on grounds accepted by the author himself. Among the elements of a complex state of consciousness (it might be said) there are some that can be easily detected by introspection, others that can only be detected with more difficulty, and, lastly, some that cannot be discovered at all by introspection, but have to be assumed in order to explain the actual presentation. These last alone are properly unconscious states. Between these and the elements that can be detected without difficulty by introspection are sub-conscious" states, for which the author's mode of expression seems to leave no place. But this is perhaps to give a slightly different sense to the doctrine he opposes.

66

In a work such as the present, where the author's aim is chiefly to set forth what is already known, much originality is not to be looked for. There are, however, some remarks on the will (Section i., ch. 4) that deserve to have special attention drawn to them; not, indeed, as being entirely new, but as being a clear statement of a truth that has not been sufficiently recognised. Dr. Lipps here argues that the mind ought to be called active when its movement is determined by nothing outside its own mechanism, passive only when it is subjected to the laws of a more extensive group of things. It is active (or passive) quite apart from any accompaniment of its activity (or passivity) by will. In daily life we are accustomed to speak of a free activity of the mind when without desire or will we follow the play of our own thoughts; when constraint calls forth an unavailing reaction we describe ourselves as not free. Thus absence of will, in the former case, springs from unrestricted activity; while, in the latter case, the violence of effort is evidence of the amount of resistance to activity rather than of the activity itself. Instead of calling the will in a peculiar sense "free," we ought, then, to ascribe freedom to the mind in all its activity.

By carrying out this idea to its application we should find that human personality is not, as is often assumed, concentrated, or even expressed in its highest or typical form, in the will. The free play of thought and emotion is a less inadequate, because less restricted, expression of the personality than any kind of external activity. It may be added that Dr. Lipps indicates the true solution of the question of freedom as opposed to determinism (pp. 701-2). When we make the activity of thought itself an object of thought, then, since all activity is according to law, and since we call that which is according to law necessitated, our own thought also seems to be subject to necessity. But apart from this "objectification" thought itself knows nothing of constraint; and the law which it is said to obey is the law of the psychical mechanism itself, not something imposed from without.

T. WHITTAKER.

VI.-NEW BOOKS.

[These Notes (by various hands) do not exclude Critical Notices later on.]

Microcosmus: An Essay concerning Man and his Relation to the World. By HERMANN LOTZE. Translated from the German by ELIZABETH HAMILTON and E. E. CONSTANCE JONES. In Two Volumes. Edinburgh T. & T. Clark, 1885. Pp. xxvi., 714; xi., 740.

It was Lotze's fate to die, not only at the beginning of what (it was hoped) might have been a brilliant, if not a long, last stage in his academic career, but just before he could have the satisfaction of knowing how wide-spread as well as deep was the effect he had wrought upon the minds of his contemporaries. Following close upon the translation of his unfinished System (part of which is appreciated elsewhere in this No. with a thoroughness that is still under rather than over the mark) comes now a rendering also of his finished masterpiece of an earlier time (1856-64). In MIND III. the distinctive features of the Mikrokosmus were delineated at some length. The present translation was begun some years ago by Elizabeth Hamilton, Sir W. Hamilton's daughter, and, upon her untimely death, was taken over by Miss Jones of Girton College. Miss Jones is solely responsible for the whole of Vol. ii. and from p. 659 of Vol. i., but she has also had much to do in revising the earlier portion. Her work, as far as we have been able to test it by comparison with the original, gives evidence of the most conscientious care as well as intelligent understanding; indeed she appears almost over-conscientious in setting in the front longish lists of Errata which are for the most part too trivial to be so gibbeted. This, however, is but an excess of virtue; and she is decidedly to be congratulated upon the success of her effort to cope with the difficulties of Lotze's style, which are not small because he happens to have written better than most of his kind. Also by numbering Sections, improving Table of Contents, and adding a detailed Index (10 pp.), she has rendered

no small service both to her author and to his readers.

Malthus and his Work. By JAMES BONAR. M.A., Balliol College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co., 1885. Pp. x., 432.

This book, excellent alike in conception and execution, lies for the most part beyond the province of MIND; but the author, though declaring (p. 39) that "Malthus cannot be said to have a place in the history of philosophy," has not omitted, in a special division of the work entitled "Moral and Political Philosophy" (pp. 319-54), to examine at length the question of his philosophical basis (so far as there), and especially to bring into view his relations to the English moralists and publicists of last century. In general agreement with his contemporary Paley (who on his side was decisively gained to the theory of population), though differing in his refusal to allow moral value to action done from either fear of punishment or hope of reward, Malthus owed most to Tucker among those who went before. Nothing, apparently, can be added to what the author has worked out, in his very interesting chapter, upon all the more philosophical aspects of the famous doctrine. Nor is it improper here to add, of his presentation of the economic theory itself, that now for the first time can the truly profound thought of Malthus be said to stand fully and fairly disentangled from the confusing accidents of its many successive settings.

