most isolated and whose common boundaries are most

sharply defined. In illustration may be mentioned the cases of insular peoples, of mountain-clans, and of races like the Jews and the Cagots who live mingled with other communities but sharply isolated from them. Here too we see one great reason of the pacific influence of commerce. It is not necessarily that the traveller or the resident in a foreign country learns to like or to respect his new neighbours; it is that he becomes a member of the foreign community, and so long as he remains a member of it he is directly interested in its welfare. In course of time the identity of interest teaches him to assimilate his adopted to his native nation, and to regard them as parts of a single community.

The feeling with which a national benefactor is regarded I have called Piety, reverting to an ancient meaning of the term. It is closely akin to Reverence, and although the latter feeling has already been classified elsewhere, a reference to the definition of it will show that there is no inconsistency involved in the arrangement. Reverence was defined as the feeling corresponding with the relation of the organism to an actively beneficent agent of greatly superior power. Now it is evident that an agent capable of directly affecting the whole community must be cognised as overwhelmingly powerful as compared with the organism; and if it affects the community beneficially, a fortiori it affects the individual beneficially; so that from this point of view Tribal Reverence or Piety is included in Reverence as a species in a genus. Here again we meet with an instance of the impossibility of representing all the complicated inter-relations of the feelings either in serial order or by any arrangement in a single plane. Were it worth while, it would not be difficult to show by another solid diagram the relations of feelings of the present to those of the previous Class.

The only feeling of this group that corresponds with an action initiated by the organism is Patriotism, a feeling which corresponds with an act undertaken on the common environment for the benefit of the community at large. The object with which the act is undertaken marks the limitation of the feeling. Whatever beneficent acts a man may do for any section of the community, however large, are not termed patriotic. If a man spends a million upon improved dwellings for the poor, we call him benevolent. If he wears out his life in labouring for the amelioration of class after class of his fellow-countrymen, we call him philanthropic or public-spirited. But we do not apply to his conduct the term

Patriotic so long as his labours are for the good of a part or even of several or many parts of the community. Only when it concerns the welfare of the entire community does this term become applicable. Now the great majority of acts done for the benefit of the community as a whole consists in dealings with other communities, and the struggle for existence necessitates that, in dealing with other communities for the benefit of his own, the patriot has usually to deal with them antagonistically; and for this reason patriotic conduct is commonly understood to mean conduct antagonistic to some other community. But that this is not the sole nor the true meaning of the term will, I think, appear upon reflection; for nearly everyone would admit the propriety of terming patriotic the conduct of a statesman who had devoted his life to the service of his country, even if he had never involved it in a war; and the self-sacrifice of a Curtius or a Winkelried is allowed to be a brilliant instance of patriotism, even though it harmed none but himself.

Order II. The Ethical Feelings: corresponding with such interactions between the organism and its social environment as affect the common welfare. This definition of the ethical feelings is novel, and its correctness is not immediately apparent, but I think it may be established. First note that in the absence of a social environment ethical feelings have no existence. If a man were entirely isolated from his kind and lived in total solitude, the terms right and wrong would not be applicable to his actions. If so applied they would have no meaning. According as his conduct tended to self-conservation or the reverse it might be termed prudent or imprudent, but a wicked or righteous act would be impossible. A wrong or wicked act must be an act that hurts some one; it may be more than this, but it must be this at least, and if there is no one to hurt, wrong and wickedness are impossible. Obversely, a right action must benefit some one. An act that benefits some one need not necessarily be a right act, but a right act must have this quality; and in the absence of any one to benefit there can be no rightness, in the ethical sense, in the act. It may be said that if an Alexander Selkirk were to gratuitously torture an animal, the act would be wrong; and this is manifestly true; but it is also true that we think it wrong because the sentient animal has come to be in a manner included in our social environment. To those whose social environment is more limited the act does not appear wrong; and as the ethical feelings become more and more developed

wrongness is recognised in inflicting harm upon beings more and more distant in relationship from man, or rather this extension of the application of the stigma of wrongness is itself the expression of the development of ethical feeling. Development in another direction of the ethical feelings is marked by the less and less amounts of harm that are recognised as being wrong to inflict. I do not propose to discuss here the question of what we ought to call right and wrong. I merely take the facts as I find them; and, granting that these terms are applied to acts and classes of acts, I seek to define both the one and the other, to show under what conditions the terms right and wrong are as a matter of fact applied to them, and to discover the feelings that correspond with their various phases and varieties.

