logy that have reached their final expression in the division of the mind into feeling, thought and will, and to put in their place the true doctrine, that of Aristotle and Aquinas. All earlier philosophy, the Socratic philosophy as well as the philosophy of the Middle Ages, recognised only two fundamental faculties of the mind, the "apprehensive" and the "appetitive"; the mental processes we call feelings being always assigned to the appetitive faculty. The modern tripartite division of mind, with the assumption of a separate faculty of feeling, appears for the first time in Tetens, but since Kant's acceptance of it has become, without protest, a received doctrine of German psychology, and has exerted an evil influence on speculative theology, ethics, æsthetics, and especially on the theory of rhetoric. In Section i. (pp. 10-84) the author treats of "the fundamental powers of the human soul" so far as is necessary for his special purpose. Sections ii. and iii. are an exposition of the Scholastic doctrine of the feelings in a form accommodated to the German spirit as manifested in the words Gemüth and Gefühl, for which no exact equivalent can be found in the terminology of Scholasticism. Thus while regretting, amid the confusion of modern schools, "the clearness, the precision, the depth-in a word, the reasonableness of the speculation of the 13th century," the author does not simply repeat the distinctions of Aquinas. His exposition is further modified by the effort to incorporate with the Thomistic doctrines the results of modern physiology.

In Dr. Knauer's book the Scholastic doctrine of the feelings finds its place in an exposition of the whole philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Although his work is offered as a contribution to the history of philosophy, the author would not claim that his treatment is simply historical; for the doctrines that result from the simultaneous examination of Aristotle and Aquinas (or rather of Aquinas in relation to Aristotle) are treated as essentially parts of a single system which is the highest expression of philosophic truth. The Aristotelianism of Aquinas always kept in view the unity of human nature. It was only the "false Aristotelianism" of the close of the Middle Age that thought of the body as regulated by the soul like a ship by the pilot (pp. 91-2). The vegetative,' 'sensitive,' and 'intellective' powers are not to be thought of as three distinct souls dwelling apart in the body. The position of Aquinas with regard to the relation of mind and body is explained in detail in the last two chapters (cc. xvi., xvii., "The connexion of body and soul," "The separation of body and soul"). Here we may see the ground of the difference between the modern and the Scholastic doctrines of the feelings. The modern tripartite division of mind is a purely psychological classification; Scholasticism, on the other hand, having divided the "intellective powers" into "intellect" and "will," explains feeling by the interaction of body and "will," that is, by the aid of the philosophical assumption of a dualism of mind and body,-a dualism which, however, as explained above, is not to be understood in an unqualified sense. In the usual Neo-Scholastic way, Dr. Knauer tries throughout to find in the Aristotelianism of Aquinas anticipations of the theories and results of modern science and philosophy.

Ueber philosophische Wissenschaft und ihre Propädeutik. Von Dr. ALEXIUS MEINONG, a. ö. Professor der Philosophie an der Universität in Graz. Wien: A. Hölder, 1885. Pp. xii., 182.

The occasion of these studies is the recent publication by the Ministry of Education in Austria of new directions for the teaching of the subjects that constitute the "philosophical propedeutic" of the Gymnasia. The author (known by his careful Hume-Studien) has in view at the same time to defend the interests of philosophy and of philosophical instruction generally. He holds that philosophy is at present suffering for a certain

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arrogance in its claims during the time when a position at the head of the other sciences was accorded to it. An effect of this has been that scientific men have often denied the existence of any philosophy distinct from the special sciences. In the consequences of the scientific reaction against philosophy, however, Dr. Meinong sees hope for the future. Men of physical science, when they no longer recognised any ground reserved for philosophy, were obliged themselves to speculate on the most general questions. They then found that, in speculations about things as a whole, a new element appears which in their own researches they are accustomed to ignore, viz., the element of consciousness. On the other hand, the attempt to solve philosophical questions by the methods of physical science showed philosophers what field of research is really outside the competence of students of organic and inorganic nature. They were brought to see the special importance for philosophy of the mental side of phenomena, and hence of the science of psychology, which (outside England) had frequently been excluded from philosophical consideration merely empirical". The general result of this movement of thought must be that psychology will obtain the dominant position due to it among the philosophical disciplines and that philosophy will no longer be denied a place by the side of the special sciences. Dr. Meinong recognises in the new official scheme an acceptance of the point of view of "scientific philosophy," shown especially in rejection of the old plan of beginning with the history of philosophy, and in prescription of the elements of psychology and formal logic as the subjects of which systematic knowledge is to be required; but he contends that, as a matter of fact, adequate preparation in the subjects prescribed is made impossible by the way in which the new scheme is worked out, above all by the shortness of the time allowed for psychology. He argues strongly against the directions to teachers to confine themselves to established truths and avoid uncertainties, showing in an appendix (pp. 169-182) that much must always be left to the tact of the teacher even in subjects like Greek and Latin grammar and mathematics. For the rest, the uncertainty of psychology as compared with other sciences has been exaggerated; and in any case its educational value in other respects compensates for want of fixity in results. The author does not despair of seeing reforms that shall make possible the acquisition of a philosophical groundwork in the Gymnasium, and refers to Dr. Paulsen's Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts &c. (see MIND XXXVIII. 312) as one among other evidences that in Prussia reforms such as he advocates are in no want of influential voices in their favour. Philosophie der Geschichte. Von GUSTAV BIEDERMANN. Prag: F. Tempsky; Leipzig: G. Freitag, 1884. Pp. xlix., 386.

