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Commenting upon the later French colonial history, Mr. Morris says: “The verdict on French (colonial) enterprises is not yet written. French rule over foreign lands may well be said to be for the most part in the transitory stage. * * * To have effected these results since 1830, in view of the few dilapidated fragments of the former colonial domain then recently recovered, is certainly a work of which the French people may be proud. While these achievements are not yet by any means final, the foundation is well laid for the subsequent erection of the superstructure. * * * Whatever be the opinion of the details of French rule, it must be conceded that the doctrines of to-day constitute a decided improvement over the theories of the old system. * It must be with deep regret that French statesmen of this age reflect upon the disasters of the past. Liberty and exemption from paternalism are the crying needs of French colonization. Let France have the courage to remodel the administration of her colonies, to liberate them from red tape officialism, and to give them their local independence. With these essential reforms, drawing in their wake so many minor ameliorations, permanent prosperity will be assured.”
Poultney Bigelow, in his “Children of the Nations,” 1901, says: “Since the Franco-German war the French nation has sought consolation in colonial expansion, and the French flag now flies over an immense area of northern and tropical Africa, Tonquin, and parts of Polynesia. France now, as in the days of Champlain, shows no lack of venturesome spirits, and the annals of modern exploration contain few names more glorious than that of Colonel Monteil. But, though France in her colonies shows to-day greater liberality than in the time of Louis XIV, she yet reflects the failings of the mother country to an extent which depresses her own most serious writers on the subject. * *
“Next door to French Guiana was British Guiana, flourishing under a healthy representative administration, while Cayenne pined away under the suffocating influence of too much officialism. The excellent roads which the French have built in northern Africa, and, above all, the vast sums expended on railway construction and military effectiveness, prove that France is thoroughly in earnest from an administrative point of view. The general commanding the division of Oran told me that he regarded the railway as the main civilizing instrument of France; that we must have patience and faith in the future; that savage tribes who now prowled on the flanks of caravan columns would ultimately give up nomadic life and till the soil, when the locomotive should have demonstrated that brigandage was no longer profitable or even possible.
“The French nation has shown itself strangely susceptible to far-reaching projects and ideals far removed from mere gain. It develops vast military energy and popular enthusiasm in acquiring colonies which produce no revenue, but flatter the rising generation, who think that the size of a country is the measure of its importance. The French are proverbially reluctant to leave their country, even as tourists. Yet in no other country does the public mind occupy itself so much with the military and official side of colonization. The Frenchman, impatient of military routine at home, has but to plunge into the African wilderness and plant the flag of his country in some lonely place to be immediately recognized by the press as a notable person. Should it happen that the flag was inadvertently stuck into soil already occupied by England, and should his action be resented in London, he returns not merely a hero, but something of a martyr as well. On his way to Paris deputations from the various towns greet him with wreath and brass bands. The press finds in his glorious failure a text from which to preach upon the greed of 'perfidious Albion,' and thus new fuel is added to the popular firés of colonial zeal.
“Northern Africa is dear to the Frenchman, for it represents the soil on which his armies have fought from the Pyramids to the Pillars of Hercules. He has done much for Egypt. Notably was it a Frenchman who built the Suez Canal in 1869; but it was English shipping which made it profitable, and it was ultimately England to whom Egypt owed the capture of Khartoum and the good administration throughout the valleys of the Nile.
“Algiers is but a few hours' sail from the south of France, and Tunis not much farther. Here is the field in which we might look for a prosperous French peasantry under climatic conditions but slightly different from those prevailing in Provence or Gascony. Yet to-day it is not the Frenchman, but the Italian and the Spaniard, who furnish the language of the white man for this part of the world. There are French cafes in the towns, and the little round tables are occupied by French officials; French uniforms are on all sides, and the French flag waves over the Government buildings. That flag is a blessing to the country, so far as it means good roads, efficient police, courts of justice, harbor works, and other necessary expenditure. But from a colonial point of view, Spain and Italy are the countries directly benefited rather than France.
