which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.

And, further, the signatory powers agree not to support any agreements by their respective nationals with each other designed to create spheres of influence or to provide for the enjoyment of mutually exclusive opportunities in designated parts of Chinese territory. The negotiation of this treaty is in itself the most formal declaration of the policy of the Executive in relation to China, and supersedes any Executive understanding or declaration that could possibly be asserted to have any contrary import. If the Senate assents to this treaty, the principles and policies which the treaty declares will be supported and enforced by a binding international agreement. My answer, then, to your first question is that the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement has no binding effect whatever, either with respect to the past or to the future, which is in any sense inconsistent with the principles and policies explicitly declared in the ninepower treaty to which I have referred.

As to your second question, I may say that the four-power treaty does not refer to China and hence does not directly bear upon the Lansing-Ishii notes which related exclusively to China. The fourpower treaty, however, is an essential part of the plan to create conditions in the Far East at once favorable to the policies we have long advocated and to an enduring peace.

WARREN G. HARDING

793.94/13251⁄2

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Shidehara), March 23, 1922

[Extract]

3. Lansing-Ishii Notes. The Ambassador said that he had read very carefully the President's message to the Senate with respect to the Lansing-Ishii notes; that he understood that the President had stated that if the notes were inconsistent with the treaties which had been signed, that they no longer would be effective. The Ambassador said that he did not wish to raise any formal question about the matter but that he would like to know whether the view was that the Lansing-Ishii agreement was dead even though it did not conflict with the treaties; that that would involve an important matter for consideration.

The Secretary said that he was wholly opposed to the exchange of notes or memoranda which had any ambiguity; that he had al

ways regretted that the Lansing-Ishii notes had been exchanged because they were so expressed as to give rise to questions and indeed in anticipation of this, as the Ambassador knew, there were certain confidential memoranda made at the time the notes were exchanged. The Secretary said that he did not approve of that course, as he believed that the way to maintain friendly relations with another country was to have all the exchanges free from ambiguity and understood in the same sense in both countries.

The Secretary said that he understood that Japan did not claim any special interest in China in the sense that it had an interest lifferent in kind from that of the other Powers; that the LansingIshii notes could be construed to mean that special interests merely referred to a difference in degree in the sense that Japan was dependent for the importation of raw materials that it needed and upon certain trade; but not that Japan had any interest special in kind which was in derogation of the sovereignty and independence of China or inconsistent with the "open-door" policy.

The Secretary added that he was much gratified when the Ambassador, at the close of the Conference, had stated the position of Japan substantially in this way; that the Secretary had listened to his remarks, which doubtless he had noticed were quoted by the President in his recent message to the Senate, with the deepest interest, for the Secretary supposed that the Ambassador would not make such a statement at the close of the Conference except with the cognizance of his Government and that he was taking pains to remove from the American Government any apprehension as to an interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii notes which would be in the slightest degree inconsistent with the treaties which were under consideration and the principles which had been adopted at the Conference.

The Ambassador did not indicate any dissent from this but said that of course the Lansing-Ishii notes could not be effective if inconsistent with the treaties and that it would be a different thing to say that they were dead altogether even if they were not inconsistent with the treaties. The Ambassador intimated that it might be well to have an understanding upon this point.

The Secretary said that he understood that Japan and the United States had definitely agreed upon the principles to be enforced in China in order to avoid all possible misunderstanding; that so far as the Lansing-Ishii notes served any purpose inconsistent with these principles, they could not be regarded as effective; and that if it was desired to treat them as effective for any purpose consistently with the treaties, the Secretary would want to know very precisely what that was, as he did not intend to have any understandings or

enter into any exchanges whatever which would permit any misunderstanding to arise between this Government and Japan in the future. He felt sure that this was the way to maintain cordial relations with Japan, which he was very desirous of having. The Ambassador apparently acquiesced in this view.

793.94/1340a

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Chargé (Saburi)

AIDE MEMOIRE

The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires will recall that at the time of the exchange of notes between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii, on November 2, 1917, there was recorded an understanding between them to the following effect:

66 PROTOCOL

"In the course of the conversations between the Japanese Special Ambassador and the Secretary of State of the United States which have led to the exchange of notes between them dated this day, declaring the policy of the two Governments with regard to China, the question of embodying the following clause in such declaration came up for discussion: they (the Governments of Japan and the United States) will not take advantage of the present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states.'

