pofterous doctrine; I contented my felf with reminding him of what he had faid to me in one of our laft conferences, when he made a comparison of the weakness of France under its monarchs, and its strength and vigour under its republican form of government. "Nous ne fommes plus dans la décrépitude de la France monarchique, mais dans toute la force d'une Republique adolescente,' was his expreffion; and I inferred from this, according to his own reasoning, that the force and power France had acquired by its change of government was much greater than it could derive from any acquifition of territory; and that it followed, if France, when under a regal form of government, was a very just and conftant object of attention, not to fay of jealoufy, to the other powers of Europe, France (admitting his axiom) was a much more reasonable object of jealoufy and attention under its present conftitution than it ever had yet been, and that no addition to its dominions could be feen by its neighbours but under impreffions of alarm for their own future fafety and for the general tranquillity of Europe. M. Delacroix's anfwer to this was fo remarkable that I must beg leave to infert it in what I believe to be nearly his own words.- "Dans le tems revolutionarie tout ce que vous. dites, my Lord, etoit vrai-rien n'egaloit notre puiffance; mais ce tems n'existe plus. Nous ne pouvons plus lever la nation en maffe pour voler au fecours de la patrie en danger. Nous ne pouvons plus engager nos concitoyens d'ouvrir leurs bourfes pour les verfer dans le trefor national, et de fe priver même du neceffaire pour le bien de la chofe publique."And he ended by saying, that the French Republic, when at peace, neceffarily muft become the moft quiet and pacific power in Europe. I only obferved, that in this cafe the pallage of the Republic from youth to decrepitude had been very fudden; but that ftill I never could admit that it could be a matter of indifference to its neighbours, much lefs one neceffary fecurity to itself, to acquire fuch a very extensive addition to its frontiers as that he had hinted at.

This led M. Delacroix to talk of offering an equivalent to the Emperor for the Auftrian Netherlands, and it was to be found, according to his plan, in the fecularization of the three ecclefiaftical electorates, and feveral bifhopricks in Germany and in Italy.

He talked upon this fubject as one very familiar to him, and ont which his thoughts had been frequently employed.

He fpoke of making new electors, and named, probably with a view to render his fcheme more palatable, the Stadtholder and the Dukes of Brunfwick and Wurtemberg as perfons proper to replace the three ecclefiaftical electors which were to be reformed. · It would be making an ill ufe of your lordship's time to en deavour to repeat to you all he faid on this fubject; it went in fubftance (as he himself confeffed) to the total fubverfion of the

prefent conftitution of the Germanic body; and as it militated directly against the principle which both his Majesty and the Emperor laid down fo diftinctly as the bafis of the peace to be made for the empire, I contented myself with reminding him of this circumstance, particularly as it is impoffible to difcufs this point with any propriety till his Imperial Majefty becomes a party to the negotiation. I took this opportunity of hinting, that if on all the other points France agreed to the propofals now made, it would not be impoffible that fome increase of territory might be ceded to her on the Germanic fide of her frontiers, and that this, in addition to the duchy of Savoy, Nice, and Avignon, would be a very great acquifition of ftrength and power. M. Delacroix here again reverted to the conftitution, and said that these countries were already constitutionally annexed to France. I replied, that it was impoflible, in the negotiation which we were beginning, for the other powers to take it up from any period but that which immediately preceded the war, and that any acquifition or diminution of territory which had taken place among the belligerent powers fince it firft broke out, muft neceffarily become fubject matter for negotiation, and be balanced against each other in the final arrangement of a general peace. You then perfift, faid M. Delacroix, in applying this principle to Belgium? I answered, moft certainly; and I thould not deal fairly with you if I hesitated to declare, in the outlet of our negotiation, that on this point you must entertain no expectation that his Majefty will relax or ever confent to fee the Netherlands remain a part of France.

