be implied to restrain the effect of the judgment appealed from so as to preserve the subject of litigation for disposi tion according to the final judgment of the appellate court. The object of the appeal is not to give that tribunal of last resort merely an opportunity to make a vain display of its power and wisdom. The appeal in this case was given that the parties might have their rights to the property in question determined, and that it might be given to the one entitled to it as finally decided. If, when that decision shall be made, the property shall be beyond the effect of the decree and the process of the court, and the party to whom it may be adjudged does not get it, the purpose of the appeal will have been defeated, and the ends of justice will not have been reached. The motion to dissolve the injunction is denied. BOREMAN, J., and HENDERSON, J., concurred. UNITED STATES, RESPONDENT, 1. HORACE S. ELDREDGE AND ANOTHER, APPELLANTS. FORFEITURE OF BAIL UNLAWFUL COHABITATION. -Where two complaints for unlawful cohabitation were filed before a commissioner of the supreme court on the same day, and two bonds given by defendant to appear to answer the complaints, and the accused failed to appear to answer either charge, it is no defense for the sureties when sued to show that defendant could have been convicted upon but one of the charges, or that judgment has been already obtained upon one of the bonds. Mr. W. H. Dickson and Mr. C. S. Varian, for respond ent. Mr. Le Grand Young, for appellants. APPEAL from a judgment of the district court of the third district and from an order refusing a new trial. The opinion states the facts. BOREMAN, J.: The principal facts of the case are the same as in case No. 6599, heretofore decided at the last January term, ante p. 161, except as to the time of the alleged unlawful cohabitation, and except that in this case two prosecutions, instead of one, are pleaded. The two prosecutions thus pleaded in defense of this action are the indictment of the twenty-fourth of March, 1885, and the prosecution in which the undertaking sued on in case No. 6599 was given. Both of those cases, as well as the present one, were for unlawful cohabitation. It is contended that unlawful cohabitation is one continuous offense, and that it cannot be divided into two or more offenses, and that the present prosecution is not the one on which the accused could have been held. It will be proper for us, therefore, first to examine whether the prosecution in which the undertaking herein sued on was given, could or could not have been the proper one. The supreme court of the United States has lately decided, in the case of Ex parte Snow, 120 U. S., 274, that unlawful cohabitation is a continuous offense, yet that an indictment for that crime would not preclude another prosecution for the same offense committed at a time subsequent to the finding of such indictment. The cohabitation in the present case is alleged to have been committed at a time subsequent to the indictment of the twenty-fourth of March, 1885, and, as a consequence, that indictment would be no bar to the prosecution in which the undertaking herein sued on was given, and cannot be pleaded as a defense in this action. With the indictment of the twenty-fourth of March, 1885, eliminated from the case before us, there remains for our consideration the question whether the other prosecution, the one on which the undertaking sued on in case No. 6599 was given, is a bar to the present action. The complaint for the arrest of the accused in that case, and the complaint in the present one, were filed before the commissioner on the same day; but the one represented by case No. 6599 was prior in time. The warrants were issued on the same day; the accused was brought before the commissioner on the same day on both warrants; and the undertakings in both cases were on the same day. The appellants, the sureties on the undertaking herein sued on, claim that if they had surrrendered the accused, or if he had appeared at the time appointed, he would have been entitled to his immediate discharge from custody; that since the institution of this action, the supreme court of the United States having decided that there could be but one prosecution for this offense, therefore the holding of the accused on the charge in this case was unlawful and void, and hence that the holding of the sureties on the undertaking is unlawful and void. The supreme court of the United States did not decide that there could be but one prosecution instituted, nor could that idea have been intended to be conveyed. It would have been contrary to the settled doctrine. It is not infrequent that a second or even a third indictment is found for the same offense; but on one alone is the party tried, and the others are dis |