urged in the other case.

The additional allegations in this application for the writ did not materially change the situation.

For the reasons stated in the opinion just delivered, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.

Affirmed.

This case was argued with, and the decision follows that in, No. 387, (180 U. S., 109), by the same counsel.

The Supreme Court of the United States.

ELIAS S. A. DE LIMA, ELIAS A. DE LIMA, AND EDWARD DE LIMA, COMPOSING THE FIRM OF D. A. DE LIMA & Co., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, V. GEORGE R. BIDWELL, COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S. 1.)

No. 456. Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

By the customs administrative act of 1890 an appeal is given from the decision of the collector" as to the rate and amount of the duties chargeable upon imported merchandise" to the Board of General Appraisers, who are authorized to decide "as to the construction of the law and the facts respecting the classification of such merchandise; and the rate of duties imposed thereon under such classification; " but where the merchandise is alleged not to have been imported at all, but to have been brought from one domestic port to another, the Board of General Appraisers has no jurisdiction of the case, and an action for money had and received will lie against the collector to recover back duties assessed by him upon such property and paid under protest.

66

With the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, April 11, 1899, the island of Porto Rico ceased to be a foreign country" within the meaning of the tariff laws.

Whatever effect be given to the act of March 24, 1900, applying for the benefit of Porto Rico the duties received on importations from that island after the evacuation by the Spanish forces, it has no aplication to an action brought before the act was passed.

Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckam, JJ. Dissenting, McKenna, Shiras, White, and Gray ́ (in a eparate opinion), JJ.

The judgment of the circuit court for the southern district of New York is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in consonance with this opinion.

This is one of the "Insular tariff cases." The question was raised 'whether territory acquired by the United States by cession from foreign power remains a foreign country' within the meaning of he tariff laws." The circuit court, southern district of New York, held it was "foreign country," which decision, however, was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

This case arose through the importation of sugar from Porto Rico into the United States (at New York) in the summer of 1899, after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain and before the taking effect of the Foraker Act for the government of Porto Rico.

Supreme Court of the United States.

No. 340. JOHN H. GOETZE, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF JOHN H. GOETZE & COMPANY, APPELLANT, V. THE UNITED STATES.

No. 515. GEORGE W. CROSSMAN AND HERMANN SIELCKEN, COMPOSING THE FIRM OF W. H. CROSSMAN & BRO., APPELLANT, V. THE UNITED STATES.

Appeal from the Circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S., 221.)

October term, 1900. No. 340 was argued December 17, 18, 19, and 20, 1900; No. 515 was argued January 14 and 15, 1901. The two were decided together May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1 (case No. 456), followed by reversing the action of the general appraisers.

Opinion by Brown, J. No dissenting opinion.

With the ratification of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, April 11, 1899, the island of Porto Rico ceased to be a "foreign country" within the meaning of the tariff laws.

The judgments of the circuit court are therefore reversed and the cases remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the action of the board of general appraisers.

These were petitions for a review of two decisions of the board of general appraisers, holding subject to duty certain merchandise, imported, in one case from Porto Rico, and in the other, from Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands (p. 221).

No. 340. Goetz v. U. S. The importation in this case consisted of tobacco which was imported from Porto Rico into the United States (at New York) on June 6, 1899, after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain and before the taking effect of the Foraker Act for the government of Porto Rico.

No. 515. Crossman. U. S. This importation consisted of liquors. imported from Hawaii into the United States in April, 1900, after the passage of the resolution of annexation (July 7, 1898) and before the taking effect of the act of April 30, 1900, which provided a government for that Territory.

There was no decision of these cases on the merits, the Supreme Court holding that the Board of General Appraisers had. no jurisdiction of the cases. Both of the cases are among those known as the "Insular Tariff Cases."

Supreme Court of the United States.

HENRY W. DOOLEY ET AL., ENGAGED IN TRADE AND COMMERCE BETWEEN PORTO RICO AND NEW YORK UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF DOOLEY, SMITH & CO., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES.

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S., 222.)

No. 501. October Term, 1900. Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

The Court of Claims and the circuit courts, acting as such, have jurisdiction of actions for the recovery of duties illegally exacted upon merchandise alleged not to have been imported from a foreign country.

Duties upon imports from the United States to Porto Rico, collected by the military commander and by the President as Commander in Chief, from the time possession was taken of the island until the ratification of the treaty of peace, were legally exacted under the war power.

As the right to exact duties upon importations from Porto Rico to New York ceased with the ratification of the treaty of peace, the correlative right to exact duties upon imports from New York to Porto Rico also ceased at the same time.

Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, White, Gray, Shiras, McKenna, JJ.

The judgment of the circuit court is therefore reversed and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings in consonance with this opinion.

This, too, is one of the cases commonly known as the insular tariff cases. (The question here raised was the validity under the Constitution of duties collected on goods imported into Porto Rico from the United States during the military occupation by the United States, but after the cession of Porto Rico by the ratification of the treaty of peace and before the taking effect of the Foraker act. It was held that these duties were improperly exacted, the decision in the De Lima case being followed.)

Supreme Court of the United States.

SAMUEL B. DOWNES, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF S. B. DOWNES & COMANY, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,

v.

GEORGE R. BIDWELL, COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF New York, DEFENDANT

IN ERROR.

Error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

(182 U. S., 244.)

No. 507. October Term, 1900. Argued January 8, 9, 10, 11, 1901. Decided May 27, 1901.