“France is doing a great work in the civilization of the world, notably among inferior races. Her missionaries are more successful than ours; and, whether in the backwoods of Canada, among the negroes of the West Indies, or in the Far East, the Frenchman has to a remarkable degree shown a capacity to live the life of the subject race and acquire personal ascendency over him.
“The history of the French in India has been frequently noted by English historians as a notable instance of failure on the eve of a great triumph, for at one time France, with a handful of clever negotiators and enterprising soldiers, had apparently mastered the land of the Great Mogul. Yet the French administration in India crumbled to pieces under the quick strokes of a handful of Englishmen with the same startling completeness which characterized her loss of Canada at about the same time (1759). And the reasons were roughly analogous—persisting to this day. The Frenchman is a brave soldier, and his fellow-citizens have a passion for detailed administration. They conquer and they govern, but they do not colonize. When they govern, they govern too much. They are suspicious of native initiative and distrustful of colonial self-government.
“It does, indeed, seem as though history rejoiced in paradoxes, which we have to note, that the Scandinavians, the Germans, and the Italian people, without colonies worth mentioning, send forth annually a powerful stream of humanity to enrich other countries, and that France, with her vast colonial possessions, should show herself capable of producing nearly everything but colonies.”'
Regarding the methods in the French colonies, Mr. Alleyne Ireland, an Englishman who resided many years in the British colonies, but who is at present a resident of the United States, says in his Tropical Colonization, 1899:
“In regard to their forms of government, the French tropical colonies may be divided into two classes—those in which the government is carried out to some extent by the passage of laws, and those in which all matters are settled by the simple decree of the governor. To the first class belong Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Réunion; to the second class all the other French tropical colonies. In the first class of colonies the principal subjects to which the passage of laws is applicable are the exercise of political rights, the regulation of contracts, matters relating to wills, legacies, and succession, the institution of juries, criminal procedure, recruiting for naval and military forces, the method of electing mayors, municipal deputies, and councilors, and the organization of the local councilsgeneral. In regard to all other matters of importance all the French tropical colonies are on the same basis of legislation—that is, government by decrees issued by the governor or the minister of the colonies.
“The governor of a French colony has very wide powers. He is commander of the local land forces and of such vessels of war as may be attached to his station, as well as of the local militia. He can, of his own authority, declare his colony in a state of siege, and has at all times the power to appoint courts-martial for the trial of military offenders. In his administrative capacity he has absolute authority to regulate nearly all the internal affairs of his colony; and he is above the law, for he can not be brought before the local courts for any cause whatever.
“The governor is to some extent guided by the advice of two bodies—the privy council, which is a nominated body consisting of official and unofficial members, and the general council, which is made up of councilors elected by the votes of all male persons over 25 years of age who have resided for more than one year in the colony. Generally speaking, these bodies merely advise, but in regard to a few matters, such as the fixing of the tariff, the regulation of transfers of property and mortgages, the governor is bound to follow the advice thus given him. Such, in brief, is the constitution of the French tropical colonies; but in addition to the privy council and the general council, some of the colonies have local councils and conseils d'arrondissements. The exact delimitation of the functions of these various bodies would involve an amount of detail which would be out of place in a volume intended merely as an introduction to the study of tropical colonization.
“The principal officers under the governor in the French colonies with which I am dealing are the director of the interior, the military commandant, the chief of the health department, the permanent inspector of finances, the attorney-general, and the judges of the superior courts. It is to be noted that Martinique, Guadeloupe, and some of the other colonies which I have named send representatives to the French assembly, usually one senator and two deputies; but it is difficult to see that the colonies derive any advantage from this arrangement.
“The system which I have just described would seem to imply a very rigid government control over the French colonies; but my observation leads me to suppose that, although such control does undoubtedly exist in some of the French colonies, notably in Madagascar and Indo-China, in others, owing to the weakness of French officials and the fear inspired by the aggressive attitude of the natives, the ignorant masses are practically in control. In this view I am supported by no less authority than Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, the eminent French economist. In his work, 'De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes,' he says, 'As regards politics, we have introduced French liberty into our colonies; we give them civil governors; we admit their representatives into our Parliament. All these reforms are excellent in themselves. It is unfortunately to be feared that they will, in practice, result in abuses, and that unless the mother country is very watchful those free powers which she has granted to her colonies will become powers of oppression.'"
