tions of judgment, that, to wit, named antecedent and consequent; and then the indifferent colours coalesce into the relation of cause and effect. The three colours here figured are that of water at 212°, that of white of egg as dropped into it, and that of this latter as acted on by the former. We call the hot water the cause of the change in the albumen, and this change we call the effect of the cause, the boiling water. Similarly any case of cause may be so treated. The discharge of a loaded pistol followed by the report must, if to be recognised, be first of all a mere sequence of sights and sounds in sense. The fall of a bridge in a river flood is but a yellow-gray on the retina of the eye disappearing in a shaded brown-one colour disappearing in another. A bit of saffron put into clean water; a lump of sugar dissolving in a tumbler; a prick of the skin and blood; lead melting in a ladle; water freezing in a glass, and again liquefying; kindling a match, or fire; extinguishing a torch; lighting the gas, and turning it out; opening the shutters and closing them; clouds and the sun; clouds and rain; winds and waves; winds and shadows on the grass-in short, the thing is endless; but no one can consider any of these cases without acknowledging that, so far as sense is concerned, there is a mere indifferent succession of impressions, indifferently reaching consciousness, each good for itself, but each, so far, good only for itself, and quite independent of any other or all the others.

Now this is the turning-point. Kant, even to get the rule of his category in any such cases to act, is forced to postulate a rule already existent in the mere contributions of sense themselves. A rule subjective must precede the rule objective. Kant signifies as much as that; but he only signifies it. As for the source of the subjective rule, he has not a word to offer us. He only says that "it is possible that there is, or gets to be, found a rule of relation in the facts of sense, which rule already declares one sense-unit constantly to succeed another, but not vice verså". [“Es ist aber möglich, dass in der Wahrnehmung eine Regel des Verhältnisses angetroffen wird, die da sagt: dass auf eine gewisse Erscheinung eine andere (obgleich nicht umgekehrt) beständig folgt."] And so far, be it observed, the facts are only subjective: it is the next step alone, the addition of the category, that makes them objective,-converts them into necessarily interconnected objects of actual experi

ence.

There is no lack, elsewhere in Kant, of testimony to the same effect. We read, for example (ii. 168) :—

"In the synthesis of the sense-presentations, the units of these always follow one another. So far there is as yet not any consciousness of an object; for through this following, common as it is to all apprehensions, there is not as yet anything distinguished from another. So soon, however, as I observe, or by anticipation assume, that there is in this following a reference to the preceding state, on which state the present state ensues according to a rule, then I have something before me that so happens, or that is an event."

The apprehension of sense is, then, simply as such, always successive; but it is another matter with the objects that come to be formed out of the mere sense-apprehension. These may be successive, as in causality, or they may be at once and together, as in reciprocity. In fact, even an object as a one object, a single fixed object there before actual perception, a house, say, is but a co-existent together of many units of sense which can only have been successively apprehended.

This point, however, of the necessary presence of a rule in the facts of sense before-nay, actually for the possible addition to them of the rule categorical, is so important, so crucial in its touch as it were, that I allow myself to quote still further in illustration.

And here it is in place to warn of a possible double use, on the part of Kant, of the term experience. When he talks of experience as being à posteriori, contingent, subjective, he thinks wholly and solely of the element of special sense that always forms a constituent part, the matter, of experience; whereas, when he opposes what he directly calls judgments of experience [Erfahrungsurtheile] to what again he calls. judgments of sense-perception [Wahrnehmungsurtheile], he means by experience in that case-these same elements of sense certainly, but as now transfigured, raised into an entire new quality, by the addition of form in consequence of the entrance into them of a category. What was before experience subjective, contingent, à posteriori, is now experience objective, necessary, and (so far as validity is concerned) à priori,—in a word, experience, experience proper.

What I should like to quote now would be the whole of that portion of the Prolegomena which expressly treats of these two experiences, or of the two judgments which they respectively involve, in the first instance, one subjective, and, again, for completion, another objective. This, in any fulness, however, would be out of place here. I shall confine myself, therefore, to a few of the more salient expressions; but I may refer, at the same time, to the Appendix in the

Text-Book to Kant, where what is referred to will be found pretty well at full.

"The subjective judgment is without category and amounts only to the logical connexion of the impressions of sense in a thinking subject. So far, I merely compare, in a consciousness of my own sentient state, the units of sense-impression themselves; but, following this up, I unite, in the objective judgment, these units of sense-impression, under a category, into a one single consciousness as a conjunct whole, into a one single cognition. The necessity is never in the elements of sense, but only in the category under which they are subsumed. The first judgment is merely a conjoining of the units of impression in my state of feeling, without any reference to an object at all. The elements of sense must then be subsumed under a notion which prompts the form of judgment correspondent to them, connects them into a single cognition, and infuses necessity into what would be otherwise merely empirical. The sun shining on a stone, this latter becomes warm. The judgment, so far, is only one of sense, and implies no necessity. No matter how often I, or others, may have received these same sense-impressions, all that can be said, so far, is, that they have been found associated usually thus. It is the category changes all that into objective perception, into experience proper, experience that implies necessity. The category is added when, in the first judgment, the logical connexion of the units of sense has, through comparison, got to be made universal. The second judgment brings the impressions, according to their particular form in sense, under categories. The sense-impression is determined in respect of some one primary form of judgment rather than another. The object-in-itself is unknown, and never can be known; consequently, what we call perception of the object is no perception of it. Only the feelings set up in us by the object-in-itself (the impressions of sense) -only these categorised into a single cognition, constitute the object which we say we perceive. In the same way, in causality, I only, first of all, connect together two sensations in a mere subjective sense-judgment: it is the category converts them into an objective example of causation in experience proper. The categories are so many possible modes of uniting particulars of sense (sensations) into a single objective cognition in experience proper: they stand in connexion with correspondent moments, divisive and exhaustive of judgment as judgment, which similarly function unity of particulars of intellect (ideas). The notion of cause implies a rule, according to which out of one state of things another necessarily follows; but sense in experience can only show us that often-and, when it rises high, commonly-on one state of things another follows, and can extend, therefore, neither rigorous universality nor necessity. That warmth in the stone always follows the shining on it of the sun is, so far, only a judgment in sense and contingent."

