is responsible for want of discipline in his scholars and the general for anything that is done amiss by his army. Gehirn und Bewusstsein. Physiologisch-psychologische Studie. Von Dr. In Part i. of this "physiologico-psychological study" the author maintains against the view of Du Bois-Reymond, who holds that consciousness although it cannot be explained mechanically may yet originate mechanically, that this last supposition is equally inadmissible with the first. He dismisses also the doctrine that mind and matter are opposite sides of the same reality. Matter-the extended world-is, he concludes, only a portion of consciousness. But material phenomena have a certain symbolic value. It is one of the objects of Part ii. to define this value in the case of the matter that is most directly related to consciousness, that is, the matter of the brain. By study of the mechanism of the brain, regarded as having a symbolic value, and by direct psychological study, the author seeks to discover a "universal law of association". He finds that actual states of consciousness are complex, and do not absolutely differ from one another, but are alike as to some of their parts. "This partial real likeness of the parts of the whole, with which a likeness of material sections of the whole material process can be co-ordinated," accounts for the fact that parts of those wholes can be replaced by others; and this power of like states of consciousness to replace one another explains association. Having rejected (in Part i.) the idea of a real external cause producing effects in consciousness, and consequently of a real subject receiving impressions, the author goes on, after dealing with association, to discuss in Part iii. the question whether there is any unity in consciousness itself by which particular occurrences are bound together. He finds that there is not. world and consciousness may be reduced to collections of occurrences (Vorkommnisse) without unity in any philosophical sense. No real activity is to be discovered within consciousness any more than upon it from outside. "The Ego," "judgment," "comparison," &c., are merely names for certain groupings of "elementary occurrences," not "special phenomena or modes of relation of consciousness to an object". In looking into our thoughts, as in looking upon the clouds, we see in what manner they come and go, but not how they came into being. We should describe ourselves rather as "the place of thought and actions" than as really thinking and acting. The Metaphysik. Drei Bücher der Ontologie, Kosmologie u. Psychologie. Von HERMANN LOTZE. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1884. Pp. 60-4. Grundzüge der Psychologie. Dictate aus den Vorlesungen von HERMANN LOTZE. Dritte Auflage. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1884. Pp. 95. Pending critical notice of Lotze's Metaphysic in English translation to follow upon review of the Logic in the present No., we note the appearance of the second edition of the original, five years after the first. Though no indication is given of the changes, Prof. Rehnisch, who has had charge of the works since Lotze's death, intimated some months ago, in a notice of the French translation of the Metaphysik mentioned in MIND XXXV. 475, that this had been found useful in clearing up the sense of the original at some points during preparation of the second edition. A third edition of the Lecture-notes on Psychology first issued in 1881 has now been called for. They are again given as dictated in Lotze's last winter session, 1880-1, but with some minor alterations of interestdevelopments here and there of particular paragraphs. Specielle Physiologie des Embryo. Untersuchungen über die Lebenserscheinungen vor der Geburt. Von W. PREYER, 0.ö. Prof. der Physiologie an der Universität Jena. Mit 9 lithographirten Tafeln und Holzschnitten im Text. Leipzig: Th. Grieben (Fernau), 1885. Pp. xii., 644. Reflex The last of the four separately issued parts of this work having now appeared, it becomes possible to speak of it as a whole. It may be said that the author has done for the physiology of the embryo what Balfour did for the morphology in his Handbook. The section of the book that will be most interesting to psychologists is, of course, the account of the mobility and sensibility of the embryo. Some of the researches described here are closely connected with those on new-born children described in the author's previous work Die Seele des Kindes, to which he has frequently occasion to make reference. His most important general results are that mobility appears long before sensibility, and that the sense-organs and the parts of the nervous system connected with them are capable of functioning before it is at all likely that in normal embryonic life they have any proper functions to perform. By "mobility" is to be understood more especially the power of making spontaneous or impulsive" movements. The presence of sensibility can only be proved by the existence of what is really a kind of mobility—that is, reflex mobility. When the appropriate reflex movements are obtained on stimulating the sense-organs it is inferred that the corresponding kind of sensibility is present. movements are not only later in appearing but can also be made to disappear more easily than impulsive movements. The movements that indicate sensibility can be suppressed (in the artificially extracted embryo of the rabbit) by applying chloroform to the skin, with more difficulty by causing chloroform to be breathed. In either case the anaesthesia