The colonial history of Netherlands, like that of France, may be considered in two distinct periods: The earlier, characterized by the acquisition of large areas in many cases with but doubtful success), followed by losses of a considerable portion of its scattered territories; and in the later period application to a development of its.island possessions in the Orient, especially Java and Sumatra, in which, particularly the former, it has been remarkably successful from a financial standpoint, and in more recent years through the internal development of the island and improvement in the condition of the natives.
“The rise of the Netherlands as a colonizing nation,” says Lucas in his introduction to the Historical Geography of the Colonies, “dates from the beginning of the seventeenth century. By 1661 they had practically driven their Portuguese rivals out of the Indian seas, taken Mauritius and St. Helena, planted a colony at the Cape, established factories on the shores of the Persian Gulf, in the Persian capital of Ispahan, along the Malabar and Coromandel coasts of India, in Bengal, Burmah, and Cochin-China; had expelled the Portuguese from Ceylon, Malacca, and Formosa, and killed their trade with China and Japan. They had become all-powerful in the East Indian Islands, the possession of which, with their rich trade, was the earliest, as it was always the main object of all Dutch efforts, and as far back as 1619 they had founded in Java the great city of Batavia. They had explored, too, while they traded and conquered, and made known to the world Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand. * * * The keynote of Dutch colonization was trade. Their dealings with the peoples of the East were the dealings of merchants, not of warriors or conquerors; they guided their policy for good and ill by the interest of their commercial monopoly, and, while staunch supporters of the reformed religion, subordinated religion itself to trade. The monopolies of the Latin peoples were, as we have seen, almost entirely Crown monopolies; the Dutch, on the other hand, committed their trade wholly to chartered companies. In the dealings of these companies commercial exclusiveness was carried to the last extreme. The trade of the Spice Islands especially was most jealously and unscrupulously protected from foreign interference. The system was at once ungenerous, oppressive, and unsound, but it had the merit of concentrating the private strength and wealth of the mercantile community'-a species of concentration which was necessary while Holland was fighting her way up among nations. Enterprising as the Dutch were, they remained little more than traders from first to last. They never emigrated in great numbers. The two parts of the world where they settled and colonized, the Cape and North America, passed into English hands. Nor were they a governing race in the true sense; they governed almost solely with the view of making a direct profit for the mother country. Among the causes of the success of the Dutch colonization in the past, writers have noticed their strict attention to business, a dogged maintenance of their commercial monopolies, the rigid supervision kept over their subordinate officers, and the combination in the case of the latter of regular payment and systematic promotion with absolute prohibition of private trading. * * * No people ever had so definite an aim in foreign and colonial policy as the Dutch, and none ever realized their aim more completely. From the first their one object was to secure the trade of the Spice Islands. They tried to avoid collison with other powers. They did not want to conquer;
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they did not want to acquire territory. They wanted only to trade. And when in 1824, after the Napoleonic wars, Holland, having become a political cipher in Europe, and having lost Ceylon and the Cape, gained, by treaty with England, recognition of her possessions in the East Indian archipelago, the object with which she became a colonial power was finally attained,” viz, the permanent control of her present possessions in the East Indies, Java, and Sumatra.
