the chain of dependence, which is next to the original power. Powers given ters of the Crown. That which your committee conto the minis siders as the fifth and last of the capital objects of the act, and as the binding regulation of the whole, is the introduction (then for the first time) of the ministers of the Crown into the affairs of the company. The state claiming a concern and share of property in the company's profits, the servants of the Crown were presumed the more likely to preserve, with a scrupulous attention, the sources of the great revenues, which they were to administer, and for the rise and fall of which they were to render an account. The interference of government was introduced by this act in two ways; one by a controul, in effect by a share, in the appointment to vacancies in the supreme council. The act provided, that His Majesty's approbation should be had to the persons named to that duty. Partaking thus in the patronage of the company, administration was bound to an attention to the characters and capacities of the persons employed in that high trust. The other part of their interference was by way of inspection. By this right of inspection every thing in the company's correspondence from India, which related to the civil or military affairs, and government of the company, was directed by the act to be within fourteen days after the receipt laid before the secretary of state; and every thing, that related to the management of the revenues, was to be laid before the commissioners of the treasury. In fact, both descriptions of these papers have been generally communicated to that board. Defects in the It appears to your committee, that plan. there were great and material defects in both parts of the plan. With regard to the approbation of persons nominated to the supreme council by the court of directors, no sufficient means were provided for carrying to His Majesty, along with the nomination, the particulars in the conduct of those, who had been in the service before, which might render them proper objects of approbation or rejection. The India house possesses an office of record capable of furnishing, in almost all cases, materials for judging on the behaviour of the servants in their progress from the lowest to the highest stations; and the whole discipline of the service, civil and military, must depend upon an examination of these records inseparably attending every application for an appointment to the highest stations. But in the present state of the nomination, the ministers of the Crown are not furnished with the proper means of exercising the power of controul intended by the law, even if they were scrupulously attentive to the use of it. There are modes of proceeding favourable to neglect. Others excite enquiry, and stimulate to vigilance. presentation, whether above or below, that whenever any person, who has been in the service, shall be recommended to the king's ministers to fill a vacancy in the council general, the secretary of the court of directors shall be ordered to make a strict search into the records of the company; and shall annex to the recommendation the reasons of the court of directors for their choice, together with a faithful copy of whatever shall be found (if any thing can be found) relative to his character and conduct; as also an account of his standing in the company's service; the time of his abode in India; the reasons for his return; and the stations, whether civil or military, in which he has been successively placed. With this account ought to be transmitted the names of those, who were proposed as candidates for the same office, with the correspondent particulars relative to their conduct and situation: for not only the separate, but the comparative, merit probably would, and certainly ought to have great influence in the approbation or rejection of the party presented to the ministers of the Crown. These papers should be laid before the commissioners of the treasury, and one of the secretaries of state, and entered in books to be kept in the treasury and the secretary's office. &c. Stables. These precautions, in case of the Appointment nomination of any who have served of counsellors, the company, appear to be necessary from the improper nomination and approbation of Mr. John Macpherson, notwithstand- Macpherson's ing the objections which stood against appointment. him on the company's records. The choice of Mr. John Stables, from an inferiour military to the highest civil capacity, was by no means proper, nor an encouraging example to either service. His conduct, indeed, in the subaltern military situation, had received, and seems to have deserved, commendation; but no sufficient ground was furnished for confounding the lines and gradations of service. This measure was, however, far less exceptionable than the former; because an irregular choice of a less competent person, and the preference given to proved delinquency, in prejudice to uncensured service, are very different things. But even this latter appointment would, in all likelihood, have been avoided, if rules of promotion had been established. If such rules were settled, candidates, qualified from ability, knowledge, and service, would not be discouraged by finding, that every thing was open to every man; and that favour alone did not stand in the place of civil or military experience. The elevation from the lowest stations unfaithfully and negligently filled to the highest trusts, the total inattention to rank and seniority, and much more the combination of this neglect of rank with a confusion (unaccompanied with strong and evident reasons) of the lines of service, cannot operate as useful examples on those, who serve the publick in India. These servants, beholding men, who have been condemned for improper behaviour to the company in inferiour civil stations, elevated above them, or (what is less blamable, but still mischievous) persons without