capital is invested in Latin America than in any other area in the world. We also have a long-term commitment in the Alliance for Progress to assist the Latin American people in their difficult struggle toward economic and social betterment. For such improvement, stability is indispensable.

By selectively employing subversion and insurgency-and capitalizing on unexpected opportunities-the Communists aspire to seize political power, communize the area, and thereby eventually wrest control of the world's strategic balance of power from the United States and the Atlantic community. To achieve their objectives, Latin American, Cuban, Soviet, and Chinese Communists work unceasingly.

The many-sided Communist attack includes armed insurgency, penetration of key positions in the society of the country, and attempts to achieve power legally through the control of mass political organizations-these methods are used separately or in combination, depending on the situation in each country.

The Tricontinental Conference held in Havana this past January demonstrated, as did the November 1964 Havana Conference, that Soviet-backed Communists are pressing their efforts to subvert Latin America. The Communists pledged all-out support for so-called wars of national liberation and established the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) designed specifically to promote and support violent revolution in Latin America. As a result, we can expect increased financial and psychological support for Communist insurgent movements.

Communist China, meanwhile, has also published its own militant blueprint for world conquest. Last September, Marshal Lin Piao reoriented Mao Tse-tung's longstanding thesis on rural guerrilla warfare. Lin Piao visualizes the Communist seizure, through guerrilla warfare, of Latin America and two other underdeveloped continents as the key toward isolating and destroying the power of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance.

Important elections are scheduled in about one-third of Latin American countries this year, and these elections could generate instability and disorders-exploitable by the Communists.

In summary, for the years ahead:

We foresee serious political instability and continued and increasing Communist activity of all sorts, including guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

Plans to contain and eventually eliminate the threat are based on clear and concise objectives.

The primary objective of the overall U.S. national policy in Latin America is to assist the economic and social development of the individual countries, so that the people of Latin America can live a better life in peaceful, democratic societies.

In pursuit of this objective, the United States, in conjunction with other Latin American countries, instituted the Alliance for Progress. The U.S. military programs in Latin America must, as an integral part of the total U.S. programs, contribute to the success of the Alliance for Progress. It cannot be questioned that economic and social development has priority; but many fail to recognize the corallary that such development is not attainable in the absence of law

and order, a feeling of security, institutional integrity, and political stability guaranteed by military and other security forces.

Efforts to attain these objectives have helped to produce significant accomplishments and encouraging developments during the past year. In general, Latin American governments appreciate the dangers and are working hard to cope with the threat of subversion and insurgency. You are, of course, familiar with the situation in the Dominican Republic. Fourteen nations in the OAS voted for the resolution establishing the Inter-American Peace Force and five nations (Brazil, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica) joined the United States in furnishing troops for duty in the Dominican Republic.

The civic action program speaks for itself and clearly justifies the approximately $10 million the United States has invested each year since 1962. The U.S. emphasis on the civic action program in Latin America is illustrated by the fact that over half of the countries in the program are in Latin America; and approximately one-half of the worldwide MAP and AID funds for civic action is allocated to Latin America.

The program has contributed to the economic and social development of the nations of Latin America by opening new lands for development, by building farm to market roads and schools, and by providing potable water, sanitation facilities, and medical and dental treatment.

In addition to making a pronounced contribution to economic and social development, the civic action program has been a factor in the reduction of insurgency and guerrilla activity. It is fair to say that civic action in Latin America is both popular and effective.

We have encouraged the development of regional military organizations which would make Latin America more cohesive and responsive to the threat. Communism knows no boundaries and regional cooperation will help to deny safe haven to insurgents and guerrillas. The Central American Defense Council shows real promise as a regional organization. It is an effective military grouping working alongside and complementing an increasingly successful common market effort.

Essential to the success of regional organizations are regional communications systems and joint operation centers. We are making sure that the communications equipment provided through the military assistance program is compatible so that it will function in a regional communications system.

This is the initial step toward the goal of developing effective national and regional military command and control systems for support of counterinsurgency operations.

Another effective means of encouraging close coordination and cooperation between the armed forces of the hemisphere has been the joint and combined exercises which have been conducted annually since 1961. They include large-scale combined exercises such as Ayacucho, hosted by Peru in December 1964; surveillance/intercept exercises such as Halcon Vista, involving triservice forces of countries bordering the Caribbean; and the annual combined naval exercise UNITAS, involving the air and naval forces of South America and the U.S. Navy. These exercises increase military proficiency, but

more important, they improve interservice and international cooperation and provide a sense of solidarity in the armed forces of the hemisphere.

In the fiscal year 1967 program, we are continuing our efforts to: Develop cohesion between the political, economic, and military forces in Latin America; encourage the military in its progress toward professionalism; and maximize the military contribution to the success of the Alliance for Progress.

We have included equipment and training for tactical forces which will increase their capability for internal security operations.

The amount of equipment and training has been increased for civic action this year in accordance with the President's desire for "greater emphasis on the civic action program." The urgent need for effective communications systems has been recognized and equipment and training have been included for this purpose.

Special emphasis is given to the youth program by the inclusion of training and orientation tours in the United States for young officers with high potential for future leadership and for noncommissioned officers and officer candidates.

The fiscal year 1967 program provides for only the minimum, essential materiel and training and makes optimum use of every available asset. I can assure you that every effort has been made to insure that the program is tailored for Latin America and is in consonance with the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

As for future requirements beyond the fiscal year 1967 program: [Security deletion.]