The above are not always literal translations; but I am quite sure they always represent what meaning the original itself desires to convey. And I would point out, first, in them what vacillation they indicate as regards how much or how little the subjective judgment shall involve. We have seen already what, as regards causality, is said of the rule in sense, the subjective judgment, the judgment of perception, sense-perception. This is "a rule of relation which declares that, on a certain impression of sense, another (but not conversely) constantly

66

follows". In the above we see, also, that (iii. 65) comparison," even in the first judgment, has already made "the connexion of the units of sense" "universal [allgemein]"; and that this, too, is exemplified by the statement that warmth in the stone "always [jederzeit] follows" the shining on it of the sun. These three deliverances, as is evident, all cohere. But now there are others at variance with them. It is declared (66), for example, that the first judgment is a “uniting of impressions merely relatively to the subject and, consequently, only contingent and subjective". Again, in the same judgment, as concerns light from the sun and warmth in the stone, it is expressly said that their connexion, let all experience of ourselves or others be what it may, is something that is just found to be usually so and so; and then we hear lastly that the judgment of sense "can only show us that often, and, when it rises high, commonly, on one state of things another follows," &c. Once more we have three statements that cohere among themselves; but, surely, they directly oppose the others. In fact, as we conclude, Kant is found to be suspended here between his two perceptions of the state of the case. He perceives, first, that sense as sense is always contingent. But then he perceives, second, that if a sensation A and another sensation B are to be subsumed under the category and converted into an antecedent and consequent, they must of themselves have already given us reason to assume for them precisely that quality-precisely that relation! This latter perception we suppose to have come late to Kant; and it is precisely in consequence of this perception that we attribute the cold sweats to him which attend that endless tangle of the Second Analogy where we see only bewildered attempts to renew courage in himself by the constant refrain, Necessity of synthesis cannot be due to sense, and must be due to the understanding! But the renewed courage must ever fail again; for the perception cannot but return into sight: the causal manifold even in the apprehension of sense, the very terms in sensation that, just as sensations, are to be causally connected, cannot have in themselves an order that is indifferent; they must already have an order of their own, and a fixed order of their own; otherwise, where is the occasion, what ground can I see, what reason can I allege, for my making them examples, not of quantity, or reciprocity, or substance, say, but precisely of causality? That I merely

1 I had already in 1867 strongly characterised the Second Analogy—see Essays, "Jerrold," &c., pp. 178-9.

find the terms together is not enough; for in every apprehension of sense I find its constitutive terms, just as there, a mere successive together. If the together in sense is but a frequent one, a usual and common one-if it is only that, and no more than that, I cannot, simply of my own will, affix a stamp to it that will make frequent constant, usual invariable, and common universal-unless surreptitiously. Where were the warrant, the guarantee, the sponsor, for any such action on my part, or on the part of any organ or faculty of mine, whether overt or covert? Or is it possible to conceive that each category, quite unknown to me, without any conscious ness on my part, might unerringly scent a case of its own, even as a dog a bone! Nay, if it did scent a case of its own, must it not have already scented, even in the case, the peculiar necessity, i.e., of the rule?

Perhaps this is going something further than the actual conscience or consciousness of Kant; but it appears to me impossible to doubt that Kant did come to see the necessity of a recognised order of the terms even in sense, and correspondent to that of those (antecedent and consequent) in judgment-the necessity, I say, of this recognised correspondent order, before there could be so much as a motive for the category of causality to act. This, in fact, is precisely the import of that "rule of relation" even "in sense," the "finding" of which is to Kant "possible".

The word rule is of frequent occurrence, in a general sense, in both editions of the Kritik. Nay, the express rule subjective, the rule in sense, may be thought to be plainly and advisedly present even in the first edition, and antecedently, therefore, to the publication of the Prolegomena. Reference may be made, for example, to the very definition that was then, and is still, given of the actual schema of causality. Rule is expressly asserted of the relation of its contents. We find the same word, too, and a like assertion in reference to the schema of reciprocity. Still it would be a mistake to suppose that it is to the element of sense that the application is made. On the contrary, even then and there, rule must be referred to the category; for the schema is but a determination of the category in the element of time.

In point of fact, I can think of only one occasion on which a rule in sense itself would seem not obscurely to be referred to even in the first edition. It is the passage (ii. 168) already quoted at page 56 and elsewhere frequently referred to by me-the passage in which the key-notes are the expressions "But so soon as I perceive or assume," &c. Even here, however, it is still possible to doubt, for we may