The Light of Asia and the Light of the World: A Comparison of the Legend, the Doctrine and the Ethics of the Buddha with the Story, the Doctrine and the Ethics of Christ. By S. H. KELLOGG, D.D., Professor in the Western Theological Seminary, Allegheny, Pa., U.S.A., &c. London: Macmillan & Co., 1885. Pp. xx., 390.

This work, as title and sub-title imply, has a distinctly apologetic aim which does not fall to be considered here, but it is of a scholarly character in its expository parts. The author (who was eleven years missionary in India) "has endeavoured, as regards every point involved in the discussion, to let the Buddhist authorities speak for themselves and state their belief in their own words. He believes that he will be found to have made no statement of any importance regarding Buddhist belief for which he has not given distinct Buddhist authority."

Scepsis Scientifica: or Confest Ignorance the Way to Science; in an Essay of the Vanity of Dogmatising and Confident Opinion. By JOSEPH GLANVILL, M.A. Edited, with Introductory Essay, by JOHN OWEN. London Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1885. Pp. lxx., 218.

It was a happy thought to reprint this work. Though not quite so scarce as the editor (following Hallam) supposes, it has never before been as accessible as could be wished in view of its philosophical interest. Principal Tulloch, in his Rational Theology in England in the 17th Century, has very well described the subordinate and-as he was an Oxford man-somewhat extraneous part played by Glanvill in the philosophical movement known by the name of the Cambridge School; and the present editor in an Introductory Essay (pp. vii.-xlvi.) brings clearly into view some of the conditions under which he wrote, though rather strangely omitting all reference to the philosophical ideas of Hobbes which Glanvill is throughout so much concerned to oppose. (It is surely, too, by mistake, if at p. xxiv. it is meant that Sir Walter Raleigh, as well as Glanvill, can have owed anything to Gassendi.) The Scepsis Scientifica, published in 1665, reproduces, in a more subdued form, The Vanity of Dogmatising, in which, four years earlier, at the age of twenty-five, Glanvill had with youthful exuberance discoursed "of the Shortness and Uncertainty of our Knowledge and its Causes, with some Reflections on Peripateticism". The chief addition in the Scepsis is the high-flown "Address to the Royal Society," which had in the interval became formally constituted. This "Address" is here, somewhat unfortunately, paged xlix.-lxx. in line with the editor's Introduction. It is a pity too, in what is otherwise so choice a specimen of typography, that not only is Glanvill's misprint of Ignorance' for Innocence in the heading of p. 1 left standing (though noted by himself in a list of Errata), but in the next line (first of the chapter) the reverse mistake is now made of printing 'Innocence' for 'Ignorance'. On p. 25, line 3 from bottom, motions' should be substituted for 'notions': Glanvill noted this error when first made in 1661, but carelessly allowed it to re-appear in the Scepsis without noting it; and it has now again been overlooked.

A Handbook of Psychology. By J. CLARK MURRAY, LL.D., F.R.S.C., John Frothingham Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, M Gill College, Montreal. London: A. Gardner; Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1885. Pp. x., 422.

:

"This handbook is designed primarily to introduce students to the science of psychology and to this design every other purpose, which the book may serve, has been made subordinate." We must defer till a later No. more detailed notice. After a short Introduction (pp. 1-12) on the De

finition and Method, the author divides into two Books-of General and of Special Psychology. Book i. (pp. 17-108) deals with the "simple factors and processes" disclosed by analysis as involved in our cognitions, feelings and volitions: the "factors" or "elements" being Sensations; the "processes," Association and Comparison. Book ii. (pp. 111-417) then takes up the resulting "actual mental states," under the usual three heads; Feelings receiving considerable attention (pp. 303-92) after Cognitions, but Volitions being somewhat huddled up at the end.

The Plan of the Central Nervous System. A Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Medicine in the University of Cambridge. By ALEX. HILL, M.A., &c., Hunterian Professor at the Royal College of Surgeons of England. Cambridge Deighton Bell & Co.; London: George Bell & Sons, 1885. Pp. 56.

