in a matter so important and urgent, had not resolved to take the risk upon themselves, and to direct the completion of the work, trusting that government would see them finally repaid. This government had engaged to do so; and the county of Norfolk might by that time, perhaps, be in possession of its signals. But by whose fault had it happened, that it was not in possession of them sooner? It must fairly be said, not by the fault of any one. The striking feature of the case was, that with so great a delay and such a succession of persons, no one could be found to whom the delay was imputable. The Lieutenant of Division could not be blamed, for not being willing to advance his money, till he knew by whom he was to be repaid. The Deputy Lieutenants might well have been justified, had they persisted in refusing to the last, to take upon themselves an expense, which they had no means of recovering from the county. The county was well warranted in insisting that their charge was one, which was incurred for the general safety, and which ought to be defrayed by a general tax. The Admiralty were not to blame for delaying to send officers, and commence the expenses of their establishment, till they should know that houses were ready to receive them. But this successive justification of all the parties concerned in the measure, was the most complete condemnation of the system to which it belonged. What must that system of proceedings be, in which, when every party under it had done his duty, nine months could elapse, before the maritime counties were furnished with their establishment of signals? With this example he might sately close his account of the conduct of the hon. gents. as persons fit to direct the energies, and call out the resources of the country, at the present moment. The instance itself, as a circumstance in the situation of the country, was now of no great importance; as it might be hoped, that by this time, or at least in about a month more, the evil was, or would be, at an end, and the maritime counties be prepared with their signals. But it was not so with the state of the army, and of the military force of the country. Here was not only a great misconduct, but a great national evil and danger, present and future. The hon. gentlemen had not only not provided an army, but had brought things to a state, in which, without some great change, it was impossible that an army should be provided. The army of reserve, the only channel of recruiting not yet dry, would

soon, possibly, be dry likewise. It had yielded 7000 men: it was doubtful how many more it had to yield. Whatever it gave to the army, was so much in diminution of its own numbers.How much might continue to ooze in from it, in its decreased and decreasing state, was very uncertain; not to mention the dreadful expense and ruinous example of those successive enrolments-this double bounty. At all events the supply, in this way, had necessarily a termination. It was an arti ficial, not a natural cascade. As a supply, it must at last run out. When recruits should have entered from this army, equal to the original numbers, the measure was at an end. The army ofreserve, therefore, could not be looked upon as a permanent mode of recruiting and reinforcing the army; and, in the mean while, by this and their other measures, ministers had laid the foundation of such difficulties, as would render it nearly impossible that any such mode should be devised in future. The proba bility was, that after yielding to the army a few more thousands, so much would just remain of the army of reserve, as would be sufficient to preserve the. example of this anomalous force, and to make recruiting impossible by contributing, with the militia, to continue the high rate of bounties. In aid of all these mischiefs come the effect of the volunteer system, which, as the hon. gentlemen had managed it, whether by design or by mistake, locked up 400,000 men of the active population of the country. What a blow was here! He was tempted to call out to the hon. gentleman, as the Roman Emperor did to his General, Redde mihi, Vare, legiones. Seventy thousand men and more, withdrawn from the supply of the army of reserve, by the militia; and 400,000 men withdrawn from both militia and army of reserve by the volunteers; and the army of reserve, the only source for recruiting the army; with what sort of men, and at what rate of recruiting, was the army likely to be supplied? All this, as a future consideration, the hon. gentlemen thought nothing of. They had got, or thought they had got (they had in fact got no such thing), what was sufficient for present defence; and, beyond that, they never thought of looking. Defence was their utmost horizon. All beyond was clouds and darkness. But to those, who did not wish to bound their views merely by that consideration, who thought that if the country was to exist after the present dangers, it was of some consequence to consider what that existence was to be; to such

persons it would be a matter of anxiety to know, how the country was to proceed without the use of a disposable force, and if such a force should appear necessary or desirable, in what manner it was to be obtained. His ideas upon this subject had long since been declared, and he had not been able, by any subsequent reflexion or inqui ry, to get beyond the notions which he had at first formed. His opinion had been, and was, that, as a first step, there should be an universal abolition of the system of substitution. That all commutation for personal service (as commutation there must be), should be made by fixed fine, so as to render government the only recruiter in the market without competition from militia, army of reserve, or any other service. That to meet, and co-operate with the effects of the advantage thus given, service, in the army, should be changed from life to term of years; drafting should be formally abolished; means possibly devised to render service in the West-Indies less frequently necessary; and some other subordinate regulations adopted, calculated to give to the profession of a soldier advantages and attractions, additional to those, not inconsiderable ones, which it already had. With these things done, he was of opinion, that the condition of the country was not so changed, either as to the wealth or inclinations of the lower orders of its inhabitants, as to make it impossible, that, upon a greatly increased population, the army should be recruited as in former times. He was by no means sure, that if these methods had been adopted, at the time when they were first suggested (and still more if they had been adopted at a period somewhat earlier) the army would not have been recruited, and the general defence of the country increased, even at this moment, far beyond what it had been by the boasted measure of the army of reserve. That it would be so in the end, there could not be the smallest doubt. In a comparison of these measures, the same distinction must be observed, as gentlemen, accustomed to planting, knew how to make between a sown and a planted tree: though the latter would have the advantage at the beginning, and it might be, for some few years, it was known which would outstrip the other at the long run.-But should the danger at any moment be such, as not to wait the gradual progress of recruiting, however successful; or should the general success of recruiting, even in the new circumstances proposed, be less than he was willing to imagine, it would be then open to have recourse to compulsory mea