SYLLABUS.

By Mr. Justice Brown, in announcing the conclusion and judgment of the court.

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The circuit court have jurisdiction, regardless of amount, of actions against a collector of customs for duties exacted and paid under protest upon merchandise alleged not to have been imported.

The island of Porto Rico is not a part of the United States within that provision of the Constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions of the Constitution as go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and such as are operative only throughout the United States, or among the several States.

A long continued and uniform interpretation put by the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government, upon a clause in the Constitution should be followed by the Judicial Department, unless such interpretation be manifestly contrary to its letter or spirit.

By Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice McKenna concurred.

The Government of the United States was born of the Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly or by implication from that instrument. Even then, when an act of any Department is challenged, because not warranted by the Constitution, the existence of the authority is to be ascertained by determining whether the power has been conferred by the Constitution, either in express terms or by lawful implication, to be drawn from the express authority conferred or deduced as an attribute which legitimately inheres in the nature of the powers given, and which flows from the character of the Government established by the Constitution. In other words, whilst confined to its constitutional orbit, the Government of the United States is supreme within its lawful sphere.

Every function of the Government being thus derived from the Constitution, it follows that that instrument is everywhere and at all times potential in so far as its provisions are applicable.

Hence it is that wherever a power is given by the Constitution and there is a limitation imposed on the authority, such restriction operates upon and confines every action on the subject within its constitutional limits. Consequently it is impossible to conceive that where conditions are brought about to which any particular provision of the Constitution applies its controlling influence may be frustrated by the action of any or all of the Departments of the Government. Those Departments, when discharging within the limits of their constitutional power, the duties which rest on them, may of course deal with the subjects committed to them in such a way as to cause the matter dealt with to come under the control of provisions of the Constitution which may not have been previously applicable. But this does not conflict with the doctrine just stated, or presuppose that the Constitution may or may not be applicable at the election of any agency of the Government.

The Constitution has undoubtedly conferred on Congress the right to create such municipal organizations as it may deem best for all the Territories of the United States whether they have been incorporated or not, to give to the inhabitants as respects the local governments such degree of representation as may be conducive to the public well-being, to deprive such territory of representative government if it is considered just to do so, and to change such local governments at discretion.

As Congress in governing the Territories is subject to the Constitution, it results that all the limitations of the Constitution which are applicable to Congress in exercising this authority necessarily limit its power on this subject. It follows also that every provision of the Constitution which is applicable to the Territories is also controlling therein. To justify a departure from this elementary principle by a criticism of the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sanford (19 How., 393) is unwarranted. Whatever may be the view entertained of the correctness of the opinion of the court in that case, in so far as it interpreted a particular provision of the Constitution concerning slavery and decided that as so construed it was in force in the Territories, this in no way affects the principle which that decision announced, that the applicable provisions of the Constitution were operative.

In the case of the Territories, as in every other instance, when a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the question which arises is, not whether the Constitution is operative, for that is self-evident, but whether the provision relied on is applicable.

As Congress derives its authority to levy local taxes for local purposes within the Territories, not from the general grant of power to tax as expressed in the Constitution, it follows that its right to locally tax is not to be measured by the provision empowering Congress "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises," and is not restrained by the requirement of uniformity throughout the United States. But the power just referred to, as well as the qualification of uniformity, restrains Congress from imposing an impost duty on goods coming into the United States from a Territory which has been incorporated into and forms a part of the United States. This results because the clause of the Constitution in question does not confer upon Congress power to impose such an impost duty on goods coming from one part of the United States to another part thereof, and such duty besides would be repugnant to the requirement of uniformity throughout the United States.

By Mr. Justice Gray.

The civil government of the United States can not extend immediately, and of its own force over territory acquired by war. Such territory must necessarily, in the first instance, be governed by the military power under the control of the President as commander in chief. Civil government can not take effect at once as soon as possession is acquired under military authority or even as soon as that possession is confirmed by treaty. It can only be put in operation by the action of the appropriate political department of the Government, at such time and in such degree as that department may determine.

In a conquered territory, civil government must take effect, either by the action of the treaty-making power, or by that of the Congress of the United States. The office of a treaty of cession ordinarily is to put an end to all authority of the foreign government over the territory; and to subject the territory to the disposition of the government of the United States. The government and disposition of territory so acquired belong to the Government of the United States, consisting of the President, the Senate, elected by the States, and the House of Representatives, chosen by and immediately representing the people of the United States.

So long as Congress has not incorporated the territory into the United States, neither military occupation nor cession by treaty makes the conquered territory domestic territory, in the sense of the revenue laws. But those laws concerning "foreign countries" remain applicable to the conquered territory, until changed by Congress.

If Congress is not ready to construct a complete government for the conquered territory, it may establish a temporary government, which is not subject to all the restrictions of the Constitution.

Opinion by Brown, J. Concurring, Gray, Shiras, White, McKenna, JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Affirmed.

This is one of the "insular tariff cases." The right to collect duties on goods coming into the United States from Porto Rico after the Foraker Act took effect is involved in this case. The circuit court, Southern district of New York, upheld the validity of that part of the Foraker Act and the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the contention, holding that the island of Porto Rico is not a part of the United States within that provision of the Constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

In announcing the conclusion and judgment of the court in this case, Mr. Justice Brown delivered an opinion. Mr. Justice White delivered a concurring opinion, which was also concurred in by Mr. Justice Shiras and Mr. Justice McKenna. Mr. Justice Gray also