doctrine as a whole, and a point of view of his own from which to criticise as well as interpret it. În Mr. Benn's Greek Philosophers, Prof. Teichmüller sees evidence that others have independently come to take the broader historical view of Plato which he advocates. He replies incidentally (in vol. ii.) to Mr. Benn's arguments against his explanation of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as taught in the Phaedo. Consistently with his "pantheistic interpretation of Plato," he still holds that the doctrine of personal immortality had for Plato only the value of those myths whose meaning he approved of: in Plato himself immortality means permanence of the intelligible element of the soul; and he does not admit the transcendent isolation of this any more than of the sensible element. The central doctrine of Plato's whole system is that of μebéέis, union of being with becoming; being, or the ideal element, cannot exist apart from the flux of things: the older critics have not seen that this is implied in what is commonly taught as to Plato's combination of the doctrine of the Eleatics with that of Heraclitus. The author applies his new method to fixing the chronology of Aristotle as well as of Plato. He claims to have shown that in the Laws Plato replied to Aristotle's criticisms in the Nicomachean Ethics; that indeed passages from Aristotle are actually quoted in the Laws. As the Theaetetus is a fixed point for determining the chronology of Plato, so the Laws will become a fixed point for determining the chronology of Aristotle. Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zur Gegenwart. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf den klassischen Unterricht. Von Dr. FRIEDRICH Paulsen, a. o. Professor an der Universität zu Berlin. Leipzig: Veit, 1885. Pp. xvi., 811. The parts of Raumer's Pædagogik and of the Encyclopædia of Schmid which deal historically with learned education in Germany being incomplete, especially as regards the Universities, Dr. Paulsen, well-known by his work on the historical development of Kant's theory of knowledge (1875), has devoted himself to filling up the blank that was thus left in literature. The present work is divided into three Books dealing respectively with the shaping of learned instruction under the influence of "the first humanism" and the Reformation (1500-1600); the changes during the period of Rationalism and Pietism (1600-1805); and lastly, “the time of the new humanism". In Bk. i., c. 1., a brief sketch is given of education in the Middle Ages. The author's own view as regards the_future—important as coming from so distinguished a member of the Berlin philosophical faculty-is that the classical training given in the Gymnasia must be very much restricted. The power of reading Latin will always remain essential; but classical education in the older sense will become a specialty of philologists. Not mathematics and natural science, but German (with other modern languages) and philosophy, are to replace it. Modern culture, although having its origin and its basis in ancient culture, first as continued in the Middle Ages by the Church, afterwards as rediscovered in its earlier and typical form by the Renaissance, has now become an independent culture, itself capable of affording all the materials for a complete education. As a means of bringing about the changes he desires Dr. Paulsen does not propose new examinations, but rather the suppression of some of the present ones. He thinks it unfortunate, however, that no preliminary philosophical instruction should be given in the Gymnasium : for at present, through its postponement to the University, those who do not make a specialty of philosophy hardly come in contact with it at all; the specialisation of "the philosophical faculty" (the old "faculty of arts"), of which philosophy, properly so called, is only a branch co-ordinate with the natural sciences, philology, &c., being now complete. This change in the position of philosophy, no longer obligatory even on non-professional students at the University, and yet absent from the Gymnasium, a change which was not completely effected till the present century (the Renaissance having left philosophical instruction almost where it was in the Middle Ages),-is explained by the author as due in part to the less fitness of modern philosophy as compared with the scholastic philosophy for being taught by text-books, and to its division (since Kant) into schools. His own opinion, however, is that the difficulties in the way of making philosophical training a part of all high education can be surmounted. Kant's Dinge-an-sich und sein Erfahrungsbegriff. Eine Untersuchung von M. W. DROBISCH. Hamburg and Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1885. Pp. V., 53. Kant's intention in his doctrine of things-in-themselves was to make his theory of knowledge independent of the question as to their reality. The conception of the thing-in-itself is a limiting conception, not an affirmation of the real existence of a noumenal world. The application in the theoretical philosophy of the category of causality to things-in-themselves is to be explained by the distinction between thinking (Denken) and knowing (Erkennen); the thing-in-itself is "thought," but not "known," as a cause. Through his mode of affirming this limiting conception, Kant, in his doctrine of experience, came very near "subjective idealism"-the derivation of the matter as well as the form of knowledge from an activity of the subject. The author contends that, for the categories to be applied to experience at all, not only the "matter" but "the determinate form of objects of experience" must already be "given". In restoring the "realistic" element which Kant tended (in consequence of his mode of statement) to suppress, he trusts that, although "an old Herbartian," he is not interpreting Kant from an external point of view, but correcting his doctrine in the sense in which he himself would