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in Germany and France. It is entirely prob- gress for intervention in Cuba, our governable that Cuba being left without any means ment in some way pledged itself to make no of defense, these governments on behalf of requirement or suggestion respecting the their citizens would demand and endeavor to establishment of a government by the people enforce their assumption.

Cuba's only guar

of Cuba. Such persons by some strange antee against this will be the fact that any misapprehension also insist that the clause nation attempting to compel it to pay this in- which has come to be known as the “Teller debtedness will understand that it has the resolution,” estopped the United States from United States to deal with. Between revolu- having anything to say as to the relations tionists and Spaniards and Cubans who were which should exist between us and the new loyal to Spain, there is little love. With no government; that although for three-quarters army to repress disorder, it is certainly within of a century conditions in Cuba had at varithe limit of reasonable probability that the ous times imperilled our peace, and had alrevolutionary and turbulent party may at ways been an object of deepest solicitude, we tempt the destruction or confiscation of Span- deliberately pledged our honor that from the ish and Cuban property which the new gov time we should drive out Spain we would ernment would be utterly powerless to prevent. surrender any right to say what the future We most certainly owe a duty to our own government of Cuba should be, and comcitizens in Cuba that they shall be protected mitted all the vast interests of the United in the enjoyment of their property and kept States in that island to the people of Cuba free from the dangers which attend revolu alone. The folly of such action on our part tionary uprisings. Indeed, any one who ought to be a sufficient answer to those who knows public sentiment in Cuba is aware that insist on such a construction. it is expected by Cuban people that if diffi To show, however, the utter fallacy of such culty, either foreign or domestic, shall arise, a contention, it is necessary only to inquire the United States will be called upon to meet what the so-called “Teller resolution” really

Even those who insist that nothing is, and to consider for a moment the circumshould be put into the constitution recognizing stances under which it was adopted. The our right to do so, say that the United States fourth clause of the resolution of intervention will do it as a matter of course. Their is as follows: strange attitude is that they will have a right to call the United States to their defense, but

“ That the United States hereby disclaims any

disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, will not agree in advance that we may assert

jurisdiction or control over said island, except that right.

for the pacification thereof, and asserts its deThe United States needs this mutual ar

termination, when that is accomplished, to leave rangement because, for its own defense, it the government and control of the island to its cannot permit any foreign power to dominate, people.” control or obtain a foothold in this hemisphere

It should be remembered that we were then or its adjacent territory, and cannot tolerate declaring war against Spain. We demanded such revolutions or disorders upon an island

in the second clause of the resolution so near our coast, as frequently occur in southern American republics ; more than all,

“that the government of Spain at once rebecause it stands pledged in honor to its own

linquish its authority and government in the iscitizens, to the citizens of Cuba, and to all

land of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval

forces from Cuba and Cuban waters." the world to maintain quiet and peace and good government in Cuba. In a word, Cuba That our motive for the war upon which needs self-government, peace, tranquillity and we were entering should not be misunderstood, prosperity. The United States asks for either by Cuba or the nations of the world, nothing more than this, but it recognizes its we thought it proper and necessary to deobligation and insists upon its right to see clare that we had no intention of acquiring that such results are to be permanently secured. the island of Cuba. It was an assertion

The justice, fairness and wisdom of the merely that we would not exercise the right conditions thus proposed do not seem to be of a conqueror and reduce the island to our questioned by any. A few persons only assert possession; that our motives were disinterested, that in the joint resolution passed by Con and that the war was a war for humanity,

undertaken to put an end to abhorrent condi meant the securing of conditions in the island tions near our shores, and not a war of con which would assure not only temporary but quest. No other construction can be justly permanent peace under a stable government placed upon the clause quoted. Our interven- by the people. By every consideration, then, tion was the assumption of a right, even at of our own interests, our own peace, as well the cost of war, to put an end to intolerable as our responsibility to the people of Cuba government in Cuba; it was as clearly the and the nations of the world, we have the assumption of a right to provide for a toler- right to insist that, in the establishment of a able government there in the future. That government there, conditions shall be assented we should assert in the same sentence our to, which will, so far as possible, secure a govright and duty to put an end to abhorrent ernment which we can indorse, and, if necesconditions in the island of Cuba, and also sary, defend. abandon our right to insist upon stability and Will it be contended for a moment that, if peace thereafter, is inconceiveable.