Philosophy of history is defined by the author as "the science of the concept in history". The philosophical treatment of history is the last of three possible modes of treatment; the others being (1) the "naïve," (2) the "critical" writing of history. These correspond to the three stages of human thought as (1) "Vorstellung," (2) "Gedanke,” (3) “Begriff". In philosophy of history the character of States is to be viewed as determined by the character of the race and by national character. Among the factors of the individuality of peoples the study of climate and geographical surroundings is not to be neglected; but it is in language especially that the distinctive character of the mind of each people is to be sought. Following upon the history of particular States, which is the last part of the history of peoples, there is the international history of States; this is the highest determination of the development of human life. The book is divided into two parts, dealing respectively with ancient and modern history. The great distinction between the ancients and the moderns (or, more strictly, between Paganism and Christianity) is, in the

author's opinion, that Paganism finds God only in nature, Christianity in the human mind also. Of the three chief peoples of modern times, the Germans, the Romance peoples and the Slavs, the Romance peoples, more characterised by "Gemüth than "Gewissen," were the first to undergo the influence of the ancient civilisation and to form national individualities, but without much independent activity of thought. The Germans, later in undergoing this influence and less passively receptive of it, were able to carry further the lessons of their teachers; and to the development of the German spirit Protestantism is due. It was the error of the Catholic period to make Church and State alike in extent and significance: the religious idea is really outside and above the political idea, but the idea of the Church finds its value only in the universality and unity of the idea of the State. Till lately the Romance peoples had the lead in politics, the Germans in speculative thought. The Germans, although they have now taken the lead in politics also, will not be able to forget that the chiefs of modern thought are Kant and Hegel, and that to find thinkers of equal rank we must go back to Plato and Aristotle. German philosophy is now on the way to open a new world of the spirit, the world of the concept ". The first result of this will be a new development in theology of the Christian conception "that God the Spirit is the Spirit as God," a conception which sums up in itself "all philosophy of religion, all religion of philosophy"

Der Papua des dunkeln Inselreichs im Lichte psychologischer Forschung. Von ADOLF BASTIAN. Berlin: Weidmann, 1885. Pp. xx., 368.

Having last dealt with "the part of Africa that has lately been brought nearer German interests," the indefatigable author is now going on (not without a similar reason) to study the mythology, religion, institutions, &c., of the Australasian peoples, and takes again occasion to urge how his research is intended as a contribution to the inductive treatment of psychology "according to comparative-genetic methods". Man as the object of a natural science of psychology presupposes society; and uncivilised peoples are to be studied for the sake of the light their modes of thought and institutions throw on apparently abnormal features of civilised societies. Especially in the case of classical religion and mythology, may we expect to gain insight by the study of primitive modes of thought as observed in the lower races. In order that progress may be made in this line of study it is especially necessary to distinguish accurately between religion and mythology. Every individual has a religion or the elementary disposition for it, every people a mythology; but as there are unimaginative individuals without taste for mythology, so there are peoples without a religion. For example the Greeks, as a race, had no religion (except perhaps an æsthetic one); individuals obtained from the teachings of philosophers or from the mysteries a religion of their own. Grundlegung zur Reform der Philosophie. Vereinfachte und erweiterte Darstellung von Immanuel Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Von Dr. HEINRICH ROMUNDT. Berlin: Nicolai'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung (R. Stricker), 1885. Pp. vi., 264.

The aim of this exposition of the results of the Kritik is to show what must be the nature of the metaphysical doctrine which was to proceed from them, but which Kant himself did not develop. The author tries to explain how it came about that, while Kant's object was to give metaphysics the security and uniformity of method that characterise the natural sciences, and especially physics and mathematics, there have been more divisions among philosophic schools since his time than before. The teaching of Schelling and Hegel, but above all of Fichte, has, he considers,

been injurious to philosophy. What Fichte did was to put rhetoric and "sophistic" in the place of scientific method. Nevertheless, the Kantian criticism is not only the first real step forward taken by philosophy, but it is a step that can never be retraced. Kant has made room for two fundamentally different kinds of knowledge, "natural science" and "metaphysics," to exist side by side. Metaphysics serves as "the foundation for the sciences of man, for morals and religion, and is the porch of Faith". Thus, the "reformed philosophy," founded but not completed by Kant, begins with mathematics and physics, and ends with "Religionslehre"; making the union of scientific knowledge with that which was a common possession of all men before the appearance of any kind of science. Aesthetik. Die Idee des Schönen und ihre Verwirklichung im Leben und in der Kunst. Von MORIZ CARRIÈRE. Dritte neu bearbeitete Auflage. I. "Die Schönheit. Die Welt. Die Phantasie." II. "Die bildende Kunst. Die Musik. Die Poesie." Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1885. Pp. xxii., 627; xiv., 616.

