supplemented by twenty-five Excursuses on special topics, of which some are more distinctively philosophical in character: "On the ground of Human Immortality" (398-404): "The Connexion of Body and Soul" (414-9): "The Psychological Problem" (483-524): "The Problem of Free-will in Man (526-35): "The Processes of Mind" (545-56). The author contends for a knowledge of Substance beyond phenomenathus at p. 501: "There is a substance at the foundation of all being which deserves the name of spirit; and to see what is the connexion which subsists between the illimitable substance so denominated and the terminal substance which we call matter, I say that the former, as primitive substance, has energy and generic quality as its inherent attributes; and that matter is in its proper foundations a specific quality thereof, originated in the form of atoms. All this however has respect to but one fundamental side of spirit. This fundamental side, which I refer to as Ether, presents only the objective basis of primitive substance, which yields what we call matter. There is obviously a subjective or crowning basis of primitive substance, through which alone we can account for the phenomena of mind.”

(1) Energy, Efficient and Final Cause. (2) Development; What it can do and what it cannot do. (3) A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy. (4) Herbert Spencer's Philosophy as culminated in his Ethics. ("Philosophic Series," II., III., VII., VIII.) By JAMES M'COSH, D.D., &c., President of Princeton College. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1884. Pp. 55, 50, 60, 71.

In the first of these pieces (continuing the Series begun by the earlier piece noticed in MIND XXXVII., 143) "an attempt is made to clear up the subject of Causation, which has become considerably confused". "David Hume, in establishing his philosophical scepticism, laboured with all his might to loosen the causal connexion." Dr. M'Cosh's attempt to reverse the process consists in arguments to show that we have a "primitive cognition" of power in causes, both material and mental, to produce their appropriate effects. Five sections deal successively with "Physical Causation," "Psychical Causation," "Causation Subjective," "Various Sorts of Causes,” and "Final Causes". The author treats the theory of conservation of energy at some length, seeking not only to explain it but also to "keep it within its proper limits".

In the second piece the question is put, "What is the unity in Development?" The answer given is that development is "organised causation for ends," of which in nature there are two classes: (1) "general ends,” such as the harmony that is the result of the uniformity of law; and (2) "special ends," consisting in the good of various kinds of living beings. The great scientific work of the past age has been to show what evolution can do; that of the coming age is to show what it cannot do. It cannot give an account of the origin of things; it cannot explain the nature of the power that works in development; and it cannot of itself give us ends in nature. The appearance of new powers in the ages, of life and mind after matter and of the higher faculties of the mind after the lower, is not explained by evolution. At the same time "it is of no use denying in our day the doctrine of evolution in the name of religion or any other good cause ".

The third and fourth pieces belong to the "historical" part of the Series, as the others to the "didactic" part. In the third Dr. M'Cosh expresses the opinion that the principles of Kant's ethics, "if carried into the region of speculative reason, would establish positive truth, without illusions of any kind," while "the phenomenal and illusory principles of

the Kritik of the Pure Reason, if carried out in a Kritik of the Practical Reason, would undermine morality". The proper office of the metaphysician is not, as Kant says, "to purify the a priori principles by criticism," but to formulate these principles (or "intuitions" as Dr. M'Cosh would prefer to call them) "without addition or diminution". Kant did not meet Hume's primary position, as he ought to have done, but accepted from him the "phenomenal theory": the consequence of this first error of assuming scattered "impressions" on which the mind must impose its own forms, instead of asserting the self-evidence of the existence of a real self and real things outside, of which we know the primary qualities "directly and immediately," is that Kant's system leads logically to idealism or to agnosticism, as is shown by the development it has undergone at the hands of his followers of different schools. "Back to Kant,' but back beyond him to what he looked to or should have looked to, and by which his views and ours are to be tested, to the facts of our mental nature."