any distinguished civil talents, taken from the subordinate situations of another line to their prejudice, will despair by any good behaviour of ascending to the dignities of their own; they will be led to improve, to the utmost advantage of their fortune, the lower stages of power, and will endeavour to make up in lucre what they can never hope to acquire in station. The temporary appointment by parliament of the supreme council of India arose from an opinion, that the company, at that time at least, was not in a condition, or not disposed to a proper exercise of the privileges, which they held under their charter. It therefore behoved the directors to be particularly attentive to their choice of counsellors on the expiration of the period, during which their patronage had been suspended. The duties of the supreme council had been reputed of so arduous a nature as to require legislative interposition. They were called upon, by all possible care and impartiality, to justify parliament at least as fully in the restoration of their privileges, as the circumstances of the time had done in their suspension. | venting the utter and, perhaps, irretrievable ruin of publick affairs. In such a case, the process ought to be simple, and the power absolute in one, or in either hand separately. By contriving the balance of interests formed in the act, notorious offence, gross errour, or palpable insufficiency, have many chances of retaining and abusing authority, whilst the variety of representations, hearings, and conferences, and possibly the mere jealousy and competition between rival powers, may prevent any decision; and at length give time and means for settlements and compromises among parties, made at the expence of justice and true policy. But this act of one thousand seven hundred and eighty, not properly distinguishing judicial process from executive arrangements, requires in effect nearly the same degree of solemnity, delay, and detail for removing a political inconvenience, which attends a criminal proceeding for the punishment of offences. It goes further, and gives the same tenure to all who shall succeed to vacancies, which was given to those whom the act found in office. for vacancies. Another regulation was made in the act, which has a tendency to render the controul of delinquency, or the removal of incapacity, in the council general, extremely difficult, as well as to introduce many other abuses into the original appointBut interests have lately prevailed in the court ment of counsellors. The inconve- Provisional of directors, which, by the violation of every rule, niencies of a vacancy in that important appointment seemed to be resolved on the destruction of those office, at a great distance from the privileges, of which they were the natural guardians. authority that is to fill it, were visible: but your Every new power given has been made the source committee have doubts, whether they balance the of a new abuse; and the acts of parliament them- mischief, which may arise from the power given selves, which provide but imperfectly for the pre-in this act, of a provisional appointment to vacanvention of the mischief, have, it is to be feared, made provisions, (contrary without doubt to the intention of the legislature,) which operate against the possibility of any cure in the ordinary course. In the original institution of the supreme council, reasons may have existed against rendering the tenure of the counsellors in their office precarious. A plan of reform might have required the permanence of the persons, who were just appointed by parliament to execute it; but the act of one thousand seven hundred and eighty gave a duration, co-existent with the statute itself, to a council not appointed by act of parliament, nor chosen for any temporary or special purpose: by which means the servants in the highest situation, let their conduct be never so grossly criminal, cannot be removed, unless the court of directors and ministers of the Crown can be found to concur in the same opinion of it. The prevalence of the Indian factions in the court of directors and court of proprietors, and sometimes in the state itself, renders this agreement extremely difficult: if the principal members of the direction should be in a conspiracy with any principal servant under censure, it will be impracticable; because the first act must originate there. The reduced state of the authority of this kingdom in Bengal may be traced in a great measure to that very natural source of independence. In many cases, the instant removal of an offender from his power of doing mischief is the only mode of pre cies, not on the event, but on foresight. This mode of providing for the succession has a tendency to promote cabal, and to prevent enquiry into the qualifications of the persons to be appointed. An attempt has been actually made in consequence of this power, in a very marked manner, to confound the whole order and discipline of the company's service. Means are furnished thereby for perpetuating the powers of some given court of directors. They may forestal the patronage of their successours; on whom they entail a line of supreme counsellors and governours-general. And if the exercise of this power should happen in its outset to fall into bad hands, the ordinary chances for mending an ill choice upon death or resignation are cut off. In these provisional arrangements it is to be considered, that the appointment is not in consequence of any marked event, which calls strongly on the attention of the publick, but is made at the discretion of those, who lead in the court of directors; and they may therefore be brought forward at times the most favourable to the views of partiality and corruption. Candidates have not therefore the notice, that may be necessary for their claims; and as the possession of the office, to which the survivors are to succeed, seems remote, all enquiry into the qualifications and character of those, who are to fill it, will naturally be dull and languid. Your committee are not also without a grounded | (that is, £.11,785.)