created to arise in futuro, as, for instance, in the case of incorporeal hereditaments: Washburn "Real Prop." (4th ed.) p. 33; Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) sec. 16, also sec. 52 note 5. The feudal requirements as to seisin had no application to equitable estates, and these could, therefore, be created to arise in futuro, and future interests could be created to take effect otherwise than by way of remainder. Indeed, it was this feature of equitable estates which gave rise to the doctrine of "springing and shifting uses," i. e., legal estates to arise in futuro, either in derogation of the grantor's estate or of some prior estate created by him: Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) sec. 54; Williams "Real Property" (22d ed.) p. 383; Kales "Future Interests" (2d ed.) sec. 72; since, prior to the Statute, there were no technical rules based on seisin with respect to the creation of future equitable estates (then known as "uses"): Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) sec. 52-sec. 69; Leake "Property in Land" p. 108; Williams "Real Property" (22d ed.) p. 383. So, when the Statute of Uses was passed, its effect was to convert these equitable estates (or "uses") into legal estates, and, hence, to make possible the creation of future legal estates, unhampered by any requirements as to seisin, and, hence, future legal estates to arise in the future, or in derogation of prior estates: 24 Laws of England pp. 231, 279, 280; Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) secs. 54, 69; Kales "Future Interests" (2d ed.) sec. 72; Williams "Real Property" (22d ed.) pp. 178, 385-7. When equitable estates re-emerged after the Statute of Uses (in the form of "uses on uses," "active trusts," etc.): Williams "Real Property" (22d ed.) p. 179; Leake "Property in Land" pp. 93-4: the same freedom from the technical restrictions based on seisin governing legal estates, still obtained as to equitable estates, and equitable estates "executory" in character, could therefore be freely created: Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) sec. 69; Leake "Property in Land" p. 108. In the instant case, then, the interests to arise, on the death of the grantor during the trust period, did not arise as a "shifting use" but as a future equitable estate, "executory" in character: Gray "Perpetuities" (3rd ed.) p. 52. L. M. G. COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND IN EQUITY-WHO CAN ENFORCE. In Natural Products Co. v. Dolese & Shepard Co. 309 Ill. 226, 140 N. E. 840, the Dolese & Shepard Co., who at the time of the deed containing the covenant in question owned considerable property being sold in lots for residence purposes, conveyed a portion of this land to the grantor of the Natural Products Company, with a covenant against using the land so conveyed for the purpose of producing crushed stone there from. The Natural Products Company brought a bill to remove this covenant from its title, as a cloud upon the title, but the Supreme Court sustained the covenant as one that ran with the land, rejecting in that decision the two contentions raised against it, viz.: (1) that such a covenant operated to violate the law against pools, trusts, and combines and (2) that it operated in restraint of trade, for both of which reasons, it was claimed the covenant was against public policy and therefore invalid. In the course of its decision, however, the court uses this language: "When the deed to von Owen was made, the defendant owned many lots, some of which have been sold to persons who are not parties to this suit, who would have a right to enforce the covenant, and some of the lots are still retained by defendant." This language is susceptible of construction, it is believed, quite beyond what the court intended. Thus it would seem to be the law that only where lots are platted and sold pursuant to a common scheme, in which the restriction figures as an integral part of the scheme, and where the purchasers buy with this scheme in mind as part of the consideration they get, does the law permit the various grantees to enforce the restriction as against each other (I. L. R. XIV 500, 501). As, except there be such a general scheme according to which all the lots are sold, the presumption is that the grantor intended the restriction to be in favor of what be retained. It could not be argued here, either, it would seem, that if later he conveyed part of what he retained, the covenant would run as to that part, and also remain in favor of the part still in the ownership of the grantor. Indeed, it would seem that the same situation would obtain here that obtains in case of easements (Moline Water Power Co. v. Waters 10 Ill. App. 177), and that the conveyance of a part of the dominant estate does not pass with it the benefit of the easement where such benefit is not conveyed as appurtenant to it, either by express terms or by implication. (Jarvis v. Seele Milling Co. 173 II. 192, 194). That a similar rule would apply to covenants would seem to follow, particularly as the courts will not presume the extension of a covenant beyond its strict terms, but will confine its operation strictly. And that conclusion would seem to follow. from Clark v. McGee 159 Ill. 518, where one who owned a tract of land laid it out into 38 lots. In conveying these lots no two deeds contained the same restriction, and some were without restrictions altogether. The court held that there was, therefore, no uniform plan pursuant to which these lots were conveyed, so that the rule permitting any of various grantees to enforce the particular covenants to which each is bound against each was held inapplicable. E. M. L. POWER OF APPOINTMENT-DEATH OF APPOINTEE-LAPSE.-A rather unusual point is decided in Bradford v. Andrew 308 Ill. 458, 139 N. E. 922. A donee of a general power of appointment under the will of her husband made a will in which, by the third clause thereof, she devised and bequeathed the residue of her estate, in specified fractions, to certain brothers and the issue of certain deceased brothers and sisters, and expressly declared this clause should include, not only her own property, but her husband's property subject to her appointment, and should constitute an appointment under her husband's will. One of the residuary devisees having predeceased the testatrix, and the gift to him having thereby lapsed, the question arose who should take in his place with respect to the appointed property. It was held that, although in the case of a lapse arising by reason of the death of an appointee, the heirs of the donor of the power will, in the absence of any express limitation in default of appointment, take, as a general rule, yet where the donee of a general power of appointment appoints by will in such terms as to disclose an intention to treat the property subject to appointment as part of her own estate, by virtue of the donation of the power, then in case of lapse by death of an appointee the appointed property will pass to the heirs of the donee of the power. Since the will in question comprised both the testatrix's own property and that over which she had a general power of appointment in one general residuary clause, under the principles above stated, it was deemed that the testatrix's heirs (not those of her husband) should take the lapsed share of the appointed property. The authorities are fully cited in the opinion of the court. L. M. G. NEGLIGENCE-PERSONAL INJURIES-PREMISES ATTRACTIVE TO CHILDREN.-In N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Fruchter 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38, the Supreme Court of the United States rejects the application of the attractive nuisance theory to a situation where a public |