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1906, makes specific provision for the bringing of such suits by the Department of Justice.1 According to a recent decision, it would seem that a State cannot impeach naturalization.2 It is established that private parties, exclusive of the naturalized person himself, may not impeach the record of naturalization. The judgment may be impeached on the same grounds that would render any judgment of a court invalid. The usual ground is fraud or illegality in the procurement of the naturalization.4

In European countries, municipal courts frequently have to decide upon the effect to be given to a foreign judgment of naturalization, and the general rule as to judgments appears to be followed. For example, if the foreign court was without jurisdiction of person or subject-matter, recognition of the judgment will be refused. Similarly, if the foreign naturalization is contrary to the law or public policy of the jurisdictional state, the foreign judgment will be denied validity.5 In the absence of treaty, the original home state of the naturalized person may not admit the validity of or give effect to his foreign naturalization, if obtained in violation of its law. This is quite different from directly declaring a foreign naturalization null, which would be an invasion of the sovereign rights of a foreign state. It would seem true, also, as in the case of all foreign judgments, that fraud in its procurement may be set up as a ground of impeachment, and the local court will refuse to recognize and enforce a judgment of naturalization obtained by fraud. This also is the standpoint assumed by international tribunals in passing upon the evidentiary character of a certificate of naturalization.

134 Stat. L. 596. The Act is set out in Van Dyne, Naturalization, 417 et seq. and the proceedings under § 15 are discussed at pp. 34-36, 135–141. See U. S. v. Nesbit, 168 Fed. 1005; U. S. v. Simon, 170 Fed. 680; U. S. v. Meyer, 170 Fed. 983; U. S. v. Mansour, 170 Fed. 671; U. S. v. Luria, 184 Fed. 643, 231 U. S. 9; U. S. v. Spohrer, 175 Fed. 440; Johannessen v. U. S., 225 U. S. 227.

seq.

2 Peterson v. State (1905), 89 S. W. 81.

3 Cases quoted and cited in H. Doc. 326, op. cit., 132–133.

4 H. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess., 133; Act of June 29, 1906, § 15, infra, § 228 et

"Bar, 163-165.

6 Story, Conflict of laws, 608; Ruiz v. U. S., No. 112, Span. Treaty Cl. Com., Decision printed in Van Dyne, Naturalization, 167–168.

§ 226. The Practice of International Tribunals of Arbitration.

Whatever the conclusive force of judgments of naturalization under municipal laws of the country where granted, international tribunals have often asserted and exercised the right to determine for themselves the citizenship of claimants from all the facts presented.1

These international tribunals, with practically unbroken uniformity, have held that they were not conclusively bound by a certificate of naturalization, but, on an allegation of fraud, could go behind the certificate to examine the antecedent facts on which it was granted. Such a certificate has been held to be prima facie evidence of citizenship, and in the absence of proof of fraud, it has been accepted as conclusive evidence of its own validity. A mere error or irregularity or honest failure to comply fully with the laws of the United States has not been generally deemed a sufficient ground to impeach the evidentiary force of the certificate of naturalization, but some intentional and dishonest misrepresentation or suppression of material facts by the party obtaining the naturalization has usually been required to effect this end. Nevertheless, in some cases, e. g., in the Medina case before the United States-Costa Rican commission of 1860 and in the Flutie case before the United States-Venezuelan commission of 1903, fraud was not considered essential to denial of a claim of citizenship, but misrepresentation or proved non-compliance with the conditions for naturalization was considered sufficient to overcome the presumptive evidence of the certificate. Some exceedingly able opinions on this question have been written, and particular merit is found in the decisions of Umpire Bertinatti in the case of Medina before the United States-Costa Rican Commission of 1860 and of

1 Flutie (U. S.) v. Venezuela, Feb. 17, 1903, Ralston, 38, 42, citing Medina (U. S.) v. Costa Rica, Moore's Arb. 2587; Laurent (Gt. Brit.) v. U. S., ibid. 2671; Lizardi (U. S.) v. Mexico, ibid. 2589; Kuhnagel (France) v. U. S., ibid. 2647; Angarica (U. S.) v. Spain, ibid. 2621; Criado (U. S.) v. Spain, ibid. 2624.

Delgado (U.S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, Moore's Arb. 2590-2592; Sprotto (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, ibid. 2717.

'Delgado (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, ibid. 2590; Madan (U. S.) v. Spain, ibid. 2638, 2641 (under agreement of Dec. 14, 1882, infra).

4 Moore's Arb. 2583, at pp. 2586–2589.

the recent Spanish Treaty Claims Commission in the case of Ruiz v. United States, No. 112.1

In the decision of Umpire Bertinatti in the case of Medina v. Costa Rica, it was held that the judgment of an American court was not binding on Costa Rica, and that while a duly issued certificate of naturalization is presumptive evidence of its validity, "the presumption of truth must yield to truth itself," and where the existence of facts is shown, which, had they been known, would cause the application for naturalization to have been rejected, e. g., a residence in the United States much shorter than the five years required by statute, the certificate of naturalization will be considered incompetent to confer citizenship.