M. Delacroix replied, he faw no profpect in this cafe of our ideas ever meeting, and he defpaired of the fuccefs of our negotiation. He returned again, however, to his idea of a poffible equivalent to be found for the Emperor; but as all he propofed was the alienation or the difinemberment of countries not belonging to France even by conqueft, I did not confider it as deferving. attention, and it is certainly not worth repeating to your lordship.

I need not obferve that all the equivalents propofed, however inadequate to the exchange, were offered as a return for our confent that the Netherlands thould remain a part of France, of course the admitting them in any fhape would have been in direct contradiction to my inftructions.

M. Delacroix touched very flightly on Italy; and the course of our converfation did not bring this part of the subject more into difcuffion.

I must add, that whenever I mentioned the restoration of the Netherlands to the Emperor, I always took care it fhould be understood that thefe were to be accompanied by fuch further ceffions as thould form a competent line of defence, and that France could not be permitted to keep poffeflion of all the intermediate

country

country to the Rhine; and I particularly dwelt on this point, when I held out the poffibility of admitting an extention of the limits of France on the fide of Germany. But as the French minister no lefs ftrenuously opposed the reftitution of the Netherlands to the Emperor than I tenaciously infifted upon it, the further extension of my claim could not of courfe become a fubject of argu

ment.

I believe I have now, with a tolerable degree of accuracy, informed your Lordship of all that the French minifter faid on my opening myself to him on that part of my instructions which more immediately relates to peace between Great Britain, his Imperial Majefty, and France. It remains with me to inform your lordship what palled between us on the subject of our refpective allies.

On the articles referving a right to the court of St. Petersburg, and to that of Lisbon, to accede to the treaty of peace on the ftrict ftatus ante bellum, the French minister made no other remark than by mentioning the allies of the Republic, and by inquiring whether I was prepared to fay any thing relative to their interefts, which certainly the Republic could never abandon. This afforded me the opportunity of giving in the confidential memorial B. relative to Spain and Holland, and I prefaced it by repeating to him the fubftance of the first part of your Lordship's, No. 12.

Although I had touched upon the fubject of the Spanish part of St. Domingo, when I had been speaking to M. Delacroix on the peace with France, yet, as it did not become a matter of difcuffion between us till I came to mention the peace with Spain, I thought it better to place all that paffed on the fubject in this part of my difpatch; it was the only point on which he entered: but I by no means infer from his not bringing forward fome claims for Spain, that we are not to hear of any in the course of the negotiation; on the contrary, I have little doubt that many, and most of them inadmitfible, will be made before it can end. He, however, was filent on them at this moment, and confined all he had to fay to combating the idea that Spain was bound by the treaty of Utrecht not to alienate her poffeffions in America. I had the article copied in my pocket, and I read it to him. He confeffed it was clear and explicit, but that circumstances had fo materially altered fince the year 1713, that engagements made then ought not to be confidered as in force now. I faid that the fpirit of the article itfelf went to provide for diftant contingencies, not for what was expected to happen at or near the time when the treaty was made, and that it was because the alteration of circumftances he alluded to was forefeen as potlible, that the claufe was inferted; and that if Spain paid any regard to the faith of treaties, the muft confider herfelf as no lefs ftrictly VOL. V. bound

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bound by this clause now. than at the moment when it was drawn up. I went on by faying, that it did not, however, appear quite impoffible that this point might be fettled without much difficulty; and that means might be devifed that his Catholic Majefty fhould not break his faith, and both England and France be equally fatisfied. I then held out to him, but in general terms, that either Spain might regain her poffeffion of St. Domingo, by making fome confiderable ceflion to Great Britain and France, as the price of peace, or that, return for leaving the whole of St. Domingo to France, we should retain either Martinico or St. Lucia and Tobago. M. Delacroix liftened with a degree of attention to thefe propofals, but he was fearful of committing himfelf by any expreffion of approbation, and he difmiffed the fabject of the court of Madrid, by obferving, that France never would forfake the interefts of its allies.