In criticising Mr. Spencer's philosophy, Dr. M'Cosh finds that "there is one great omission in his enumeration of the original agents from which the actual phenomena of the world are developed. In this process he does not call in mind." Mr. Spencer, he thinks, "is successful in showing that as geological ages have run on there is a constant increase in the general amount of happiness". He has also established another point, equally if not more important," viz., "that nature prepares for the introduction of morality". The Data of Ethics, however, would have been better described as a Preparatio Ethica; for although he has shown" that there are aids to human virtue in prearrangements to call it forth and maintain it," Mr. Spencer has "not entered the subject of ethics, which has to look to character and to voluntary acts of human beings". Neither Mr. Spencer's philosophy nor that of Mill, whom also the author "had the courage to oppose when his reputation was at its greatest height," "meets the demands of our intellect or the cravings of our heart".

Hegel's Esthetics. A Critical Exposition. By JOHN STEINFORT KEDNEY,

S.T.D., Professor of Divinity in the Seabury Divinity School, Faribault, Minnesota; Author of The Beautiful and the Sublime. ("Griggs's Philosophical Classics.") Chicago: Griggs & Co., 1885. Pp. xviii., 302.

Parts i. and iii. of this volume are a condensed exposition of the corresponding parts of Hegel's Esthetik, accompanied by criticisms, which are kept separate from the expository part of the book by enclosure in square brackets. The second part of the Esthetik having been translated (by W. M. Bryant), the author has substituted for it "an original disquisition, in language approaching nearer the vernacular, and with more immediate regard to present æsthetic problems; yet following also the pathway marked out by Hegel, and giving the substance of his thoughts". The chief aim of this disquisition is to establish the distinction between the "subjective" (or variable) and the "objective" (or invariable) element in the appreciation of works of art; between "the beauty which depends on the attractiveness of a state of things that is transitory" and "that which depends on the ultimate reality, which is permanent". Appreciation of the first kind of beauty is the province of "the lower criticism" which occupies itself with the technical qualities of artistic work and the subjective impression got from it; "the higher criticism" has for its province "whatever in the emotion of the beautiful can only be explained from the ideal of the ultimate perfection, which is the normal and essential constitution of the universe, is the common element in all subjectivity, and thus a part of the true objective". The author goes on to expound the Hegelian

view of the historical development of art showing how in the first or symbolic period "the spiritual is weighed down by the corporal and material and struggles to be free"; how "in the classic period there is a momentary equilibrium"; while in the third or romantic period "the spirit retires from nature, refuses its allegiance, and returns to it as ideally its master".

Outlines of Metaphysic. Dictated Portions of the Lectures of HERMANN LOTZE. Translated and edited by GEORGE LADD, Professor of Philosophy in Yale College. Boston: Ginn, Heath & Co., 1884. Pp. xii., Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion, &c., as above. Translation edited, &c., as above, 1885. Pp. viii., 155.

166.

A beginning is here made of translation of the series of eight small volumes of Grundzüge, giving the dictated portions of Lotze's courses of lectures, which have been noted in these pages as they appeared in the original during the last three or four years. The series has had a very large sale in Germany, and English readers will, it is hoped, enable Prof. Ladd and his publishers to carry out their thought of adding to the present two volumes, with the Moral Philosophy announced to follow before long, at least the Psychology, the Esthetics and the Logic. No words are needed to commend such an enterprise, now that Lotze's importance as a thinker is so well understood. Prof. Ladd has begun with the Metaphysic because of the fundamental importance attached by Lotze himself to this part of his philosophical scheme, following next with the Philosophy of Religion for reasons of convenience personal to himself as a teacher. The translation is careful and painstaking, but reads somewhat stiffly. Useful indexes are supplied.

The Elements of Moral Science, theoretical and practical. By NOAH PORTER, D.D., LL.D., President of Yale College. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1885. Pp. xxv., 574.