the Cuban convention should adopt a conWe did agree that when“ pacification” stitution which provided for a limited monshould be accomplished we would leave the archy, we should be under obligations to turn government and control of the island to its over the island to such a government ? And people, but it requires a great stretch of im if it be admitted that we should not, does it agination to say that “pacification ” meant not necessarily follow that we may exercise only peace with Spain, and that we were to our own judgment as to the circumstances withdraw from the island as soon as that was and conditions under which we will leave the accomplished. If that narrow meaning is the island to the control of the people of Cuba? correct one, we should have evacuated Cuba The whole question may be summarized in at the same time Spain did. If we rightfully a sentence. The United States of right may, remained there to secure the establishment of and must, insist that before it will withdraw a government by the people of Cuba, we cer from the military occupation of Cuba there tainly have a right to insist that that govern shall be a friendly government established ment shall be one which will result in there which will in case of necessity assist in permanent pacification. A clear light is the discharge of all international obligations thrown upon the meaning of the word and in protecting the life, liberty and property “pacification " when we recall the fact that of all its inhabitants. To require less would the resolution of intervention was the result be national folly and result in national disgrace. . of a message to Congress by the President of It is unfortunate, to say the least, that any the United States on the 11th of April, 1898, one should suppose that in requiring the rein which he said :

lations between the two countries to be thus “ I ask Congress to authorize and empower the

defined, we are in some sense interferring President to take measures to secure a full and

with the independence of Cuba. Assent to final termination of hostilities between the the propositions set forth can in no sense deGovernment of Spain and the people of Cuba, tract from or impair Cuban independence. An and to secure in the island the establishment of independent government is none the less ina stable government, capable of observing its dependent because it enters into agreements international obligations, insuring peace and by way of treaty, or by way of an ordinance tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well attached to its constitution, with another govas our own, and to use the military and naval

ernment. We make treaties with forces of the United States as may be necessary

many

nations in which we assume obligations and for these purposes.”

concede rights, but we are none the less indeNo one who reads the clause and considers pendent, and Cuba will not be less, but more the circumstances under which it was adopted, surely independent than it could otherwise can for a moment with reason claim that its be, when it shall assent to terms by which its “pacification" meant only turning Spain out independence will be firmly secured. Selfof the Island. If so, we should have left the government without the benefits naturally regovernment of the island then to the insur- sulting therefrom, would be of little value. gents, a step which every right-minded person Cuba needs a real not a paper independence, will say would have been a palpable violation and this the United States alone can asof duty and honor. Manifestly pacification

sure her.

It is not easy to understand the reasoning Cuban soldiers; we have assumed the payof those who assert that we propose to limit ment of all damages which our citizens susor detract from the independence of Cuba, tained during the revolution, and we ask nor is it easy to understand the sensitiveness nothing in return but that there shall be an which seems to prevail among some of the independent government established and permembers of the constitutional convention on manently maintained in Cuba, a government this subject. The overtures of the United which shall insure the continued pacification States are friendly overtures. President of that island. Surely we may ask the Cuban McKinley in his recent inaugural message, people if this generous exhibition of our with his rare faculty for expressing a whole friendship is not a guarantee that we desire to argument in a single sentence, accurately be their friends in the future. stated the situation : “With our neighbors What the immediate action of the Cubans we must remain close friends."

will be is at the time that this is writIt is sad to reflect that sometimes peoples ten uncertain, but it is scarcely conceivas well as men are inclined to turn their backs able that in the end the people of Cuba will upon their best and truest friends. We have reject the liberal and friendly proposals of the shown our friendship for Cuba in a most United States. We can wait. We shall wait, generous way. The lives of our brave

young

as we have done, in a spirit of friendship, in men have been freely sacrificed, an immense full confidence that eventually the better amount of treasure has been expended; we sentiment of the island will assert itself, and have relieved the starving reconcentrados; we the world will see not only a free Cuba, but a have paid three millions of money to the peaceful and prosperous Cuba.