—a large sum to be received apprehension of the ill effect on any existing coun- by a person in that subordinate situation. cil general of all strong marks of influence and The minuteness with which these accounts apfavour, which appear in the subordinates of Ben-pear to have been kept, and the precision with gal. This previous designation to a great and which the date of each particular, sometimes of arduous trust, (the greatest that can be reposed very small sums, is stated, give them the appearin subjects,) when made out of any regular course ance of authenticity, as far as it can be conof succession, marks that degree of support at veyed on the face or in the construction of such home, which may overshadow the existing govern- accounts; and if they were forgeries, laid them ment. That government may thereby be disturbed open to an easy detection. But no detection by factions, and led to corrupt and dangerous is easy, when no enquiry is made. It appears compliances. At best, when these counsellors an offence of the highest order in the directors elect are engaged in no fixed employment, and concerned in this business, when, not satisfied have no lawful intermediate emolument, the na- with leaving such charges so long unexamined, tural impatience for their situations may bring on they should venture to present to the king's a traffick for resignations between them and the servants the object of them for the highest trust, persons in possession, very unfavourable to the which they have to bestow. If Mr. Stuart was interests of the publick, and to the duty of their really guilty, the possession of this post must furnish him not only with the means of renewing the former evil practices charged upon him, and of executing them upon a still larger scale, but of oppressing those unhappy persons, who, under the supposed protection of the faith of the company, had appeared to give evidence concerning his former misdemeanours. situations. Since the act, two persons have been nominated to the ministers of the Crown by the court of directors for this succession. Neither has yet been approved. But by the description of the persons a judgment may be formed of the principles, on which this power is likely to be exercised. Stuart and pointment to Vacancies. Your committee find, that in consequence of the above-mentioned act succeed to the honourable Charles Stuart and Mr. Sulivan were appointed to succeed to the first vacancies in the supreme council. Mr. Stuart's first appointment in the company's service was in the year one thousand seven hundred and sixty-one. He returned to England in 1775, and was permitted to go back to India in 1780. In August 1781 he was nominated by the court of directors (Mr. Sulivan and Sir William James were chairman and deputy chairman) to succeed to the first vacancy in the supreme council, and on the 19th of September following His Majesty's approval of such nomination was requested. Mr. Stuart's situation at the time of his appointment. In the nomination of Mr. Stuart, the consideration of rank in the service was not neglected; but if the court of directors had thought fit to examine their records, they would have found matter at least strongly urging them to a suspension of this appointment, until the charges against Mr. Stuart should be fully cleared up. That matter remained (as it still remains) unexplained from the month of May 1775, where, on the Bengal revenue consultations of the 12th of that month, peculations to a large amount are charged upon oath against Mr. Stuart under the following title; The Particulars of the Money un'justly taken by Mr. Stuart, during the time he was at Burdwan." The sum charged against him in this account is 2,17,684 sicca rupees (that is, 25,253 pounds sterling): besides which there is another account with the following title: "The Particulars of the Money unjustly taken by Cally-persaud Bose, Banyan to the Ho"nourable Charles Stuart, Esquire, at Burd"wan, and amounting to sicca rupees 1,01,675." 66 66 This attempt in the directors was the more surprising, when it is considered, that two committees of this house were at that very time sitting upon an enquiry, that related directly to their conduct, and that of their servants in India. Mr. Sulivan's situation at appointment. It was in the same spirit of defiance of parliament, that at the same time they nominated Mr. Sulivan, son to the time of his the then chairman of the court of directors, to the succession to the same high trust in India. On these appointments, your committee thought it proper to make those enquiries, which the court of directors thought proper to omit. They first conceived it fitting to enquire what rank Mr. Sulivan bore in the service; and they thought it not unnecessary here to state the gradations in the service, according to the established usage of the company. The company's civil servants generally go to India as writers; in which capacity they serve the company five years. The next step, in point of rank, is to be a factor, and next to that a junior merchant; in each of which capacities they serve the company three years. They then rise to the rank of senior merchant, in which situation they remain till called by rotation to the board of trade. Until the passing of the regulation act in 1773, seniority entitled them to succeed to the council, and finally gave them pretensions to the government of the presidency. The above gradation of the service, your committee conceive, ought never to be superseded by the court of directors, without evident reason, in persons or circumstances, to justify the breach of an ancient order. The names, whether taken from civil or commercial gradation, are of no moment. The order itself is wisely established, and tends to provide a natural guard against