The United States-Mexican commission of 1868 dismissed the claim of Perez because of his failure, as an alleged naturalized citizen, to comply with the residence requirements of our naturalization statutes, notwithstanding his possession of a certificate of naturalization. Mr. Thornton, umpire of that same commission, held that the tribunal was not bound to admit the citizenship of a claimant when the evidence showed that his certificate of naturalization had been obtained by the false swearing of certain witnesses before the municipal court which granted naturalization.4

The question of the finality of a certificate of naturalization was argued very fully before the United States-Spanish commission under the protocol of February 12, 1871. By that protocol it was provided that Spain shall have the right to "traverse the allegation of American citizenship, and thereupon competent and sufficient proof thereof will be required." In the case of Delgado,5 Umpire Bartholdi declined to inquire into the validity of the claimant's naturalization,

'Reprinted in Van Dyne, Naturalization, 144-178. Commissioner Maury's able dissenting opinion is also worthy of note, ibid. 178-189. Valuable briefs on the question were filed by attorneys for the claimants and by the Government in the cases of Adolphus Torres v. U. S., No. 45 and Rita L. de Ruiz et al. v. U. S., No. 112. Briefs of the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, v. 7.

2

Medina (U. S.) v. Costa Rica, July 2, 1860, Moore's Arb. 2583, 2587.

'Perez (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, ibid. 2719 (Wadsworth, commissioner).

'Lizardi (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, ibid. 2589.

'Delgado (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, Moore's Arb. 2590-2592.

it appearing that he had resided in the United States over five years and no charge of fraud having been made. In a second case, Ortega,1 a failure to comply with the naturalization laws was clear. The umpire, therefore, dismissed the claim and refused to be bound by the certificate of naturalization. This amounted to a denial of the position of the advocate of the United States that the certificate of naturalization must be accepted as final. The interposition of the Department of State being invoked, Secretary Evarts first expressed the opinion that the powers of the Commission were not "judicial," and that in effect the Commission could not question a certificate of naturalization. Baron Blanc, Bartholdi's successor as umpire, in the case of Dominguez 2 held that it was his duty to determine whether the certificate of naturalization was procured by fraud or was granted in violation of treaty stipulations or of the rules of international law, but that Dominguez's absence from the United States prior to his admission to citizenship did not work a change of legal residence; and assuming that the naturalization court had taken this view, it must prevail so long as it is unreversed by an American court. The Spanish Arbitrator, Marquis Potestad, protested against the ruling that the decision of an American court is final, and against a proposition of the umpire that the tribunals of the United States are the sole interpreters of the laws of the country. Secretary Evarts, again called upon, held that the tribunal, as an international judicial body, could "bring under judgment the decisions of local courts of both nations." He thus in effect upheld the protest of Marquis Potestad. When Count Lewenhaupt succeeded Baron Blanc as arbitrator, the whole question was reargued. In the case of Buzzi,5 the umpire decided that the claimant had no right to appear as an American citizen, since it was shown that during the five years immediately preceding his naturalization he had lived about four and a half years in Cuba. Secretary of State Blaine, who had succeeded Mr. Evarts, instructed 1 Ortega (U. S.) v. Spain, Moore's Arb. 2592.

2 Dominguez (U. S.) v. Spain, ibid. 2595-2597.

3

The history of this question before the Commission is presented by Mr. Moore in his Digest, III, 506–509. See also Moore's Arb. 2593 et seq.

4 Moore's Arb. 2601-2613.

5 Buzzi (U. S.) v. Spain, Feb. 12, 1871, Moore's Arb. 2613.

the American counsel to state that the United States could not accept the judgment as within the competence of the umpire to render, and that a duly issued certificate of naturalization was the judgment of a court, which could not be reversed or reviewed by the Executive or by an international commission.1

Secretary Frelinghuysen, Mr. Blaine's successor, did not adhere to the radical position of Secretary Blaine, but, while insisting that the Department had conferred no power on the Commission to examine into the object or motive of an applicant in seeking naturalization nor to make actual presence in the United States for five years immediately preceding naturalization a requisite, nevertheless admitted that a certificate of naturalization may be proven to have been obtained fraudulently, and added that the certificate could only be impeached "by showing that the court which granted it was without jurisdiction, or by showing, in conformity with the adjudications of the courts of the United States on that topic, that fraud, consisting of intentional and dishonest misrepresentation or suppression of material facts by the party obtaining the judgment, was practiced upon it, or that the naturalization was granted in violation of a treaty stipulation or of a rule of international law.” 2

This was accepted as a binding rule by the Commission, and several claims of alleged naturalized citizens were dismissed on one or other of the above grounds. In several other cases it was held that there was no proof of intentional misrepresentation or fraud within the meaning of the rule adopted, and that claimants were entitled to appear as citizens of the United States.4

The French-United States mixed commission under the treaty of January 15, 1880, held that they had the right to examine the original

1 Moore's Arb. 2618. The radical position of Mr. Blaine has been generally disapproved.

2 Moore's Arb. 2619-2621.

3 Angarica (U. S.) v. Spain, ibid. 2621, 2624; Criado, ibid. 2624, 2626. See also cases of Buzzi, and Ortega, supra.

4 Zenea, Moore's Arb. 2626 (held no fraud, although naturalized before he was 21; see Moore's comment, ibid. 2629); Zaldivar, ibid. 2630 (suspicion of irregularity, but no fraud); Govin y Pinto, ibid. 2635; Madan, ibid. 2638, 2642; Antonio M. Mora, ibid. 2642, 2645 (burden of proof on Spain); Rozas, ibid. 2646; Montejo, ibid. 2643. See the statements of the Marquis de Potestad, Spanish Arbitrator, on these claims, ibid. 2631-2635.

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