M. Jules Leclercq, in a valuable work issued in 1898, Un Séjour dans l'île de Java, says: "The traveler returning from Java is likely to be asked by the Dutch by what he was most impressed in their splendid colony, and he is tempted to answer that the most striking feature is to see that they are there at all. This simple people, whose country is but a dot on the map of the world, has ruled for the last three centuries, with admirable tenacity, this vast colonial empire of the Indian archipelago, which contains 35,000,000 inhabitants, comprising islands as great as France, and which are the remnants of the former immense empire which the Dutch possessed in the East Indies, and which formerly extended to the Bengal and even to the Cape of Good Hope. * * * How have the Dutch maintained themselves in the archipelago? How have 30,000 Europeans peaceably governed 35,000,000 Maylay Javanese? This is the most wonderful fact in Java, and it is the most interesting to examine. Holland has no autonomous colonies as England has; such as have a responsible government and parliament. The Dutch colonies have no independent existence whatsoever. They are subject to the control of the mother country, and the King's representative exercises there almost absolute power. Before the Dutch constitution of 1848 the King had the right of exclusive administration of the colonial possessions. At present the law. requires a budget of the colonies of their most important affairs. The administration of the colonial possessions is exercised in the King's name by the minister of colonies, and a detailed annual report is presented to the States General on the situation in the colonies. The government in the Indies is vested in one man, the governor-general, a functionary of the King, and responsible to him for the proper discharge of his office. He is the commander of the land and sea forces of the Dutch Indies. He exercises supreme control over the different branches of the general administration. He issues ordinances on all matters not regulated by royal decree, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties with the native princes, and appoints civil and military employees. One of his most important duties is the protection of the natives. He watches that no cession of land violates their rights, and issues rules and regulations relating to the Government cultures; fixes the kind and extent of the forced labor, and sees to the proper execution of all ordinances pertaining to this matter. He has the power of disciplining all foreigners who disturb the public order. To be sure, by his side, or rather under him, there is an Indian council meeting under his chairmanship, and constituted of a vice-president and four members, but this is merely a consultative body whose opinion he takes, however, without being bound to follow it. * * * At the head of the civil administration are five officials who hold the modest title of directors and are subject to the order and supreme control of the governor, who is, in the empire of the Indies, almost the King himself in the absolute sense of the term. The machinery of the local administration reveals the ingenious skill by which a very small number of functionaries rule the densest population of the world. The island is divided into 22 provinces, at the head of which are European officials who are as powerful in their provinces as the governor-general in the colony at large, * * and who are aided by assistants, who in turn have their subordinates in the persons of the controllers, who see to the proper observation of the regulations relating to the natives, visiting periodically in the villages of their districts, listening to complaints, overseeing the plantations, and forming the link which connects the native administration to the European administration. * * * The mechanism of government consists partly in concealirg the true motors of the machine under the network of pure display by leaving to the native princes the illusion of power and veiling the action of the European rulers. Each 'residency,'or political division, governed by a resident or governor, comprises one or more residencies, and alongside of each resident, or European governor, there are one or more regents; and while the resident is always a European, the regent, on the other hand, is always a native functionary belonging to the highest families of the country and frequently of princely birth. The natives are subject to the regent, their natural chief, and the resident or European governor of the section, although the real holder of power, does nothing except through the medium of the regent.”
The method by which production was controlled and developed in Java and made of great profit to the Government differed from that practised in the other colonies of the world. Through the machinery above described, by which absolute control of the natives was obtained through cooperation with the native chiefs, the Dutch Government in the island of Java was able to dictate what articles should be produced from the soil and in what proportion, and thus what has been known as the “culture system” of Java was established by which each occupant of the land, all of which was held to be practically the property of the Government, was required to plant a certain proportion in coffee, sugar, or such other articles as the officials might direct, and to sell it at a fixed price to the Government, which in turn resold it in the markets of the world at a large profit.
“Under the culture system,” says Henry Scott Boys, formerly an officer of the British Government in India, who visited Java in 1899, “the Government of Java may be said to have become farmers on a gigantic scale. Recognizing the fact that the soil of Java was eminently suited to the growth of certain valuable products, such as sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, cinnamon, pepper, indigo, and cochineal, and that the native, left to himself, would never exert himself to raise these crops, the Government determined, in its capacity as owner of the land, to declare that in the villages selected as suitable at least one-fifth of the area should be sown with the crop prescribed. If the crop was one such as sugar, requiring manufacture on the spot, a director was placed in the village or group of villages, to whom the villagers were bound to deliver all the raw product as cut, receiving a fixed price for the same. The director, who had received large advances from the Government to enable him to set up the necessary machinery, on his part was bound to deliver a certain quantity of the manufactured article to the Government at a fixed price. The result has been enormous profit to the Government, very considerable gain to the director, and, the advocates of the system say, of great pecuniary advantages to the villagers. Under this scheme, initiated in 1832, the revenue was raised in twenty-five years from £2,000,000 to £9,500,000 annually. Imports jumped from £2,000,000 to £5,000,000, and exports from £2,000,000 to £8,500,000, and population rose during the same period from 6,000,000 to 12,000,000.”
