leaving his family with little property, Mr. Hill gave the widow $10,000 to maintain herself and children. So secretly was this good deed performed that it did not become known till long afterwards. The unvarying desire to remember and aid the friends of his less prosperous days is characteristic of Mr. Hill. Several years ago, for example, a pioneer jobber of St. Paul failed. He was old, he had a dependent family, he was practically destitute. But he had given Mr. Hill a clerkship in a time long past, and Mr. Hill advanced to his old employer the means, not merely to sustain himself and family, but to travel in search of health. This generous provision was maintained until the old man died and his family provided for.

The widow of another early friend applied to Mr. Hill for a small loan. She said she was going to open a boarding-house. "Sorry, Mrs. X, but can't let you have it. But you'd better get your boarding-house started."

"Why, Mr. Hill, how can I? I have no money." "Don't need money." "Why, surely, I must pay for the furniture." "No, you mustn't; get a good house, get a bill for six months' rent, furnish the house, send bills to me. I'll pay 'em-sorry can't let you have any money. any money. Good-morning, Mrs. X."

At another time Mr. Hill was walking down Third street, once a flourishing thoroughfare, but now deserted by the general public. He stepped into a little tobacco shop kept by a German who had known him in the village days of 1860. "Hello, Joe," exclaimed the railroad president, "how's business?" "Bat, ferry bat. I haf der chop, but vere is der beeples?" Mr. Hill glanced over the shop. There was no assistant tobacconist whose discharge could be recommended. But Mr. Hill asked for a blank check, and the following week the old tobacconist was besieged by "beeples" in a modern well-stocked shop on the principal retail thoroughfare.

A

QUITE important part of the world's work is now in progress in Cuba, and the United States is necessarily responsible for the wise and proper performance of that work. For three-quarters of a century our people have been deeply interested in the ultimate fate of Cuba. The Island is scarcely a hundred miles from our shores. It commands the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the approach to our future inter-ocean canal. Large amounts of capital have been invested there by American citizens, and vastly larger amounts are waiting the assurance of protection before investment. Each country affords a natural market for the other. Cuba, then, by reason of its proximity, its strategic position and its political and economic features is more closely related to us than any other foreign country. That the United States would not permit any hostile or foreign power other than Spain to occupy the island has been frequently declared to be our settled policy. Its annexation by purchase has been several times suggested by Presidents and diplomatic representatives, and forcible annexation has been more than once hinted at. We have often narrowly escaped war on account of complications arising there. Self-defense and the integrity of our institutions alike give us a right to be heard now that a new government is being established.

Thoughtful and thoughtless men alike have anticipated that the time must come when Spain would be compelled to relinquish her authority in Cuba as she had in her other American possessions. That time has at last arrived, and the problem, still unsolved, of the relations which must exist between Cuba

and the United States is the more intense, because it demands present settlement. The future welfare of both countries is directly involved, and only patriotic and high-minded purposes should be permitted to influence the people of either.

Two solutions only are possible. One, the annexation of the island by the United States; the other, the establishment of an independent republic there in which the vital and just interests, both of Cuba and the United States, shall be defined and maintained.

The project of annexation may, and ought to be, dismissed. It should not for a moment be considered, except in case of the direst necessity. The people of Cuba, by reason of race and characteristics, cannot be easily assimilated by us. In these respects they have little in common with us. Their presence in the American union, as a state, would be most disturbing, and we have already asserted, as the deliberate conclusion of Congress, that they ought to be free and independent. There is nothing to be gained, much, even honor, to be lost by the annexation of Cuba.

The real question, then, is, how can an independent republic be established there under conditions and circumstances which shall best subserve the interests of the people both of Cuba and of the United States? That our people have interests in Cuba which must be subserved and protected, goes without saying. We cannot, and will not, permit any European power, much less a hostile or unfriendly power, to acquire rights or privileges in Cuba to our disadvantage. The essence of the Monroe Doctrine asserted, and justly insisted upon for nearly eighty years, forbids it.

Nor can

the United States permit the existence of a government in Cuba in which peace and order, the protection of life and property, and the maintenance of all international obligations are not observed. In respect to the future government of Cuba our interests and those of the Cuban people are identical; the government of Cuba must be stable, as well as republican, in form. Again, our obligations to the world at large, created and assumed by the act of intervention, demand of us that we become responsible both for the character and maintenance of the new government. If duty required us to see to it that Cuba was free, duty equally requires us to see to it that the Cuba of the future shall be both peaceful and prosperous. The "abhorrent conditions" existing in the island amply justified the intervention of the United States. President McKinley, in his message of April 11th, 1898, well outlined both the necessity and motive for intervention in these pregnant words:

"The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop."

When, therefore, in the name of humanity, of civilization and of American interests, we intervened to put an end to misrule and intolerable government, we made ourselves responsible for the establishment and continuance of good government thereafter. More than this, we are bound by our treaty obligations with Spain to protect the life and property of Spaniards and Cubans who did not engage in the revolution. In the negotiations between Mr. Cambon, the French Ambassador, and Mr. Day, our Secretary of State, looking to the preliminary peace protocol, this was distinctly insisted upon. In a message of the Minister of State of Spain, dated August 7th, 1898, submitted by Mr. Cambon, this language appears:

"The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country."

This preliminary condition of peace was carried forward into the treaty of Paris in the first article of which it was stipulated:

"And, as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation for the protection of life and property."

And in the sixteenth article it was further

stipulated that the United States would

"upon the termination of such occupancy, advise the government established in the island to assume the same obligations."