sures; but measures so chosen, (that is to say, of which the abolition of substitution should make part), as to become a powerful stimulus to recruiting, instead of presenting any impediment to it. He was as little a friend to compulsory measures, where they could be avoided, as any other gentleman: but he would not court popularity, nor discredit his own judgement by decrying them as unconstitutional. He had shewn, on a former occasion, together with several of his hon. friends; that so far from objecting factiously to any measure of government, or lying in wait to raise a cry against the hon. gentlemen, he was more ready than the hon. gentlemen had seemed to be, to brave that cry, in support of any measure of the soit alluded to, which the circumstances of the times might render necessary.―These were his ideas of the measures to be adopted, for creating that first and most indispensable requisite in the present state of the world, as well for the sake of immediate safety, as with a view to the future condition of the empire, a regular and disposable military force. Instead of this, the hon. gentlemen seemed by their measures to be looking to any other force, rather than that of a regular army, the augmentation to which was as yet, by their own account, only 7000 men; while by their general conduct they had brought the country to a state, in which, at the end of nine months, a line of cruizers, or (according to the expression of an old poet, whom he did not dare to quote in the original)" a single plank of wood," was all that protected the country, he would not say, from the "grave," but from evils and dangers, of a magnitude not to be described.

Mr. Secretary Yorke.-Sir; after the very long, and certainly very entertaining speech, which you have just heard, I fear that I shall neither merit, nor be able to obtain from you and the House, that patience and that attention, which I shall have ample occasion for, in replying to the attacks that the right. hon. gentleman has made on me, and on most of the measures of the present administration. The hon. gent. has quoted a passage of very indifferent poetry, to prove that there is "nothing good we say, and nothing wise we do;" but, in my opinion of the country, and of this House, the present government, if I may judge from the experience of the last session of Parliament, or the actual feelings of the people, has little to apprehend from the opposition of the right hon. gentleman, or the application of what he has quoted. During that session, it must be admitted that we heard many excellent oppositio * Y y 2

peeches (and I should be sorry that the right hon. gent. were deprived of the opportunity of amusing and instructing the House;) but then we had to set off against them some good ministerial votes, the cordial and zealous support of a very great majority of this House. The right hon. gent. has begun by condemning the constitution of the army, considering it as the whole of a military system; and has enforced, with all the eloquence and ingenuity that he is master of, the necessity of a total alteration in it for considering, he says, the power, the means, and the intentions of France, it is absolutely incumbent on us to effect an entire change in our military system. I need scarcely repeat to the right hon. gent., that peculiarly constituted as the army of this empire is, there is no power, save and except the omaipotence of Parliament, that can operate those changes he so forcibly recommends. The sanction of the legislature must precede the improvements, (if improvements they are) that the right hon. gent. advises. I have no objection to taking the whole of our military system under general consideration, provided that the right hon. gent. will have the prudence to omit the minute details; for, I trust, that every one who hears me will allow, that a Committee of this House is not the best or the fittest place to go into an accurate examination of the merits or defects of such a complicated system. The right hon. gent. has found much cause for disapprobation, in the defenceless and vulnerable state in which some part of the coast has been suffered to remain. In reply to this, I will frankly admit, that it is not in as good a state of defence as it might have been, considering our means and the spirit of the people; but still I shall contend, that it is fully sufficient for the protection of the country, and capable of affording a very serious resistance to any probable effort of the enemy. The right hon. gent. has been particularly severe in his condemnation of two measures of the government, which took place immediately after the signing of the peace of Amiens, the disbanding of the army, and the disarming and dismantling of the navy. I must, Sir, most solemnly protest against the view which the right hon. gent. has taken of those measures, for the true state of the facts will not justify the inferences he has endeavoured to draw from them. At no period of our history was there ever, at the conclusion of a peace, an establishment both naval and military, maintained, that would support any comparison with that voted and sanctioned by this House, subsequent to the ratification of the defini

