The fecond memorial of Lord Malmesbury concerns the allies of France; and this memorial is not lefs infulting than that we have mentioned. After having paffed curforily over the interefts of Spain, to which he fuppofes no indemnification to be due, he speaks of Holland, and on this head his pretenfions are extravagant even to phrenzy. According to him, the French Republic ought to barter the liberty of Holland-the Stadtholderate must be restored-France muft facrifice their republic, with which the most perfect friendship fubfifts, to a new revolution-trampling under foot the moft facred conventions-fhamefully violating the faith of treaties, the is called upon to let loose upon the head of this people all the horrors which would arife from the re-action of the Orange party. And what was to be the price of this infamy?-Would it not be imagined that England offers upon thefe conditions the reftitution of what treachery has enabled her to plunder from Holland? -Would it not be imagined that she was to add to this offer that of fome indemnification to be afterwards arranged?-No; fhe offers only the reftitution of a part of what she does not blush to confider as a conquest, and, doubtlefs, by means of the indecifive reserve the preserves, she was afterwards to announce the pretenfion of retaining the Cape and the island of Ceylon, still with a view of preferving the balance of Europe, which in her understanding confifts in being herself every thing, and the other powers nothing. Lord Malmesbury proposes, in fine, that, if the French do not consent to tear Holland in pieces with their own hands, they fhould to give the Emperor and King every thing which Holland has ceded to France in the treaty concluded between them. Such, truly, are the conditions of peace proposed by the noble Lord! Without doubt, they must be confidered as war-hoops by every man whofe heart is not impenetrable to the love of his country; by every man who refpects its laws and the faith due to its treaties; it is fhame and perfidy which England proposes to us; it is the violation of our conftitution and good faith; it is the fubverfion of our principles, the restoration of the emigrants, the reftitution of their fortunes, a counter-revolution, anarchy, and civil war; it is every evil, every misfortune, and every crime united, with which they prefent us in pretending to ask for peace! Perfidious England, or rather, crafty and nefarious English government! you only wifhed for money, and this was the only object of your embaffy! you wifhed to deceive the people whofe happiness is entrusted to you! you wifhed to obtain from them refources, without which your unmeaning rage. would become impotent! But, do not count upon the fucceffes with which you flatter flatter yourfelf; you are about to lavish your new treasures to no purpose; you are going only to affure and to hasten your ruin; your vain boaft of public credit will come to nought as soon as the blindness of the nation is removed; French courage will foon leffen your arrogance, the heroes who beat you in the fields of Hondfcoote, Jemappe, Fleurus, Werwick, Comines, &c. upon the frozen plains of Holland, upon the banks of the Adige, in the necks of the Brenta, of Trou-d'Enfers, &c. thefe heroes ftill exist; they will force you to restore to the world that peace which humanity reclaims, and which your avarice and devouring ambition withhold. Friends of peace! take courage, blood will not continue long to flow. England cannot steel the hearts of all the powers against the cry that humanity has raifed. Auftria, Auftria itself will foon open its eyes: alarmed at a war to which it fees no end; exhaufted by the immenfe expence of a lengthened ftruggle; deprived of the refources of thofe ftates now in our poffeffion; undeceived refpecting the English government, who calling itself her ally, has preferved what was its own, and has left her defpoiled of Belgium, of a part of Germany, and of Italy;-preffed by her own fubjects, upon whom the devaftations confequent upon the war chiefly fall; Auftria, in fine, under the influence of better counfels, menaced perhaps from another quarter, will feel the neceffity of treating with the Republic, and then England, ftanding by itfelf, and juftly expofed to all the refentment of the French, it will not be able to diffemble its weak nefs, and will receive with more gentleness a peace which it now dares to difdain. Manifefto of the British Government against France. THE negotiation which an anxious defire for the restoration of peace had induced his Majefty to open at Paris, having been abruptly terminated by the French government, the King thinks it due to himself and to his people to ftate, in this public manner, the circumftances which have preceded and attended a tranfaction of fo much importance to the general interefts of Europe. It is well known that early in the prefent year his Majefty, laying afide the confideration of many circumftances of difficulty and difcouragement, determined to take fuch steps as were best calculated to open the way for negotiation, if any correfponding defire prevailed on the part of his enemies. He directed an overture to be made in his name, by his minifter in Swi.ferland, for the purpose of afcertaining the difpofitions of the French government with refpect to peace. The anfwer which he received in return was at once haughty and evasive; it affected to question the fincerity fincerity of thofe difpofitions of which his Majefty's conduct afforded fo unequivocal a proof; it raifed groundlefs objections to the mode of negotiation propofed by his Majefty (that of a general congrefs, by which peace has fo often been reftored to Europe); but it ftudiously paffed over in filence his Majefty's defire to learn what other mo 'e would be preferred by France. It at the fame time afferted a principle which was ftated as an indifpenfable preliminary to all negotiation-a principle under which the terms of peace must have been regulated, not by the ufual confiderations of juftice, policy, and reciprocal convenience; but by an implicit fubmiffion, on the part of all the powers, to a claim founded on the internal laws and feparate conftitution of France, as having full authority to fuperfede the treaties entered into by independent ftates, to govern their interefts, to control their engagements, and to difpofe of their dominions. A pretenfion in itself fo extravagant could in no inftance have been admitted, or even liftened to for a moment. Its application to the prefent cafe led to nothing lefs than that France thould, as a preliminary to all difcuffion, retain nearly all her conquefts, and thofe particularly in which his Majesty was moft concerned, both from the ties of intereft, and the facred obligations of treaties that the fhould in like manner recover back all that had been conquered from her in every part of the world; and that she fhould be left at liber,y to bring forward fuch further demands on all other