The international responsibility of the nation or central government for the acts of its political subdivisions or dependencies, such as suzerain and vassal states, protectorates, constituent states under a real or personal union, or federation or confederation of states 1 depends generally upon the extent to which the political subdivision or dependency has constitutionally been deprived of independent international personality. If the central authority undertakes by treaty or otherwise to represent its constituent parts in international affairs, it must discharge the resulting obligations, although constitutionally the fulfillment of many of these duties may in first instance be delegated to the political subdivisions of the nation.2 Constitutional arguments do not avail to excuse the non-performance of international duties, although the constitutional inability of the United States to compel the states to satisfy the treaty obligations of the nation has often furnished a controversial ground for contesting its legal liability.1 The torts committed against aliens by officers or authorities of a political subdivision of a nation, under circumstances which would render the subdivision responsible, generally bind the central government to indemnify the injured alien.5 The reason for this, as has

1 Westlake, I, ch. III; Tchernoff, 188-193. On constituent states see Donot, M., De la responsabilité de l'état fédéral à raison des actes des états particuliers, Paris, 1912, p. 100 et seq. On protectorates see Hall, Foreign powers and jurisdiction, § 96, and Jenkins, H., British rule and jurisdiction, etc., Oxford, 1902, p. 175.

2 In a dictum by Plumley, Umpire, in Davy (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 13, 1903, Ralston, 411, a difference was deduced from the constitutional character of the bond existing between the constituent state and the central government, in the fact that in the case of some countries, e. g., Venezuela, where the states are carved out of the national domain and formed in accordance with the national wishes, the federal government is held to more direct responsibility for the acts of its constituent states than in the case of a country like the United States where the federal government merely has delegated powers, sovereignty being reserved in the separate states.

'Lord Clarendon to Mr. Erskine, April 21, 1870, 65 St. Pap. 669, Baty, 152 (case in Greece); Speech of Senator Edmunds, June 3, 1886, Cong. Record v. 17, part 5, p. 5186; Mr. Fish, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Partridge, March 5, 1875, Moore's Dig. VI, 816 (case in Brazil); De Brissot (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Dec. 5, 1885, Moore's Arb. 2949-2967; Trumbull (Chile) v. U. S., Aug. 7, 1892, ibid. 3569. See article by Despagnet, "Les difficultés venant de la constitution de certains pays," 2 R. G. D. I. P. (1895), 181 et seq.

Generally without success. See infra, § 91.

"Little, Commissioner in De Brissot and Rawdon case (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Dec. 5,

already been observed, is that the state is a unit in its international relations; and in view of the inability of a constituent political subdivision of the state to commit an international delinquency on its own responsibility alone, the parent government is bound to answer for it.1

§ 83. Succession of States and Apportionment of Debts.

The matters connected with the distribution of public obligations in the case of the division of a state into distinct states, or the cession of a portion of one state to another have engaged the attention of numerous writers without having led to any definite conclusion except that no universal rule of international law on the subject can be said to exist.2 1885, Moore's Arb. 2949, 2967; Davy (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 13, 1903, Ralston, 411; Torreny (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 1903, Ralston, 162 (local police officer); Jones (U.S.) v. Mexico, March 3, 1849, Moore's Arb. 3019 (illegal detention of vessel by governor of a state); Montijo (U. S.) v. Colombia, Aug. 17, 1874, Moore's Arb. 1421, 1443; Dominique (France) v. Venezuela, Feb. 19, 1902, Sen. Doc. 533, 59th Cong., 1st sess., 206 (municipality). See also Knapp and Reynolds claims, Moore's Dig. VI, 800 (connivance of local authorities in brigandage).

