life inadequate, just as any exclusively monistic treatment of the problems of existence is often likely to be. The perusal and careful study of Kohler's contributions show us that "spirit still lives," even though materialism is very much alive. In the opinion of the reviewer, idealism is needed today even though pragmatically idealism were an unscientific theory, which is not here admitted; in fact, the reviewer finds himself greatly in accord with Kohler's viewpoint. But to the adherents of Analytical, Historical, or Sociological jurisprudence, whose quest for reality and meaning in the problems of law and existence may still be unsatisfied after re-reading this new edition of the Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, let it be said that they shall be the more able to reach a solution of their problems because of the tireless and versatile work of Josef Kohler. E. F. ALBERTSWORTH.

Western Reserve University, Law School.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS AT THE FIRST ANNUAL MEETING of the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL AID ORGANIZATIONS. Cleveland: 1923. Pp. vi + 138.

These proceedings show that the national organization of legal aid work which was started by Mark Acheson, Jr., of Pittsburgh in 1911, and which was inactive during the World War, has had a real rebirth. At the meeting held in Cleveland on June 7 and 8 the delegates from 29 legal aid organizations signed the constitution of the newly organized association. The following action also was taken :

I. Uniform record forms were adopted by the 29 organizations. These records covered: (1) Classification as to cases: (a) Nature of cases; (b) Source of cases; (c) Disposition of cases: (2) Classification of data as to clients. These uniform records will make discussions and comparisons possible, which up to date have been out of the question.

II. Six committee reports were received, discussed and action taken where it was possible. In each case the committee was instructed to continue and a program for its future work outlined. The proceedings give the discussions of the submitted reports in detail, but in several instances do not include the reports themselves. For example, there is a record of the discussion of the reports of the committees on Financial Accounting, on Relations with the Bar and the Public Defender, but the reports themselves are not included. It should be said that these committee reports were printed previous to the annual meeting and were in the hands of the delegates, but even so the published record of the proceedings now under review loses a part of its value unless the reader has at hand the pamphlet which contains the committee reports. Copies of the committee reports may be obtained from the secretary, John S. Bradway, 133 South Twelfth St., Philadelphia.

III. The six committees that reported were all reappointed and also three additional ones. It is worth while giving the list of

the committees, for they all have definite problems before them and are actively at work. They are: (1) Publicity; (2) Records; (3) Relations with bar; (4) Social work in its relation to legal aid work; (5) Domestic relations courts; (6) Small loans and investments; (7) Public defender; (8) Financial accounting; (9) Conciliation and small claims courts.

The proceedings show a good record of accomplishment for a new national organization and a definite program for committee work. A reading of the discussions gives one a comprehensive view of the field covered by legal aid and the problems arising therein. JOEL D. HUNTER.

CASES ILLUSTRATING GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONBy John C. Miles, Kt., M. A., B. C. L., and J. L. Brierly, M. A., B. C. L. Oxford: Oxford University Press (American Branch, New York), 1923. Pp. xvi + 528.

These cases were collected to illustrate leading principles of contract law, and are intended for students' use in connection with Sir William Anson's treatise. It is gathered from the preface (p. vi) that the book's purpose also is, in so far as this is compatible with its general scheme, to teach a student how to study the law at its source. Apparently the authors feel that this end is attained, to some degree at least, if a student, after he has learned a rule in the text, turns to a case "on all fours" and sees for himself the process which the courts go through in making the rule. Doubtless, one who does this is benefited; he has seen the court in action, and, if the case is well chosen, he follows the judicial process. It must be said that the authors have selected cases which are aptly illustrative, and clearly reasoned. They are illustrative in a true sense.

A modern American law school would not regard the book as a "casebook." Material is not presented so that a student may, by his own inductive reasoning, formulate for himself a body of law. An American casebook's function is not to tell a student what the law is; it is rather to furnish him with cases, some of which are rightly decided and some wrongly, from which he may determine for himself what the law actually is, and what it theoretically should be. Illustrative casebooks seem to proceed on the theory that it is better teaching first to inform the student, and then show him, in a limited number of instances, whence the imparted information came, and how it was originally formulated.

Does a student, who reads a text and a few cases, understand sufficiently well the reasons for the existence of legal rules? Does he understand the process called legal reasoning as well as one who has spent most of his time "extracting for himself, as he will later have to do in practice, the ratio decidendi" (preface, p. vi) from a substantially complete set of cases? After all, useful practice of the law depends upon a lawyer's acumen; upon the possession of a mind finely trained to reason in the way that good courts do and will continue to do. Certainly, knowledge of rules is important,

but such can always be found in the books by one skilled in recognizing them and able to grasp their significance and application to a given transaction. If neither American casebooks on the one hand, nor texts and illustrative cases on the other produce such a type of lawyer, both are inadequate. If each trains equally well, there is no choice between them. But if one trains better than the other, that one is more desirable.

A merely illustrative casebook is not compiled to fully cover its subject. It aims to give a student a taste of the real work ahead of him in his professional days. He has his information from his text; he is presumed to know the law in the abstract. Why then should a casebook of this type be limited in its problems to those dealing only with leading principles? It purposes to give the student a task in legal analysis and show him how courts apply law to facts. It may well be that a case, which either presents the best task of this kind or best illustrates a court's process, does not expound a fundamental. In other words, cases dealing with less basic principles may more fully accomplish the casebook's end, and thereby develop a student's legal ability to a greater degree. The possible usefulness of such a book, therefore, may conceivably be increased if it is not confined to illustrating leading principles as such.

JAMES LEWIS PARKS.

University of Missouri, School of Law.

HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. By James W. Eaton. Second Edition by Archibald H. Throckmorton. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1923. Pp. xv+711.