have desired to correct it. Das Endergebniss der Schopenhauer'schen Philosophie in seiner Uebereinstimmung mit einer der ältesten Religionen dargestellt. Von Dr. DAVID ASHER. Leipzig: Arnoldische Buchhandlung, 1885. Pp. 100. The author is already known as an enthusiastic advocate of Schopenhauer's philosophy, who, however, declines to accept pessimism as a deduction from the doctrine of Will. He here puts forth an idea which he had arrived at thirty years since but has not hitherto published, viz., that the central doctrine of Judaism in its earliest form,-which he takes to be that of the Pentateuch,-is identical with Schopenhauer's doctrine of "the will to live"; the God of Moses being essentially the principle of life, and being always conceived as a will. It is shown how the idea of life as the essence of things was developed by the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, and especially by Avicebron in the celebrated Fons Vita. In dealing with the ethical applications of this idea, Dr. Asher recapitulates the proofs that not only in the Mosaic books, but in the other books of the Bible, and also in the Rabbinical writings, length and fulness of life are represented as the reward of good action: by "life" being meant life on earth, since neither the Pentateuch nor any book of the Old Testament teaches the doctrine of immortality. Although a Jew by race, the author is not himself an adherent of orthodox Judaism, and his work is addressed only to those who have rejected Jewish and Christian theology. One object of his book is to protest against Schopenhauer's antipathy to Judaism, which he ascribes, with Schopenhauer himself, to its optimistic character. Dr. Asher would reconcile religion and philosophy by not admitting a permanent distinction between philosophy and religion in any sense; we are to look forward to a time when action proceeding from a reasoned view of things will be possible for all and not merely for philosophers. His view is essentially that of "evolutionist ethics"-that life is in itself good, and that life and increase of life should be made the end of effort both for the individual and the community. Die Sprache als Kunst. Von GUSTAV GERBER. Zweite Auflage, ErsteFünfte Lieferungen. Berlin: Gaertner, 1884, 5. Pp. 561. Die Sprache und das Erkennen. Von GUSTAV GERBER. Berlin: Gaertner, 1884. Pp. 336. The The second of these works carries farther the general view of speech that was given in the earlier one, half of which has now reappeared in a second edition issued by parts. Speech as a product of "naïve art" by which ideas of objects are conveyed from one mind to another, is distinguished from "natural sounds," that is, mere signs of emotion, such as are used by animals. Words, however, taking their character in part from the feelings of those who create them, do not reproduce actual things, but transform the real world into an ideal world. Having once been created by the free activity of individuals, speech reacts on the individual through the race, and becomes knowledge-a knowledge which is common to all. sentence (Der Satz), not in its grammatical form but in its form as root (Sprachwurzel), is the first product of the creative activity of man expressing itself in speech. Here knowledge is already implied; man has placed himself in a "theoretical" relation to objects. Speech itself gives the impulse to strive after a more exact knowledge of the world as it is, to make the sentence-the element of speech-a judgment expressing the truth of things. From first to last the character of speech as art is stamped on our knowledge. "It is speech that manifests the essence of man in relation to the universe." The general result of the author's criticism of knowledge from this point of view is that the categories of knowledge for the speech of the individual are the representation (1) of the empirical ego, (2) of movement in time and space, (3) of the relation of cause and effect; expressed in (1) the subject, (2) the predicate, (3) the copula. These categories are to be taken in the sense of Kant rather than of Aristotle; for although Aristotle's as well as Kant's deduction of the categories has its roots in speech, Aristotle's deduction was from isolated words, while Kant's was from the judgment as expressed in the sentence. From the deduction of the categories (cc. i.-iv.) the author goes on to consider speech as a social product (c. v.). Having so far treated it as a product of the activity of the individual and the race under the influence of external things, he next proceeds to consider it as at the same time a product of the activity of the subject passing outwards (c. vi.). Kant's distinction between Wahrnehmungsurtheile and Erfahrungsurtheile then leads to a closer consideration of the copula in the two kinds of judgment (c. vii.). Finally a summary of results is given and doctrines of the ego, especially those of Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer, are discussed in the light of the author's view (c. viii.). Ueber tragische Schuld und Sühne. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Esthetik des Dramas. Von Dr. JULIUS GOEBEL. Berlin: Duncker (C. Heymons), 1884. Pp. 108. The true conception of "tragic guilt" is not to be found in the Greek drama, but first appeared in Shakespeare; although we must not expect to find it so consciously present to the mind of "the naïve Homer of the modern drama" as to the mind of "the philosopher of the nineteenth century". The ancient dramatists never got rid of the idea of an inexplicable fate; but in order that there should be real individual guilt the hero of the drama must be conceived as possessed of free-will and as trying to affirm his own personality against the moral order of the world. The conception of tragic guilt is therefore not, strictly speaking, Teutonic, for the idea of an inexplicable fate is present in the earliest German as well as Greek legends; it is rather a Christian conception. The author traces its gradual appearance first in the "speculative aesthetic" of Solger, Hegel, Vischer, &c., the results being confirmed by "die empirische Shakespeare-forschung"; then in the classical writers of Germany (Lessing, the "Sturm und Drang" period, Herder, Goethe and Schiller); finally he criticises in an appendix the aesthetic doctrines of Schopenhauer and his more recent disciples. Ueber das Gedächtnis. Untersuchungen zur experimentellen Psychologie. Von HERM. EBBINGHAUS, Privatdocenten der Philosophie an der Universität Berlin. