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particularly the de facto character of the authorities collecting the duties, must be considered.

§ 96. Successful Revolution.

A successful revolution stands on an entirely different basis. The government created through its efforts is liable for the acts of the revolutionists as well as for those of the titular government it has replaced. Its acts are considered as at least those of a general de facto government,2 for which the state is liable from the beginning of the revolution, on the theory that the revolution represented ab initio a changing national will, crystallizing in the final successful result.3 Thus the government created through a successful revolution becomes liable for all services rendered to the revolutionists.4 The unlawful acts of successful revolutionists render the government equally liable.5

invested with the right to recognize or annul the acts of the insurgents. 25 Journ. du Dr. Adm. (1877), 233.

1 Bolivar Railway Co. (Gt. Brit.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 1903, Ralston, 394. 2 Dix (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 1903, Ralston, 7; Henry (U. S.) v. Venezuela, ibid. 14, 22.

3 Bolivar Railway Co. supra; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176. The award of the arbitral tribunal (Goode, U. S. commissioner, dissenting) in Didier (U. S.) v. Chile, Aug. 7, 1892, Shield's Rep., Washington, 1894, pp. 41, 45, seems altogether erroneous. The claim was based on a contract for supplies furnished in 1816 to the successful revolutionary party of Gen. Carrera. Because the protocol was concluded between the Republic of Chile and the U. S., the Commission, on demurrer to the jurisdiction, dismissed the claim on the ground that until 1822, when Chile was first recognized by the U. S., "Chile was de jure under Spanish domination so far as concerned the U. S." See also Commissioner Goode's dissenting opinion, ibid. 46-51. See the awards of the U. S.-Mexican commission of 1868 under identical circumstances, Moore's Arb. 1243; Tchernoff (op. cit., 337) supports the Didier award.

'Oteri claim v. Honduras, For. Rel., 1899, 352 (use of a steamer); Kummerow (Germany) v. Venezuela, Feb. 13, 1903, Ralston, 561; Redler (Germany) v. Venezuela, ibid. 560; Baasch and Römer (Netherlands) v. Venezuela, Feb. 28, 1903, ibid. 907. But it is not liable for military services rendered to the legitimate government in suppression of the very revolution which ultimately became successful. Mr. Blaine, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Patterson, April 7, 1890, Moore's Dig. VI, 624. It would seem that the Cuban government is liable for the acts of its revolutionary forces which established the government. China admitted its liability for the acts of the revolutionists which established the Republic.

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* Hill (U. S.) v. Peru, Dec. 4, 1868, Moore's Arb. 1655; Hughes (U. S.) v. Mexico, March 3, 1849, Moore's Arb. 2972; Hayball v. Peru, For. Rel., 1901, 427–430; Fowks

The successful revolutionists appear to be bound from the beginning of the revolution by the stipulations of national treaties, for the violation of which they will be held liable as successors to the titular government.1

Governments have on numerous occasions voluntarily made compensation, as a matter of policy rather than as a matter of law, for the injuries sustained by natives and foreigners during civil war, limited generally to the injuries inflicted by government forces,2 but sometimes extended to include the acts of both parties.3 If the nationals of any other foreign country were indemnified, the United States would probably insist upon equal treatment for American citizens.4

§ 97. Experience of Latin-America.

Various states of Latin-America, exposed as they have been to conv. Peru, For. Rel., 1901, 430-434; MacCord v. Peru, May 17, 1898, Moore's Dig. VI, 985-990. (These were cases of personal injury and unlawful imprisonment.)

1 Fowks claim v. Peru, supra.

2 Southern Claims Commission; British-American Commission of May 8, 1871; French-American Commission of Jan. 15, 1880. Indemnities were paid to loyal citizens and to foreigners who had not given aid and comfort to the Confederates. Haiti in 1902 paid claims resulting from the burning and pillage of Petit Goave, in 1902, by government forces. This has been Haiti's general practice.

