both speculative and practical, of the mind as a whole. The method of philosophy is not to be "psychological" but "noölogical". The psychological (or purely historical) method is a necessary preliminary to philosophy, but does not itself answer questions that are properly philosophical; it is content to set forth the actual sequence of phenomena without determining their inner relations. The author recurs to an idea he has already developed in his Geschichte der philosophischen Terminologie (noticed in MIND XIII.) and elsewhere, viz., that since the philosophical conceptions that are active at present sum up the results of past thought, a critical study of their history must of itself determine in great part the true direction of modern speculation. What antiquity and the Middle Ages expected from "metaphysics," the modern period expects from "theory of knowledge". Aristotle's metaphysics was not pure ontology, but was in relation to Greek life, and was of value just because it was an expression of actual life. Scholasticism turned the conceptions of Aristotle into a system of pure abstractions; and the danger of philosophy still is that it should be too abstract and out of relation to human life. The modern conception of "theory of knowledge" is to be adopted so far as it makes clear the necessity of a fundamental investigation of mind; but such a fundamental investigation ought not to be exclusively an investigation of "knowledge for itself,” but of the activity of the mind as a connected whole. The true aim of philosophy is not to force "the living content of existence" into categories as colourless as possible, but to be an expression of mental activity in its fulness, and thus, without becoming "a characterless eclecticism," to leave room for the different views of the world and directions of activity that proceed from differences of personality. Wahrheit aus meinem Leben. Von CARL LUDWIG MICHELET. Nebst zwei Lichtbildern und vier Stammtafeln. Berlin Nicolai'sche Verlags Buchhandlung (R. Stricker), 1884. Pp. x., 548. The distinguished Hegelian, who has now passed his eightieth year, gives an account in this volume not only of his personal life and experiences, but of the various movements, philosophical, literary and political, in which he has taken part. His aim has been to give a purely objective view both of himself and of the events of his life, rather than, like Goethe, to describe the effect of his experiences on himself; the intention so far as possible to exclude all mixture of Dichtung with Wahrheit is indicated in the title. In his effort to be exact the author has been aided by having adopted, from an early period, the habit of committing to paper notes of the more important circumstances of his life. He refrains from passing judgment on himself except in the last chapter, entitled "My Individual Character". Here he describes his life as having consisted in a series of conflicts between himself and his surroundings and between the different sides of his character; yet life, he says, does not end in a conflict but in a reconciliation. And this conflict followed by union of opposites does not take place simply in the mind of the philosopher, but is in the nature of things. It is a universal experience that the world really contradicts itself, and after having come to rest in a mean position falls into new contradictions which have to be again resolved, till at length the highest contradictions are brought into union. Grundzüge der Metaphysik. Von Dr. KONRAD DIETERICH, O. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität Würzburg. Freiburg i. B. u. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1885. Pp. 85. The author aims at giving the general results of modern philosophical thought since Kant. His own metaphysical view has been most influenced by the revived monadism of Lotze. "Pure Metaphysic" (Part i.) is divided by him into (1) doctrine of the logical laws according to which we distinguish true being and occurrence from false; (2) doctrine of the forms of intuition in which all objectively valid things and events are represented by us; (3) doctrine of the forms of feeling in which the representations of single things and events are given as real facts. The distinction that runs through this part is that of "being" from events that take place in "real beings". Neither of these kinds of "actuality" can be deduced from the other. For the being of things "the law of inherence," the law that all events are changes in persistent substances, is the fundamental law; for the succession of events, "the law of causation". Absolutely, the real being to which all events are related is one; but from this absolute unity a relative plurality may be deduced. Part ii. ("Applied Metaphysic") is divided into two sections dealing respectively with "Metaphysic of Nature" and "Metaphysic of Spirit". The metaphysic of nature has to determine (1) the simplest elements of the conception of matter, (2) the conception of mechanical connexion, (3) the law of development. Atoms and their motions are not realities outside us, but simple elements of appearances in space and changes of these appearances; yet they present to us an image of the real world. There is a real reciprocal action of "metaphysical atoms" corresponding to the reciprocal action of physical atoms which we represent to ourselves in space. In order to assign its meaning to the idea of an evolution of the whole world, we need a teleological view that shall include both nature and spirit. The problem of "the metaphysic of spirit" is to combine the results of "the empirical sciences of mind" with the results of pure metaphysic. The union of the idea of teleological connexion (combination, as distinguished from modification, of given feelings and presentations by the free activity of the soul) with the idea of mechanical connexion according