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Supreme Court of the United States. SECUNDINO MENDEZONA
THE UNITED STATES.
Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.
(195 U. S., 158.) No. 584. October Term, 1903. Argued April 22, 1904. Decided May 31, 1904.
This case involves the question just decided in Kepner v. United States, 195
U. S., 100. The plaintiff in error was acquitted in the court of first instance
and convicted in the supreme court of the Philippine Islands. For the reasons stated in the Kepner case, the judgment is reversed and the
Opinion by Day, J. Concurring, Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, JJ. Dissenting, Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, JJ.
Supreme Court of the United States.
October Term, 1904. Submitted October 25, 1904. Decided Novem
ber 7, 1904.
The review of the final judgment of the district court of the United States for
Porto Rico by this court is not restricted to cases in which the Constitution or a treaty of the United States or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed under it is denied. There may be cases, certainly civil cases, which if determined in a supreme court of one of the Territories of the United States could be reviewed although not involving any right of
a distinctly Federal nature. But a criminal case like this arising under section 3082, Revised Statutes, could
not be reviewed by this court in virtue of the words, in section 35 of the Porto Rico act of April 12, 1900, “in the same cases as from the supreme
courts of the Territories of the United States." Nor will the words in the same act, “in all cases where the Constitution of the
United States, or a treaty thereof, or an act of Congress is brought in question and the right claimed thereunder is denied,” authorize this court to review a judgment of conviction in a criminal case in the court below under section 3082, Revised Statutes, when the only claim at the trial was that the indictment did not charge an offense under the statutes of the United
States.” Such an objection was too indefinite. Unless a judgment in the United States district court for Porto Rico can be
reviewed here, then it is final; for no case determined in that court can be carried to a circuit court of appeals.
Opinion by Harlan, J. No dissenting opinion.
This was a criminal case and arose under section 3082 Revised Statutes. The plaintiff in error fraudulently imported certain goods into Porto Rico without paying the duties imposed.
Supreme Court of the United States.
FREDERICK W. LINCOLN ET AL., TRADING UNDER THE FIRM NAME OF
HENRY W. PEABODY & Co., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES. (No. 149.)
In error to the Supreme Court of the United States for the southern
district of New York.
WARNER, BARNES & Co., (LIMITED), APPELLANT, V.
STATES. (No. 466.)
Appeal from the Court of Claims.
(197 U. S., 419; also 202 U. S., 484.)
Nos. 149 and 466. October Term, 1904. Argued March 3, 1905.
The order of the President of July 12, 1898, directing the levying of duties on
goods landed in the Philippine Islands, was a regulation for and during the then existing war with Spain, referred to as definitely as if it had been named, and was not a power for any other military occasion. The right to levy duties thereunder on goods brought from the United States ceased on the termination of the war by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. Dooley v. United States (182 U. S.,
222). After the title to the Philippine Islands passed to the United States by exchange
of the ratifications of the treaty of peace, there was nothing in the Philippine insurrection of sufficient gravity to give to the islands the character of foreign countries within the meaning of a tariff act. Fourteen Diamond
Rings (183 U. S., 176). Under the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat., 691, ratifying the action of
the President and the authorities of the Government of the Philippine Islands, the ratification is confined to those acts which were in accordance with the provisions of the order of July 12, 1898, and not to the collection of duties after April 11, 1899, which were within such provisions.
SYLLABUS ON REHEARING.
Lincoln v. United States (197 U. S., 419), reaffirmed, after rehearing, to the
effect that the executive order of July 12, 1898, directing that upon the occupation of ports and places in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States duties should be levied and collected as a military contribution, was a regulation for and during the war with Spain, referred to as definitely as though it had been named, and the right to levy duties thereunder on goods brought from the United States ceased on the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace; that after title to the Philippine Islands passed by the exchange of ratifications on April 11, 1899, there was nothing in the Philippine insurrection of sufficient gravity to give to those islands the character of foreign countries within the meaning of a tariff act; that the ratification of Executive action, and of authorities under Executive order of July 12, 1898, contained in the act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat., 691, was confined to actions taken in accordance with its provisions; and that the exaction of duties on goods brought from the United States after April 11, 1899, was not in accordance with those provisions and was not ratified.
A ratification by act of Congress will not be extended to cover what was not,
in the judgment of the courts, intended to be covered, because otherwise the ratification would be meaningless or unnecessary. Congress out of abundant caution may ratify, and at times has ratified, that which was subsequently found not to have needed ratification. Opinion on first hearing, by Holmes, J. No dissenting opinion.
Opinion on rehearing, by Fuller, C. J. Concurring, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Peckham, Holmes, Day, JJ. Dissenting, White, McKenna, JJ.
Judgments reversed. The validity of imposing duties under the order of the President of July 12, 1898, on goods imported into the Philippine Islands from the United States after the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain and before Congress legislated in regard to the Philippine tariff is the question involved in these cases. The Supreme Court held that the right to levy such duties ceased upon the exchange of ratifications of the treaty, and decided the question in favor of the claimants.
These cases were reheard. Petitions for rehearing were allowed May 29, 1905. The cases were reargued January 18, 19, 1906, and decided on reargument May 28, 1906.
Decisions on rehearing in the cases of Lincoln v. United States and Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., v. United States (Nos. 149 and 466 of 1904 term), and decisions in the cases of United States 1'. American Sugar Refining Co. and Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States (Nos. 269 and 652 of 1905 term) were rendered subsequent to March 5, 1906.
Supreme Court of the United States. RAFAEL AND EURIPIDES RODRIGUEZ, PLAINTIFFS
IN ERROR, V. THE UNITED STATES.
