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fundamental difficulty. What is fruitful in this view is that it postulates the rationality of the world in God, without which indeed faith and grace would be unmeaning terms.

The actual origin of religion is discussed in Section 1, ch. 1. Prof. Pfleiderer lays greater stress on the facts of religion as discovered by self-observation than on the theories about savage beliefs. In fact, if we may say so, he does not seem quite at his ease with savages. The original form of religion he believes to have been neither Fetichism nor Animism, but what with M. Réville he calls Naturism or the worship of the great forces of nature, on whom man felt his dependence and whom he feared and loved and yearned for. This at first sight is not very unlike Prof. Max Müller's belief that religion arises from a perception of the Infinite. Prof. Pfleiderer then seeks to show how different social processes led this original belief in different directions. With some it became Polytheism, with its transformation of natural into moral Gods, and its accompanying ceremonial and mythology. With some it became as with the Jews the worship of a single God (this is called Henotheism in a sense different from Prof. Max Müller's). With some it degenerated through the disintegration of society into Spiritism or Animism, or finally Fetichism. Now it seems to us impossible to attribute religious progress or degeneracy to social progress or degeneracy: they are both due in their different ways to the same changes of thought. But our purpose rather is to point out an error into which psychology is apt to lead us and has led Prof. Pfleiderer. His analysis of the religious consciousness may be quite correct, but it does not follow that it must be attributed in this form to the original man, any more than it follows, because all religion implies a perception of the infinite, that therefore the original religion was a perception of the infinite as such. Prof. Pfleiderer rightly objects to Animism and Fetichism that they presuppose the abstract notion of soul or spirit (p. 31), but he concludes that therefore they cannot be primary. The objection is equally good against his own theory. In fact there are two totally distinct questions: (1) What is the real nature of religion? and from this point of view religion does imply the notions of spirit or the infinite; (2) What is the first form of religion? and this, to put it moderately, must be decided by the facts. The facts may be as Prof. Pfleiderer states them, but they are not proved to be so by his psychology. The primitive form of religion does involve the essential notion of religion, and yet it may be as far as possible removed from revealing that notion in the shape under which developed religions know it; just as the first kind of punishment may be modelled on private vengeance, and yet the real nature of punishment be totally distinct from private vengeance which it supersedes. And we suspect that Prof. Max Müller has this distinction in mind in his Hibbert Lectures, pp. 43-6, though if so he has not there done it justice.

The rest of the volume is an account of religious ideas, or the elements of them, regarded from the triple point of view of history, psychology and metaphysic. The names of some of the chapters will give an idea of the vast range of subjects treated: e.g., The Development of the Religious Consciousness of the IndoGermanic and the Semitic Peoples, and of Christendom; the Belief in God, in Angels and Devils; Theory of Creation, of Revelation and Miracles; Redemption and Mediation; Theodicy; Church and Cultus; Religion and Morality. It is impossible to do justice, except in a very lengthy notice, to such a rich collection of well-arranged and well-told facts, and to so much luminous theology and suggestive thought. It will be best to take an example or two of Prof. Pfleiderer's method.

We select his discussion of Redemption and Mediation. He begins by recounting the different forms which the belief has taken from the natural religions and the Persian up to Christianity. He explains the Pauline doctrine as due to a "dialectic" between St. Paul's Jewish presuppositions and their new application to the death of Christ. Christ was to him the ideal or typical man, and his death was potentially the death of all to sin. With this is joined the belief in faith, or the inner process by which all become one in Christ, so that his death is no longer a mere expiation but a proof of God's love. The different views which theologians and philosophers have held are then expounded, and lastly comes Prof. Pfleiderer's own view. Redemption he believes to be founded on an inner experience, which takes two forms. On the one hand, it is the attraction which the good exercises over the will, because of the " impulse which directs the individual will to its source in the will of God". On the other, it is the pain of unattained happiness, and, still more, the sense of guilt. These two elements go to constitute the final experience of faith and the new life it brings. This change is regarded as an effect of a higher power, or as grace, so that it may be expressed in the words, The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God'. Now this immediate belief in redemption is the same in all, and it differs only in degree of intensity in the common man and the great religious genius. But it needs the analogous experience of others, and thus in most it is not an original product, but an ideal communicated by others. Hence arises the belief in an actual redeemer or mediator, in whose love for man it sees the love of God for his creatures, and in whose death it sees portrayed that reconciliation of God with man which the individual experiences in the emotion of faith. It is natural that the revelation of divinity contained in such an experience should lead believers to attach to their redeemer a supernatural origin, and that a confusion should sometimes arise between two views of mediation-the one juridical, of the satisfaction of an angry God, the other and true one, ethical, "of the indirect production of the consciousness of

redemption through the revelation and teaching of its original vehicle" (491).

There is one thing more which we must mention, partly because of its suggestiveness, partly because Prof. Pfleiderer is evidently fond of it himself. This is his view of the form of cultus (§ 3, c. 1). He regards worship itself as containing two elements in solution, that of devotion or the endeavour of man after God, and, secondly, the divine gift and effect enjoyed. This is a double point of view which is to be found all through the book. But we are speaking of the form of worship, and this Prof. Pfleiderer regards as a drama which is a representation or imitation of the divine life in which men share. Thus sacrifice was originally an invitation to the gods to share in a common feast (537). But it is best illustrated from Christianity. Baptism, with St. Paul, as the appropriation of redemption by a moral death and rebirth, is the imitation of the death and resurrection of Christ (540). The communion again is the dramatisation of redemption, and the history of the rite shows how one or other of the two elements involved in it has been made prominent, namely, the divine act of grace on the one hand and the human response of faith on the other.

