avoid financial improvidence and national bankruptcy; the reform of the administration of the revenue pledged as security for the proposed loan, so as to make it efficient for that purpose; and the supervision of the expenditure of the loan proceeds, in order that they may not be wasted or applied to private use. These ends are in the interest of the Chinese people and serve to promote and preserve their national integrity. The Chinese object to the proposed terms and conditions. They want no control, no supervision, no auditing or accounting. They admit the present inadequacy of the security offered the salt revenue-and the necessity for its reform; but they want to reform it in their own way and at their own convenience. They are now hostile to the groups and have broken off all negotiations therewith, and there is now no prospect of the renewal of the same in the near future. In the meantime other parties have come into the field and made loans and obtained important concessions. The largest of these loans that of the London syndicate-is made upon the same security previously offered the groups. In this London loan contract there is no provision for supervision of expenditures or for the audit of accounts or for improvement of security pledged. If this and other loans made were sufficient to supply China's needs perhaps the powers supporting the groups, and the groups themselves, would have no right to object. But unfortunately they are not large enough; they are, so to speak," a mere drop in the bucket" or only a modicum of what China needs and must have. Therefore, instead of helping the Chinese out of their difficulties or clearing up the situation, these loans only make it worse. This London loan in particular adds to the burden imposed upon the salt revenue, increases the volume of securities to be thrown upon the market, and makes it that much harder to float any subsequent issue. And, what is worse, it demoralizes the Chinese and intensifies their opposition to the groups, to whom they must probably come in the end for the full measure of relief they require. The Belgian concession evidences a return on the part of the Chinese to a policy which it was supposed they had irrevocably abandoned, that is, giving concessions instead of making straight loans. * * * Under these conditions it is not strange that the local group representatives should feel a little nervous; * * * they are blocked on the reorganization loan and are thereby prevented from competing for industrial contracts on the joint account, and the combination agreement prevents them from acting on their individual account. In the meantime they are exposed to flank attacks by loan. promoters and concession hunters. It is doubtless true that if the groups remain firm, if the powers continue their exclusive support, and if the French market remains closed to these outside or sporadic loan issues, these loan promoters can not go very far in their efforts; their operations will be necessarily confined to rather narrow limits. But whatever they do, whether much or little, only serves to demoralize the Chinese and make them that much harder to deal with. * * * I think the reasonable probabilities are that if the pending deadlock continues much longer, if other concessions like the one given the Belgians are granted, and if other loans like the one made by the London syndicate are effected, the tie that holds the groups together will break and a dissolution of the groups will result. I have [etc.] File No. 893.51/1118. W. J. CALHOUN. The Secretary of State to the American Minister.1 [Telegram.-Paraphrase.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, October 30, 1912. The Japanese Government suggests that the groups should instruct their representatives to consult with the six ministers at Peking with a view to determining what terms are absolutely indispensable as well as practicable for the proposed reorganization loan. This suggestion has been approved by the British Government and the British and American groups have concurred. The American group understand that the findings of the financial representatives will of course be referred to their principals for final approval. KNOX. File No. 893.51/1129. No. 217.] The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. BRITISH EMBASSY, Washington, November 2, 1912. SIR: With reference to your note of the 30th ultimo respecting the Chinese loan I have the honour to inform you that I have today received telegraphic instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that the powers having concurred in the proposal of the Japanese Government, the British, French and Russian Ministers at Peking and their groups have been instructed accordingly. I have [etc.] INDEMNITY PAYMENTS. JAMES BRYCE. File No. 493.11/362. The Acting Secretary of State to the American Minister. [Telegram.-Paraphrase.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, December 24, 1912. A request of the Chinese Government has been informally made. by the Chinese Minister for the postponement for one year of settle 1 For repetition to Tokyo. Same to the Embassies at Paris, London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. ment of the unpaid indemnity installments due from November 1911 to December 1912. This Government is not disposed to object if postponement is necessary and provided similar instructions are received by your colleagues. HUNTINGTON WILSON. File No. 493.11/364. The American Minister to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.-Paraphrase.] AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, December 28, 1912. Postponement of indemnity payments considered yesterday by diplomatic corps. German, Japanese and American Ministers authorized to consent provided all colleagues did likewise. French Minister authorized to consent provided the Chinese effectively reorganized their finances. Russian Minister instructed to refuse to consent. British Minister without instructions. Answer of British uncertain because of increasing strain over Tibet and opium question. No further action taken. CALHOUN. File No. 493.11/366. The American Minister to the Secretary of State. [Telegram.