points of negotiation, as fuch unqualified fubmiffion on the part of thofe with whom the treated could not fail to produce. On fuch grounds as thefe it was fufficiently evident that no negotiation could be eftablifhed: neither did the anfwer of his Majefty's enemies afford any opening for continuing the difcuffion, fince the mode of negotiation offered by his Majesty had been peremptorily rejected by them, and no other had been stated in which they were willing to concur. His Majefty was however not difcouraged even by this refult from till pursuing fuch meafures as appeared to him most copducive to the end of peace; and the withes of his ally the em peror correfponding with thofe which his Majefty had manifefted, fentiments of a fimilar tendency were expreffed on the part of his Imperial Majefty at the time of opening the campaign; but the continuance of the fame fpirit and principles, on the part of the enemy, rendered this fresh overture equally unfuccefsful. While the government of France thus perfifted in obftructing every measure that could even open the way to negotiation, no endeavour was omitted to mislead the public opinion throughout all Europe with refpect to the real caufe of the prolongation of the war, and to calt a doubt on thofe difpofitions which could alone alone have dictated the steps taken by his Majefty and his auguft. ally. In order to deprive his enemies of all poffibility of fubterfuge or evafion, and in the hope that a juft fenfe of the continued calamities of war, and of the increafing diftreffes of France herself, might at length have led to more juft and pacific difpofitions, his Majefty renewed in another form, and through the intervention of friendly powers, a propofal for opening negotiations for peace. The manner in which this intervention was received indicated the moft hoftile difpofitions towards Great Britain, and at the fame time afforded to all Europe a striking inftance of that injurious and offenfive conduct which is obferved on the part of the French government towards all other countries. The repeated overtures made in his Majefty's name were nevertheless of fuch a nature, that it was at laft found impoffible to perfift in the abfolute rejection of them, without the direct and undifguifed avowal of a determination to refuse to Europe all hope of the restoration of tranquillity. A channel was therefore at length indicated, through which the government of France profeffed itself willing to carry on a negotiation, and a readiness was expreffed (though in terms far remote from any fpirit of conciliation) to receive a minifter authorised by his Majefty to proceed to Paris for that purpose. Many circumftances might have been urged as affording powerful motives against adopting this fuggeftion, until the government of France had given fome indication of a fpirit better calculated to promote the fuccefs of fuch a miffion, and to meet these advances on the part of Great Britain. The King's defire for the restoration of general peace on juft and honourable terms, his concern for the interefts of his fubjects, and his determination to leave to his enemies no pretext for imputing to him the confequences of their own ambition, induced him to overlook every fuch confideration, and to take a step which these reasons alone could juftify. The repeated endeavours of the French government to defeat this miffion in its outfet, and to break off the intercourse thus opened, even before the first steps towards negotiation could be taken; the indecent and injurious language employed with a view to irritate, the captious and frivolous objections raised for the purpose of obftructing the progrefs of the difcuffion; all thefe have fufficiently appeared from the official papers which passed on both fides, and which are known to all Europe. But above all, the abrupt termination of the negotiation has afforded the most conclufive proof, that at no period of it was any real wish for peace entertained on the part of the French government. VOL. V. After repeated évafión and delay, that government had at length confented to establish, as the bafis of the negotiation, a principle propofed by his Majefty, liberal in its own nature, équitable towards his enemies, and calculated to provide for the interests of his allies, and of Europe. It had been agreed that compenfation fhould be made to France, by proportionable reftitutions from his Majesty's conquefts on that power, for thofe arrangements to which the thould be called upon to confent in order to fatisfy the juft pretenfions of his allies, and to preferve the political balance of Europe. At the defire of the French government itself memorials were prefented by his Majesty's minifter, which contained the outlines of the terms of peace, grounded on the bafis fo eftablished, and in which his Majefty propofed to carry to the utmoft poffible extent the application of a principle fo equitable with refpect to France, and fo liberal on his Majesty's part. The delivery of thefe papers was accompanied by a declaration exprefsly and repeatedly made, both verbally and in writing, that his Majefty's minifter was willing and prepared to enter, with a fpirit of conciliation and fairness, into the difcuffion of the different points there contained, or into that of any other propofal or fcheme of peace which the French government might wish to fubftitute in its place. In reply to this communication, he received a demand, in form the most offenfive, and in fubftance the most extravagant, that ever was made in the courfe of any negotiation. It was peremptorily required of him that in the very outlet of the bufinefs, when no anfwer had been given by the French government to his first propofal, when he had not even learnt, in any regular fhape, the nature or extent of the objections to it, and much lefs received from that government any other offer or plan of peace, he fhould, in twenty-four hours deliver in a statement of the final terms to which his court would in any cafe accede-a demand tending evidently to fhut the door to all negotiation, to preclude all difcuffion, all explanation, all poffibility of the amicable adjustment of points of difference-a demand in its nature prepofterous, in its execution impracticable, fince it is plain that no fuch ultimate refolution refpecting a general plan of peace ever can be rationally formed, much lefs declared, without knowing what points are principally objected to by the enemy, and what facilities he may be willing to offer in return for conceffion in thofe refpects. Having declined compliance with this demand, and explained the reafons which rendered it inadmiffible, but having, at the fame time, exprefsly renewed the declaration of his readiness to enter into the difcuffion of the propofal he had conveyed, or of any other which might be communicated to him, the King's minifter received no other anfwer than an abrupt command to quit Paris in forty-eight hours.' If, in addition to fuch an |