partiality, precipitancy, and corruption in patronage. It affords means and opportunities for an examination | requesting, that Mr. Sulivan might be allowed to into character; and among the servants it secures a strong motive to preserve a fair reputation. Your committee find, that no respect whatsoever was paid to this gradation in the instance of Mr. Sulivan, nor is there any reason assigned for departing from it. They do not find, that Mr. Sulivan had ever served the company in any one of the above capacities, but was, in the year 1777, abruptly brought into the service, and sent to Madras to succeed as Persian translator and secretary to the council. Your committee have found a letter from Mr. Sulivan to George Wombwell and William Devaynes, Esquires, chairman and deputy chairman of the court of directors, stating, that he trusted | his applications would have a place in their deliberations when Madras affairs were taken up.-Of what nature those applications were, your committee cannot discover, as no traces of them appear on the company's records; nor whether any proofs of his ability, even as Persian translator, exist, which might entitle him to a preference to the many servants in India, whose study and opportunities afforded them the means of becoming perfect masters of that language. On the above letter your committee find, that the committee of correspondence proceeded; and on their recommendation the court of directors unanimously approved of Mr. Sulivan to be appointed to succeed to the posts of secretary and Persian translator. keep his rank. This request brought on some discussion. A Mr. Freeman, it seems, who had acted under Mr. Sulivan as sub-secretary, whilst his principal obtained so much praise for his diligence, addressed the board on the same day, and observed, "that since Mr. Sulivan's arrival, he '[Mr. Freeman] had, without intermission, done "almost the whole of the duty allotted to the post "of secretary, which it was notorious Mr. Sulivan had paid but little attention to; and nei"ther his inclination nor duty led him to act any "longer as Mr. Sulivan's deputy." 66 Here your committee cannot avoid remarking the direct contradiction, which this address of Mr. Freeman's gives to the letter from the president and council to the court of directors in April 1780, wherein Mr. Sulivan is praised for his " diligence and attention in his office of se"cretary." The president and council do not shew any displeasure at Mr. Freeman's representation, (so contrary to their own,) the truth of which they thus tacitly admit, but agree to write to the governour-general and council, "that it could "not be supposed, that they could carry on the publick business for any length of time with"out the services of a secretary, and clerk of "appeals, two offices that required personal at"tendance, and which would be a general injury "to the servants on their establishment, and in particular to the person who acted in those capacities, as they learnt, that Mr. Sulivan had been appointed judge advocate-general in Bengal; and to request the governour-general and "council to inform Mr. Sulivan of their sentiments, and desire him to inform them, whether "he meant to return to his station, or to remain in Bengal." 66 66 On the 5th December, as a mark of their approbation of Mr. Freeman, who had so plainly contradicted their opinion of Mr. Sulivan, the president and council agree to appoint him to act as secretary and clerk of appeals, till Mr. Sulivan's answer should arrive, with the emoluments, and to confirm him therein, if Mr. Sulivan should remain in Bengal. Conformably to the orders of the court, Mr. Sulivan succeeded to those posts; and the presi-" dent and council acquainted the court of directors, that they had been obeyed. About five months after it appears, that Mr. Sulivan thought fit to resign the office of Persian translator, to which he had been appointed by the directors." In April 1780, Mr. Sulivan is commended for his great diligence as secretary; in August following he obtains leave to accompany Mrs. Sulivan to Bengal, whence she is to proceed to Europe on account of her health; and he is charged with a commission from the president and council of Fort Saint-George to obtain for that settlement supplies of grain, troops, and money, from the governour-general and council of Bengal. In October the governour-general requests permission of the council there to employ Mr. Sulivan as his assistant, for that he had experienced [between his arrival in Bengal and that time] the abilities of Mr. Sulivan, and made choice of him as completely qualified for that trust: also requests the board to appoint him judge advocate-general; and likewise to apply to the presidency of Madras, for him to remain in Bengal without prejudice to his rank on their establishment: which several requests the board at Madras readily complied with, notwithstanding their natural sensibility to the loss of a secretary of such ability and diligence as they had described Mr. Sulivan to be. On the 14th February 1781, the president and council received a letter from Bengal in reply, and stating their request, that Mr. Sulivan might reserve the right of returning to his original situation on the Madras establishment, if the court of directors should disapprove of his being transferred to Bengal. To this request the board at Madras declare they have no objection; and here the matter rests; the court of directors not having given any tokens of approbation or disapprobation of the transaction. Such is the history of Mr. Sulivan's service from the time of his appointment; such were the qualifications, and such the proofs of assiduity and diligence given by him in holding so many incomOn the 5th of December following the presi-patible offices, (as well as being engaged in other dent and council received a letter from Bengal, dealings, which will appear in their place,) when, after three years desultory residence in