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1885. Pp. ix., 169. These researches carry forward to the investigation of Memory the method of experiment and exact measurement that has already yielded results in the psychology of sensation and in the determination of the time taken up by mental processes. Critical Notice will follow. Grundriss der Psychologie. Von Dr. GUSTAV GLOGAU, o. ö. Professor an der Universität zu Kiel. Breslau: Koebner, 1884. Pp. vi., 235. This volume grew out of a wish of the author's students for a comprehensive Dictat of his lectures, but it aims also at interesting a wider class of readers. Critical Notice will follow. RECEIVED also :— J. H. Godwin, Active Principles; or Elements of Moral Science, Lond., Jas. Clarke, pp. xii., 304. G. Jamieson, Profound Problems in Theology and Philosophy, Lond., Simpkin, Marshall, pp. xxix., 629. J. McCosh, Development; What it can do and what it cannot do, Edinb., T. and T. Clark, pp. 50. H. J. Clarke, The Fundamental Science, Lond., Kegan Paul, Trench, pp. xxiv., 265. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, Pt. vii., Lond., Trübner. S. Monckton, The Metaphysical Aspect of Natural History, London, H. K. N. Porter, The Elements of Moral Science, Theoretical and Practical, London, Sampson, Low, & Co., pp. xxv., 574. C. E. Lowrey, The Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth, New York, Philips, Hunt; Cincinnati, Cranston, Stowe, pp. 212. F. W. Kelsey, T. Lucretii Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, Boston, Allyn, pp. lvii., 385. G. Sergi, L'Origine dei Fenomeni psichici e loro Significazione biologica, Milano, Dumolard, pp. xxv., 454. M. L. Stern, Philosophischer u. naturwissenschaftlicher Monismus, Leipzig, Th. Grieben (L. Fernau), pp. iv., 348. NOTICE of some of these (received too late) is deferred till next No. VII.-NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE ON HALLUCINATIONS. There is one topic on which I may perhaps be allowed a few words of supplement to my article in the present No., as it has a distinct bearing on the centrifugal origin of hallucinations. There is a class of phenomena, not yet recognised by science, and for which the evidence has never yet been presented with anything like convincing fulness; but which-I do not think it rash to say-will be accepted as genuine by a large number of persons who quite realise the strength of the a priori presumption against it, whenever the quantity and quality of the evidence shall be adequately realised. It is at any rate accepted already, by a considerable number of such persons, as having a strong prima facie claim to attention; and this, being a matter of fact and not of opinion, may justify the mention of it here. It is the telepathic class-hallucinations of sight, sound or touch, which suggest the presence of an absent person, and which occur simultaneously with some exceptional crisis in that person's life or, most frequently of all, with his death. Visual and auditory phantasms occurring at such moments may be conveniently termed veridical hallucinations; for while they are completely delusive as far as the percipient's senses are concerned while they completely conform to our definition, "sensory percepts which lack the objective basis which they suggest"-they nevertheless have a definite correspondence with certain objective facts, namely, the exceptional condition of the absent person. Such cases, if genuine, militate very strongly against M. Binet's theory that excitation from the external sensory apparatus is a sine qua non of hallucinations. For here the occurrence of the hallucinations depends on the distant event; that is what fixes it to occur at a particular time; and it is specially hard to suppose an occurrence thus conditioned to be conditioned also by the accidental presence of real phenomena capable of supplying points de repère, or on an accidental morbid disturbance of the organ or the nerve. And if the brain be admitted to be the primary physical seat of the phenomena, there are, further, good reasons for supposing that its highest tracts are those first affected, and so that the hallucination is centrifugal. The chief reasons are two. (1) The phantasm is often bodied forth with elements of a more or less fanciful kind-dream-imagery, so to speak, embroidered on a groundwork of fact; and these elements seem clearly to be the percipient's own contribution, and not part of what he receives. (2) Cases occur where actual intercourse between the two persons concerned has long ceased; and where the supersensuous communication can only be supposed to be initiated by the quickening of long-buried memories and of dim tracts of emotional association. The hallucination in these cases would therefore be a complete example of the projection of an idea from within outwards; the sensorium reverberates to a tremor which must start in the inmost penetralia of cerebral process. But I would specially point out that this argument does not extend beyond the limits of the percipient's organism. It involves no physical expression of the fact of the transmission. If A is dying at a distance, and B sees his form, it is rarely that one can suppose any psychical event in A's mind to be identical with any psychical event provocative of the hallucination in B's mind. That being so, there will be no simple and immediate concordance of nervous vibration in the two brains; and that being so, there is |