"Upon careful examination of the question, it was agreed that the clause above quoted being superfluous in the relations of the two Governments and liable to create erroneous impression in the minds of the public, should be eliminated from the declaration.

"It was, however, well understood that the principle enunciated in the clause which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord with the declared policy of the two Governments in regard to China."

This understanding, although never made public, was of course intended by the two Governments to be an integral and inseparable part of the policy jointly declared by them in the notes exchanged between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii,

In the Nine-Power Treaty which on February 6, 1922, the United States and Japan concluded jointly with the other Powers represented in the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, the principles and policies agreed to be observed in relation to China were explicitly formulated. In a message to the United States Senate under date of March 8, 1922 (of which a copy is attached for reference), transmitting, in response to a Senate Resolution, in

See ante, p. 591.

32604 vol. II-38-45

formation as to the present status and binding effect of the LansingIshii Agreement, the President had occasion to state that that agreement "has no binding effect whatever, either with respect to the past or to the future, which is in any sense inconsistent with the principles and policies explicitly declared in the Nine-Power Treaty" referred to above.

A resolution adopted by the Conference on the Limitation of Armament at its Fifth Plenary Session on February 1, 1922, contained the following provision:

"The Powers represented in this Conference, considering it desirable that there should hereafter be full publicity with respect to all matters affecting the political and other international obligations of China and of the several Powers in relation to China, are agreed as follows:

"1. The several Powers other than China will at their earliest convenience file with the Secretariat General of the Conference for transmission to the participating Powers, a list of all treaties, conventions, exchanges of notes, or other international agreements which they may have with China, or with any other Power or Powers in relation to China, which they deem to be still in force and upon which they may desire to rely. In each case, citations will be given to any official or other publication in which an authoritative text of the documents may be found. In any case in which the document may not have been published, a copy of the text (in its original language or languages) will be filed with the Secretariat General of the Conference."

It would appear that under this resolution there rests upon the Governments of the United States and of Japan an obligation to communicate for the purpose of publicity not only the notes exchanged between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii, but also the hitherto unpublished understanding recorded between them at the time of that exchange, if it be the intention of the two Governments to regard the Lansing-Ishii Agreement as still in force and to be relied on. The question thus arises whether it is the disposition of the Japanese Government to continue that agreement in force by filing it in accordance with the terms of the Resolution above quoted; or whether, in view of the making of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6 last, the Japanese Government would be disposed to join with the Government of the United States in terminating by mutual consent the existence of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement as a separate understanding between the two Powers.

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1922.

Ба

See Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 194.

793.94/1403

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

By the Aide-Mémoire of May 4, 1922, the Honorable the Secretary of State was so good as to inquire the disposition of the Japanese Government with regard to the termination of the effects of the Notes exchanged between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii on November 2, 1917, bearing upon the policy of the two Governments in relation to China. Referring to the unsigned and unpublished understanding which was recorded at the time of that exchange, the Aide-Mémoire states that if the so-called Lansing-Ishii agreement should be regarded as still in force and relied upon, the two Governments would be under obligation, in accordance with the terms of the Resolution adopted by the Washington Conference on February 1, 1922, to file with the Secretariat-General of the Conference not only the Notes signed and exchanged, but also the unsigned understanding reached in connection with those notes.

It will be recalled that the Lansing-Ishii correspondence was designed "to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated." Such popular misgivings seem now happily to have been dispelled, more especially since the Washington Conference. The Japanese Government will therefore gladly agree to the cancellation of the correspondence in question, if that course is preferred by the American Government. At the same time, desiring to prevent any possible misunderstanding which might be created by such cancellation, the Japanese Government think it useful to define the position of Japan relating to China mentioned in the correspondence.

It is the opinion of the Japanese Government that the Notes exchanged between Mr. Lansing and Viscount Ishii contain nothing which is at variance, either in letter or in spirit, with the Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in enunciation of policies with respect to China. The reference made in those Notes to Japan's special interests in China is but a statement of actual conditions which have developed out of the geographical propinquity of the two Powers.

It is natural and evident that Japan is interested in China to an extent and in a degree not shared by countries more remotely situated, by reason of the vast amounts of Japanese capital invested in China; by reason of the incomparably larger number of Japanese residents, than those of any other foreign nationality, who have established themselves in various parts of China to carry on lawful