inspection, reviews and the divers other occupations that fill the hours of the soldier's life when in winter quarters. Over all, and infusing an air of animation and cheerfulness into the bronzed faces of our men, was a feeling of confidence in the leader of the army and in its success in the coming campaign. How much of this feeling was owing to the fact that Lieutenant-general Grant had established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac I will not pretend to say, but the remark was frequent after this event, "Boys, the next campaign means business; Uncle U. S. is going to travel with the Army of the Potomac." Major-general Grant was nominated lieutenant-general and confirmed by the Senate on the second day of March, 1864, and eight days afterward the President assigned him to the command of all the armies of the United States. This gave him the direction of affairs over the whole broad theater of the war, and for the first time during its existence we were likely to have a general and co-operative movement of all our vast armies.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

BATTLING IN THE ADRIATIC

ITALY VERSUS AUSTRIA-THE FLEETS-ATTACK ON LISSA-REPULSE -ATTACK RENEWED AND AGAIN REPULSED-RAMMING OF THE "RE D'ITALIA"-IRONCLADS IN ACTION-ITALY'S DEFEAT

A

A. D. 1866

T the end of April, 1866, Austria began to mobilize her army

and prepare her fleet for action. She was threatened at once in the north and the south-in the north by the powerful Prussian kingdom, with its matchless army; in the south by the new state of Italy. An alliance bound these two powers together, and the end of that alliance, from an Italian point of view, was the recovery of Venice.

War was not declared by Italy till June 20th, but six weeks before that date she had commenced her naval preparations. Admiral Count Carlo Pellion di Persano was given command of the Italian fleet, though against his own wishes. His personal character was not inspiring, nor were his war services very remarkable, yet he was regarded in Italy as the only Italian admiral, the one man who was qualified to lead the Italian fleet in war.

Italy had devoted great attention to naval matters. Her expenditure on ships had been very large since 1860, amounting to $60,000,000, and the Italian fleet made a noble show on paper. The two finest ships, the "Re d'Italia" and the "Re di Portogallo" had cost $1,625,000 each, and had been built in the United States at Webb's Yard, New York. They were large vessels of 5,700 tons,* with seven inches of armor, carrying a most formidable armament; the first, two 150-pounders, with thirty 7-inch guns and four smooth-bores; the second, two 300-pounders, with twenty-six 7-inch guns. But they were built of green wood, and were weak in their scantling, while a great deal of filth had, during their construction, been thrown down inside their frames, which made them unendurably foul. They were not good sea-boats, lacking buoyancy and maneuvering power; moreover, their rudders were exposed, a fault which had grave results at Lissa. Next to them in power came the "Affondatore," a turret-ram of 4,070 tons, built at Millwall on the Thames. She carried 5-inch armor, and two 300-pounder Armstrong guns placed in two turrets. Her enormous ram, projecting twenty-six feet, and her powerful armament led Italians to consider her as their best ship, while Persano in particular put almost childish faith in her. Yet she too was a bad sea-boat, plunging very heavily owing to the great weight of turret and belt forward, and, through her length, did not steer well. The two small rams "Terribile" and "Formidabile," of 2,700 tons, had been built in France, and were handy vessels, carrying like all the other Italian ships, except those above-mentioned, four and a half-inch plating, and 6-inch rifles as their primary armament. The "Maria Pia," "Castelfidardo," "Ancona," "San Mar

* Old measurement, in which all tonnages in this chapter are expressed,

tino" and "Principe Carignano" were broadside ironclads of over 4,000 tons, with an end-to-end belt of armor on the water-line. Two armored gunboats, the "Palestro" and the "Varese," concluded the tale of ironclads; they carried each two Armstrong 150-pounders, with some smaller guns. Behind these twelve ships, which formed the first line of the Italian fleet, were numerous wooden frigates and corvettes, steam-propelled, but of the older type, which armor had rendered obsolete. Nine such vessels were present at Lissa, carrying from fifty-four to twenty guns.

Of such a fleet Italy might well feel proud. As far as ships and guns went, it looked equal in quality, if not superior, to the fleets of France, England, or the United States, at that date the three leading naval powers of the world. The Italians had shown independence in adopting models which were then considered excellent, and the "Affondatore" might be said to embody the structural teaching of the American civil war. But though all seemed good on the surface, it is not enough to spend millions on a fleet; they must be well and judiciously spent. The Italians pinned their faith to material force, they neglected moral strength. They had forgotten the fact that it is not ships and guns which win battles, that the best of ships are useless without highly trained captains, and the best of guns without skilled gunners. They kept large squadrons in commission, but they did not train their men for war by constant practice in gunnery and steam tactics. The efficiency of a fleet depends primarily upon the efficiency of the seamen and officers who have to work it, and the inferior quality of the Italian personnel rendered vain the superiority of their materiel.