3 France made payments for injuries during civil commotions in 1830, 1834, 1851, 1871 (Commune), 1882 (Saida), and 1893 (Aigues-Mortes). (Calvo, III, §§ 12911293.) Belgium made similar payments in 1831, 1836, and in 1842, during which only the "needy ones" were provided for (Calvo, § 1294). Spain voluntarily paid French citizens at the end of the Carlist war in 1876. [Despagnet, 4th ed. 470; 15 Clunet (1888), 293.] The Khedive of Egypt compensated those sustaining injuries during the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882. (Moore's Dig. VI, 984; 71 St. Pap. 556; 74 St. Pap. 684.) Indemnities paid by Morocco for damages during disturbances in Morocco. (Despagnet, 470.) Latin-American states have occasionally by domestic commission voluntarily made compensation for injuries suffered during insurrections. Mexico in 1860, 51 St. Pap. 617; Hayti in 1884, 76 St. Pap. 302; Venezuela in 1868, 59 St. Pap. 1291; Venezuela in 1901, at the end of the Castro revolution (For. Rel., 1901, 550); Peru in 1871 for the injuries incurred in the sacking of Callao (Moore's Dig. VI, 973; 65 St. Pap. 1247); and Colombia on several occasions: In 1875 (Moore's Dig. VI, 981), seizure of certain steamers by insurgents; by certain decrees of 1877 and 1878 (68 St. Pap. 776; 69 ibid. 376); by law of Aug. 31, 1886 and Oct. 11, 1886 (77 St. Pap. 807, 810); by decree of Oct. 17, 1903 (98 St. Pap. 839). Mexico after the revolution of 1911 established a Consultative Claims Commission to adjudicate upon claims.

'Mr. Olney, Sec'y of State, to Mr. Thompson, Min. to Brazil, Jan. 20 and Oct. 10, 1896, Moore's Dig. VI, 892.

stant revolutionary movements, have on numerous occasions been subjected to liability by the countries of Europe for the injuries inflicted by insurgents or during civil war. This has been in part explained by the fact that the continuous state of revolutionary unrest takes these uprisings out of the category of fortuitious events, which the government is unable, by due diligence, to prevent.1 The European nations, in supporting claims arising out of these civil wars, regardless of whether insurgents or authorities caused the injury,2 have sometimes taken the ground that the responsibility of the state is due to a lack of diligence in preventing or suppressing uprisings. This ground could hardly be general, for "the highest interests of the state are too deeply involved in the avoidance of such commotions to allow the supposition to be entertained that they have been caused by carelessness on its part which would affect it with responsibility towards a foreign state."3 Moreover, if they were actually negligent, that fact would be extremely difficult to prove, and if the claims rested upon this ground alone few of them could be prosecuted to payment. As a matter of fact, the ground is, as a rule, advanced for plausibility alone, and assuming that the government is so organized that civil commotion is only a fortuitous event and not one invited by lack of proper political organization, the Latin-American republics would appear to deserve support in their endeavors to be relieved from the diplomatic pressure of claims resulting from injuries suffered in the legitimate operations incident to civil war, or caused by insurgents.

1 H. Arias in 7 A. J. I. L. (1913), 746. See also Lawrence's Wheaton, 176.

2 The following have been some of these occasions: France and Great Britain v. Argentine, 1858, 48 St. Pap. 28; 49 ibid. 1340; France v. Brazil, 22 Clunet (1895), 925; 1 R. G. D. I. P. (1894), 164, 2 ibid. (1895), 340; Belgium, France, and Italy v. Venezuela (civil war of 1892), 2 R. G. D. I. P. 344; Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Germany and U. S. v. Chile at the end of the 1891 civil war, 1 R. G. D. I. P. 164 and 171; 2 ibid. 338; 3 ibid. 476; 4 ibid. 416; Moore's Arb. 4862, 4930; Italy v. Brazil after war of 1893, Documenti diplomatici, Brasile reclami italiani, Dec. 6, 1894; 4 R. G. D. I. P. (1897), 403, 463; Italy v. Salvador, Feb. 4, 1876, 70 St. Pap. 493; Italy v. Peru, Nov. 25, 1899, Memoria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1900, 645; Spain v. Mexico, Article 4 of treaty of 1853, Tchernoff, 341; 28 Rev. de derecho, 310; Greece v. Salvador, 29 Clunet (1902), 656; Several powers v. Venezuela, in 1903, secured an admission of liability in the protocols, supra; Basdevant in 11 R. G. D. I. P. (1904), 362.