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE CHARACTER OF THE CHICAGO BANKER WHO HAS MADE
SOUND MONEY MORE SOUND - THE AVERTING OF A FINANCIAL
PANIC — NOT A STRICT PARTY MAN, BUT LOYAL TO THE ADMINIS-
TRATION — ADVISER IN MORE THAN MERELY FINANCIAL MATTERS

A

PANIC was threatened in Wall Street dence and inquired as to the situation. The on December 18, 1899. The Secre answer was that the situation was panicky.

tary of the Treasury saw, about three He was also informed that the clearing-house o'clock in the afternoon, that matters had committee had about decided to issue certifireached a crisis. He had not been in com cates to supply currency. munication with Wall Street, nor had Wall The Secretary realized better than the Street appealed to him. But he had heard bankers in New York that a panic would from some of the largest manufacturers that follow such an action. He went to see the they were crowded with orders, and were President. He told him that he could avert unable to get money to tide over the interval disaster by a single move which would cost between production and collections. The the government nothing. He proposed to stringency in the money market was caused announce next morning that internal revenue by the annual demand for currency to move collections might all be deposited in the desigthe crops, aggravated by the action of nated banks throughout the country instead the banks during the preceding twelve of being sent directly to Washington. These months in overloaning upon industrial securi- deposits would amount to at least $30,000,000 ties.

in a very few days. The Secretary telephoned from Washington The President gave his consent and support. to New York to men in whom he had confi The Secretary called together the newspaper

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correspondents, and the next morning every increased flexibility of the currency are the paper in the land made the announcement. ambitions of the Secretary. He would have The effects justified Mr. Gage's predictions. sound money made more sound by requiring The New York clearing house found it the Treasury to give gold on demand for all unnecessary to issue certificates. More than silver money presented for exchange. He three hundred banks in thirty-seven states would make the silver dollar a metallic greenreceived greatly increased deposits. What back differing from the paper article only in might have been a repetition of the panic of its intrinsic material value. He would pro1893 was thus avoided by the cool head and vide further for the final retirement of all good judgment of the Secretary. Mr. Gage silver from circulation except for subsidiary believes that panics can be almost indefi- coins. The Secretary takes a modest pride in nitely deferred by proper financial legislation. refunding a large part of the national debt at

Secretary Gage is the originator of the a lower rate of interest. Through his efforts movement for civic reform which started in $446,000,000 in three, four, and five per cent Chicago under his inspiration and is now a bonds were converted into bonds bearing a national influence. He wrote the platform of

He wrote the platform of lower rate of interest. The net saving to the the Economic Conferences, a unique feature government in interest alone upon this transof Chicago's social organization, where Re action was $11,000,000. To increase the publican and Democrat, rich and poor, Con- flexibility of the currency he would retire servative and Anarchist, meet for debate and government notes from circulation and expand exchange facts and theories. It is told of the power of banks of issue. In the present the first meeting of this kind organized by system of loans and credits, he sees practically Mr. Gage that Tom Morgan, a labor agitator, all that is necessary; but his desire now is to was one of the principal speakers. After

After increase the possibilities of securing small Mr. Gage had delivered a speech, Morgan cash loans. His theory is that the man who arose and said : “Mr. Gage has spoken. He wishes to borrow $10,000 by checking it is six feet tall, a banker, well clothed and well from the bank, the bank thus avoiding the fed. You will now hear from little Tommy necessity of hoarding more than its 25 per Morgan, a runt, poorly clothed, and a factory cent legal reserve, should have no advantage hand since he was seven years old.” It is over the man who would borrow $10,000 in said that Mr. Gage never so thoroughly cash for immediate distribution. To accomenjoyed these meetings as when he succeeded plish this he would substitute a system of in getting the real representatives of all bank notes issued with assets as security, for classes of people upon their feet, perhaps the present system where all notes issued are even to antagonize his plans.

secured by government bonds. In short, he There is one thing which must always be would allow a banker to issue notes to the borne in mind in estimating a Secretary of limit of his credit. To provide against any the Treasury. The position is necessarily possible loss on these notes by the public, the one of comparative obscurity. His depart- Secretary is in favor of creating a general ment never comes into the public eye unless guarantee fund raised from taxation of all it has done something to disturb conditions. bank-note issues, out of which fund the notes One of the most satisfactory features of his of bankrupt concerns would be made good. administration to the Secretary himself is the In eighteen months of Mr. Gage's adminisfact that not once during that time has his tration, ending January 1, 1900, the most trydepartment been instrumental in exciting the ing period experienced by the Treasury since market of which Mr. Gage, though not a the Civil War, the Treasury receipts were over speculator, is a close student and a safe guide $1,100,000,000. The Secretary points with as to immediate future influences.

pride to the fact that no accumulation of the

people's money has been allowed, notwithTHE SECRETARY'S PLANS

standing this inflow. He considers that the The firmer establishment of the gold evils of accumulation may be greater than standard, a readjustment of the nation's debt the evils of distribution — both must be intelupon a basis of lower interest rates, and an ligent to be beneficial.

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