India, he was thought worthy to be nominated to the succession to the supreme council. No proof whatsoever of distinguished capacity in any line preceded his original appointment to the service; so that the whole of his fitness for the supreme council rested upon his conduct and character since his appointment as Persian translator. Your committee find, that His Majesty has not vet given his approbation to the nomination, made by the court of directors on the 30th of August 1781, of Messrs. Stuart and Sulivan to succeed to the supreme council on the first vacancies, though the court applied for the royal approbation so long ago as the 19th of September 1781; and in these instances the king's ministers performed their duty, in withholding their countenance from a proceeding so exceptionable, and of so dangerous an example. Your committee, from a full view of the situation and duties of the court of directors, are of opinion, that effectual means ought to be taken for regulating that court in such a manner as to prevent either rivalship with, or subserviency to, their servants. It might therefore be proper for the house to consider, whether it is fit, that those who are, or have been within some given time, directors of the company, should be capable of an appointment to any offices in India. Directors can never properly govern those, for whose employments they are or may be themselves candidates; they can neither protect nor coerce them with due impartiality, or due authority. If such rules as are stated by your committee under this head were observed in the regular service at home and abroad, the necessity of superseding the regular service by strangers would be more rare; and whenever the servants were so superseded, those, who put forward other candidates, would be obliged to produce a strong plea of merit and ability, which in the judgment of mankind ought to overpower pretensions so authentically established, and so rigorously guarded from abuse. Deficiency of powers to mi The second object in this part of the nisters of go- plan of the act of 1773, namely, that Vernment. of inspection by the ministers of the Crown, appears not to have been provided for, so as to draw the timely and productive attention of the state on the grievances of the people of India, and on the abuses of its government. By the regulating act, the ministers were enabled to inspect one part of the correspondence, that, which was received in England; but not that, which went outward. They might know something, but that very imperfectly, and unsystematically, of the state of affairs; but they were neither authorized to advance nor to retard any measure taken by the directors in consequence of that state: they were not provided even with sufficient means of knowing what any of these measures were. And this imperfect information, together with the want of a direct call to any specifick duty, might have in some degree occasioned that remissness, which rendered even the imperfect powers originally given by the act of 1773 the less efficient. This defect was in a great measure remedied by a subsequent act: but that act was not passed until the year 1780. 1773. ports. Your committee find, that during Disorders inthe whole period, which elapsed from creased since 1773 to the commencement of 1782, disorders and abuses of every kind multiplied. Wars contrary to policy, and contrary to publick faith, were carrying on in various parts of India. The allies, dependants, and subjects Vide secret of the company were every where op- committee repressed; dissensions in the supreme council prevailed, and continued for the greater part of that time; the contests be- Vide select tween the civil and judicial powers committee rethreatened that issue, to which they ports, 1781. came at last, an armed resistance to the authority of the king's court of justice; the orders, which by an act of parliament the servants were bound to obey, were avowedly, and on principle, contemned; until at length the fatal effects of accumulated misdemeanours abroad, and neglects at home, broke out in the alarming manner, which your committee have so fully reported to this house. in India not In all this time the true state of the Proceedings several presidencies, and the real con- known to parduct of the British government to- liament. wards the natives, was not at all known to parliament: it seems to have been very imperfectly known even to ministers. Indeed, it required an unbroken attention, and much comparison of facts and reasonings, to form a true judgment on that difficult and complicated system of politicks, revenue, and commerce, whilst affairs were only in their progress to that state, which produced the present enquiries. Therefore, whilst the causes of their ruin were in the height of their operation, both the company and the natives were understood by the publick as in circumstances the most assured, and most flourishing. Insomuch that, whenever the affairs of India were brought before parliament, as they were two or three times during that period, the only subject-matter of discussion, anywise important, was concerning the sums, which might be taken out of the company's surplus profits for the advantage of the state. Little was thought of but the disengagement of the company from their debts in England, and to prevent the servants abroad from drawing upon them, so as that body might be enabled, without exciting clamours here, to afford the contribution that was demanded. All descriptions of persons, either here or in India, looking solely to appearances at home, the reputation of the directors depended on the keeping the company's sales in a situation to support the dividend; that of the ministers depended on the most lucrative bargains for the exchequer; and that of the servants abroad on the largest investments; until at length there is great reason to apprehend, that, unless some very substantial reform takes place in the |