1 It is on this theory that the United States has on several occasions felt itself constrained to award indemnities to aliens injured under circumstances rendering the states responsible for the injury. Foreign governments are not compelled to look to the constituent states for the vindication of the treaty rights of their nationals, and the inability of the federal government to compel the states to observe these rights or make reparation for their violation lays the foundation for the liability of the United States. Presidents Harrison, McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft and the authors of numerous bills introduced in Congress to give the federal courts jurisdiction over offenses against aliens, considered the police and judiciary of the state in such cases as federal agents. See infra, p. 226 (mob violence) and footnote 1. In this respect, the constitutional inability operates in the same way as a negligent failure to bring local officers to justice. De Brissot and Davy cases, footnote 1, supra. If local officers depend for their authority on the central government, they may be considered government agents. Baasch and Römer (Netherlands) v. Venezuela,

Feb. 28, 1903, Ralston, 906.

2 The details of this exceedingly interesting subject, which may become of renewed importance at the conclusion of the present European War, can hardly be discussed here. It is a very complicated subject, and precedents depend so largely upon the special facts and circumstances of each case, that conclusions of principle are not deducible. The ablest discussions of the subject, involving the transmission bility of obligations arising out of public debts, general and local, and out ts and concessions will be found in Westlake, I, 58 et seq.; Keith, Arthur B. ry of state succession, London, 1907, ch. VIII; Huber, Max, Die Staatenon, Leipzig, 1898, § 125 et seq.; Schönborn, W., Staatensuccessionen, in ich des Völkerrechts, II, 2, Stuttgart, 1913, pp. 55-60, 80-84, 96-109, 113,

As a general rule, however, it may be said that the state, through all changing forms of government,1 is responsible for the debts of its titular government and even of general de facto governments. Public debts are not extinguished by the division of a state into distinct states, whether by war or by mutual consent.2 According to the weight of authority among international law writers, however, there appears to be no legal obligation on the part of a seceding province or on the part of a country taking over a certain portion of territory from another country to assume some share of the national debt when the identity of the parent state is maintained. They recognize, however, a moral obligation to assume a proportionate share of the general debt of the parent government which has been incurred for the benefit of the entire country. Many of the continental writers supported by the evidence of numerous treaties, erect the moral obligation into a legal one, whereas the Anglo-American publicists-possibly influenced by the fact that their countries have been annexing and conquering countries and in turn supported by various treaties, such as the treaties following the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 and the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the treaties of cession of Louisiana, Florida, New Mexico and California, assert vigorously the merely moral character of the obligation. Moreover, no uniform rule for the apportionment of the debt has ever been agreed upon,5 a further evidence of the non-legal

117-118; Appleton, H., Des effets des annexions de territoires sur les dettes, etc., Paris, 1894 (part 2 of a doctoral dissertation); and Cavaglieri, Arrigo, La dottrina della successione de stato a stato, etc., Pisa, 1910, ch. II, § 11, p. 89 et seq.; see also Moore's Dig. I, § 96 et seq.

1 Westlake, I, 58; Oppenheim, I, 122; Halleck, I, 96. See also Zouche, Brierly's trans., § 66, in which Aristotle's contrary view is cited. The rule of the text, which was favored by Grotius, II, 9, § 3, is now uniformly adopted. Moore's Dig. I, 249 et seq.; Bolivar Ry. Co. (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 1903, Ralston, 394; Neapolitan Indemnity, convention of October 14, 1832, Moore's Arb. 4579. For de facto governments see infra, p.

The U. S., as a military occupant, however, was not liable for the debts of Cuba. Griggs, Atty. Gen., 22 Op. Atty. Gen. 384.

2 Hall, 91, 92. Case of the ship Tarquin (U. S.) v. Brazilian Indemnity, Jan. 24, 1849, Moore's Arb. 4617.

4

'Hall, 92; Oppenheim, 129, and authorities cited; Magoon's Reports, 189, 190. Oppenheim, 130, 131; Hall, 92; Keith, op. cit., 60 et seq., and authorities cited. *See different principles set forth by Huber, op. cit., § 134.