We now only mention the appearance of this third and considerably altered edition (second edition, 1872; first, 1859), of a standard work, which should be better known outside of Germany. Critical Notice will follow.

On the Ethics of Naturalism. ("Shaw Fellowship Lectures, 1884.") By W. R. SORLEY, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge; and Examiner in Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons. Pp. 292. This forthcoming volume consists of the third quinquennial course of Shaw Lectures-delivered in the University of Edinburgh in January, 1884. The argument of the lectures has been revised since their delivery; and is now divided into nine chapters: Ethics and its Problems; Egoism; the Transition to Utilitarianism; Moral Sentiment; the Theory of Evolution and the Development of Morality; Evolution and Ethical Theories; Hedonism and Evolutionism; the Evolutionist End; the Basis of Ethics. The fundamental ethical question of the end of conduct is made prominent throughout; and its connexion with ultimate philosophical conceptions is examined, so far as these conceptions are founded on a naturalistic basis. The ethical theory of Evolution receives special attention, as regards both its relation to other systems of morality and its independent contribution towards determining the ethical end.

RECEIVED also:

W. Wynn Westcott, Suicide, London, H. K. Lewis, pp. x., 191.

M. Davies, Body and Soul, London, Elliot Stock, pp. 24.

Th. Funck-Brentano, Les principes de la Découverte, Paris, Plon, pp. vi., 264. B. Faug, Les vraies Bases de la Philosophie, Paris, E. Dentu, pp. 323.

F. Maltese, Cielo, Vittoria (Sicilia), G. B. Velardi, pp. xi., 381.

G. Caracciolo, Ne Dio nè Caso o La Cosmogenesi Scientifica, Monopoli, Ghezzi Dragone, 1884, pp. 589.

J. Hoppe, Der psychologische Ursprung des Rechts, Würzburg, Stuber, pp. 103. A. Weckesser, Der empirische Pessimismus, Bonn, C. Georgi, pp. 74.

E. Brücke, Ueber die Wahrnehmung der Geräusche, Wien, Exner's Repertorium der Physik, pp. 155-81.

NOTICE of some of these deferred till next No.

VII.-NOTES AND CORRESPONDENCE.

PROFESSOR SIDGWICK ON TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY".

Prof. Sidgwick's Critical Notice of Types of Ethical Theory in the last No. of MIND expresses no more dissent from its doctrine than I was prepared to expect and his criticisms I should have preferred to weigh in respectful silence, had they been invariably addressed to opinions for which I am willing to answer. On several points however I have evidently failed to make my meaning clear to him: and chiefly from the desire to remove the false issues thus raised, I offer a few notes on his Review.

In commenting on the classification of Theories as Unpsychologicalstudying man as one of the dependent contents of the world, and Psychological-studying him as a self-conscious subject in himself, Prof. Sidgwick raises the question why I begin with the former, which I reject; though another rejected set, arising from a division of the latter-the Heteropsychological-is postponed to the end. The reason, he supposes, is historical; and proceeding on that assumption, he naturally is displeased with the unhistorical sequence of Plato, Spinoza, Comte, and with the detached study of each, apart from the continuous process of intervening development. The arrangement is not historical at all, but purely logical. In the suit between the Unpsychological systems and the Psychological, the question is, whether kosmical knowledge provides for self-knowledge in that between Idiopsychological theory and Heteropsychological, it is, whether unmoral self-knowledge provides for moral. The former compares two wholes; the latter two sections of the second whole and as the genera must be defined, before the species are differentiated, the very conception of the problem itself settles the order of its discussion.

In disclaiming the obligations of an historian of philosophy, I certainly forfeit his advantages and I am very sensible of the dangers of mistake in comparing schemes of speculative thought, originating far apart in place and time. Still it has not proved impossible to produce useful monographs on particular philosophers, where the authors of them have been furnished with the critical apparatus required by a competent interpreter. And why a short series of them, selected as representatives of distinct schools, should "sacrifice the more positive part of the instruction" they have to give us and yield only negative and unprofitable criticism, I am unable to perceive. If, in attempting such a series, I have "unconsciously mixed modern categories with those of an earlier period," the fault is in the writer and not in his plan for nothing is richer in positive instruction than the discriminating comparison of ancient with modern categories which the plan itself enforces, and in which it almost consists. The special interpretations of Plato to which Prof. Sidgwick takes exception have arisen in the process, not of mixing but of severing the elements of Greek conception and of our own; while his criticism of them, derived from the maxim that vice is ignorance and that no one is voluntarily bad, falls away of itself when the terms of those maxims are translated back from the English to the Socratic sense.

As an example of my "erroneous rendering of Platonic Ethics," "due to neglect of its historical relations," is adduced my assertion of Plato's avowed "preference of voluntary pravity to involuntary". This assertion is said to be made "on the strength of a passage in Hippias Minor (373, ff.); whereas," Prof. Sidgwick adds, "it appears to me certain that the argument of this dialogue which belongs to the earliest, most Socratic, stage of Plato's development is purely elenchic' and negative in its direct results: the

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