passes off very rapidly. It is supposed that the chloroform in the first case acts directly, in the second case indirectly, on the nerves of the skin; that it only secondarily affects the spinal cord; and that it does not act at all on the brain. The movement of sensibility in the embryo gradually rises from its first appearance up to birth. In the embryo of the rabbit, the skin being irritated, two seconds may pass from the contact to the reaction. The occurrence of respiratory movements is dependent on the power already present of reflex movement in response to stimuli on the skin, not the power of reflex movement on respiration. Little has been ascertained with regard to the sense of temperature and the muscular sense; the fact that mobility is increased by warmth, diminished by cold, of course proves nothing as to the sense of temperature properly so-called. The human fœtus gives signs of having feelings of taste two months before birth. The whole complex of parts belonging to the ear is functionless before birth, as are also the parts of the eye: but the power of raising the eyelid is present; the eyes are not closed in the human embryo after the sixth month. The conditions for the organic feelings are present several weeks before birth; pleasure and pain can be distinguished. The author finally puts the question: What is the actual state of the embryo normally? He arrives by a series of arguments that seem pretty conclusive when taken together at the result, that its state is normally like dreamless sleep or like the state of a hibernating mammal; it does not wake up from this state before birth except momentarily, and then only when strongly stimulated. Das Gefühlsleben. In seinen wesentlichsten Erscheinungen und Bezügen dargestellt. Von JOSEPH W. NAHLOWSKY. Zweite durchgesehene und verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig: Veit. Pp. xii., 193. The first edition of this book was published in 1862; and since the appearance of the second edition of Prof. Bain's Emotions and Will (1865), the author's classification of feelings (on Herbartian principles) has been before English readers. The subtitle is now altered, by omission of the previous express reference to "practical points of view". The Introduction (pp. 3-36) is wholly recast, chiefly with the object of giving still greater precision to the scientific distinction he had made between Empfindung and Gefühl. For the rest the alterations in the text are confined to points of detail, being considerable only in the description of the feeling of Love. The author, in his new preface, draws attention to the increased amount of interest (since 1862) in Esthetics as a science shown by the appearance of a number of important works, and selects for short discussion the views expressed in Zimmermann's Allgemeine Esthetik als Formwissenschaft (1865) and in Köstlin's Esthetik (1869) on the relation of form to content in works of art-in order to define here also his own position more precisely. Die realistische und die idealistische Weltanschauung entwickelt an Kants Idealität von Zeit und Raum. Von E. LAST. Mit dem Portrait der Verfasserin. Leipzig: Th. Grieben (Fernau), 1884. Pp. xxiii., 259. In Germany also, women are now joining in the philosophical movement. According to the authoress, who has previously devoted herself with success to the exposition of Kant and Schopenhauer's main doctrines in a work entitled Mehr Licht! the "realistic" view of the world is that which has expressed itself both in ancient and modern times as "materialism" or "naturalism". It is the first speculative result of the effort of man to comprehend the world as a whole. This view tends to express itself not only as a theoretical but also as a practical philosophy, and here its defects become manifest. Ideals in general and more especially moral ideals cannot be explained, even with the aid of the modern doctrine of evolution, as mere products of nature; on the contrary they are seen to be imposed on nature by man. The realistic view has, however, its advantages as promoting scientific research and improvement of the conditions of life. And the bad influence which it would exert if unchecked can be counteracted by bringing into relation with it the idealistic view and thus disclosing its theoretical weakness. The idealistic view has been expressed by Kant better than by any other philosopher. In Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time is to be found a refutation of the attempt to derive the human mind from nature as if "nature" were something known apart from the mind. Those, therefore, who wish to check the evil influence that might proceed from materialism unmodified by any other philosophy ought to devote themselves to making Kant's idealism better known. Das Auswendiglernen und Auswendighersagen in physio-psychologischer, pædagogischer und sprachlicher Hinsicht. Von Dr. J. HOPPE. Hamburg u. Leipzig: L. Voss, 1883. Pp. 143. In this little volume Dr. Hoppe discusses a subject of considerable psychological interest and practical value. In the process of learning by heart and repeating or giving out what is then learned we have raised in a very definite form the question how words are related to ideas, and further what is the precise nature of verbal images. The author (whose former work Die Schein-Bewegungen was noticed in MIND XVI.) appears to have had two main objects in view in his present monograph: (1) to contend against the mechanico-physiological theory that speaking is a reflex nervous process in which the mind