The culture system, under the criticism in the closing part of the nineteenth century, has gradually disappeared. Probably the most elaborate discussion of the Dutch political system in Java which has been published is that of J. W. V. Money, a former British official in India, entitled, Java; or How to Manage a Colony, issued in 1861, in which he summarizes the results of the culture system as follows: “The revenue raised from 24,000,000 florins to 115,000,000 florins; instead of the former yearly deficit, a yearly net surplus of upwards of 45,000,000 florins; the unproductive expenditure for the administration of the country raised from £2,000,000 to £3,000,000; the reproductive expenditure on public works and in developing the resources of the country raised from a mere trifle to over £2,000,000 annually; the imports raised from a yearly average of about one and two-thirds millions to over £5,000,000; the exports raised from a yearly average of about £2,000,000 to over £8,000,000; crime and litigation so diminished that the judicial sittings of the local courts were reduced to an average of about thirty days in the year; the population raised from about 6,000,000 in poverty, paying a revenue of about £2,000,000, to 11,000,000 of the richest peasantry in the East, paying a revenue of £9,000,000, or 16d. and 6s. per head.”
Ireland, in his work, Tropical Colonization, says of the Dutch methods in Java: “The general principles of the culture system were these: All land belonged to the Government and was given out for cultivation on the condition that of all produce four-fifteenths should be paid to the Government. A class of Europeans known as contractors were encouraged by the Government, by means of loans, to build factories and storehouses for the gathering and handling of the crops, chiefly sugar, coffee, and spices. Behind this system lay the corvee, or liability of the country to render a certain amount of free service to the Government in each year (for construction of roads, harbor works, etc.). The amount of such service varied between fifty and seventy-five days a year. By utilizing this forced labor the Dutch covered the island with public roads. The effects of the system were most striking, a remarkable increase taking place in the production, revenue, and imports of the island and a corresponding improvement in the material condition of the peasantry. From 1871 onward the rigor of the system was relaxed, and in recent years taxes have been substituted for the corvee and the land has been thrown open to private enterprise. During the past five years the island, which formerly yielded a handsome annual profit to Holland, has had to face a yearly deficit averaging about $5,000,000. (This is due in part, at least, to the Achinese war.) The condition of the agricultural classes of Java compares very favorably with that of the same classes in India, and this has been attributed by writers to the fact that under the Dutch system there exist no landlords and middlemen to send up the rental of land.”
Morris, commenting upon the record of the Dutch in Java in his History of Colonization, recounts the early experiences under the Dutch East India Company and those of the nineteenth century, in which the island was developed through the revenues produced by the culture system and the later abandonment of that system, but continuation of the interval development of the island, and says: “The situation of the Dutch during these two intervals immediately suggests the question, which is the true doctrine: To secure financial success at the sacrifice of colonial welfare and private interests, or to promote by every feasible means the progress of the colony and its inhabitants even at the expense of the metropolis? There is no doubt of the correct answer, for under the latter policy the indirect benefits readily compensate the losses sustained. The English have always found it the genuine system, and the recent experience of the Dutch, although costly by reason of their procrastination in its adoption, confirms the fact. After they shall have achieved the public works commenced by them and which should have been sooner undertaken, but must now, because of their postponement, be the more quickly accomplished, their dominions will undoubtedly become self-supporting. This condition forms the happy medium of prosperity for the dependency and satisfaction for the nation; it is the normal status. The history of Java in this century forcibly recalls that of Cuba, but affords this striking contrast—the Dutch began their reforms of their own free will and not too late to save their sovereignty. Under their present rule and future prospects Java and other possessions of the East will probably long remain attached to Holland.
