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File No. 893.00/1399.
The American Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to the Secretary of State.
Vienna, July 27, 1912. On presentation of the memorandum communicated in the telegram of July 20, Count Berchtold informed me that the AustroHungarian Government does not feel the time has arrived for recognition of the Chinese Republic in view of the unstable conditions existing. Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian Government, apart from this point, does not consider that an agreement between the powers could at present be reached.
File No. 893.00/1403.
Paris, July 31, 1912. I have just received a note verbale from the Minister for Foreign Affairs dated July 29, of which the following is a translation:
Summary of translation: The Minister acknowledges the Ambassador's note verbale of July 24 in regard to recognition of the Chinese Government. The French Government considers that under existing circumstances the conditions for recognition seem far from fulfilled. Until the Provisional Government shall have been succeeded by a regularly constituted parliamentary régime, according to the properly expressed desire of the people, and until such new and wellestablished government shall have given formal guaranty of treaty stipulations and rights of foreigners in China, the French Governinent does not consider that the question of recognition of the Chinese Government can be advantageously advanced,
File No. 893.00/1408.
The American Ambassador to Russia to the Secretary of State.
St. Petersburg, August 3, 1912. I have today received the following aide-mémoire:
Summary of the aide-mémoire: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs acknowledges the embassy's aide-mémoire of July 30 relating to recognition of the Chinese Republican Government. This Government is only provisional; the period for which it was elected soon expires ; under its administration the conditions in China sem not to have sensibly improved; the Russian Government believes that none of the powers who have sent troops to China is thinking of recalling them. Consequently the Russian Government believes that it would be prudent to postpone formal recognition of the Chinese Republic until that Gorernment, having been definitely established, shall have given sufficient proofs to judge of its stability.
File No. 893.00/1447.
(Extract.) No. 612.]
Peking, August 3, 1912. Sir: Referring to your telegram [of July 20] repeated from Tokyo July 22, I have the honor to report that on July 26 I received a call from Mr. Ijuin, the Japanese Minister. He said his Government had informed him of your inquiry or suggestion concerning recognition of the Chinese Republic, presented to his Foreign Office in Tokyo through the American Ambassador. He said his Government had asked for his opinion on the subject but before replying he called to confer with me and to learn my opinion. I replied substantially as follows: I suppose the basis for recognition is the existence of a government
a which has the appearance of stability or offers reasonable assurance of permanence. There may be reason to doubt whether or not the present Government in China gives evidence of such right to recognition; I had some doubt on the subject myself. But after careful consideration of the situation, I am now of the opinion that the present Government affords reasonable assurance that, if not permanent, it will at least last an indefinite time.
For these and other reasons I am in favor of immediate recognition and think that it will be both a friendly and helpful act on the part of the powers to
The Japanese Minister said that he was of my opinion, or, rather, he agreed with me upon the whole, but with him it is largely a question of the proper time. He is afraid that recognition at this time will serve to influence the ambition, increase the arrogance and add to the excitement of the young fledglings now in the Government and in the National Assembly. It is now very hard to deal with them and recognition would make it still harder.
I replied that at present, as a result of the recent Cabinet resignations, very few of the class to whom he referred are in the Government.
Now that they are out of the Cabinet and their places filled with men who are more closely identified with Yuan, the latter will be entitled to credit for recognition and will be made that much stronger in his position, especially in the eyes of his own people.
Mr. Ijuin seemed to accept my estimate of the situation as correct and left leaving the impression on my mind that he would report to his Government in favor of recognition.
The next day however, Mr. Midzuno, the First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, also called to see me.
He thinks there is a probability of considerable feeling and conflict at the coming election, and the result may be destructive of all our hopes for peace and order.
I told him I had thought of that phase of the situation. I had however made inquiry among the best informed Chinese I knew, and they all seemed to think the election will not develop any serious trouble and that Yuan is reasonably sure to be reelected.
But Mr. Midzuno was not convinced. He thinks there are enough clouds in the political sky to suggest a storm of some kind.
The day following Mr. Krupensky, the Russian Minister, also called and he brought up the same question. He was quite pessimistic in his view of future possibilities. He said he thought his Government will reply that the time for recognition has not arrived. I did not argue the question with him.
I have not seen or talked with the other ministers on the subject. They are nearly all out of the city on vacations. I have [etc.]
W. J. CALHOUN.
File No. 893.00/1413.
Rome, August 9, 1912. The Foreign Minister says that while conditions in the Chinese Republic remain precarious and provisional, formal recognition would be premature. It is the duty of the Powers to make sure that the Government can effectively assume obligations. The Italian Government will therefore wait and observe.
File No. 893.00/1414.
The American Ambassador to Great Britain to the Secretary of State.