tive treaty. Exclusive of that which took place in the cavalry, in which I admit it was considerable, the diminution in the rest of our force, the infantry, I mean, was very trifling indeed; not more than 7,000 men out of the whole of our regular army. The rest of those disbanded were troops whose services were limited, partly consisting of second battalions, who volunteered from the militia, whose time were within a year of expiration, and whose services, for that short time, government, for very cogent and prudential reasons, deemed it adviseable to dispense with. With regard to the numerical enumeration of our force, I can meet the right hon. gent., not only with pleasure bet with absolute confidence on that head. I will state, for the information of that right hon. gent., and for the satisfaction of this House, that our regular force has been nearly doubled since last session of Parliament. Instead of 60,000 we have now an effective regular force of 120,000 men. In this number I certainly mean to include the army of reserve, which has been incorporated with the regular army, and which, for every military purpose, is as effective as any regulars, although, perhaps, according to a phrase of the right hon. gentleman's, "they have not yet got the grass out of them." In answer to the right hon. gent.'s objections to the battalions of reserve, I will allow, that although they may not be as good as the others, still I will maintain, that such is the general practice in all, or most, of the great military services of Europe. There is scarcely one of them in which the practice does not prevail of establishing reserved battalions, or battalions of dêpot. Such a part of a military system is not unattended with great utility; it is equal to many and very important services, for undertaking garrison duty for instance, and by that means reliev ing the troops of the line, and adding to the disposeable force of the country. As to the militia, I assert that they are as good as ever. Their number amounts to above 70,000 in England, and to 14,000 in Scotland. They have been inspected and seen under arms by a number of general officers, and they have extorted the applause and approba tion of every person of military eminence who has seen them. The volunteers, as I before stated, amount to upwards of 379,000, among which there are 340,000 infantry, with a proportion, and certainly no incon siderable one, of 17,000 officers. The rest of the volunteer force is made up of cavalry and artillery; and it is this numerous body of men, disciplined almost as well as any equal body of men could be in the time that

the right hon. gent. is pleased to consider as not an effective force. Although, Sir, they may not at the outset be capable of meeting a regular army in line of battle, a circumstance, by the bye, not much to be apprehended, or expected in a country like this, yet stil there are many possible contingencies in which they may be eminently useful. By acting on the flanks and rear of the enemy; by making demonstrations; by contributing, with their numbers, to increase to the eye of the enemy, the magnitude of our regular force; on these and similar occasions, they will not prove, as the right hon. gent. has said, an ineffective force, but a formidable and highly efficient one: and whenever the actual struggle comes, whenever they are to contend for their country and their homes, for every thing that is dear to their feelings and to their honour, I am confident that they will all be found to do their duty, and that many of them will enter into the line. As to the right hon. gentleman's objection to their clothing, I must allow that it is a matter of regret, that they have not all adhered to the national colour, and principally because as the departure from it may occasion some confusion. I even am tempted to wish, that they had all adopted the regulation clothing, although that is not of so very much importance, as it is impossible, when acting in large bodies, that an enemy could distinguish the difference at a few hundred yards distance. The right hon. gent., as he conceives, has made a still more serious objection against ministers, for he asserts, that the volunteer system at first made no part of their means of defence. Sir, in reply to this, I will only recal to this House an act which passed in the year 1802, in which, among others, there were express provisions, not only for continuing the old volunteers, but even for accepting new offers. Sir, it must be in the recollection of gentlemen, that such an act was before this House, and that it created no discussion. It was in vain that I wished to call the attention of the House to the whole of our military and volunteer system. The provisions and principles of that bill passed through the House, with little comment, and as little attention. Surely, if there had been any thing vicious in that system, it should have been resisted in limine. The General Defence Act, as it is entitled, did not embrace the volunteer system, nor was it meant to supersede it. The proposition for exonerating the parishes, if volunteers should offer to a certain extent, was made with the unanimous concurrence of this House. The whole nation rose as one man, and it was from that cause that the idea of

parochial companies was laid aside. Was such an impetuous and gallant disposition on the part of the people, to be rejected by us? Were we to say to them, we won't accept your services, we will resort to our compulsory means? Sir, I need not suggest to the right hon. gent. how culpable, I should almost say, how criminal, government would have been, if they had not availed themselves of the spirit of the people, which we have never endeavoured to repress, as the hon. gent. has charged us with, but which, on the contrary, we have done every thing to promote. As to the state of the arsenals, though that appertains more immediately to the ordnance department, I will assert, that they never were more abundantly provided. Upwards of 400,000 stand of arms have been distributed, and it was the question of arms, and the question of exemptions, which first compelled the government to the determination of restricting the extent of the volunteersystem. I lament, that I possess not the ability to reply to the whole of the ingenious speech, which the right hon. gent. has delivered. With regard to his observation about a directing mind, I, for my own part, will admit, that I am not fortunate enough to possess all the talent that the right hon. gent does; but I will not yield to him, or any man, in the disposition to serve the country with zeal, and, I trust, with effect. We, Sir, will do right, if we can, and while we do so, we will expect the support of the country. With regard to the principle of fortifying, although that is the exclusive province of the Board of Ordnance, yet I shall make a few observations on that branch of our military system. I entirely coincide with the idea, that security is our best economy; and I will candidly allow, that in my opinion, that part of our system has been too much neglected; and it is on that account, that the plan which was submitted to Parliament, so far back as the year 1786, had not been adopted. Not that I think, consisting as the population of this country does of a brave and gallant race of men, surrounded by the sea, and encircled by a navy the most numerous, enterprizing, and well-appointed of any in the world, that we have any occasion to resort to a very extensive plan of that species of defence. As to the Martello towers, which the right hon. gent. has recommended so strongly, and the advantages of which he has illustrated so clearly by an instance which I shall not attempt to dispute, I will say that their establishment depends upon the opinion of military officers,