to the law of cause and effect, forms a reconciliation of the doctrine of freedom of the will with this law. Thus the relation between free development of the soul on the one hand and psychical mechanism on the other is identical with the relation between teleological connexion and mechanical connexion generally. Die Italienische Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Von Dr. KARL WERNER. Erster Band: "A. Rosmini und seine Schule"; Zweiter Band: "Der Ontologismus als Philosophie des nationalen Gedankens. (Gioberti, Mamiani.)" Wien: G. P. Faesy, 1884-5. Pp. xv., 472; XV., 426. In these two volumes the author gives an elaborate account of the philosophical systems of Rosmini, Gioberti and Mamiani. The philosophy of this group of writers is described as part of a movement of return of Italian thought to its true basis in Catholicism; the other parts of the general movement being the literary and political movements of the early part of the century. Manzoni, for example, as the author mentions, found in Rosmini's writings, when he became acquainted with them, the philosophical ground of his own artistic activity and of that of the Italian Romantic school. Just as Italian literature became more national in passing from Classicism to Romanticism, so Italian speculative thought became more national in throwing off the influence of the English and French philosophy of the last century and returning to the Catholic philosophy of the Middle Age. The political side of this national movement, the author thinks, injured its intellectual effectiveness. There was a break between the religious and the political consciousness; for the expression of the national ideal in practical politics became inconsistent with its remaining a Catholic ideal. Thus in place of a common effort towards the reconciliation of scientific knowledge and faith, towards the regenerative transformation of modern thought in the light of the Catholic idea, an effort which should have acted first of all on the moral nature and left social and political changes to follow,-there is now on the one side a reactionary Thomism and on the other a philosophy inconsistent with Catholicism. "The new Thomism" must give up its purely negative attitude so far as the undeniable acquisitions of modern research (and these not merely in physical science) require, and must make its speculative ideas comprehensive enough to embrace all the results of thought since the Scholastic period but in the end everything will be found reconcilable with the Catholic idea. RECEIVED also: R. S. Perrin, The Religion of Philosophy, Lond., Williams & Norgate, pp. xix., 566. O. Pfleiderer, Hibbert Lectures on the Influence of the Apostle Paul on the A. P. Sinnett, Esoteric Buddhism, 5th Ed., Lond., Chapman & Hall, pp. xxvii., 239. T. S. Goodlake, Typical Developments, or Ideals of Life, Lond., Roworth, Pp. 280. M. Prince, The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, pp. x., 173. A. Coste, Les Conditions sociales du Bonheur et de la Force, 3me Ed., Paris, F. Alcan, pp. xxxvi., 279. T. Desdouits, La Legende tragique de Jordano Bruno, Paris, E. Thorin, Pp. 27. F. Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au XIX Siècle, 2me Edition, Paris, Hachette, pp. 330. G. Barzellotti, David Lazaretti di Arcidosso detto il Santo, i suoi Seguaci e la sua Leggenda, Bologna, Zanichelli, pp. xv., 322. V. Knauer, Grundlinien zur Aristotelisch-Thomistischen Psychologie, Wien, Konegen, pp. 283. J. M. Vold, A. Krause's Darstellung der Kantischen Raumtheorie, &c., Christiania, J. Dybwad, pp. 29. G. Biedermann, Philosophie der Geschichte, Prag, Tempsky; Leipzig, Freitag, pp. xlix., 386. L. Gumplowicz, Grundriss der Sociologie, Wien, Manz, pp. 246. J. Jungmann, Das Gemüth und das Gefühlsvermögen der neueren Psychologie, 2te Aufl., Freiburg i. B., Herder, pp. x., 219. A. Bastian, Der Papua des dunkeln Inselreichs im Lichte des psychologischen Forschung, Berlin, Weidmann, pp. xx., 368. H. Romundt. Grundlegung zur Reform der Philosophie, Berlin, Nicolai (R. Stricker), pp. vii., 264. G. Gerber, Die Sprache als Kunst, 2te Aufl., Bd. ii., Berlin, R. Gaertner (H. Heyfelder), pp. 526. NOTICE of some of these has to be deferred till next No. IX.-NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE. 66 With the kind permission of the Editor, I purpose to make a few remarks, in reply to Prof. Sidgwick's friendly but acute criticisms, which appeared in the last number of MIND, on my recent work, Progressive Morality. Prof. Sidgwick's first criticism is to the following effect: "I do not myself think that what is here [in my chapter on Sanctions] characterised as the 'higher' religious motive, which operates when we simply do good and act righteously, because God, who is the supreme object of our love and the supreme ideal of conduct, is good and righteous -comes strictly under the head of 'sanctions' as defined by Prof. Fowler: that is, I do not think it is clearly a case of pleasure attracting or pain deterring". My definition of a sanction (Progressive Morality, p. 4) is any pleasure which attracts to as well as any pain which deters from a given course of action'. Now, to a man of lofty religious sentiment, what pleasure can attract to a given course of conduct more effectively than that which accompanies the reflection that it is in accordance with the nature and will of One who is 'the supreme object of his love and the supreme ideal of conduct,' or, on the other hand, what pain can be more deterrent than that which attends the consciousness of thwarting and displeasing such a Being? I own that I cannot perceive the force of this criticism as I do that of those which follow. On the next point I only find myself to a slight extent in disagreement with Prof. Sidgwick. With reference to my statement that 'in the main we approve of ourselves for having done what is thought right