It is remarkable how Holland has not merely preserved but extended its dominions. Without them it would be an insignificant, feeble member in the family of Europe. With them its power is much more substantial and far-reaching than many of the larger empires. * * The Dutch, by their exercise of prudence, judgment, and enlightenment during the past few years, have admirably molded their policy to meet conditions prevailing in the countries over which they rule. By their moderation they have been able to maintain their sovereignty, while by their sagacity they have in many respects improved their position. After two centuries of monopoly, as injurious to their real interests as it was contrary to justice, they have abandoned it; at least, the errors of their former methods are manifest. Private capital and personal energy are now allowed full play. Not a single company, but rather the entire nation has a part of its wealth. Even at the sacrifice of profits abuses in the colony have been corrected and reforms introduced. The natives are not any longer being simply taught to till the soil, but are gradually being more and more brought under the protection of genuine civilization. Education is being developed, and even religion is receiving some individual attention. A spirit of philanthropy is supplementing exclusively mercantile aims.”
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Mr. Sylvester Baxter, in the Yale Review, discussing the experience of the Dutch in Java, says: “This example of Dutch success in the management of colonies is not put forward with any idea that it is anything to be copied by ourselves. If we are to succeed, it must not be by imitating what some other nation has done, but by judiciously adapting our methods to the circumstances, just as the Dutch have done. Quite different systems will probably be demanded in the East and West Indies, respectively, and again in Hawaii. In Porto Rico and the Philippines we have to deal with peoples where European power has been in control for three or four centuries, while in Hawaii American influences have long been prominent. In the Philippine Islands we have to do chiefly with the Malay population, naturally docile, and in the West Indies the problem is made more difficult by the large negro element, notoriously turbulent, unruly, and ignorant. The Dutch themselves have failed with the West Indian negro where they have succeeded with the East Indian Malay.”
AN OFFICIAL CRITICISM.
The culture system, although very profitable to the Government, and although under it Javan population increased and the interior of the island was developed, was the subject of severe criticism upon the ground that it was an injustice to the native, both in dictating what he should produce and the methods by which he should dispose of his product, methods which were so adjusted as to become extremely profitable to the Government creating and enforcing the system. It was vigorously attacked in 1868 by a former officer of the Dutch Government, who had spent seventeen years in official life in Java. In a powerful novel, which has been referred to as the “Uncle Tom's Cabin of Jaya,” he pointed out certain features of its injustice to the natives. In that discussion he says:
“The native is by nature a husbandman. The cultivation of rice is in Java what the vintage is in the Rhine provinces and in the south of France. But there came foreigners from the West, who made themselves masters of the country. They wished to profit by the fertility of the soil, and ordered the native to devote a part of his time and labor to the cultivation of those things which should produce higher prices in the markets of Europe. To persuade the lower orders to do so, they had only to follow a very simple policy. The Javan obeys his chief; to win the chiefs it was only necessary to give them a part of the gains and success was complete. To be convinced of the success of that policy, we need only consider the immense quantity of Javanese products sold in Holland; and we shall also be convinced of its injustice, for if anybody should ask if the husbandman gets a reward in proportion to that quantity, then I must give a negative answer. The Government compels him to cultivate certain products upon his ground; it punishes him if he sells to any purchaser but itself and fixes the price actually paid. The expenses of transport to Europe through a privileged trading company are high, the moneys paid to the chiefs for their encouragement increases the prime cost, and because the entire trade must create profit, that profit can not be got in any other way than by paying the Javan just enough to keep him from starving."
That the United Knigdom has been more successful in the management of noncontiguous territory than any other nation will probably be conceded by all, and this fact may justify a more extended review of the discussions as to the causes of this success.