and, if adviseable, most certainly should be adopted, wherever they are practicable. To the objections which the right hon. gent has made to the particular mode of employ ing the Sea Fencibles, I will observe, that it is intended that some further arrange. Denis, with respect to that branch of the national defence should be made in this session. Constituted as they are, even at this moment, they are eminently useful. They are competent to the manning of the gun-boats, and in that capacity, I am convinced, would be more than a match for any force of the same kind that Fiance could send against us. Indeed, I think 1 shoul not say too much, if I hazarded the assertion that they would be able to beat all its boasted flotillas. The right hon. gent. has said much about adopting a compulsory system of recruiting the army, by a novel and rather extraordinary mode of putting an end to the volunteer system. I do not know, at least I have not made up my mind to say, whether the kind of compulsion the right hon. gent. recommends, be strictly constitutional or not. I know that it is within the omnipotence of Parliament to ordain it; but I much doubt that the army could ever be efficiently recruiting by adopt ing the system of fining, and employing the revenue drawn therefrom in the manner the right hon. gent. has suggested. Much less do I approve of the practice resorted to on former occasions, I mean; that of allowing individuals to raise regiments. The bad effects of that system have been felt from experience, and it has not been thought adviseable to recur to it again. I think there is but one more of the right hon. gentleman's suggestions, which it is necessary for me to advert to, and that is, the recommendation of enlisting for a certain term of years. To this there is one insuperable objection, and that is, that it could not be done without disorganizing the whole of our military system; for it must be extended to the whole of the army, or it would inevitably produce jealousies and dissatisfaction, that might prove fatal to that strict discipline and prompt obedience and alacrity, without which an army is nothing. I am aware that such a practice prevailed in the Austrian service, and I know that it was one of the greatest defects in it. Let any man only consider the consequence that would attend the adoption of such a system, particularly if a number of troops were ordered abroad, whose period of service was nearly expired, and who possibly might have a claim to be discharged before they could arrive half way to the place of their desti

nation. I am sure when the right hon. gent, reflects a little upon what he has thus recommended, he will have good sense enough to perceive the utter impracticability of it, and candour enough to acknowledge it. I have thus, as far as I am able, replied to every observation of the right hon. gent. which I have conceived to be material. I regret that I have been obliged to trespass so long upon the patience of gentlemen, and that they have been so ill repaid for the attention they have afforded me.

Mr. Pitt.-It is not my intention at present, Sir, to follow the example of my right hon. friend, (Mr. Windham) in taking that detailed and comprehensive view of the subject before the Committee; neither is it my intention to go into any retrospective dis cussion of the measures of government, nor to inquire whether the extraordinary means with which they were entrusted before the last prorogation of parliament, have been exercised with sufficient vigour and ability. Considering the danger with which the country was threatened as not yet past, convinced that the crisis still impends, and that still we have further efforts to exert, and further precautions to adopt, in order to enable us to meet it, I am anxious to direct your attention only to such points as are peculiarly urgent, and on which delay would be inconvenient, if not dangerous; and to suggest prospectively, the consideration of those objects which are immediately connected with the public se curity. I am still less inclined at present to examine all the questions that might be included in the resolutions presented to the Committee, opening a wide field of discussion of the conduct of government and the state of our defence. I wish to confine myself particularly to what is more directly before us-the nature, the amount, and the proposed management of the military force of the country. I am the more anxious to do this, as I have the misfortune to differ fondamentally from my right hon. friend, with regard to what should be the nature of that force to which we ought to look as a permanent source of safety throughout the whole of this contest, however long may be its du ration. No man thinks more highly than I do of the importance of a regular military force, or of the regular force of this country, No man is more convinced that the excellence of regular military forces is unattainable in the same degree by any species of force which can be employed; but, in the last session of Parliament, I professed an opinion, which I still maintain, that there are other kinds of force to which, as subsidiary