ILLUSTRATED CASES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. By Archibald H. Throckmorton. Second Edition. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1923. Pp. x+611.

A second edition of James W. Eaton's Handbook of Equity Jurisprudence has been edited by Archibald H. Throckmorton, professor of law, Western Reserve University, and with it a collection of cases for use in the classroom. The original text-book has been reviewed many times and since the new edition does not make any radical changes either in the form or the scope of the former work little that is new can now be said. Some new material has been interpolated on the subjects of injunctions and receivers and throughout the revision the development of the law since the year 1901, when the first edition was published, has been noted and a number of more recent citations have been given. These additions fully justify the new edition and many will be pleased that the life of the original work has thus been extended, though perhaps as many will regret the limitations which the nature of the Hornbook Series places upon its authors. Undoubtedly the old handbook was among the best of the many short treatises on the subject of equity jurisdiction and perhaps gave more historic setting and a much clearer insight into the development of the law than did any of its

fellows, but it was, and only claimed to be, a handbook, and being such, naturally failed to fully reflect the gladsome light of jurisprudence, to disclose the real sources and the real reasons, and above all to elucidate the real workings of the judicial mind.

Turning to the casebook we are compelled to express the fear that it will fail in educational efficacy. Educationally speaking, handbooks should be handmaids to the cases and to the casebooks and not mothers, yet in the scheme of Mr. Throckmorton the textbook "is the thing" and it is the handbook alone which is sought to be taught and illustrated. "Unlike casebooks prepared for the 'Case Method' of instruction," the publishers say, "no attempt has been made to supply a comprehensive knowledge of the subject from the cases alone. It should be remembered that the basis of the instruction is the text-book, and that the purpose of these casebooks is to illustrate the practical applications of the principles of the law.” No one, however, can learn equity this way. No one can be a successful equity lawyer who does not realize that it is the conscience of the chancellor that after all controls and that, though we have pretended to reduce the subject of equity to a system and though we talk much of the judicial as opposed to the personal conscience, we have in fact done little more than to urge caution and to change the method of expression or excuse. Constantly we find the courts acknowledging the existence of the formulated rules, but at the same time making new and sometimes poor law in hard cases by new expediencies, such as by stating that the case is one in which the courts should be "astute to discover fraud," and then discovering it by the means of an intellectual microscope. The judge of today is not materially different in his sympathies and in his intellectual processes than the judge of four centuries ago and the real thing to be studied is the judicial mind and conscience as it has expressed itself through the centuries. An opportunity for this study is not afforded by the books which are before us.

Both books attempt to cover too much ground. Surely one modern case in the casebook and one page in the text-book cannot cover the doctrine of mutuality, nor are two cases sufficient to an understanding of the origin and history of equity jurisdiction. Surely two cases and eight text-book pages are not adequate to the subject of receivers. These are but instances. In a word it is a mistake to attempt to condense the important subjects of equity jurisdiction, trusts, and mortgages into a volume of six hundred pages.

A. A. B.

THE LAW AND ITS SORROWS. By James Hannibal Clancey, of the Jackson, Mich., bar. Detroit: The Bentham Institute, 1922. Pp. 314 and index.

The author in his sub-title describes this book as "An Exoteric of Our Legal Wrongs." It is a jeremiad assailing the law as administered in America as a thing wholly bad and not worth saving.

The book is written for laymen with a view to having them join "The Bentham Institute."

One of the chapters is entitled "Museum of Horrors"; but the entire volume is an 'Eden Musée,' filled with more or less life-like, but generally overdrawn, representations of the law's alleged failures.

In the first part of the book the author tells "the simple story of the present unhappy situation of the law." This simple story loses nothing in the author's manner of telling. The second part, consisting of some fifty pages, contains "some court opinions taken. at meantide." The author first lays before his readers his own unfortunate experiences with the Supreme Court of Michigan. Though intended to elicit popular sympathy, this part of the book will enable the initiated, and perhaps the shrewd layman as well, to make a fairly accurate estimate of the author's legal attainments.

After regaling his readers and himself with over three hundred pages of colorful criticism, the author evidently realized at page 306, when it was almost too late, that a man of his wide knowledge of our legal wrongs owed it to his fellowmen to suggest the remedy. This he has undertaken to dash off in less than five pages, in which he gives "The Answer." He asks his lay readers to give the following "suggested reforms" their "hearty, vigorous support":

"First: Pleadings of every kind and name as they exist and are in use today should be abolished.

"Second: In substitution of all pleadings, the adoption of the originating summons. Stated somewhat more in detail, this device will provide that upon payment into court of a moderate fee . . . it shall become the innate [sic] right of citizenship that every suitor, plaintiff and defendant, have the right in person or by attorney to lay the facts of his cause before a proper judicial officer, called a master, whose duty it shall be to determine what fact or facts are to be tried and to frame the proper issue thereupon. The modus operandi of bringing the parties and their witnesses into court is a simple matter of detail.

"Third:

abolished.

All differences between Law and Equity should be

"Fourth: All forms of action should be abolished.

"Fifth: The judiciary should be made responsible for the final and safe disposition of each cause on its merits. In every case both judge and jury should be required upon their honor to certify that substantial justice has been done between man and man.

"Sixth: To execute judgments, orders, etc., and to provide the machinery for even so simple a plan as the above, a rule-making committee, modeled somewhat on the English plan, should be provided. Such a committee at its best should be an independent official body, independent of all other branches of government, always in session, demanding the exclusive attention of its members, entirely separate from other occupations, and dominated by its lay members. It should also review each court decision and make findings and recommendations when necessary to the legislature.

"Seventh Some plan must be devised to render innocuous the evil of tinkering with legislative acts.