at the time, even though we may have come to think it wrong,' he admits that "this is true as regards the moral judgments of reflective persons," but thinks that "the emotional satisfaction with which we contemplate a past act, performed under a sense of duty, which we have come to regard as mistaken, is at best a very feeble pleasure". What I have myself said (p. 34) is, that the subsequent results of our acts and any change in our estimate of their moral character may considerably modify the feelings with which we look back upon them,' though I maintain that still, in the main, it holds good that the approval or disapproval with which we regard our past conduct depends rather upon the opinions of right and wrong which we entertained at the moment of action than those which we have come to entertain since'. It is plain that the difference between Prof. Sidgwick and myself on this point is only one of degree, and that not a very important one. I am obliged to Prof. Sidgwick for drawing my attention to a passage on p. 139, where I have, by implication, made an exaggerated statement. Having on p. 33 stated that 'human nature, in its normal condition, is so constituted that the remorse felt, when we look back upon a wrong action, far outweighs any pleasure we may have derived from it, I speak, on p. 139, as if it were only where the feelings of self-approbation and selfdisapprobation are very strong, that a man always gains more happiness, in the long run, by following the path of duty and obeying his social impulses than by confining himself to the narrow view which would be dictated by a cool calculation of what is most likely to conduce to his own private good'. The word 'very,' I must acknowledge, has crept into the sentence through carelessness, as is tolerably plain from the fact that it does not occur in the corresponding sentence, which follows immediately upon it. In the 'normally-constituted' mind, then, I do not regard the feelings of self-approbation and self-disapprobation as being necessarily very or exceptionally strong, though I do regard them as being strong. For by a normally-constituted mind I do not mean simply an average mind, but a mind of which the various faculties are recognised as healthily developed and as being in due proportion to one another. It is not necessarily a mind of heroic or exceptional virtue, but a mind representing a norma or exemplar, which, though not always actually followed, admits of being followed by average men. In the case of such a mind I am prepared to reiterate the statement that the pleasures and pains attendant on the feelings of self-approbation and self-disapprobation are 'far more intense and durable than any other pleasures and pains,' though, perhaps, in order to avoid misconception, I ought to have explained, thus early in the book, that, in estimating relative intensity, I include the elements both of quality and quantity. Nor do I regard this statement as inconsistent with the doctrine ascribed, and rightly ascribed, to me by Prof. Sidgwick that 'sacrifice' is an essential characteristic of acts morally approved. It is true that, if a man consciously and deliberately attempts to forecast his subsequent feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and throws them, as it were, into the scale, he cannot, strictly speaking, be said to sacrifice his own good to the greater good of others'. But this, I imagine, is a rare case. Men usually act on much more direct motives than a prospective reference to their own subsequent feelings. Even the best men act, on most occasions, from principles which, indeed, they have learnt to approve, but without any direct regard to the satisfaction they will subsequently experience. And, when they do act on this motive, it seems to me that there is still an element of sacrifice, an element which I have included under that head in my third chapter, namely, the sacrifice of their own lower to their higher good. The passage which I have quoted from Hume (pp. 40-42) in order to illustrate the analysis of an act of moral approbation was quoted simply and solely for that purpose, and I had no idea that it could be taken (as it has been taken by more than one critic) as committing me to any other parts of Hume's system. I certainly do not agree with the purely subjective hypothesis' of Hume, which maintains that morality is determined by sentiment,' and 'defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation, and vice the contrary' (Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix I.). On the other hand, in reply to Prof. Sidgwick's question, I may say that I do conceive the class to which an action is intellectually referred, before it excites "the appropriate feeling of approbation or disapprobation," as "having ethical characteristics-I mean, as being good or bad, right or wrong". I am sorry if my language is at all doubtful upon this point, but it appears to me that the expressions quoted by Prof. Sidgwick himself, such as 'moral judgment' and the like, sufficiently define my position, and that, had it not been for the quotation from Hume which is supposed to imply more than I intended by it, my opinion could not well have been mistaken. And, even within three short pages (p. 45) of that quotation, I find the following passage exactly pertinent to this question, a passage which Prof. Sidgwick must have overlooked: When an action has once been pronounced to be right or wrong, morally good or evil, or has been referred to some well-known class of actions whose ethical character is already determined, the emotion of approval or disapproval is excited and follows as a matter of course'. There is an apparent inconsistency in my account of the logical process of which the moral judgment is the result, as stated in chaps. 3 and 4 respectively, which I am indebted to Prof. Sidgwick for pointing out, |