Additional communication equipment and training will be required to provide the communication systems which are essential for command and control.

The greater emphasis on civic action will require a continuing allocation of funds to insure an adequate capability for this important program. [Security deletion.] Thus, it is in our national interest to continue to cooperate closely with the Latin American military forces in order to foster the trend toward professionalism and assist in the development of military forces which serve as a bulwark of democratic governments.

The military assistance program in Latin America is austere when examined in the light of U.S. objectives, Latin American armed forces requirements, and total U.S. effort in Latin America. Based on cumulative data through fiscal year 1964, the military assistance program is only 3.9 percent of the total U.S. effort, and I believe that the 3.9 percent is a low premium rate for the insurance received.

I feel that a continuation of current favorable developments in Latin America and an effective fight against unfavorable developments will depend in large part on our pursuing present policies to support and advise the Latin American armed forces under the U.S. military assistance program.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, General Porter.

We are going to start this morning with the lower end of the table. The first to question will be Mr. McVicker.

Mr. McVICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this.

General Porter, I was down at the Central American area several weekends ago and I looked for some civic action programs. I was not able to spend the time to get into the field. I am sure I would have seen them if I had.

I wonder if you would be kind enough to give me some examples of where civil action programs have helped in the development

process.

General PORTER. There are 19 countries. Do you have some specific countries in mind?

Mr. McVICKER. I was in Panama, El Salvador. What would I have seen there, and Guatemala?

General PORTER. In Guatemala you would have seen educational programs where they are training young soldiers in basic skills with Vocational programs.

Mr. McVICKER. I saw where most of the army training takes place. In what effort, what would I have seen?

General PORTER. You would have seen that part of the effort in getting the facilities together came from the U.S. funds. I think you would have seen that the military advisers had helped with the curriculum and were working behind the scene.

Also in Guatemala there is an engineer battalion that is building roads in the big area west of the Great Honduras, opening up that big

area

Mr. McVICKER. How large a group is that?

General PORTER. The battalion consists of two engineer companies. I have been 1 year in this command.

Mr. McVICKER. Your command is in Panama?

General PORTER. That is right. In Honduras the engineer battalion is also working up in the high country along the Guatemalan border. This is a part where you don't know where the border is. The border moves back and forth, and is ill defined.

Mr. McVICKER. Turcios is your real problem there, isn't he? He attended the conference. I am told he got on the airplane disguised as

a nun.

General PORTER. Yon Sosa used a disguise as a nun also.

Mr. McVICKER. He didn't go to the conference.

General PORTER. Some people claim he is dead, but I don't think

he is.

In Panama we stopped the civic action there at the time of the flag riots. We had programed bulldozers which were coming in for the Guardia Nacionale. When I went down there one of the first things I did was to start the bulldozers going and we have got them in

hand.

In the dry season one project of the Guardia Nacionale is to open up a road into an Indian area which has been giving them a lot of problems in the last 2 or 3 years. This road project brought help to 2,000 Indians on Sundown near David. We took a big team of medical doctors up there. The Panamanians had medical doctors there also. They were treated. There was a band and quite a celebration. They know the Guardia Nacionale will bring order where there has been lawlessness and disorder, and where the Communists have been working. [Security deletion.]

Mr. McVICKER. Is anybody under your command assigned to ROCAP, which is the regional office of our mission to the common market in the Central American States?

General PORTER. We have no liaison there. Our senior military man in Guatemala City is constantly in contact with him. There is no actual liaison as such.

Mr. McVICKER. This ROCAP pretty much does a priority emphasis in relation to the programs which in turn is worked out by the host people in the countries. You don't have liaison with them? General PORTER. No. Our liaison is with

Mr. McVICKER. With the mission within the countries?

General PORTER. It is also with the permanent Commission of the Central American Defense Council, which is also in Guatemala City. We are working directly with them. We have no formal tie, liaison tie with this Central American headquarters.

My political adviser just reminded me that we had worked through IAGS-Inter-American Geodetic Survey-of the area, looking into its economic potential. That is the only thing.

Mr. McVICKER. I simply bring this up because the strong impression I had was ROCAP was working with the countries in helping them with the economic part of the common market, to emphasize what civil action programs, and what infrastructure projects should be undertaken and where the emphasis is to be placed. The money is coming from various missions. Wherever you spend it you must spend it in a single country and the other four countries would prefer to have it in their own.

General PORTER. We have no formal

Mr. McVICKER. Should there be? I don't know.

General PORTER. Truly I don't believe there should.

I have a man, a senior military man in each country who reports to me. He is a member of the Ambassador's country team. The incountry projects are brought up in the civic action field, and are brought up before the country team and discussed there.

I believe that it is better for the military aspects of civic action to be brought in at the level where the Ambassador will have some influence on the outcome, rather than have me sit in Panama and freewheel in this area.

Mr. McVICKER. I agree it shouldn't be freewheeled. But the real emphasis that is being placed-and I got the impression that it is being placed in an accepted manner-is the use of the common market system.

As you say they are talking about military. They have plans to have a common currency within 10 years, which is extraordinary, and even more so, politically. That is in El Salvador. Our ROCAP is on a level with our AID mission in each country, which relates to the ambassador level. In talking to the Ambassador, I felt there was an excellent relationship here. They were using ROCAP and were behind the Common Market. I wonder why you shouldn't take part in that continuing progress, which seems to be working, since some of the major part of the money we are putting in there channels through your office.

General PORTER. I see your point. I have been three times in Guatemala and to be honest with you, I haven't called on the Director