The Italians have always been a seafaring people. Their coastline is long; they have considerable fisheries; and the history of Venice and Genoa is the history of naval states. Their past was not ignoble, and they were fired by a great idea. The freedom of Italy appealed strongly to every Italian; they had fought and suffered in 1848 and 1859 for that worthy cause, but in 1866 it was to be won by them ignobly and ingloriously, through the aid of their ally. History teaches that men fight best when they have a good cause behind them; here there was a good cause, which did not bring its devotees success. Incapable generals, irresolute

admirals, untrained officers, undisciplined sailors, explain their defeat. Nelson had won the victories which made England great, in part at least, by the harmony which he inspired among the "band of brothers" who served him. But here was great friction and jealousy between admiral and admiral, between captain and captain. There was none of that prompt and unquestioning obedience which is the preliminary of successful war. Neither faithful

ness nor deference marked the relation of officers to one another, and so notoriously was this the case that an Italian writer has naively asserted that in all navies this state of things obtains, and more that it is an inseparable effect of life at sea. The gunners who were collected to fight the ships were mostly raw recruits, who, coming from an eager and excitable stock, stood greatly in want of discipline. Trained engineers were conspicuous by their absence, as the Englishmen who had hitherto attended to the machinery did not choose to fight; worst of all, the officers in the inferior grades were ignorant and inexperienced. Many of the ships wanted heavy rifled guns, and the engines in numerous cases had been badly kept and were not in good condition.

Such was the fleet of which Persano took command. An able and determined man might, even so, have done much, but Persano was neither able nor determined. On May 16th he went to Taranto, and was so much dispirited by what he saw that he wrote on the 22d, "I fear we shall go down." His behavior has been well described in the act of accusation. "Persano's acts, in one

continued series, exhibit a true repugnance to taking any decisive step. Now he talks of waiting for steel shot; now he wants to transfer guns from one ship to another; now it is gun-carriages which are lacking; now ammunition for his Armstrong guns; now swift scouts; now store-ships; now doctors; now nurses; now engineers; now lieutenants; now speaking tubes; now pilots; now marines; and when he has the fleet at last in perfect order, for such was the opinion of all, and when he might with success have attacked the Austrians, he runs back to port to wait for the 'Affondatore." " The words which are italicized are certainly an exaggeration, but, on the whole, this severe indictment is true. Amid incapacity and mismanagement, despairing of success, but

compelled by public opinion to enterprises which his judgment considered desperate, he lacked the ability to organize an efficient fleet, and the moral courage to refuse to lead forth to disaster an inefficient one.

On June 25 he brought such of his ships as were ready from Taranto to Ancona, and anchored there. The "Affondatore, which fills his dispatches to the Italian Minister of Marine, was on her way from Gibraltar, and till she came he felt that he could do nothing. He had a powerful squadron, but it was not powerful enough to his mind, though he knew that the Austrian fleet was far inferior in every respect. His first act on his arrival at Ancona was to telegraph to the Minister of Marine for four fast merchant steamers to serve as scouts, for five pontoons for use at Ancona, for doctors, for twelve powerful glasses, for as many guns as possible, and for two or three gutta-percha voice-pipes. Many of these requests were at once complied with, though the guns had not all arrived by July 7th. Meantime he was exercising his stokers and gunners, when, on the morning of June 27th, the dispatch-boat "Esploratore" steamed into port with the news that the Austrians were in sight. The "Re d'Italia" had the coal in her bunkers on fire; the "Re di Portogallo" could not start her engines; the "Terribile" had only half her guns; the "Ancona" was unready for battle; the "Varese" and "Palestro" had engineers who could not manage their engines; the "Carignano" had no heavy guns. The rest of the fleet was coaling confusedly. However, the "San Martino," "Maria Pia," "Castelfidardo," and "Carignano," the latter ship in spite of her missing battery, made ready and formed up in some sort of order. Outside the port lay Tegetthoff, to whose doings we must recur later, with six most indifferent ironclads and one old frigate. For three hours he steamed in line abreast slowly backward and forward, cleared for action, and waiting for the infinitely finer ships of the Italians to assail him. He waited in vain. Though Persano had described his intention as being "to entice the hostile fleet to offer battle, and to annihilate it if it makes the attempt," he failed to lead out his ships and annihilate the enemy now they were at hand. Instead, he went on board the "Esploratore," no fighting ship, ordered his four ironclads to