The name "Moral Science," because it has "acquired a somewhat profounder signification," is used, rather than " Ethics," to describe the consistent, articulated and finished system" in which it is here sought "to give the results of careful observations, subtile and exhaustive analyses, clear and careful definitions, verified inductions, logical deductions". "Ethics," according to the author, "more commonly suggests what may be called arranged or classified rules of conduct or behaviour, as given for practical convenience, exclusive of any reference to fundamental principles or scientific grounds". He does not, however, neglect such "Practice of Duty," reserving for it Part ii., after treating in Part i. the "Theory of Duty". The topics of Part i. are-the Sensibilities; the Will ; Character ; the Intellect, its Functions in the Moral Activities and Experiences; Moral Relations; the Moral Feelings; Ethical Definitions and Theories ; Education and Development of the Moral Judgments and Feelings; Social Influences as Helps or Hindrances in Morals; the Law of Honour; the Conscience; Cases of Conscience; the Christian Theory of Morals. Part ii. comprehends Duties to Ourselves; Duties to our Fellow-men; the Doctrine of Rights; Duties of Truth or Veracity; Duties of General Beneficence; Duties to Benefactors, Friends and Enemies; Duties to Family and Kindred; the State; Law and its Enforcement; Duties to the State; Duties to Animals; Duties which respect the Physical World; Duties to God; Special Religious Duties.

The Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth. A Study of the the Universe. By CHARLES E. LOWREY, A.M. & Hunt; Cincinnati: Cranston & Stowe, 1884.

Intellectual System of
New York: Phillips
Pp. 212.

The author, who writes from Ann Arbor, Michigan, gives in this "Study," after a few pages on Cudworth's life and works, (1) a sketch of "the Hobbes-Cartesian movement," which Cudworth sought to stem; (2) an account of Cudworth's argument against "Atheism"; (3) a statement of the "characteristics" of Cudworth's philosophy, ending with a view of his theory of knowledge as set out in the posthumous Immutable Morality. The design is to work for the rescue of Cudworth from the neglect into which he has been suffered to fall and to induce an examination of the large mass of his unpublished MSS. in the B. Museum. The author has performed his task in a conscientious, if not particularly effective, manner, relying, outside of his author, on the original works of Descartes and Hobbes, and on various historical and critical authorities given in a list at p. 24. The most obvious and serious omission is of Principal Tulloch's Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the 17th Century, in which full justice had already been done to Cudworth, as also to the other Cambridge Platonists (here but slightly touched).

Essais de Critique Philosophique.

Par AD. FRANCK, Membre de l'Institut, Professeur au Collège de France. Paris: Hachette, 1885. Pp. xvii.,

346.

66

The doctrine of these Essays is, the author says, a spiritualism not "traditional," but "free and purely philosophical ". He protests against the ethical and metaphysical doctrines of the contemporary English school," which exercises authority "nowhere more than in France". The modern doctrine of evolution, he compares to the ideas of the alchemists; "the dream of the transmutation of metals," he says, "deserves as much indulgence as that of the transmutation of species". This adherence to Cuvier's doctrine of the fixity of species appears especially in the first Essay ("L'Histoire naturelle dans l'Antiquité"), where Aristotle is praised for holding fast to the certainty of the existing distinctions among species, and “leaving hypothesis to his successors," and for his doctrine of final causes. It also influences the critical part of the review of M. Guyau's Morale anglaise contemporaine (ix.) and of M. Fouillée's Critique des Systèmes de Morale contemporains (xi., "Un Révolutionnaire en Morale "). The historical Essays (the greater part of the book) are, perhaps, of more interest than those that treat of contemporary subjects, both as dealing with matters that are less familiar, and as having been written, for the most part, with no view to their bearing on any particular doctrine of the author. Among them may be selected for special mention "La Philosophie Chrétienne au troisième Siècle" (a study of Origen), and "Le Mysticisme et l'Alchimie au seizième Siècle" (a study of Cornelius Agrippa). In the first of these, the relations of Origen to Philo and to Clement of Alexandria are pointed out; his influence is traced up to the time of his condemnation; then it is shown how "Origenism" reappeared in a new form " in the heterodox theology and in the mystical philosophy, even in the science of the West"; finally, resemblances are shown to exist between the doctrines of Origen and of modern mystics on whom he has had no direct influence. The object of the study of Cornelius Agrippa is to show that he was not a sceptic like the Pyrrhonists of antiquity, or like Montaigne, for example, as has been supposed in consequence of a false interpretation of the treatise De Vanitate Scientiarum, but that he was a critic and a reformer (in religion as well as in science). There was much of the charlatan, the author admits, in Agrippa, but the inconsistencies of his character have prevented justice being done to his work. His notion of "magic was not essentially different from that of Bacon; it was the idea of a new science of nature. Apart from his scientific ideas and his views of religious reform, Agrippa's system is taken from the Hermetic books and the Cabbala.