-Paraphrase.] AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, December 30, 1912. Private suggestion of Dutch and German Ministers that consent be given to extension of indemnity payments provided a majority of the interested ministers agree. I submit the question for your instruction. CALHOUN. File No. 493.11/366. The Secretary of State to the American Minister. [Telegram.-Paraphrase.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, December 31, 1912. Although there is some question as to whether the Department has the authority to sanction the postponement of the indemnity payments, if in the opinion of a majority of the ministers interested postponement should prove unavoidable it is, under the present circumstances, extremely unlikely that this Government will demand immediate payment. ΚΝΟΣ. INTERNATIONAL PLAN FOR DEFENSE OF FOREIGN SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE FINAL PROTOCOL OF 1901. File No. 893.00/544. The American Chargé d'Affaires to the Secretary of State. No. 298] [Extract.] AMERICAN LEGATION, Peking, July 25, 1911. SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith copy of a memorandum of the 21st instant from the British Legation regarding an international plan of defense for the foreign settlements at certain Yangtze river ports in the event of disturbances involving danger to the lives of foreigners [etc.] As conditions on the Yangtze river have been unsettled for some time and are likely to remain so indefinitely during the period of transition from an autocratic to a democratic representative form of government, and as the American communities in the riverine ports are small and totally unable to take steps adequately to protect themselves in the event of uprisings endangering foreign life and property, I believe it would be prudent to instruct our consuls in those ports to collaborate with their British colleagues with a view to effecting an arrangement for concerted action in defending these settlements. As the American residents in any of these foreign settlements would undoubtedly benefit from any international plan of defense that might be devised, it is obvious that they should bear their full share of responsibility for its maintenance. In consideration of this question it occurred to me that the views of the admiral commanding the American Asiatic fleet would be valuable to the Department in deciding as to what course of action to pursue, and I have accordingly transmitted to Admiral Murdock a copy of the enclosed memorandum, asking him to transmit to the Navy Department an expression of his views thereon. The distribution of foreign men-of-war on the Yangtze cannot but be a most important factor in any international concerted plan of defense of these settlements. In referring this question to the Department, I have the honor therefore to recommend favorable action on the inclosed memorandum, and would be pleased if you would inform the Legation of your views and instruct it concerning any course of action deemed necessary or advisable to take. I have [etc.] PERCIVAL HEINTZLEMAN. [Inclosure.-Memorandum.] The British Legation to the American Legation. A revised scheme has been under consideration for the defense of the international settlements at the Yangtze ports of Chinkiang, Hankow, Nanking, Wuhu, Kiukiang, and at Amoy, in the event of disturbances involving danger to the lives of foreigners. The suggestion emanated from the British naval authorities, who considered that a concerted plan was necessary in order to 67106°-F B 1912—11 enable them to render effective assistance if called upon in an emergency. His Majesty's Government however consider that any such plans would be greatly enhanced if the American authorities were disposed to lend their cooperation in carrying them out. The reports received from His Majesty's consular officers indicate that to a large extent their colleagues at the ports named are already cognizant of the proposed schemes and have signified in principle their approval of them. His Britannic Majesty's Legation has the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, to inquire whether the American Legation would be disposed to instruct its consular officers to discuss further the details of the schemes at the several ports with their British colleagues with a view to completing arrangements for an international plan of action. PEKING, July 21, 1911. File No. 893.00/544. The Acting Secretary of State to the American Chargé d'Affaires. No. 173.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 27, 1911. SIR: In reply to the Legation's despatch No. 298 of July 25 last, regarding the international plan of defense [etc.] you are informed that the Department is in receipt of a letter dated September 22, 1911, from the Acting Secretary of the Navy approving fully cooperation by the American and British authorities for the purpose above mentioned, and to this end he has instructed the American Commander-in-chief of the United States Asiatic fleet to confer with the British naval authorities and with the American consular officers in regard to the matter. You will therefore instruct the American consuls at the ports referred to to collaborate with their British colleagues with a view to effecting an arrangement for concerted action in defending the settlements. You may inform the British Minister of this action. I am [etc.] HUNTINGTON WILSON. File No. 893.00/566a. The Secretary of State to the American Ambassadors to France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Russia, and to the Minister to China. [Identic Telegram.-Paraphrase.] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, October 14, 1911. In view of the seriousness of the present disturbance in China this Government contemplates advising its nationals in the affected districts to concentrate at open ports easily accessible to foreign menof-war. Before taking such action this Government desires to ascertain whether the Government to which you are accredited shares our view as to the advisability of such a step and whether the situation calls for further measures by the powers for the protection of foreign interests. 1 Not printed. |