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When the assignor of a claim is a party plaintiff he need not be made a defendant. Singleton v. O'Blenis, 125 Ind. 153.

The defendant must be the owner of a claim before notice of the assignment to the plaintiff to warrant the allowance of such claim as a set-off. Goldthwait v. Bradford, 36 Ind. 149.

If an account is not transferred by a written endorsement the assignor must be made a party or the complaint will be bad. Watson v. Conwell, 3 App. 518.

278. (277.) New party, how brought in by defendant.-99. When it is necessary for the defendant to bring a new party before the court, he may state the matter relating thereto in his answer, and demand relief; and thereupon a summons shall issue and other proceedings be had against him as if such matter had been exhibited in the original complaint.

The complaint of one defendant against a co-defendant, that he is surety for the latter, is not an answer or cross-complaint, but is a new proceeding, which can not be tried upon the plaintiff's summons. Joyce v. Whitney, 57 Ind. 550; State, ex rel., v. Ennis, 74 Ind. 17.

If the matters set up in the cross-complaint are apparent on the face of the original complaint, and the defendant has been served with process, no new summons need issue. Pattison v. Vaughan, 40 Ind. 253; Bevier v. Kahn, 111 Ind. 200.

When matters are not apparent on the face of the original complaint process should issue. Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458; Swift v. Brumfield, 76 Ind. 472.

The new party must be a necessary one, and the answer must state the facts and pray for relief. Conklin v. Bowman, 11 Ind. 254.

ARTICLE 3.-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

SEC.

279. What causes of action joined.

280. Actions for title papers--Reforma

tion, etc.

SEC.

281. Joinder in matters of contract-Separate trials.

[1881 S., p. 240. In force September 19, 1881.]

279. (278.) What causes of action joined.-106. The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when they are included in either of the following classes:

First. Money demands on contract.

Money demands on contract means any action arising out of contract which seeks the recovery of money. Roberts v. Nodwift, 8 Ind. 339.

See section 1309, clause 11.

Second. Injuries to property.

Third. Injuries to person or character.

Fourth. Claims to recover the possession of personal property, with or without damages for the withholding thereof, and for injuries to the property withheld.

Claims for possession and conversion of property may be joined. Baals v. Stewart, 109 Ind. 371.

Fifth. Claims to recover the possession of real property, with or without damages, rents, and profits for the withholding thereof, and for waste or damage done to the land; to make partition of and to determine and quiet the title to real property.

Actions for partition and to quiet title may be joined. Schissel v.

139.

Dickson, 129 Ind.

Sixth. Claims to enforce the specific performance of contracts, and to avoid contracts for fraud or mistakes.

In an action to correct a mistake in a deed, title to the land may be quieted. Hunter v. McCoy, 14 Ind. 528.

Seventh. Claims to foreclose mortgages; to enforce or discharge specific liens; to recover personal judgment upon the debt secured by such mortgage or lien; to subject to sale real property upon demands against decedents' estates, when such property has passed to heirs, devisees, or their assigns; to marshal assets; and to substitute one person to the rights of another; and all other causes of action arising out of a contract or a duty, and not falling within either of the foregoing classes. But causes of action so joined must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial, and must be separately stated and numbered.

An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may be joined with a suit to recover a debt. Frank v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106; Bowen v. State, ex rel., 121 Ind. 235.

Causes of action that can not be joined in a complaint can not be joined in a counterclaim. Woodruff v. Garner, 27 Ind. 4.

A misjoinder of actions should be objected to by demurrer. Bougher v. Scobey, 16 Ind. 151; Fritz v. Fritz, 23 Ind. 388; Langsdale v. Woollen, 120 Ind. 16.

280. (279.) Actions for title papers-Reformation, etc.-107. When the plaintiff desires to recover the possession of title papers or other instruments of writing, or correct any mistakes therein, a separate action may be brought therefor; or the possession of such title papers or other instruments of writing may be recovered, or mistakes corrected in any other action, when such recovery or correction would be essential to a complete remedy.

A mortgage may be reformed and foreclosed in the same suit. Miller v. Kolb, 47 Ind. 220.