La Psychologie allemande contemporaine. (École expérimentale.) Par TH. RIBOT, Directeur de la Revue_Philosophique. Deuxième Édition, corrigée et augmentée. Paris: F. Alcan, 1885. Pp. xxxiv., 380.

M. Ribot's very serviceable account of present German psychology, originally published in 1879, is not a little altered and added to in this second edition. The net increase of 12 pp. gives no idea of the labour he has bestowed in incorporating with his exposition the main results of the last six years of active work recorded in periodicals like Prof. Wundt's Philosophische Studien or set forth in special monographs. Retrenchments at various points render the additions altogether very considerable. The overstrained declaration in favour of the physio-psychological, as against the introspective, method of investigation remains as it was in the Introduction; but in spite of the author's exaggeration at this point, his work in general is much to be commended, and a good translation of it would go far to fill a gap that still remains in English psychological literature.

Du Langage et de la Musique. Par S. STRICKER, Professeur à l'Université de Vienne. Traduit de l'Allemand par FRÉDÉRIC SCHWIEDLAND. Paris F. Alcan, 1885. Pp. 180.

For this French translation of his Studien über die Sprachvorstellungen (noticed in MIND XIX. on its appearance) the author has made some additions, of which the most important are c. 22 ("On the Representation of Musical Sounds") and pp. 33-46 of c. 5. This last passage contains a fuller discussion of the researches of Fritsch, Hitzig and Ferrier than was thought necessary in the first edition. In order to meet the opposition of Goltz, Dr. Stricker has repeated many of the experiments of those physiologists, and on the ground of his results maintains the theory of the separation of motor from sensory centres in the cerebrum. He finds that physiological experiments and pathological observations alike confirm the conclusion at which he had arrived psychologically that "pure representations" of words consist of motor and not of sensory images. In the new chapter on musical sounds he contends that the motor element is fundamental in representations of tones as in representations of words. The acoustic element in music corresponds to colour in pictures, the motor element to drawing and as in the blind the sense of form-which may be appealed to by raised outlines-is detached from that of colour, so in a (comparatively) non-musical person the motor representations become detached (in memory) from acoustic representations; even in the nonmusical, however, these last predominate at the time, while musicians also have what they call "abstract" representations of melodies, which are really motor representations. The arguments of Stumpf and Henle against this view are discussed; the author contending that in admitting that melodies can be represented in an "abstract" manner they in effect concede his position. The distinction he had made between movements of articulation properly so called and laryngeal movements is applied to the case of musical sounds; "internal song" is independent of change in the position of the larynx. Dr. Stricker is disposed to believe that the tensor tympani plays an important part in the hearing especially of sounds of high pitch. Le Sommeil et les Rêves considérés principalement dans leurs Rapports avec les Theories de la Certitude et de la Mémoire. Par J. DELBŒUF, Professeur à l'Université de Liège. "Le Principe de la Fixation de la Force." Paris F. Alcan, 1885. Pp. 262.

After a critical review of the works of other writers on sleep and dreams (Introduction, pp. 1-53), the author discusses the relation of dreams first to the theory of certitude (pp. 55-102) and then to the theory of memory