Perhaps these remarks may make it clear that it is as a contribution to the speculative theology of Christianity that Prof. Pfleiderer's book is most valuable. It is needless to say that he is perfectly acquainted with all that criticism has done for the subject this work is, in fact, a dictionary of the results of the science of religion, not only for Christianity but other religions also. He approaches the subject with a profound belief in the truth of the Protestant faith, and perhaps his writing sometimes has the air of a sermon. But there are very few religious questions which he has left unanswered, and we should have liked to quote more of his answers to them. They are all worth studying.

S. ALEXANDER.

Geschichte der Psychologie. Von Dr. HERMANN SIEBECK, Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Basel (1880), Giessen (1884). Erster Theil, Abth. 1: "Die Psychologie vor Aristoteles"; Abth. 2: "Die Psychologie von Aristoteles zu Thomas von Aquino". Gotha: Perthes, 1880, 1884. Pp. xviii., 284; xi., 531.

This book is too full of matter for detailed criticism in present circumstances, but there should at least be no more delay in following up the brief notices already given of its two Parts, as they appeared, with some more adequate account of the kind of instruction which it makes the first systematic attempt to furnish to students of psychological science. In the author's view, Psychology has now reached a critical stage in its course, when

future progress depends not least upon a true understanding of the path, or paths, it has hitherto traversed. It has at last, after whatever devious wanderings and changing fortunes, following upon the early start it got from Aristotle, won recognition as an independent science in the modern sense, and, if it is henceforth to be pursued without more interference from metaphysical speculation than any other science must submit to, its past history cannot be too closely scanned in or out of relation to general philosophy. Of historical consideration applied to psychological notions there has, of course, been as little lack as to philosophical thought in general. Zeller is there, for the ancient world, with his mine of psychological as of other information, as indeed no historian of philosophy, whether on the wider or narrower scale, can avoid making mind the very first of his topics. Neither have some of the more distinguished among recent psychologists neglected the help to be got from historical consideration; W. Volkmann especially, in his comprehensive Lehrbuch der Psychologie, having displayed extraordinary research of this kind in illustration of his own scientific positions. History of Psychology, as a continuous tracing of the whole conception men have struggled from the beginning to form of the mental life they distinguish within their being, as yet there has been none. This is the deficiency which Prof. Siebeck here sets himself to supply.

But

It is not surprising that in such a first effort he limits the field of view by taking no account of Oriental ideas except in so far as, at different times, they can be proved to have directly influenced Western inquiry; but, with the help of recent investigation of human origins, he does not fail, in a general introduction (pp. 1-29), to begin the story from long before the time of systematic reflection. An "anthropological monism"-which recognises, but leaves aside for philosophical consideration, the transcendent aspect of consciousness, and confines itself to the facts of psychical and psychophysical experience in their positive relations-is, in his view, the outcome of the more developed psychological activity of the present century, prefigured at every earlier stage according as the research was conducted in a scientific spirit, and by nobody so decidedly as by Aristotle. The goal, however, has been approached or reached from an original position of crude (objective) dualism. Man, in the earliest dawn of thought, has everywhere been regarded as a compound of two separable beings, soul and body, one within the other-a conception, as the author well urges (pp. 6, 7), suggested in the natural course of waking-experience, and not only by the intermittent phenomena of dreaming or the supreme crisis of death. The problem, then, is to understand how, when express inquiry began in Ionia some six centuries B.C., it has tended by whatever variety of ways towards the actual result.

The whole exposition will fall into three main divisions, of

which but one is yet completed in the two sections of the present volume. Vol. iii. is reserved for the mass of scientific work that, in this century, has followed the critical investigation of Kant. In vol. ii. the modern movement till the end of last century will be traced from its first beginnings within the Middle Age-in Roger Bacon after Arab initiative towards positive inquiry, in the Nominalists and even in Duns Scotus. So much of mediæval thought being still left over, Thomas is made the final term of the present volume, because in him the Aristotelian doctrine attained its utmost development-in accommodation to the Christian scheme of life which Europe had meanwhile adopted, but still in professed agreement with the conceptions of the master who first gave definite form to psychological science. Within the volume, the special work of the historian is to show how the decisive achievement of one man was prepared by the varied labours of many before him, and affected all later thought about mind for at least 1500 years. In the execution of this task nothing is more noteworthy than the author's width of survey, beyond the conventional lines of treatment. Thus, in the period after Aristotle, great prominence is given to Galen, whose influence, as regards all that concerned the physiological conditions of mental life, superseded Aristotle's own, and remained predominant till Harvey's discovery prepared the way for a truer conception of nervous function; but also at the preliminary stage Prof. Siebeck is able to trace with effect, in what is reported of earliest medical work, the opening of more than one vein of later psychological theory. And of the plan of treatment generally, it may be said that it displays a judicious tempering of regard for mere chronological order with topical consideration. Whether he is dealing with single thinkers of critical importance, like Plato and Aristotle, or with periods in which multitudes of lesser men carried forward the inquiry upon this line or that, the author makes such division of subjects as that effective comparison of the state of psychological knowledge at the different stages is always possible. Mention should also be made of two chapters of special importance (ii. 130-60, 331-42), in which the development of the notions of "Vital Spirit" (Pneuma) and "Consciousness" is continuously set forth at those points of the history when, after long elaboration, they acquired the deeper significance which they were destined to receive and thenceforth retained.

Aristotle, as the central figure, naturally takes the largest space (115 pp., followed by a dozen pages more of summary criticism). Through him Psychology became definitely constituted as a special science on a basis of positive observation; for, though in modern times it has had again to conquer a place among the new divisions of knowledge, nothing is so remarkable as Aristotle's anticipations of the most advanced doctrine as to its scope and method. By comparison with the natural sciences in their positive form, psychology has indeed a history

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