Mr. GROSS. I think what they are doing borders on treachery as far as the United States is concerned. I would like to hear you tell that to the Americans fighting over in Vietnam, that you think the British are carrying their share of the load and aren't indulging in something awfully close to treachery.

Chairman MORGAN. Any further questions?

Mr. FRASER. General, I had hoped to have some time to talk about the development of regional planning and the prospect of some form of integration. But I don't want to pursue that now except to express my strong interest in it. I know that this is not a cure-all for the development of an adequate military establishment in Latin America, but I do think that it would be a useful complement to what needs to be a push on the economic side for economic integration. The more we can get people thinking in regional terms the more it seems to me we will contribute to the success of Latin America.

General PORTER. I think this is a very astute observation of yours. I am working on this as I can through the military advisers in the country. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. You are pushing them to do that?

General PORTER. We are pushing this. [Security deletion.]
Mr. FRASER. [Security deletion.]

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, General Porter.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 a.m., tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, April 7, 1966.)

(The following memorandum has been supplied by the Department of Defense in further response to Mr. Zablocki. See also p. 347, pt. II.)

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

We know from recent detailed investigations that the ratio of civilian to Vietcong casualties is much less than those cited by Congressman Zablocki. We continue to believe that the figures provided by the Secretary of Defense in March, which represent civilian casualties recorded through MACV's indemnification system, reflect the situation; namely, the number of civilian casualties is much lower than those incurred by the Vietcong. Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland have repeatedly confirmed this view. The U.S. mission in Saigon and the Government of Vietnam are constantly reviewing the measures to prevent civilian casualties and revise them when necessary.

It should be noted in this context that civilian casualties resulting from deliberate acts of terrorism and assassination by the Vietcong continue at a high rate, many times more than those inadvertently caused by United States-Government of the Republic of Vietnam military operations.

The United States employs a number of measures to prevent civilian casualties as a result of military operations in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese military and other allied forces are encouraged and assisted to take the same precautions. Air strike and artillery procedures provide for close control to avoid civilian casualties. All preplanned air strikes are coordinated with Government of the Republic of Vietnam province and district officials. Nonprogramed close support strikes are used only when controlled by a forward air controller who is usually in contact with both ground observers and strike aircraft. Artillery fire is equally controlled. Impending operations in areas populated by civilians are preceded by leaflet drops and/or by announcements over loudspeakers in Vietnamese. Inhabitants are warned of the time of an impending attack, and are instructed where to go for safety. United States, third country, and Government of the Republic of Vietnam troops are thoroughly and frequently indoctrinated on the subject and techniques of avoiding civilian casualties. Measures to prevent civilian casualties are under constant review, and are revised whenever experience shows they can or need to be tightened.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1966

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding. Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning in executive session for a continuation of the hearings on the foreign aid bills for fiscal year 1967, H.R. 12449 and H.R. 12450.

Our witness this morning is Gen. Paul D. Adams, Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command; and Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and Southern Asia.

General, we are going to begin. There are not many here, but a telephone check shows we will have other members coming in before long.

General, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed, sir. STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL D. ADAMS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. STRIKE COMMAND; AND U.S. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, AND SOUTHERN ASIA General ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I am here to discuss the important role military assistance plays in carrying out my responsibilities as Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command, and my collateral responsibilities as the U.S. Commander in Chief of the Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and Southern Asia. USCINCMEAFSA is the abbreviated title used in business relating to the countries of the MEAFSA area. I am accompanied this morning by Col. David E. Ott, Lt. Col. L. M. Kellam, and Maj. B. F. Rogers, U.S. Air Force members of my staff.

On December 1, 1963, by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I assumed full responsibility for the mission "to plan for and conduct normal operations in the MEAFSA area."

Mrs. BOLTON. May I interrupt and ask you please just in the beginning to give us a rundown on USCINCMEAFSA. What does it all mean?

General ADAMS. The title that goes with the job of responsibility for the area of Africa south of the Sahara

Mrs. BOLTON. What is MEA?

General ADAMS. Middle East.

Mrs. BOLTON. And CINC?

General ADAMS. Commander in chief. U.S. commander in chief, Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara.

Mrs. BOLTON. It makes sense. Thank you.

General ADAMS. That is a funny title. I don't like it but I have got it.

The term "normal operations" requires me to discharge three func tional responsibilities. [Security deletion.]

The area for which I am responsible is shown on each of these charts. It includes all of Africa excepting Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya. It includes the Malagasy Republic; the countries of the Middle East except Turkey, a member of NATO, and the countries of southern Asia to the Burma border. The island of Ceylon is also included. Water areas included in this area of responsibility are the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The total area is inhabited by 28 percent of the world's population and encompasses 30 percent of the world's land mass. These two facts alone render the area strategically important.

The MEAFSA area is an area of contrasts.

MEAFSA is a world of diversity and adversity-of superlatives and historical firsts. The Biblical cradle of man, it also produced the first great civilizations and empires which have endured for more years before Christ than the modern empires have lasted after Christ.

Eight of the world's eleven major religions were born here. Here we find the highest mountain, Everest-the lowest elevation, the Dead Sea-the longest single river, the Nile-the loftiest mountain ranges, steaming jungles, and scorching deserts.

We have here the most diamonds and gold-and more importantly, the most oil. Uranium is found here and precious stones. Money was invented here but some people have never seen any.

Knowledge was born here illiteracy lives here.