character of the obligation. In the case of a debt raised for the purposes of the ceded territory or charged upon its local revenues, it is held by the majority of writers, who cite numerous treaties in support, that the obligation passes with the land to its new owners.1 While reason and authority favor this rule, it is not altogether certain that the annexing state contracts a legal obligation to pay the debts secured upon local revenues, and it is fair to conclude that it is not bound to pay war debts contracted by the conquered state or province for the very purpose of resisting conquest and annexation. Nor is a new independent state split off from a parent state legally obliged to assume any share of the debts of the parent state, although some of them may have been incurred in its special behalf. Thus, the American colonies in 1783 assumed no part of the general debt of Great Britain; on the other hand, the Spanish-American colonies practically all undertook to pay a portion of the debt of Spain.2

According to strict principles of international law, the parent state which has lost a province by conquest or cession, remains liable for all but local debts of the transferred province contracted for local purposes. On equitable grounds, a reduction of the debt has, at times, been allowed by creditor governments, especially when the debt was incurred through the separated province.3 Where the identity of the parent state is destroyed, the conquering or annexing power or the new state becomes

This was one of the contentions in the Hodgskin and Landreau claims v. Chile both diplomatically and before the arbitral tribunal under convention of Aug. 7, 1892. The right of claimants to certain guano deposits in Peru was in question. It was contended that the obligation of Peru passed to Chile on the cession of the guano territory. The Tribunal (Goode, U. S. commissioner, dissenting) held that the claim was personal only against Peru, and did not pass with the land. Moore's Arb. 35713590. In the diplomatic correspondence, the U. S. seems to have contended that the satisfaction of the Peruvian obligations, pledged upon the transferred guano deposits, was a moral obligation of Chile. This is the better view, but Westlake (I, 63, 1st ed.) believes the obligation to have been legal. Westlake here adopts the view of the continental writers. See Keith, op. cit., 60, 63. See claims of France v. Chile, July 23, 1892 (Award, July 5, 1901), Descamps & Renault, Rec. int. des traités du xx siècle, 1901, p. 188 et seq. In support of the text, see also Hall, 92. Magoon's Reports, 178, 189. See extracts in Moore's Dig. I, 339 et seq.

2 Moore's Dig. I, 342–343.

3 Claim of Chilean S. S. Lautardo v. Colombia, reduced by a third after secession of Panama, which had been responsible for the original wrong. For. Rel. 1907, I, 293.

heir to the debts of the destroyed country. The ceded or seceding territory, however, is liable for local debts, although, as observed, there is much difficulty in establishing what is a local debt. It has been noted that a general debt, even when made a lien upon local revenues, is not a local debt and an obligation in rem. A local debt is one incurred only for strictly local purposes, and is the only one which carries to the annexing state or new state created, a legal obligation to pay. It is important in all cases to establish whether the debt has been contracted for local or for national purposes.3

It is stated by practically all the authorities that the annexing state becomes liable for all the concessions and contracts of the annexed state. For this view, they find support in numerous treaties and court decisions. Nevertheless, the fact that bankrupt states could thus impose enormous obligations on their successors, and that war debts would thus legally have to be paid, weakens to such an extent the force of the contention, that it may with justice be said that the successor is bound to satisfy only such contractual and other obligations of the annexed state as appeal to him as fair and reasonable, equitable considerations, however, dictating the maintenance of all obligations not founded in fraud or against the public interest.4

DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS

§ 84. Different Kinds. Transmission of Obligations.

The internal political changes which a state may undergo do not affect its international personality. In the rapid change of government to which some states have been subject, certain parties have secured control and exercised the powers of government, without compliance with constitutional or strictly regular forms. This control may extend over the entire nation or over certain parts only. It becomes important then to determine when such control of the administration may be said to have become a de facto government, and to

1 Oppenheim, 129; Hall, 99; Halleck, 98; Dana's Wheaton, note 18.

2 Oppenheim, 131; Hall, 92; 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 187.

3 Magoon's Rep. 190; 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 187. The authorities are unsatisfactory

on many of the points here discussed. See footnote in Hall, 93–94.

The ablest discussion of this matter has been found in Keith, op. cit., 66-72.