takes no part; (2) to upset the view that the movements of articulation are attended with definite muscular feelings, the Here for revival of which constitutes the essential element in our verbal images. He takes a rather optimistic view of the power of learning by heart, appearing to think that it is the natural tendency of the mind to dwell on ideas and not on the words which signify them. Speaking involves both a physiological mechanism and an activity of mind which somehow dwells in the cortical substance and sets the machinery going when it wills. The author's rather imaginative way of describing this cherub-sort of mind sitting aloft and keeping guard over the nervous mechanism, is perhaps not altogether conducive to scientific exactness. With respect to the precise nature of verbal images, he asserts that they are essentially auditory; that when we "think words" we are thinking of the articulate sounds; and that there are no such things as clear articulatory images, but only at best vague tactual representations of the various contacts (lip with lip, tongue with palate, &c.), involved in articulation. There is much re-iterated assertion to this effect, which the reader would gladly exchange for some more decisive references to fact. example is a simple experiment which everybody can try. Choose a series of unmeaning sounds-say pum, roch, crant, &c. First, "think" or imagine these as mere sounds, carefully repressing any tendency to articulate. Repeat them thus internally several times, and then try to recall them after a few seconds. Then take this same series (or some equally meaningless one) and instead of merely thinking the sounds, execute the movement of the mouth involved in articulating them, yet without carrying out the respiratory process necessary to complete audible utterance. Do this repeatedly and then try, as in the other case, to recall the series after an interval. The difference in the distinctness of the verbal images in these two cases seems to point to the articulatory element's having a more important part to play in the representation of words than Dr. Hoppe admits. At the same time, he seems to be right in his main contention that the auditory image is, under normal circumstances, by far the more prominent element of consciousness. There is a brief reference at the close to the way in which the blind and deaf, as well as the simply deaf, have to speak, but this, interesting though it is, hardly appears to supply an adequate basis for the generalisations set up. Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens. Von Dr. THEODOR LIPPS, Privatdocent der Philosophie an der Universität Bonn. Bonn: Max Cohen, 1883. Pp. viii., 709. By miscarriage, this extensive work, in which the author seeks to traverse the whole field of psychological science proper (avoiding, as far as possible, both metaphysical and physiological reference), failed to reach us at the time it was published, more than eighteen months ago. Only just received, it can at present be merely mentioned. It is laid out in six divisions: (1) Critical Preliminaries; (2) The most general Facts; (3) Flow of Presentations and die Vorstellungsverhältnisse; (4) Flow of Presentations and die Vorstellungsbeziehungen; (5) Blendings and Complications. of Presentations; (6) Conation (Streben). RECEIVED also :- M. D. Conway, Farewell Discourses, London, E. W. Allen, pp. 188. C. Gill, The Evolution of Christianity, 2nd Ed., London, Williams & Norgate, pp. xcvi., 397. J. McCosh, Energy; Efficient and Final Cause, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, pp. 55. 'Alchemist', The Altruistic Act, Montreal, Witness Printing House, pp. 12. A. Young, Destiny or Man's Will-Means and Will-Ends, London, Houlston, Pp. 21. Y. Guyot, Principles of Social Economy, trans. (C. H. d'Eyncourt Leppington), London, W. Swan Sonnenschein, pp. xx., 305. S. V. Clevenger, Comparative Physiology and Psychology, Chicago, Jansen & McClurg, pp. 247. F. Bouillier, Etudes fumilières de Psychologie et de Morale, Paris, Hachette, pp. 315. A. Fouillée, La Proprieté sociale et la Democratie, Paris, Hachette, pp. ix., 294. E. Rabier, Leçons de Philosophie, I. Psychologie, Paris, Hachette, pp. 676. A. Büchner, Essai biographique sur Léon Dumont, Paris, F. Alcan, pp. 183. A. Bain, Les Emotions et la Volonté, trad. (P. L. le Monnier), Paris, F. Alcan, pp. 595. N. Colajanni, Il Socialismo, Catania, F. Tropea, pp. 396. G. Fontana, Genesi della Filosofia Morale Contemporanea, Milano, Fr. Dumolard, pp. 222. G. Cesca, La Dottrina Kantiana dell' A Priori, Verona e Padova, Drucker e Tedeschi, pp. 279. J. Armangué y Tuset, Mimicismo ó Neurósis Imitante Barcelona, Ramirez, pp. 48. E. v. Hagen, Kritische Betrachtung der wichtigsten Grundlehren des Christenthumes, Hannover, Schüssler, 1881, pp. lvi., 120. E. Grafe, Die Paulinische Lehre vom Gesetz, Freiburg i. B. u. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, pp. 26. G. Gerber, Die Sprache als Kunst, 2te Aufl., 1te Lief., Berlin, R. Gärtner, Pp. 112. - Die Sprache u. das Erkennen, Berlin, R. Gärtner, pp. 336. R. v. Schubert-Soldern, Grundlagen einer Erkenntnisstheorie, Leipzig, Fues, pp. 349. E. v. Böhm-Bawerk, Geschichte u. Kritik der Kapitalzinstheorien, Innsbruck, Wagner, pp. xii., 498. F. v. Wieser, Ueber den Ursprung u. die Hauptgesetze des wirthschaftlichen S. Stricker, Physiologie des Rechts, Wien, Töplitz u. Deuticke, pp. x., 144. J. Goebel, Ueber tragische Schuld u., Sühne, Berlin, C. Duncker, pp. 108. NOTICE of some of these (received too late) is deferred till next No. |