Our converfation on thofe of its other ally, Holland, was much longer, as the wording of the memorial inevitably led at once deep into the fubject.

M. Delacroix affected to treat any deviation from the treaty of peace concluded between France and that country, or any reftoration of territories acquired under that treaty to France, as quite impracticable. He treated as equally impracticable any attempt at reftoring the ancient form of government in the Seven United Provinces. He talked with an air of triumph of the eftablishment of a national convention at the Hague, and with an affectation of feeling, that by it the caufe of freedom had extended itself over fuch a large number of people. He, however, was ready to confefs, that from the great loffes the Dutch Republic had fuftained in its colonies, and particularly from the weak manner in which they had defended them, it could not be expected that his Majefty would confent to a full and complete reftitution of them, and that it was reasonable that fome fhould be facrificed; and he asked me if I could inform him, how far our views extended on this point? I faid I had reafon to believe that what his Majefty would require would be poffeffions and fettlements which would not add either to the power or wealth of our Indian dominions, but only tend to fecure to us their fafe and unmolefted poffeffion. You mean by this, faid M. Delacroix, the Cape and Trincomale. I faid they certainly came under that defcription, and I faw little profpect of their being reftored to the Dutch. M. Delacroix launched forth on this into a mot laboured differtation on the value of the Cape of Good Hope, which he did not confider at all as a port de relache, but as a poffeffion which, in our hands, would become one of the moft fertile and most productive colonies in the east; and, according to his eftimation of it, he did not fcruple to affert, that it would ultimately be an acquifition of infinitely greater importance to

England

England than that of the Netherlands to France; and, if acquiefced in, fhould be reckoned as a full and ample compenfation for them. He added, if you are masters of the Cape and Trincomale, we hall hold all our fettlements in India, and the iflands of France and Bourbon, entirely at the tenure of your will and pleafure they will be our's only as long as you chufe we should retain them. You will be fole mafters in India, and we fhall be entirely dependent upon you. I repeated to him, that it was as means of defence, not of offence, that these poffeffions would be infifted on, and that if the matter was fairly and difpaffionately difcuffed, he would find that they afforded us a great additional fecurity, but no additional power of attack, even if we were difpofed to disturb the peace of that part of the world. If these, and perhaps fome few other not very material fettlements belonging to the Dutch, were to be infifted upon, and if he would be pleased to enumerate all we should still have to restore to them, while they had nothing to restore to England, it was impoflible not to confider the terms on which his Majefty propofed peace to Holland as generous and liberal.

M. Delacroix was not at all difpofed to agree with me on this point, and faid, Holland, ftripped of thefe poffeffions, would be ruined. He then held out, but as if the idea had just croffed his mind, the poffibility of indemnifying the Dutch for their loffes in India, by giving them a tract of territory towards the Meufe, (I could not find out whether he meant Aix la Chapelle, Liege, or the countries of Juliers and Berg) and hinted, that if this was not to be done, an additional fugar ifland might, perhaps, be ceded to the Dutch Republic. I told him all this might become a fubject of future difcuffion, and I conceived, that if we could agree upon the more effential points, the treaty would not break off on thefe fecondary confiderations. Our conversation had now been extremely long, and M. Delacroix ended by saying, that although he had taken upon himself to enter with me thus far upon the fubject, yet I must not confider any thing he faid as -binding, or as pledging the Republic, till fuch time as he had laid the papers I had given him before the Directory; and in order to do this with more accuracy, he again asked me, whether in his report he was to fate the difuniting Belgium from France as a fine qua non from which his Majesty would not depart. I replied, it molt certainly was a fine quâ non from which his Majesty would not depart; and that any propofal which would leave the Netherlands annexed to France, would be attended with much greater benefit to that power, and lofs to the allies, than the prefent relative fituation of the belligerent powers could entitle the French government to expect.

M. Delacroix repeated his concern at the peremptory way in which I made this affertion, and afked whether it would admit

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