3 * Hall, 6th ed., 220; Fiore, § 673 et seq.; Pillet, Les lois de la guerre, 29; Wiesse, op. cit., § 14; Leval, § 103; Pittard, 281.

In order to avoid this pressure of claims arising out of civil wars, the Latin-American states have succeeded in concluding numerous treaties with European nations by which the latter admit the nonliability of the government for injuries sustained by their subjects in civil war at the hands of revolutionists or savage tribes, provided the damage is not caused through the fault or negligence of the authorities of the government.1 The states of Latin-America have among themselves concluded treaties providing for absolute non-liability, whether the injuries sustained by their respective citizens are due to the acts of insurgents or legitimate authorities.2 The Latin-American states have resorted to other methods to avoid the presentation of claims by foreigners for injuries sustained during civil war. In the resolutions of the Pan-American Congresses, in their constitutions, and in their statutes, they have provided that the alien taking part in a civil struggle shall be treated as a native and shall lose his privileges. of alienage. These municipal regulations provide generally that the alien shall have the same civil rights as the national and shall have the right to the diplomatic protection of his own country only in the event of a denial of justice after an exhaustion of local remedies.1 These

1 Such treaties have been concluded between France and Mexico, Nov. 27, 1886, art. 11 Martens' Recueil des traités, 65, 843; 77 St. Pap. 1090; France and Colombia, May 30, 1893, For. Rel. 1894, 200; 84 St. Pap. 137; Belgium and Mexico, June 7, 1895, art. 15, Martens, 73, 73; Belgium and Venezuela, March 1, 1884, art. 18, Martens, 61, 620; 75 St. Pap. 39; Germany and Colombia, July 23, 1892, art. 20, Martens, 69, 842; 84 St. Pap. 144; Germany and Mexico, Dec. 5, 1882, art. 18; Martens, 59, 474; Italy and Colombia, Oct. 27, 1892, art. 21, Martens, 72, 313; Italy and Mexico, Apr. 16, 1889, Apr. 16, 1890, art. 12, Martens, 68, 711, 771; Italy and Venezuela, July 19, 1861, art. 4, 54 St. Pap. 330; Spain and Colombia, Apr. 28, 1894, art. 4, Olivart, Tratados de España, 11, 64; Spain and Ecuador, May 23, 1888, art. 3, Olivart, 9, 27; 79 St. Pap. 632; Spain and Honduras, Nov. 17, 1894, art. 4, Olivart, 11, 156; Spain and Peru, July 16, 1897, art. 4, Olivart, 12, 348; 4 R. G. D. I. P. (1897), 725; and art. 4 of treaty of Aug. 14, 1897, ibid. 794-797; Spain and Venezuela, Aug. 11, 1861, 53 St. Pap. 1050; Sweden and Mexico, July 29, 1885, art. 21, Martens, 63, 690. 2 Arias in 7 A. J. I. L. (1913), 756; Podesta Costa in 42 Rev. de derecho hist. y let. (1912), 511, note.

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* This provision has been incorporated in one or two treaties with European countriés-e. e. g., Spain and Peru, Aug. 14, 1897, art. 3, 2 R. G. D. I. P. (1895), 342; 4 ibid. (1897), 794; Belgium and Venezuela, March 1, 1884, art. 8, Busschere, A. de, Code de traités... interessant la Belgique, Bruxelles, 1897, II, 434.

These municipal provisions as well as the treaties concluded by a few European

provisions of municipal law, as will be more fully noticed hereafter, have been ineffectual in relieving the states of Latin-America from the fulfillment of what have been conceived, by the stronger powers, to constitute their international obligations.

countries with Latin-American states acknowledging the principle of limited diplomatic protection are discussed, infra, § 391. See also article by Arias in 7 A. J. I. L. (1913), 757 et seq. The Institute of International Law has declared itself as opposed to the clauses of reciprocal irresponsibility on the ground that they relieve states from the duty of protecting the foreigner in their territory. It believed that states which, through a series of extraordinary circumstances, do not deem themselves to be in a position to insure in a sufficiently effective manner the protection of foreigners in their territory, cannot withdraw themselves from the consequences of such a state of things except by a temporary interdiction of their territory to foreigners. (18 Annuaire, 253, translated in Ralston's International arbitral law, 234.)

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