The method of regarding feelings as states in the organism corresponding with interactions between the organism and the environment seems to me to divest this perplexing subject of much of its difficulty. If we regard the Ethical Feelings as states corresponding with interactions between the organism and its social environment, the question arises, What special form can this interaction take that is different from the interactions between the organism and other sections of its environment? The community acts directly on the organism by punishment and reward-by chastisement, imprisonment and various other kinds of torture on the one hand, and by the bestowal of wealth, honours, power and other benefits on the other. But all these interactions can be suffered or attained-torture can be suffered and social eminence gained-not indeed in the absence of the community, but apart from its direct action; and the corresponding feelings-of Pain, Restraint, Authority, and so forth-as they correspond with other actions are included in other classes of feelings. The feelings of the present group are those which correspond with that additional element in the interaction which converts a pain into a punishment and a pleasure into a reward; they correspond with interactions that occur between the organism and its social environment and that cannot occur under any other circumstances. Although the community may and does act physically upon the organism, it is not the physical part of the action that the ethical feelings correspond with. It is with that feature of the community's action that we call Approbation or Reprobation.

These two attitudes of the community toward the individual are the special reactions that are evoked by the acts of the individual; and an act evokes the one or the other of these two reactions according as it is cognised to be noxious

or beneficial to the community. When an individual acts in such a way as to benefit the community he arouses in beholders an attitude of approbation. When he acts in such a way as to harm the community he arouses in them an attitude of reprobation. These two attitudes of a community towards individual members of it are of course assumed in respect of patriotic and antipatriotic acts-those done on the environment of the community-as well as in respect of acts done on the community itself; but it is with the latter class of acts alone that we are now concerned.

I

Wrongful acts may be divided into two classes-those that wound the person or diminish the property of others, and those that wound the feelings. Every wrongful act must do one of these things, although many acts that do these things are not wrong; and the rightness or wrongness of a harmful act depends on whether the harm done to the individual is or is not exceeded by the benefit done to the community. If A wounds B, the act is viewed with reprobation-is considered wrong-not only by B, but by C, D, E, and other witnesses. Why is the act considered wrong by those who do not suffer from it? Because, as it seems to me, leaving Sympathy aside, each of these witnesses regards himself as possibly the next victim. Each of them grounds his judgment of the wrongness of the act, not on the fact of its perpetration on B in particular, but on its perpetration on a member of the community of which he himself is one. do not say that this is the reason consciously alleged for the judgment. In most cases Reprobation, like other feelings, is felt and expressed without any analysis being made of the ground of its existence; but the reason that I have given, although not alleged, although perhaps not discovered on subsequent meditation, is yet the sub-conscious foundation for the judgment. Though it is not the avowed basis of our daily partition of acts into right and wrong, this is the avowed basis for the partition of them when occasion arises for a formal judgment to be pronounced; and explicit or implicit in every judicial decision is the proposition that the degree of rightness or wrongness of an act depends on the degree in which it is beneficial or noxious to the community. The jury decide whether or no the act was done, and by whom it was done. The judge sits as the representative of the community to determine the rightness or wrongness of acts. In forming his decision the principle by which he is guided is always the bearing of the act, not upon the person who chiefly suffers by it, but upon the community; or on the sufferer as representing the community.

This principle is formally embodied in the statute law.

A steals an article from B. He is sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. On his release he steals an article from C. This time he is sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment. He is again liberated and steals another article from D. He is now sentenced to penal servitude. He gets a ticket of leave and steals another article from E. He is sent back to penal servitude for a longer term. Why this progressive augmentation of the punishment? The articles are of approximately equal, or we will suppose of diminishing, value. The wrong done to E is not greater than that done to B. It may be much less. Why should it be visited by a penalty twenty or fifty times as severe? Obviously because the offences are looked upon not as isolated offences against individuals but as repetitions of the offence against the community. Still stronger evidence is afforded by the law. A prosecutes B for theft. B says he is sorry and A wishes to withdraw from the prosecution; but the magistrate refuses to allow the charge to be withdrawn. On what possible ground? Clearly because he looks upon the act of B as injury not to A only but to the whole community, and in his view A is no longer the party chiefly interested in the matter.

It is, as a rule, wrong to deprive people of their property without compensation, to injure or to kill; but there are many exceptions in civil life to these rules; and the exceptions are those occasions in which the harm done to the individual is, or is believed to be, more than balanced by the good done to the community. This it is that makes it right to fine the wrong-doer, to flog the garotter and to hang the murderer. If it be said that the rectitude of such acts lies not in the balance of benefit which they secure to the community but in the infliction of a divinely-ordered punishment, then wherein lies the justification for destroying a house in order to prevent a fire from spreading, or in order to give a clear range to the artillery of a besieged town? and how can it be ethically permissible to imprison innocent people in quarantine? While as to most of these acts there is much controversy as to whether there is an excess of good done to the community over the harm done to the individual, no question is ever raised, save in the case of hanging, as to whether the action is right if this excess is shown to exist.

From a social point of view, acts may therefore be divided according as they benefit or harm the community or are indifferent. In the last case no feeling belonging to the present class is evoked in the beholders, but in the two former, feelings of Approbation and Reprobation respectively are aroused, and commonly find ready and well-understood