Mr. C. P. Lucas, as already explained, has been for many years an officer of the British colonial office and is now an Assistant Under Secretary, and presumably presents in concrete form the view of those directly connected with the colonial work of Great Britain. In his work on the geography of the British colonies he says:
“The great success of the English in planting colonies and retaining them must be mainly attributed to the character of the country and the race. Great Britain stands alone in Europe in being an island power. The insular position has made the English a race of sailors, has given the country a temperate climate, has kept the people from being perpetually entangled, like their French neighbors, in foreign troubles. In the early days of migration England was not left to herself, and many streams from many lands combined to give her a mixed population. The English-speaking breed is one composed of various elements-English, Saxons, Jutes, Danes, Northmen, Flemings, while the Welsh, Irish, Manx, and Northern Scotch are offshoots of the Celtic stock. Difference of race, too, has been accompanied by varieties of religion. These diversities of geography, of breed, and religious thought give some clew to the history of the English as a colonizing nation. The sea bade them colonize, and as colonization takes men into various parts of the earth, it seems to follow that the inhabitants of a country which is a miniature world in itself will be more successful colonizers than those whose land and breed and thought are all of one uniform type. * * * There have been nearly three centuries during which the English have been engaged in colonizing, and a study of the manner in which the possessions have been acquired will show that each century of colonization has a distinct character of its own. * * * The leading characteristics of English colonial enterprise during the seventeenth century were that it took the form of settlement rather than conquest, that it was little interfered with or protected by the State, and found its sphere of action chiefly in the west. With the eighteenth century English colonization entered on a new and widely different phase. This second period, reaching down to 1814, comprises the years during which Great Britain became an imperial power. Its dependencies were then won chiefly at the point of the sword, and the men to whom they were due were statesmen and soldiers, not explorers or merchants. During the present century colonization has taken on the form of expansion of existing settlements or the absorption of coterminous land, an absorption which in Canada and Australia has been a more or less peaceful process, but which in India and South Africa has been accomplished by constant wars.”
Commenting further upon colonial development, especially in the last century, Mr. Lucas says, in his introduction to Lewis's Government of Dependencies, when that valuable work was republished in 1891:
“The dependencies of any country which has the good or bad fortune to own dependencies fall into two great classes: Dependencies which it rules, and dependencies which it also settles; lands where the climate forbids European settlement or which are sufficiently peopled already by colored races,
and new homes for emigrants from an old country where population is wanted, where the soil and climate bid the incomers to be fruitful and multiply-colonies in the true sense of the word. Before 1841 the places where Europeans can live and thrive had been already annexed, and the chief acquisitions made by Great Britain during the past fifty years have been almost entirely dependencies in tropical lands of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. What were the causes which have been so fruitful in enlarging the number and size of the British dependencies? In the first place, the same spirit of energetic restlessness which made the English a colonizing race was certain sooner or later to find new openings. In the second place, wherever a civilized nation is side by side with uncivilized races-wherever an organized system borders on disorganization—there is sure to be direct or indirect annexation, whether it be by Russians in Central Asia or by English in India, Burma, and the Malay Indies. But there are above these tendencies three special causes which have operated for expansion mainly in the last twenty years. * * * Looking at the late partition of Africa, or at the parallel case of New Guinea, it is obvious that Great Britain has moved on mainly because Germany has moved on. Among nations, as among men, competition is the law of life, and as in Asia and America Great Britain competed with the Netherlands and France, so in Africa and the Pacific lately she has found a new competitor in Germany, and has literally extended herself in consequence. The second of the three special causes of the late enlargement of the British Empire is to be found in the fact that in the Empire, to an extent for which there is no parallel in history, an old country is linked to young countries—to self-governing colonies which wish to move faster than their mother, and which do not feel the ties and restraints imposed upon a leading European nation. The third and last special cause or feature of the new foreign policy is the regeneration of the system of chartered companies. It is at once cause and effect. It is an effect of a fresh outburst of colonial enterprise, and it is a cause of moving further along the path of annexation by giving to that enterprise cohesion, organization, and a definite plan. The age of great chartered companies seemed wholly gone.
They had played a great part in history, and having played their part had become gradually absorbed by their respective governments. Yet in these last days, as if to emphasize the fact that a new era of annexation has dawned, the trade and administration of great territories is being once more taken in hand by companies of merchants. In Borneo the British North Borneo Company rules 31,000 square miles, and their governor administers, under the colonial office, the little colony of Labuan. In Africa the Niger Company, the South Africa and the East Africa companies have extensive power over extensive districts. Why has the day of these chartered