A deed may be reformed and title quieted in the same action. Hunter v. McCoy, 14 Ind. 528; Smith v. Kyler, 74 Ind. 575.

A note may be reformed and enforced in the same cause. Conger v. Parker, 29 Ind. 380; Rigsbee v. Trees, 21 Ind. 227.

Contracts may be reformed and enforced in the same action. Monroe v. Skelton, 36 Ind. 302.

281. (280.) Joinder in matters of contract-Separate trials.-108. When the action arises out of contract, the plaintiff may join such other matters in his complaint as may be necessary for a complete remedy and a speedy satisfaction of his judgment, although such other matters fall within some other one or more of the foregoing classes. When several causes of action are united, belonging to any of the foregoing classes, the court may order separate trials, for the furtherance of justice.

The same proceeding may include the collection of a debt and the setting aside of a

fraudulent conveyance. Love v. Mikals, 11 Ind. 227; Frank v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8; Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106; Bowen v. State, ex rel., 121 Ind. 235.

Judgment upon a claim against the husband may be had in the same case with decree, to avoid a fraudulent conveyance to the wife. Frank v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8.

An action by several creditors to recover their debts and to enjoin the transfer of property will lie. Field v. Holzman, 93 Ind. 205.

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[1881 S., p. 240. In force September 19, 1881.]

282. (281.) Where actions survive-Representatives.-5. In all cases where actions survive, they may be commenced by or against the representatives of the deceased to whom the interest in the subjectmatter of the action has passed.

283. (282.) What actions die-Exception.-6. A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies with the person of either party, except in cases in which an action is given for an injury causing the death of any person, and actions for seduction, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.

See section 7085, vol. 3.

An action for injury to the person abates with the death of the plaintiff. Its pendency can not be pleaded to bar an action for the death of such person. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143.

A cause of action in favor of a parent for seduction survives. Gimbel v. Smidth, 7 Ind. 627.

A right of action for bastardy survives the death of the defendant. State, ex rel., v. Williams, 8 Ind. 191.

Where the death of a married woman was caused by malpractice of a physician, it was held that a cause of action survived to her husband and administrator. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595.

The personal representatives of a deceased can only recover for an injury causing his death when he might have recovered for such injury if he was alive. Lofton v. Vogles, 17 Ind. 105.

If the plaintiff in a suit for any injury that dies with the person dies before final judgment, his administrator can not continue the action. Stout v. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 41 Ind. 149.

An action for causing the death of a person does not survive against the personal representatives of the wrong-doer. Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176.

If a parent sues for the death of a child and dies pending suit, his personal representatives may continue the action. Penn. Co. v. Davis, 4 App. 51.

284. (283.) All other actions survive-Exception.-7. All other causes of action survive, and may be brought by or against the representatives of the deceased party, except actions for promises to marry. An action survives against the personal representatives of a deceased surety. MeCoy v. Payne, 68 Ind. 327; Hudelson v. Armstrong, 70 Ind. 99.

The penalty imposed by statute for giving a false list of taxables survives against the personal representative of the tax-payer. Davis v. State, ex rel., 119 Ind. 555.

285. (284.) Action for death of another-Limitation.-8. When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another,

the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. The action must be commenced within two years. The damages can not exceed ten thousand dollars, and must inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow and children, if any, or next of kin, to be distributed in the same manner as personal property of the deceased.

See section 5310.

The action for damages for death, under this section, is wholly statutory, and can not be joined with one for another cause. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chester, 57 Ind. 297.

The father may, under this section, maintain an action for damages for the death of a minor child, but section 560 forbids a new trial for "smallness of damages" assessed. Gann v. Worman, 69 Ind. 458. See Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328.

Compensatory damages in such cases include compensation for pain and suffering, as well as for pecuniary expenditures of the injured party. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 317.

The names, and relationship to the deceased, of the persons entitled to receive the damages, should be stated in the complaint. Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133; Stewart v. Terre Haute, etc., R. R. Co., 103 Ind. 44.

The action must be commenced within two years after the death and the complaint should show that the action is not barred. Hanna v. Jeffersonville R. R. Co., 32 Ind.

113.

A foreign administrator may sue in this state to recover for the death of his decedent in this state. Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48. Where the relation of parent and child does not exist the action must be brought by the personal representative, regardless of the age of the deceased. Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328.