This Thesis should not be overlooked by psychologists who desire to know the present state of advanced anatomical opinion on the subject of the nervous system. It throws new and striking light upon the structural conditions of the all-pervading processes passing under the names of Reflexion and Inhibition, and gives besides the main results of an original study of the anatomical relations of the different parts of the system, with constant reference to the decisive indications yielded by embryology. The author is able to trace a uniformity of structure in the system from below upwards as far as the optic thalamus, and, having connected with this foremost part of the central grey tube both the optic and olfactory nerves, would group the various cranial nerves (as now distinguished) into complete" nerves, consisting each, like a spinal nerve, of "sensory, visceral, lateral-motor and anterior-motor parts"; but he pronounces strongly against the possibility of in any way associating the corpus striatum with the thalamus on one level as so-called basal ganglia, declaring it instead to be "an entirely different element belonging to the cerebral hemisphere and certainly not subordinate in function to the cortex but more properly an involuted part of this system". The last part of the Thesis represents the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres, corpora quadrigemina and cerebellum as a peripheral grey tube added to the central grey tube of the system and not split off as a mere layer of this by a tube of white fibres intervening; and the author then attempts to show, generally, what segments of the cerebral cortex (to which for the present he limits himself) are connected with the several "metamers" of the central tube, founding upon one chief assumption, for which he seeks to adduce proof, that the hemispheres have undergone a rotation backwards into a single spiral coil. Pending the farther development of his present results and the sifting they may receive at the hands of other investigators, they certainly serve to suggest grave doubts whether a good deal of the psychology upon which physiologists have ventured will not have to be reconsidered.

On the Sensations of Tone as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music. By HERMANN L. F. HELMHOLTZ, M.D., &c. Second English Edition, Translated, thoroughly Revised and Corrected, rendered conformable to the Fourth (and last) German Edition of 1877, with numerous additional Notes and a new additional Appendix bringing down information to 1885, and especially adapted to the use of Musical Students, by ALEXANDER J. ELLIS, F.R.S., &c. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1885. Pp. xix., 576.

The distinctive features of this second edition are compendiously given as above by the translator. No scientific work of this generation was more worthy of all the pains, in the way of faithful rendering and supplemen

tary enrichments, which the most competent of interpreters has now twice lavished upon it. But the book needs to be seen before the full extent and also the remarkable quality of Mr. A. J. Ellis's labour can be appreciated. The appendices from p. 430 to p. 556 are wholly his work, while the footnotes to text and to author's appendices amount perhaps to little less than half the quantity of the original. The erudition and scientific insight displayed are equally remarkable.

Esoteric Buddhism. By A. P. SINNETT, Author of the Occult World, &c. Fifth Edition, Annotated and Enlarged by the Author. London: Chapman & Hall, 1885. Pp. xxvii., 239.

The Purpose of Theosophy. By Mrs. A. P. SINNETT. London: Chapman & Hall, 1885. Pp. 107.

Five Years of Theosophy. Mystical, Philosophical, Theosophical, Historical and Scientific Essays, selected from The Theosophist.

Reeves & Turner, 1885. Pp. 575.

London:

After the similar works noted in the last two Nos. of MIND, pp. 301, 464, the appearance of these others is also to be recorded. The new matter in this latest edition of Esoteric Buddhism (which has a certain prerogative character in the class) is considerable in amount. The second book, if it need not have been written, is short. The third, sufficiently described in title and sub-title, gives a good and varied representation of a state of mind.

Scientific Romances. No. II. "The Persian King, or the Law of the Valley." By C. H. HINTON, B.A. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1885. Pp. 33-128.

Mr. Hinton's second "Romance" is more of a romance than his first (see MIND XXXIX., 467), and is altogether a more ambitious piece while yet somewhat less effective. At least, if the long apologue that fills Part i. (pp. 33-101) is not meant to convey an independent moral or is meant less to do this than to enforce, by way of impressive analogy, the speculation of Part ii. concerning the ultimate nature of action and change in the universe, it is doubtful whether more is not lost than gained for this end by all the ingenuity displayed in imagining the wonderful tale of the Persian king. It is not possible to convey in a few words the exact idea of the very well written story; but of the chapters at the end, dealing with the phenomena of motion in the world under the four aspects distinguished by the author as Permission, Causation, Conservation of Energy and Level, it is to be said (as of the earlier piece) that they are extremely suggestive and that they evince a power of philosophical reflection upon current scientific conceptions that should be heard of farther.

The First Three Years of Childhood. By BERNARD PEREZ. Edited and Translated by ALICE M. CHRISTIE. With an Introduction by JAMES SULLY, M.A. London: W. Swan Sonnenschein, 1885. Pp. xxiv., 294. A superior translation of the second edition of M. Perez's Trois premières Années de l'Enfant, reviewed, on its first appearance, in MIND XII. M. Perez led the way in systematically following up the initiative given (or renewed) two or three years before by M. Taine and Darwin to psychological observation of children, and, among all the literature produced later, his work retains distinctive merits which justify its being singled out for translation. Mr. Sully, who has himself been a worker in this part also of the psychological field, gives in an Introduction (pp. ix.-xxiv.) an interesting sketch of what has been done and remains to be done in it;