Error to the district court of the United States for the district of
(198 U. S., 156.) No. 183. October Term 1904. Submitted March 15, 1905. Decided May 1, 1905.
Under Sections 34, 35, of the Foraker Act of 1900 (31 Stat. 85), this court
can review judgments of the district court of the United States for Porto Rico in criminal cases where the accused claimed and, as alleged, was denied a right under an act of Congress and under the Revised Statutes of
the United States. Although a motion in arrest of judgment, based on the ground that the grand
jury was not properly impaneled by reason of the deputy clerk acting in place of the clerk, was made in time, and the court below may have erred in its interpretation of the statute, the accused can not avail of that even in this court unless the record shows that an exception was proprely taken. The accused could have waived such an objection to the grand jury and by not excepting to the ruling he must be held to have acquiesced in the
ruling and waived his objection. Opinion by Harlan, J. - No dissenting opinion. Affirmed.
This was a criminal case. The plaintiffs in error were indicted for embezzlement and theft of bank notes and United States notes from the mails. After conviction in the court above mentioned the case was brought to the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the court to reexamine the judgment below was the principal question involved. The judgment was affirmed.
Supreme Court of the United States.
VALENTIN TRONO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, 1. THE UNITED STATES. Error to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands.
(199 U. S., 521.) No. 34. October Term 1905. Argued October 31, 1905. Decided December
Plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance in the
Philippine Islands and were acquitted of the crime of murder and convicted of the crime of assault and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine. They appealed to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, which reversed that judgment and found them guilty of homicide and sentenced them to various terms from eight to fourteen years' imprisonment and a fine. On a writ of error seeking to review the judgment on the ground that the action of the supreme court of the Philippine
Islands amounted to putting the accused in second jeopardy, Held, that: There is a vital difference between an attempt of the Government to review a
verdict of acquittal in the court of first instance and the action of the accused in himself appealing from a judgment which convicts him of one offense while acquitting him from the higher one charged in the indictment.
Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S., 100, distinguished. Where upon the indictment of a greater offense the one accused is found not
guilty thereof but guilty of a lower offense included therein, and upon appeal from that judgment a new trial is granted by the appellate court, the accused can, on the new trial, be tried for the greater offense in the indictment and such new trial does not amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or of the provisions in that regard in the Philippine act of July 1,
1902 (32 Stat., 691). The appeal of the accused in such case amounts to a waiver of the plea of
second jeopardy by asking that he be again tried for the same offense for which he has once been convicted and if that request be granted he must take the burden with the benefit and go back for the new trial upon the
whole case. Quaere, whether the constitutional provision against second jeopardy was in
tended to apply to a judgment under these circumstances. In reversing the lower court and itself convicting the accused on such appeal,
the supreme court of the Philippine Islands acted within its powers, and in ordinary procedure in the courts of that country under the act of July 1,
1902. Opinion by Peckham, J. Concurring, Brewer, Brown, Day, Holmes (in result), JJ. Dissenting, Fuller, Harlan, White, McKenna, JJ.
This was a criminal case. The plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance, Philippine Islands. They were acquitted of the crime of murder but convicted for assault and were sentenced to a term of imprisonment and to pay a fine. They then appealed to the supreme court of the Philippine Islands, which court reversed the judgment of the lower court and found them guilty of homicide. The main question involved was whether the conviction by the supreme court of the Philippines violated the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. L., 691), and placed the accused twice in jeopardy. The judgment of that court was held to be right, and was affirmed.
Supreme Court of the United States. THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANT, v. THE AMERICAN SUGAR REFINING
COMPANY, APPELLEE. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the southern
district of New York.
(202 U. S., 563.) No. 269. October term, 1905. Argued April 27, 1906. Decided May 28, 1906.
Under the treaty between the United States and Cuba of December 11, 1902,
and the act of Congress of December 17, 1903, imports from Cuba were not entitled to reduction of duties imposed by the tariff act of July 24, 1897, until December 27, 1903, the date proclaimed by the President of the United States and the President of Cuba for the commencement of the operation of
the treaty. After the treaty was amended by the Senate and the amendment accepted by
Cuba the time of its going into effect was to be fixed by act of Congress and not as originally fixed by the treaty ten days after the exchange of ratifica
tions. There is a presumption against retrospective legislation and words in a statute
will not be construed as having such effect unless they clearly can have no other effect, and the legislative intent cannot otherwise be satisfied; and in this respect the use in the statute of the future tense must be given
weight. Opinion by McKenna, J. No dissenting opinion.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case remanded with directions to affirm the order of the board of general appraisers.
The question here was whether certain goods-sugars—which were imported into New York from Cuba between June 12 and September 28, 1903, were dutiable under the tariff act of July 24, 1897, or whether they were entitled to 20 per cent reduction prescribed by that act, under the treaty between the United States and Cuba of December 11, 1902, and the act of Congress of December 17, 1903; and did the treaty go into effect on April 10, 1903, or December 27, 1903 ? Treaty went into effect December 27, 1903. See, also, 202 U. S., 580.
Supreme Court of the United States. FRANKLIN SUGAR REFINING COMPANY, APPELLANTS, v. THE UNITED
STATES. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania.
(202 U.S., 580.) No. 652. October term, 1905. Argued April 27, 1906. Decided May 28, 1906. United States 1. American Sugar Refining Co. (202 Ú. S., 563), followed, to
effect that treaty of December 11, 1902, with Cuba, went into effect December 27, 1903.