London, August 10, 1912. I have just received the Foreign Office memorandum, dated August 9, as follows:
His Majesty's Government regret that reports that they have received do not corroborate the statements contained in your July 20 as to an improvement in the conditions in China or to the exercise of general administrative control by the Provisional Government. On the contrary, the President, Yuan Shih Kai, himself admits that the Central Government are unable to enforce the observance of treaty obligations in certain provinces of China. Further, His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that recognition would add permanently to the stability of the existing administration.
File No. 893.00/1420.
The American Ambassador to Japan to the Secretary of State.
Tokyo, August 15, 1912. In a memorandum received today the Japanese Government, replying to the memorandum contained in your July 20, state that they do not consider the existing Provisional Government of China organized in sufficient conformity with the requirements of international law to merit recognition. They think it would be unwise and harmful fr
every point of view to regard the existing régime otherwise than as provisional. But they favor the recognition of a stable and etlicient government in China at the earliest possible moment.
File No. 893.00/1435.
The American Minister to the Seoretary of State.
Peking, August 31,1912. From the Foreign Office I learn that on the 17th instant the British minister presented a memorandum that recognizes China's suzeranity, not sovereignty, over Tibet; objects to Chinese action during the last three years in interfering in the internal affairs of Tibet; declares this interference to be opposed to the spirit of the 1906 treaty, which demands joint action by Great Britain and China; and declares that until China agrees to these demands the British Government can not recognize the Republic and will forbid the entrance of Chinese into Tibet via India.
File No. 893.00/1447.
The Secretary of State to the American Minister.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, No. 283.]
Washington, September 20, 1912. Sir: The Department has received and read with interest your dispatch No. 612 of August 3 last, reporting an interview with the Japanese Minister with regard to the recognition of the Chinese Republic What you said to Mr. Ijuin on this subject is approved by the Department.
In this connection, however, it is the Department's opinion that it would be more in accordance with established precedents to defer recognition of the Chinese Republic until a permanent constitution shall have been definitely adopted by a representative national assembly, a president duly elected in accordance with the provisions of such constitution, and the present Provisional Government replaced by a permanent one with constitutional authority. I am [etc.],
NOTE.—The principle of concerted international action in China previously announced by the Department of State is reaffirmed in a note to the Ambassador of Great Britain, dated October 4, 1912. Ag this note is directly concerned with the matter of the international loan it is printed under that head.
See also the Message of the President at the beginning of this volume, page XXIV.
CHINESE LOAN NEGOTIATIONS. CONCLUSION OF THE HUKUANG
RAILWAY LOAN. CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING PROPOSED CURRENCY REFORM, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND REORGANIZATION LOANS. CURRENT-EXPENSE ADVANCES.
HUKUANG RAILWAY LOAN.1
NOTE.-In 1903 the Chinese Government promised the British Government that if Chinese capital should prove insufficient for building a proposed railroad from Hankow to Szechuen, British capital would be invited to participate. In 1904 a promise was made that if foreign capital should be needed, Americans and British should have the preference. Reference to this promise was made by China in replying to French capitalists who requested the concession. The British and French then arranged to discuss the loan, and the British Government inquired concerning American capital. No action was taken by the Americans and a British-French syndicate was formed, provision being made for admission of Belgian and American capital. (For. Rel. 1909, pp. 146-147, 156.)
In 1905 the British Government invited American participation but no action was taken (id. 147-148). Subsequently the British and French admitted a group of German bankers to the negotiations, which took definite form in May, 1909, in a draft agreement with the Chinese Government. On June 2, 1909, the British Government, and on June 5 the Chinese Government, were reminded by the United States of the agreement of 1904, and notified that the United States had taken no action that could be construed as a relinquishment of the right of American capital to participate (id. 145 and 148).
The British-French-German agreement with China was initialed on June 6, 1909, at Peking, for a loan of £5,500,000, subject to approval by Imperial edict (id. 148-149; 152-153). In the ensuing correspondence the British Government concurred in the American view that in international law one of two joint concessionaires has no power to fix the time when the right of the other to its share in a concession shall lapse through nonuser (id. 167), and the discussion of bases for American participation went on until May 23-24, 1910, when a supplementary agreement including American capital was drafted. (For. Rel. 1910, pp. 280-282.) Ancillary propositions concerning engineering rights and division of mileage then occupied the correspondence, into which entered in October, 1910, certain objections of the Chinese Government to the terms of the agreement, whereupon the American Minister was instructed, October 7, 1910, not to participate in forcing the loan upon China, but to continue to use his good offices to bring about an amicable adjustment at an early date (id. 291).
On March 11, 1911, the American Minister reported that after many conferences of the bankers with the Chinese authorities, it had been agreed that the Hu Kuang loan agreement should be amended to omit the branch line from Ching-men-chou to Han-yang. On March 15 the Department of State approved the amendment. (File Nos. 893.51/332 and 345.)
Postponement of the negotiations was caused by political agitation in China against the loan, which was allayed by conceding to