We cannot, if we would, honorably relieve ourselves from our treaty obligation to see that the life and property of Spaniards and those Cubans who did not join in the revolution are protected by the new government. Perfunctory advice to that government will not meet the full measure of our obligation. Our work was only half done when Cuba was liberated from its oppressor. A nation which undertakes to put an end to bad government in a neighboring country must also see that just and good government follows. Nations have duties to perform as well as interests to guard and protect, a truth which it is encouraging to note is being better understood throughout the world now than ever before. From the high plane of duty alone, not less than by self interest, the United States is committed to the maintenance of good government in Cuba, and its policy must first of all be determined by this consideration. It cannot escape responsibility; it must meet it manfully.

The practical question as to how this end may be accomplished is not without its difficulties. Our responsibility for the government of the island and its people began with That the trust our military occupation. which we assumed has been wisely and justly administered to the present time can scarcely be questioned. We commenced our humane. policy in Cuba when we furnished its starving people with food, restored them to their peaceful occupations and protected them in. their individual rights. For two years and three months the people of Cuba have been more liberally, wisely and beneficently governed than ever before in their history, sensational newspaper criticisms to the contrary

notwithstanding. We have brought order out of chaos, tranquillity out of horror, happiness out of misery; we have stamped out pestilence, substituted education for ignorance, and grafted as rapidly as possible the spirit of American institutions upon an effete and corrupt civilization. We have done for Cuba what no nation on earth ever did for a conquered province.

During this period of military occupation and government we have constantly had one end only in view; namely, to afford the people of Cuba an opportunity to establish by themselves, and for themselves, an independent republic. It was impossible for them to do it without our guidance. Strange as it may seem, the fact that we have not attempted to dictate the features and provisions of their organic law is in some quarters criticised as a blunder on the part of General Wood. To have withdrawn from Cuba when Spain evacuated the island would have been shameful and disgraceful. We have therefore properly and wisely taken the steps necessary to enable the people to frame a constitution and establish a government thereunder. By the treaty of Paris, Spanish subjects were given twelve months in which to determine whether they were to retain or relinquish their allegiance to Spain. Until the end of that period it was impossible to determine who might rightly participate in the work of reconstruction. A census of the people was quite as necessary. Municipal elections, the Municipal elections, the establishment of municipal governments, and prescribing the right of suffrage were equally essential. All these steps, under the direction of the President, were taken, and then an election of delegates who should frame a constitution was ordered. The order for the holding of a constitutional convention very properly declared that the delegates in framing and adopting a constitution should, as a part thereof, provide for and agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba."

66

In no other way was it possible that future relations between the two countries could be

definitely agreed upon. That such agreement was necessary will not be questioned. Cuba was, and is to-day, a foreign power in the military occupation of the United States. It was not, is not yet, and will not be until its dependencies shall be properly recognized

capable of making a treaty with the United States. Unless, then, the relations hereafter to subsist between its future government and the United States are defined in its Constitution, or in an ordinance attached thereto, which legally becomes "a part thereof," the whole matter of determining these relations must not only remain in abeyance until a new government has been established and recognized, but we must surrender any rights to be heard as to what these relations shall be. other words, an agreement must now be had with the authorities framing the constitution, thus binding the future Cuba; or the United States, waiting until the independence of Cuba shall have been recognized, must take whatever Cuba is then willing to give by treaty, be it much or little, or be contented with nothing at all.

In

The convention met on the first Monday of last November and proceeded with the work of framing a constitution, which early in February had so far progressed that its character and general features were determined upon. There was in it no recognition of the United States, no expression of gratitude or even friendliness. As the convention neared the completion of its work it became apparent that a false pride on the part of a majority of its delegates was likely to induce them to ignore the requirement that they should as part of that constitution, by agreement with the government of the United States, provide for the relations to exist between Cuba and the United States. Great haste was manifested to complete the constitution so that it could be submitted to Congress before the close of its session without in any way considering the question of future relations. A majority of the delegates to the convention seemed to assume that nothing was to be done except to submit to Congress a constitution, ignoring the United States and any relations in future between the two countries, and that thereupon Congress would direct the withdrawal of our troops from the island, leaving all further stipulations to the Cubans themselves. To have acceded to this would have been fatal folly on the part of the United States.

A word here as to the constituency of the constitutional convention may not be inappropriate. Unfortunately the conservative element in Cuba is not largely represented in the convention. The most active, and, per

haps, therefore, the most influential delegates, represent rather the revolutionary and reactionary element, and apparently are more anxious to obtain control of the new government than to establish it upon a basis which will insure lasting peace and prosperity in the island. In this emergency, the Cuban delegates showing little or no disposition to enter into

any agreement or to formulate any statement of the relations which should exist between the two countries, it was felt to be the duty of Congress to advise the convention of conditions, a compliance with which our government deemed essential. Accordingly Congress, on the second day of March, by an amendment to the Army Appropriation bill, authorized the President to withdraw from the military occupation of Cuba

"so soon as a government shall have been established in said island under a constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba, substantially as follows:

I.

"That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

II.

"That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government shall be inadequate.

III.

"That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV.

"That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

V.

"That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein.

VI.

"That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

VII.

"That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII.

"That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States."

Unless it be conceded that we have no right whatever to indicate the character of the government to be established in Cuba, or the relations which shall exist between the new government thereof and the United States, nothing could be more fair and just than the foregoing statement of conditions on which the President is authorized to withdraw from the military occupation of the island. The conditions thus proposed by Congress are as manifestly in the interest of Cuba as of the United States. The keynote of these propositions is that Cuba shall be and remain independent under a stable republican government which the United States will assist in maintaining against foreign aggression or domestic disorder. Cuba needs this, because it will be practically powerless either to repel foreign aggression or to maintain peace and order at home if the turbulence of the past shall reappear.

The new government of Cuba will have neither an army nor a navy. There are something like six hundred millions of dollars of Spanish bonds outstanding, for which the revenues of Cuba were pledged at the time of their issue. These bonds are held largely