In an action by a parent for the death of a child the damages are confined to the pecuniary injury sustained. Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252.

A defendent is not a competent witness generally, in his own behalf, in actions to recover for the death of a person. Hudson v. Houser, 123 Ind. 309.

The action can not be maintained against the personal representatives of the wrongdoer. Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176.

If the death of a minor is wrongfully caused his administrator can not sue therefor while the minor has a living parent, unless such minor had been emancipated. Berry *. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 128 Ind. 484.

See Hecht v. Ohio, etc., R. W. Co., 132 Ind. 507.

SEC.

ARTICLE 5.-SPECIAL CAUSES OF ACTION.

286. Charges of incest, etc., how action-
able.

287. Waste-forfeiture and eviction.
288. Waste or trespass-suit by remain-
der-man.

SEC.

289. Suit against co-tenant.

290. Nuisance.

291. Who may sue.
292. Nuisance-remedy.

[1881 S., p. 240. In force September 19, 1881.]

286. (285.) Charges of incest, etc., how actionable.-850. Every charge of incest, fornication, adultery, or whoredom, falsely made by any person against a female; also, words falsely spoken of any person, charging such person with incest, or the infamous crime against

nature, either with mankind or the brute creation,-shall be actionable in the same manner as in the case of slanderous words charging a crime, the commission of which would subject the offender to death or other degrading penalties.

For construction, see Blickenstaff v. Perrin, 27 Ind. 527; Schurick v. Kollman, 50 Ind. 336; Acker v. McCullough, 50 Ind. 447; Emerson v. Marvel, 55 Ind. 265; Wilson v. Barnett, 45 Ind. 163.

What is a charge of bestiality? Harper v. Delp, 3 Ind. 225; Ausman v. Veal, 10 Ind. 355.

The mere charge of adultery or fornication against a man is not actionable. Lumpkins v. Justice, 1 Ind. 557.

287. (286.) Waste-Forfeiture and eviction.-706. Wrongs heretofore remediable by action of waste shall be subjects of action, as other wrongs in which there may be judgment for damages, forfeiture of the estate of the party offending, and eviction from the premises. Judgment of forfeiture and eviction shall only be given in favor of the person entitled to the reversion against the tenant in possession when the injury to the estate in reversion shall be adjudged in the action to be equal to the value of the tenant's estate or unexpired term, or to have been done in malice.

Before possession can be recovered during the continuance of a term on the account of waste, it must be proven that the injury equals the value of the unexpired term, or that it was done in malice. Bollenbacker v. Fritts, 98 Ind. 50.

As to what amounts to waste, see Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Wheeler v. Meshing-go-me-sia, 30 Ind. 402; Modlin v. Kennedy, 53 Ind. 267; Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind. 71; Robertson v. Meadors, 73 Ind. 43.

Tenants can only be deprived of their rights in growing crops when there is a judgment of forfeiture for waste. Sullivan v. O'Hara, 1 App. 259.

288. (287.) Waste or trespass-Suit by remainder-man.-707. A person seized of an estate in remainder or reversion may maintain an action for waste or trespass, for injury to the inheritance, notwithstanding an intervening estate for life or years.

Owners in fee may enjoin tenants for life from cutting and removing valuable growing timber, to the irreparable injury of the fee-simple. Robertson v. Meadors, 73 Ind. 43. Tenants for life who commit actionable waste are liable to all of the remainder-men. Stout v. Dunning, 72 Ind. 343. See Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220.

Claims for waste can not be settled in an action for partition. Stout v. Dunning, 72 Ind. 343.

Persons having a mere expectancy can not maintain an action for waste. Gwaltney v. Gwaltney, 119 Ind. 144.

A mortgagee may enjoin the commission of waste when his security will be endangered. Knarr v. Conaway, 42 Ind. 260.

A remainder-man of personal property may sue to protect his interest. Goudie v. Johnston, 109 Ind. 427.

A guardian can not maintain an action for waste in his own name, but the suit should be in the name of the ward. Wilson v. Galey, 103 Ind. 257.

289. (288.) Suit against co-tenant.-708. A joint tenant, or ten

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