Distinctions are sharp between race and religion, class and caste, tribe and clan.

Here we have the world's oldest nation, Egypt-and 35 of the world's new nations all struggling to build nationhood.

And here we have the longest continuous land frontier between the free world and the Communist world. All of these facts point up the strategic importance of this area.

For a military commander, the magnitude of the time-space factor is unique.

Africa is three times as large as the United States; distances within it are great. Add to that 4,300 miles from my headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., to the nearest point, Dakar, Senegal-or consider the 8,700 miles to Calcutta, India-then the military problems come into better focus.

Lack of good bases, scarcity of usable in-country resources, inadequate communications, paucity of adequate support facilities—all point to vastly different military problems than found in the more highly developed regions.

Military assistance programs are the major instruments by which I carry out my responsibilities.

During fiscal year 1967, the United States will have active military assistance programs in 19 countries in the MEAFSA area.

We have three military assistance advisory groups or MAAG'slocated in Iran, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. These countries are shown in red on the chart. We have military missions in the six countries colored green. Beginning in west Africa, these countries are Mali, Liberia, Guinea, the Republic of the Congo (Léopoldville), Saudi Arabia, and India. Small military assistance programs are administered under my direction by the U.S. defense attachés in Senegal, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Nepal. These countries are shown in blue on the chart.

The goal of our military assistance programs is to assist recipient nations in developing forces tailored to their specific needs and capabilities rather than to build replicas of U.S. forces.

[Security deletion.] We work steadily toward the replacement of grant aid funds by military sales, self-help, and third-country assistance wherever possible. Substantial progress is being made in this respect [security deletion].

Formal, modest research and development programs are supplementing the military assistance program in Iran and Ethiopia in 1966. This is a form of self-help which can be a very valuable means for ultimately reducing grant aid.

For example, the Ethiopians were encouraged to develop their own field ration as a substitute for the expensive and not particularly useful grant-aid-furnished U.S. field rations, which they wanted. In a few months they developed a good field ration based on local diets. and issued it to their troops in the field.

In another case, it was found that heavy U.S. tentage with store fittings was not best suited for the Ethiopian soldiers especially in the sweltering heat of some lower altitudes. Instead of accepting a request for additional grant aid for tentage, the Ethiopians were urged to develop a lightweight tent more suited to their needs. This action is presently underway and, which when standardized for local troop use, will have the added economic bonus of using locally grown cotton.

In Iran, two U.S. research and development advisers are being added to the MAAG staff this year. The purpose is to assist the Iranian armed forces in developing a solid, in-country R. & D. effort.

As a matter of priority, our MAAG's and missions continue to encourage self-development of country capabilities for production of their own military materiel to fill their own specific needs. Three key principles I insist be emphasized are simplicity, practicability-and utility.

We also influence the armed forces of recipient nations to undertake civic actions within their capabilities. This involves a variety of contributions to civic improvement such as building roads, schools, improving sanitation, and providing good sources of water. The Iranian forces have done a remarkable job, and have thereby changed to a large extent the attitude of the people toward the armed forces from one of fear and distrust to an attitude of friendliness and dependence. In Ethiopia, the work has not been so widespread, but it is spreading. In our training efforts in Ethiopia we hope to attain a standard of training that will permit each battalion to spend 1 month a year on

substantial civic projects such as building roads, which are sorely needed.

Another important facet of our activities is in the field of humane actions. Often these activities are less dramatic than others but they are equally effective. Within this field we have provided: Medicines and drugs to Iran in the summer of 1965.

A medical team to Somalia in mid-1965 to help overcome a health crisis.

An engineer team to Mali to teach simple road and bridge building, and another one to Guinea.

On a larger scale, we furnished aircraft to haul food, medicines, and other essential civilian supplies to the northeast Congo during the crisis period last year.

The Middle East Force, a small naval element under my operational command that operates in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean area also engaged in civic actions.

In December 1965, the Commander, Middle East Force, gave sorely needed medicines to a hospital in Hodeida, Yemen. His men helped paint a building of the World Health Center organization and a maternity and child feeding center.

In another case, just last month, the men of the Middle East Force painted the interior of two buildings of a large tuberculosis hospital in Mogadiscio, Somalia. This voluntary act created a very favorable local impression because the Somalis were afraid to enter the building for fear of contracting the disease.

All our activities are designed to support U.S. national objectives in the area. We strive to achieve these objectives:

By encouraging self-help as a contribution to sound economic growth.

By producing an atmosphere of security which permits the internal life of a country to develop if not yet flourish.

By increasing the understanding between Americans and people of MEAFSA area countries, thus sustaining friendly relations with those people.

By strengthening the integrity, unity, and collective security of the friendly MEAFSA countries.

And through these and other actions we seek to encourage countries which wish to maintain freedom.

While on this subject, five of the seven Government takeovers in the African portion of my area since last November-the Congo, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Nigeria, and Ghana-[security deletion], stabilized internal situations in the countries. [Security deletion.] While Mobutu has faced the real problems of the Congo, the problems are large and complex. We have yet to see concrete results emerging.

In Dahomey, a political stalemate developed last year between the country's dual executives. The resulting governmental inaction toward solving the country's chronically weak economic and fiscal situation created growing national instability. Army Commander General Soglo initially took matters into his own hands [security deletion] and installed a caretaker civilian government. When the interim government also proved ineffective, Soglo assumed full executive powers for himself last December.